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ABSTRACT
Insecure Hegemony: The Cultural Construction of ‘Righteous Retaliation’ in the Hunt for Osama
bin Laden
by
Marisa Tramontano
Advisor: Barbara Katz Rothman
This study examines the American “authorized discourse” about the hunt for and killing of alQaeda leader Osama bin Laden to better understand it as an episode in American cultural
hegemony maintenance. Through a structural hermeneutic analysis of presidential speeches and
widely-circulated national strategy documents, high distribution news coverage, and
entertainment media, alongside one-on-one interviews and focus groups, I illuminate the
symbolic mechanics by which the death of Osama bin Laden was constructed as righteous and
legitimate retaliatory violence in response to the unprompted, offensive violence of the 9/11
attacks.
Drawing on an array of theoretical approaches including classical sociologists Karl Marx, Max
Weber, Emile Durkheim, Marxist thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci and Edward Sa’id, strong
program cultural sociologists such as Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith, as well as the work of
critical race and feminist scholars, I retell the story and analyze its plot and characters, attending
especially to the gendered and racialized cultural underpinnings, placing it historically and
within the media landscape.
This research demonstrates that the dominant narrative presents bin Laden’s death as resolution
of a melodramatic plot where moral heroes, in the name of innocent victims, eliminated the evil
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villain. This case offers one example of the unrelenting cultural work undertaken by hegemonic
agents to reconcile America’s self-professed commitment to democracy, freedom, and equality,
with the legacies of genocide, settler colonialism, slavery, and empire. The dissertation
concludes with ideas for future research tying the findings and observations about this case to
special forces operations more broadly, mass shootings and gun fundamentalism, and mass
detentions and deportations.
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CHAPTER 1
HEGEMONY MAINTENANCE AND RIGHTEOUS RETALIATION
“…contemporary forms of common sense are shot through with the debris and traces of
previous, more developed ideological systems; and their reference point is to what passes,
without exception, as the wisdom of our particular age and society, overcast with the glow of
traditionalism. It is precisely its ‘spontaneous’ quality, its transparency, its ‘naturalness,’ its
refusal to be made to examine the premises on which it is founded, its resistance to change or to
correction, its effect of instant recognition, and the closed circle in which it moves which makes
common sense, at one and the same time, ‘spontaneous,’ ideological and unconscious. You
cannot learn, through common sense, how things are: you can only discover where they fit into
the existing scheme of things.”
-Stuart Hall (1977:325), “Culture, Media, and the Ideology Effect”
“…following the 9/11 attacks there was a cultural and discursive burgeoning followed by a
rapid sedimentation of the core narratives, metaphors, and discourses surrounding the terrorist
threat across society. This can be seen in the tens of thousands of novels, films, television shows,
comic books, video games, plays, websites, blogs, jokes, cartoons, artistic exhibitions, poetry,
popular songs, children’s books, and other texts that portrayed and reiterated scenarios of
fanatical terrorists attacking Western cities with weapons of mass destruction or otherwise
threatening massive destruction and loss of innocent life.”
-Richard Jackson (2013:271), “The Politics of Terrorism Fears”
US President Barack Obama announced to the world on May 1, 2011 that the United States had
killed al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. While he did specify in his opening remarks that “The
United States…conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden,” (Obama 2011, emphasis
added) all subsequent references to “killing” refer to al Qaeda’s actions while further mentions of
bin Laden’s death describe it repeatedly as “justice.” Obama characterizes the killing of bin
Laden as righteous retaliation for the attacks of September 11, 2001: defensive, proportionate,
and evidence of American moral superiority.
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The purpose of this dissertation is to illuminate the symbolic mechanics by which the death of
Osama bin Laden was constructed as righteous and legitimate retaliatory violence in response to
unacceptable and immoral offensive violence. How was the story told? How did events unfold,
in what order? Who are the characters? What kinds of symbols and norms are drawn upon in the
telling of the story? Upon exploring answers to these questions, I argue the implications go far
beyond the justification of particular policies, but rather, they reveal the (re)normalization of
militarized, white, Western hegemonic masculinity’s monopoly over the legitimate use of
violence (cf Faludi 2007 on the immediate wake of 9/11; Light 2017 on lethal self-defense in the
US context), demonstrating that many advances in terms of gender and racial justice in the
United States are illusory.1 I argue, more specifically, that the dominant narrative about the raid
on Osama bin Laden’s compound constructs righteous retaliation for the cultural trauma
(Alexander et al. 2004a) of the attacks of September 11, 2001 (see Smelser 2004 for a
preliminary analysis). It presents bin Laden’s death as resolution of a melodramatic plot, where
moral heroes, in the name of innocent victims, eliminated the evil villain. Moreover, use of
traditional gender norms and historical manifestations of racialized characters simultaneously
make plots and characters seem more familiar. Their repeated use influences culture more
broadly, in ways that, in turn, further validate state actions. In so doing, I unpack the cultural
conditions that allow bin Laden to appear as a madman, revealing how this episode fits into a
longer story of American empire.

1

Throughout this dissertation I assert that particular constructions of masculinity – clusters of thoughts, feelings,
norms, and practices – have coercive power over individuals in ways that discursively “monopolize” legitimacy. The
gender regime, much like institutional racism, is not a strategic player in and of itself, but its capacity to constrain,
enable, and legitimate individual players’ behavior within institutions allows the norms to hold cultural primacy
within the narration of violence as justifiable – often invisibly, both to others and to the players themselves.
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The term “violence” is notoriously slippery, difficult in terms of both definition and application.
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2008:1) suggest, “violence can never be understood solely in
terms of its physicality – force, assault, or the infliction of pain alone.” As a point of departure
then, meanings of violence are not inherent, but socially constructed (Galtung 1990). Physical
violence is force that hurts, damages, or kills. Firearms, for example, propel bullets at sufficient
velocity to tear through soft objects such as flesh, but there is no intrinsic morality or immorality
in the use of force. There is a sociocultural process to define the violence: who fired the gun?
Whom did they shoot? What were the shooter’s intentions and motivations? Was it justified? The
answers to these questions depend on cultural symbols, norms, values, and history, through
which individuals make sense of the world. They also depend on dynamics of power and
entrenchment of one narration across social institutions. 9/11 is overwhelmingly described in
American state, media, educational, and otherwise public discourse as an unprompted, senseless
act of heinous violence while narrations of legacies of slavery often lacked such a
characterization. Bin Laden is almost always described as an evil, murderous mastermind,
whereas even the most violent slaveholding plantation owners were not. Killing bin Laden in
response to 9/11 is discursively justified as righteous retaliation, while slave revolts were not.
While these repetitious characterizations sometimes appear objective, obvious and/or “natural”
to individuals, considerable work by state agents, news media, and producers of popular culture
construct this understanding of the violence that occurred that September morning, as well as
what constituted appropriate responses.

To better understand this specific case, I argue the narration of 9/11 and the death of bin Laden
are part of a cultural hegemony maintenance project (Gramsci 2010; Hall 1977; Nayak and
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Suchland 2006; Sa’id 1979). Combining Marxist theories of culture and ideology with Weber’s
([1919] 1958) differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate forms of violence, Habermas’s
(1975) examination of state legitimation work in the public sphere to maintain authority, and
Durkheimian-inspired cultural sociological analyses of how states and other cultural agents do
this work (e.g. Smith 2005), I unpack the characters, plots, meaning structures and cultural logics
of the “authorized discourse” (Bourdieu 1993) about the hunt for Osama bin Laden. I treat
George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s speeches, relevant government strategy documents and
reports, the most widely circulated print news, the most broadly viewed broadcast news, popular
books, and major Hollywood films, television documentaries and feature films about bin Laden
as the authorized discourse: a more or less coherent, dominant narrative about who bin Laden
was, what he wanted, what he did, why, how he died, and how these meanings fit into hegemonic
American culture. While one fairly stable and consistent version of events was presented by the
American government, news media, and the entertainment industry, crucially, according to
Bourdieu (1993), while there is a contentious symbolic struggle over what constitutes the
authorized discourse, generally, it is produced by “authorized representatives” – social agents
who are entrusted with authority and whose words and actions are therefore loaded with
“accumulated symbolic power” of the group they represent. The authorized discourse is neither
singular nor unified. Different groups, with various types of social authority, work to sustain
their specific sets of economic, political, and symbolic interests. Sometimes these interests
overlap and at other times they contradict. Therefore, for example, the news media is part of the
authorized discourse both in times it supports and critiques state actions. While there are
countless discursive analyses of the “war on terror” that attend to the contradictions within the
authorized discourse, this analysis of data about bin Laden produced and published after the
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2011 raid tells a more monolithic story with more synergy among the component parts of the
authorized discourse.

In some ways, there is nothing remotely new about the cultural construction of bin Laden’s death
as righteous retaliation for 9/11. He is part of a long line of threatening villains, the response to
his actions deeply embedded in the history of American violence (e.g. Rogin 1988). As Light
(2017:2) suggests, “Our textbooks and memorials celebrate armed defiance in the face of
overwhelming odds, of resisting the urge to flee in the face of fear. From the American
Revolution to the Alamo to Iwo Jima, our nation’s favorite stories of the past venerate
militaristic heroism and bold defiance over appeasement and retreat.” Bin Laden was hunted for
years, killed by a group of highly trained, heroically masculine warrior heroes avenging the
feminized homeland after violation, offering another story to add to Light’s list of American
victories.

However, there is something new about the story and its characters as well. Narrations of the
Navy SEAL raid on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan exemplify the genre of
“classic Americana,” which “accentuates robust stereotypes of the heroic and the virtuous, where
principled, if sometimes maverick, characters struggle against the odds in battles of obvious
moral polarity, allowing ‘good’ to eventually prevail over evil” (Jones and Smith 2015:3). 2
Classic Americana is a particular type of melodramatic narrative. These classic depictions
console suffering victims and justify violence with clear moral binaries and familiar masculine

2

Another difference from previous American hero narratives, explicated further in the substantive chapters, is the
nature of the hero as character. The hero narrative of the bin Laden raid centers heavily trained, armed experts while
hero narratives from Manifest Destiny to World War II to the first responders in the immediate wake of the 9/11
attacks were normal men and women who proved themselves as heroes.
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heroic war stories. At the same time, these classic and familiar stories ignore important changes
in American culture over time, which have lead to audience preferences for “Dark Americana.”
Dark Americana, Jones and Smith (2015:3) argue, “recognizes a world of moral ambiguity and
emotional complexity…Dramatic tension comes not with high tempo action sequences resulting
in the traditional, predictable denouement – the triumph of the good guys – but from character
development, interconnected storylines, and the struggles the characters have with the dilemmas
imposed by their social imprisonment.”

Advances in gender and racial equality, as well as increasing cultural preferences for Dark
Americana, produce two concurrent changes pertinent to the media landscape. First, some
audiences have tired of white male heroes and hope to see an expansion in heroic cultural
representations. Second, there has been a marked rise of insecurity as a definitive feature of
white hegemonic masculinity as its discursive grip on monopolies of rights, power, and access to
resources loosens, necessitating new kinds of justifications for its continued supremacy. In other
words, in the dominant narrative of the death of Osama bin Laden we see justifications for
reassertions of supremacy through maneuvers to maintain traditional cultural codes that justify
war and violence in the face of blurring of gender and racial binaries in contemporary American
culture (cf Nayak 2006). I do not assert a direct causal relationship between representations of
9/11 and increased insecurity in white hegemonic masculinity as cultural construct, but one
needs to look no further than analyses of “Trump’s America” to see these cultural codes come to
the fore. As model-in-chief, US President Donald J. Trump’s allusions to the size and power of
his “button” compared to North Korean leader Kim Jung-Un’s, his threats to beat up former US
Vice President Joe Biden, his rhetoric and physical violence against women, and his explicit

6

support of white nationalists and men’s rights groups make misogyny and racism that was
becoming increasingly implicit, explicit, once again.

In what follows I provide a summary of the authorized discourse’s narrative of the “hunt” for bin
Laden. Next, I layout my overarching theoretical framework and explicate specific concepts
from critical race and gender studies relevant to my analysis, and detail scholarship on cultural
trauma, melodramatic genre, character analysis, and story formulas. I conclude by setting up my
approach to using “the hunt” as an analytical device to better understand the plot and characters.
I conclude with a map of the subsequent chapters, the first of which is dedicated to a detailed
description of the data and methods.

This dissertation, vis-à-vis its interdisciplinary theoretical framework and robust application of
structural hermeneutic analysis, brings together diverse subfields of sociology to understand the
role of narrative, character, and gendered and racialized modes of discourse in the justification of
state-sanctioned violence. Further, it employs a bounded case study, which increases specificity
that is lacking in research of the amorphous “threat of terrorism.” Zeroing in on bin Laden as the
personification of terrorist threat highlights the gendered and racialized attributes of an
individual, pinpoints the star of a narrative that dictated policy for 10 years (across two
presidents and three cabinets and administrations), and works with a narrative that
has concluded, making it accessible for sociological research methods. I set out to build a
replicable theoretical framework and methodology to produce rigorous scholarship and lay the
groundwork for future research. Finally, my project addresses urgent topical questions with
practical implications. Unmasking the familiar story architectures and recurring character types
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and bringing gendered and racialized language to the attention of content producers, participants
in this study, and readers has the potential to create change in individuals who are complicit in
and/or internalize the logics of extreme security-seeking behavior at the expense of basic human
rights and domestic and international law. Supporting and celebrating the execution of Osama
bin Laden on sovereign Pakistani land, much like submitting to often-invasive screenings in
airports, is best understood as Gramscian “common sense.” To that end, this dissertation
reminds, often unrelenting in its critique, that consent is manufactured (Herman and Chomsky
1988), that “common sense” is adaptable, constantly monitored and tweaked by the hegemony’s
organizing intellectuals in the government, news and entertainment media to fit the most
embedded and resonant cultural logics.
Wanted Dead or Alive
Osama bin Laden first grabbed American attention in the late 1990s. He issued a declaration of
war on the United States in an Arabic-language, London-based newspaper in 1996, he granted
interviews to CNN and ABC in 1997, and he ordered the 1998 bombings of the American
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. President Bill Clinton was harshly
criticized for a botched attempt at retaliation following the embassy bombings. Some argued “the
planes operation” might have been thwarted had Clinton not missed this opportunity.

Before 11:00 a.m. on September 11, 2001 NBC’s Today Show anchors were already discussing
bin Laden as a likely perpetrator of the attacks while a photo of bin Laden’s face super-imposed
on a radar targeting image filled the screen, as seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Source: NBC, Today Show, September 11, 2001

President George W. Bush set the tone for a discourse dominated by dualistic morality, a Wild
West dead or alive aesthetic, and a cowboy swagger. American victims were deified, al Qaeda
members dehumanized, while Afghan civilians were nearly invisible.

The world largely rallied behind the United States and supported what many hoped would be a
brief, targeted operation in Afghanistan to find bin Laden and depose the Taliban after they
refused to hand him over. When bin Laden disappeared into the mountains of Tora Bora,
Afghanistan in December 2001, the Bush administration was infuriated and frustrated.
According to former Homeland Security advisor Frances Townsend, “The president got to the
point where at every single intelligence briefing the first question was where is bin Laden and
what are we doing to find him?” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). In the years following the attacks,
a 9/11 Commission was established and a report was published pointing fingers at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for lack of coordination on
al Qaeda and its plots. This was an embarrassment, whether it was willful or incompetent. Paired
with bin Laden’s elusiveness, confidence in the prowess of American intelligence and military
capabilities shriveled. He was getting away with it.

In late 2002, attention had shifted to Iraq. President Bush began to de-emphasize bin Laden’s
importance, saying he was no longer the main target in the war against terrorism. During the
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2008 US presidential election, Candidate Obama promised to return to the hunt for bin Laden,
suggesting that the Bush administration’s quagmire in Iraq was distracting from the real target,
even if only based on bin Laden’s symbolic power. Unbeknownst to direct victims of 9/11 or the
general public, all major accounts of the raid indicate the CIA finally got a break on a concrete
lead in 2010 that they had been chasing for years. Agents followed a Kuwaiti courier known as
Abu Ahmed to an affluent Pakistani resort town called Abbottabad. There they found a
conspicuous, fortified compound nearly impossible to surveil. Although most bin Laden experts
believed he was in still in the caves of Tora Bora, Afghanistan or living in the tribal regions
along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, the architecture was quite unusual and after additional
intelligence gathering, the CIA determined there was a chance that bin Laden was there, ranging
from 30% certainty according to an external risk assessment team to 100% according to the lead
CIA targeter. After debate among a small group of need-to-know, high ranking national security
officials, the President ruled out a traditional bombing or drone strike. Following the trend of
increased reliance on small special forces operations under the auspices of the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC, <jay-sock>), Obama decided a capture-or-kill night raid was the
best option, most likely to produce intelligence and DNA to verify bin Laden’s death, should it
come to that.

Obama tasked Vice Admiral William McRaven, then-commander of JSOC, with planning the
operation. McRaven suggested that 24 Navy SEALs would fly from a US military base in
Afghanistan low to the ground, late at night, using helicopters with state-of-the-art stealth
technology to avoid detection by the Pakistani military as the team entered its sovereign air space
without consent. The ultra-elite SEAL Team Six, known as “the tip of the Spear” – referring to
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the spear of Neptune, the Roman god of the sea – trained on models in the United States while
they awaited orders to execute. They did not know who the target was, only that his code name
was “Geronimo.” Geronimo was an Apache leader, well known for his resistance against the US
military in New Mexico and Arizona. When he died in 1909, the New York Times described him
as “crafty, bloodthirsty, incredibly cruel and ferocious…the worst type of aboriginal American
savage” (Anon., New York Times, February 18, 1909). On Feb. 17, 2009, the United States
Congress passed a resolution honoring the memory of Geronimo; shifting his legacy from
terrorist to freedom fighter.3 With that complex history – both tying the post-9/11 war against
terrorism to the wars against indigenous peoples and to some extent legitimating Geronimo’s use
of violence – could codename Geronimo really be Osama bin Laden? On the other hand, the
operation itself was codenamed “Neptune’s Spear,” implying that this was the mission of all
missions for the SEALs whose guiding symbol is the trident of Neptune, the Roman god of the
seas, and who are known throughout the Navy as the proverbial “tip” of the spear.

On April 30, 2011, the small group of national security officials knew that the raid would be
executed the following night. To protect operational security and secrecy, those whose absence
would be noticed attended the White House Correspondent’s Dinner, surrounded by the world’s
most high-ranking political journalists. Obama told jokes and kept a cool exterior, even when
late night comedian Seth Meyers made a joke about bin Laden having a C-SPAN show that no
one ever watches. Once the details of the operation emerged, this became part of the drama of
the events surrounding the raid.

3

Full text: https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-resolution/132/text
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The next evening, the lead CIA targeter and the SEALs got the “go” order while on a US
military base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The SEALs boarded the helicopters and left for
Abbottabad under cover of night. They knew the Pakistani military academy, its equivalent to
West Point, was only a mile from the compound and the mission was quite precarious. When
they arrived at the target, one of the helicopters crashed due to “unexpected flying conditions”
(Hosenball, Reuters, 2011). The SEALs entered the guesthouse first. After hearing a shot, they
killed the courier. They cleared the main house floor-by-floor, killing the courier’s brother and
his wife, herding women and children into smaller rooms along the way. A SEAL shot bin
Laden’s adult son Khalid on their way up to the third floor, where they anticipated bin Laden to
be. When they entered the room two women charged them, one SEAL tackled the women and
the other shot bin Laden. The SEALs tried to get one of his children to confirm his identity. He
called over the radio to the White House Situation Room where the national security officials
were waiting with bated breath, as captured in the iconic photo, and exclaimed “Geronimo,
Geronimo, Geronimo, for God and Country Geronimo, EKIA” – enemy killed in action. Five
people in total were killed; the SEALs removed extensive files and computers during their
exfiltration from the compound, and destroyed the proprietary technology in the downed
helicopter.

Or so the story goes.

Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh released a detailed counternarrative claiming that
Pakistan had full knowledge of the operation. In 2017, Kathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy
published an account of the raid based on interviews with bin Laden’s wives and surviving
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children, not to mention the extensive debate about the veracity of the various accounts of the
raid in the oppositional discourse. However, after reading the mainstream accounts in books and
print media, watching all of the documentary and feature films and broadcast news coverage, this
account summarizes the dominant narrative consistent across the authorized discourse. The
purpose of this dissertation is to understand how and why this narrative remained dominant in
the face of alternatives, unable to penetrate the authorized discourse.

The news networks were informed that the president would be making an important national
security announcement from the East Room of the White House that Sunday evening. Anchors
brainstormed and speculated about what it might be. Finally, later than planned, Obama
announced that the United States had killed bin Laden. He emphasized the symbolic and
operational importance and praised the efforts of all the counterterrorism professionals who
participated, but reminded viewers that the fight to secure the Untied States from the threat of
terrorism was not over. Crowds assembled outside the White House and in New York where
people chanted “U-S-A, U-S-A,” celebrating a tactical victory after a long, uncertain, frustrating
hunt. At the Phillies-Mets baseball game, the only major American sporting event that evening,
rival players and fans put their differences aside. One player reflected, “here we are, a team from
New York, a team from Philadelphia, rivals, trying to knock each other’s teeth out, but the game
isn’t that significant anymore.” Another said, “For one night it wasn’t Philly versus New York it
was the USA coming together. That’s something special” (ESPN 2011).
Cultural Hegemony Maintenance Projects
My interrogation of this dominant narrative is inspired by the classical sociological theorists Max
Weber, Karl Marx, and Emile Durkheim, in conversation with more contemporary thinkers in

13

cultural sociology, feminist, and critical race theory. Taken together, I put forth a Weberian study
of state legitimation of violence, a deconstruction, informed by Gramsci and Hall, of the
component parts of formal and common sense ideologies that constitute a cultural hegemony
maintenance project, a Durkheimian cultural exploration of the binary cultural codes of the
sacred and the profane, and a symbolic interactionist and cognitive sociological interpretation of
individuals’ mean-making and memory about the first ten years of the 21st century.

Max Weber ([1919] 1958), in Politics As Vocation, defined the state as “a system of
administration that holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in its territory.” Within that
frame, the use of force by nonstate actors such as al Qaeda is illegitimate violence that
necessitates management through a state-sanctioned violent response. Jürgen Habermas (1975)
argued that citizens need sufficient encouragement to act and think in ways that support the
political system to avoid legitimation crises, especially after an event like the 9/11 attacks. Both
of these approaches to understanding state power assume that authority is when power is
perceived as legitimate and to some extent consented to, whereas coercion is perceived as
illegitimate and therefore requires the use of force to exact its will. While some particular
policies within the “war on terror” are heavily critiqued, the state was largely successful in
constructing its authority and legitimacy in the context of killing bin Laden.

Hegemony (Gramsci 2010), in contrast to these theorizations of state power, is the domination of
a diverse society by a ruling class who manipulate the culture of that society4 – the beliefs,
explanations, perceptions, values, etc. – so that their imposed, ruling-class worldview becomes

4

The hegemonic coalition has reinforcements across the superstructure, to use Marx’s original term in the German
Ideology Part One for the institutions that own and rule the means of mental production (Marx and Engels 1998).
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the accepted cultural norm and the universally valid dominant ideology. This, in turn, justifies
the social, political, and economic status quo as natural and inevitable, perpetual and beneficial
for everyone, rather than as a series of artificial social constructs that only benefit the ruling
class. Hegemony maintenance is a constant project. Even in relatively stable times, hegemonic
agents – that is any representative of the dominant group and status quo, they need not directly
represent the state – work to reproduce and modify a coherent “common sense” ideology and set
of values in which the hegemon’s power in general and approaches to violence management in
particular are justifiable. Contrasting the hegemon to subordinated and counterhegemonic
alternatives – like presenting living under al Qaeda’s rule as the only alternative to American
state violence – casts it as the preferable, realistic option.

Particularly in democratic societies with a relatively free press like the United States, hegemonic
agents dominate subordinates through a combination of coercion and consent. The continuation
of the hegemony relies on not only state power, but also the continuous efforts to build and
reinforce a culture in which the hegemon and its actions are viewed as legitimate within civil
society. The killing of Osama bin Laden was a celebrated moment in the narrative. “The people,”
by and large, enthusiastically consented.

While Weber ([1922] 2013), in his theorization of cultural carrier groups – “those responsible for
making representational claims about the shape of social reality,” given their “particular
discursive talents for articulating their claims…in the public sphere” (Alexander 2004a: 11) –
and Habermas, in his conception of a sociocultural system that operates alongside the political
system, attend to a slightly broader range of actors than state agents alone, Gramsci’s (2010)
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notion of cultural hegemony better captures the wide range of actors who co-construct the
authorized discourse. First, hegemonic ideas can cross state borders, as is the case with American
hegemony, rooted in the historical imperialist logics of “civilization” versus “barbarism.” For
example, before George W. Bush was elected President of the United States, his vice president
Dick Cheney coauthored a document with key architects of the eventual Bush Doctrine Paul
Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby, entitled “Defense Planning Guidance” (1992) for the Project for
the New American Century that they characterized as “a blueprint for maintaining US
preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security
order in line with American principles and interests.” In Bush’s speeches about al Qaeda he
frequently invoked al Qaeda’s imperial aims to establish a global caliphate in its cultural and
theological image as the core underpinning of the severity of the threat the group posed.
Therefore, while Weber attends to the monopoly over the use of violence itself, adding a
Gramscian lens helps to clarify the threat of shifting cultural values, in addition to the use of
physical force alone.

Second, hegemonic ideas can be built, disseminated, and reinforced, sometimes even more
successfully, by nonstate actors, such as the news media and entertainment industries.5 Although
Habermas and Weber acknowledge the existence and role of the sociocultural system and
cultural carrier groups, respectively, neither offers directed attention to how they bolster efforts
by the state to maintain legitimacy. Cultural hegemony fills this gap. Notably, cultural hegemony
does not require transparent, explicit collusion between state and civil society’s social
institutions. Some maneuvers made by the state are explicitly propagandist to build support for

5

Relying on hegemonic actors as the key player in the narrative avoids a problem is using “the state” as a thing or a
player as well.
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its rule in general and particular policies. Some dramas crafted by news organizations (Monahan
2010) intend to support the state’s position, but more often there are other motives. Sometimes
the state and the entertainment industry openly collude6 – as they did for the film Act of Valor
(2012), a Hollywood-produced recruitment film for the US Navy that cast real-life US Navy
SEALs in lead acting roles – and at other times the entertainment industry is merely reading and
then participating in the cultural field where their products will sell.

Critiques of Gramsci and other Marxist theorists include the image of individuals as dupes to
false consciousness, unable to resist hegemonic constructions of reality. Cultural theorist Stuart
Hall continues Gramsci’s exploration of common sense ideology, and to some extent continues
this trend, for example he argues, “What passes for ‘common sense’ in our society – the residue
of absolutely basic and commonly-agreed, consensual wisdoms – helps us to classify out the
world in simple but meaningful terms. Precisely, common sense does not require reasoning,
argument, logic, thought: it is spontaneously available” (1977:325, emphasis added), but he also
developed media reception theory to attend to variation and agency within media audiences. He
argues that while the media does “encode” ideology, audiences then “decode” messages in at
least three different ways (1977:343-346). Even in the case of an event constructed as traumatic,
shocking, and unprecedented like the 9/11 attacks, audiences decode dominant, negotiated, or
oppositional interpretations depending on their cultural background and lived experiences (Hall
1980). However, based on my own research and national opinion polls, the proportion of people
6

This collusion is corroborated in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006) that suggested the United States
needed to boost awareness of and reputation of Special Forces. Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest
Law at George Washington University Law School explains in the foreword to Operation Hollywood (2004) that the
US military wants to shape the message, but cannot do it directly. He suggests Americans care too much about free
speech for the military to use a stick to stop the production of films that portray the military in a negative light.
Beyond principles, courts would never allow it. So rather they use a carrot: they offer money, information,
equipment etc. if filmmakers collaborate and allow them to control the content.
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with negotiated or oppositional interpretation of 9/11 or the death of bin Laden are much smaller
than in cases of more quotidian media messaging.

To more fully understand audience perceptions and interpretations, I also engage individual-level
interpretations. Wagner-Pacifici (1986:13) argues, “in political theater the audience not only
considers the messages and ideals of the plot, it also ultimately determines its success. The
public/audience can decide either to applaud the production of political reality, to passively and
indifferently (or resentfully) withdraw attention…[o]r it may decide to deny the particular
dramatic resolution and thus deny that protagonist’s legitimacy.” Therefore a symbolic
interactionist approach to individual meaning-making is also necessary to appreciate the great
variation in the way individuals perceive, categorize, and remember, what they attend to and
focus on (or not), how they experience time, and what symbols mean to them, as they cognitively
and emotionally grapple individually and in groups (Zerubavel 2007). I use the core assumptions
of symbolic interaction – that people act toward things based on the meaning those things have
for them and that these meanings are derived from social interaction and modified through
interpretation (Blumer [1930] 1986) – to work through the influence of culture in explaining how
individuals have come to understand the meaning of the life and death of Osama bin Laden in the
ways they do. American cultural hegemony depends on the consent of its citizenry, broadly
defined, rife with its contradictions and inconsistencies, conscious and subconscious
connections, and explicit and implicit influences. Due to the complexity of audience
interpretation, an in-depth understanding of a small group of individuals’ reception of the
authorized discourse about the death of Osama bin Laden is crucial to understanding the full
scope of symbolic circulation for a few, rather than a surface understanding of more individuals.
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Finally, to better understand the cultural work behind the maintenance and extension of
hegemony, Sa’id (1979) coined the term Orientalism to refer to a “style of thought based upon an
ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time)
‘the Occident’” (1979:2). Crucially, Orientalism is also “the basic distinction between East and
West [and] the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and
political accounts concerning the Orient, and its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny and so
on…[and] a Western style for dominating, restricting, and having authority over the Orient”
(1979:2-3). In other words, Orientalism provides a binary framework to construct, maintain, and
understand cultural self-concept in contrast to an “Other.” Similarly, Alexander (2006:54-55),
suggests, “binary codes supply the structured categories of pure and impure into which every
member, or potential member, of civil society is made to fit. It is in terms of symbolic purity and
impurity that centrality is defined, that marginal demographic status is made meaningful, and
high position understood as deserved or illegitimate.” He continues, “The positive side of this
discursive formation is viewed by the members of civil communities as a source not only of
purity but also of purification…The negative side of this symbolic formation is viewed as
profane…it embodies evil. The objects it identifies threaten the core community from
somewhere outside it” (Alexander 2006:62). These two very different theoretical traditions both
underscore the importance of binary cultural codes in the construction of self and other.

While Sa’id, as well as many feminist and critical race theorists (e.g. Nayak 2006), attend to the
hegemonic binary representations of orient and occident, self and other, it is Durkheim’s
approach to the binary cultural logics of the sacred and the profane that inform the
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methodological approach of strong program cultural sociology, discussed in the next chapter. As
Alexander (2004b:550) explains, there is an “already established skein of collective
representations that compose culture – the universe of basic narratives and codes and the
cookbook of rhetorical configurations from which every performance draws.” Paramount among
these cultural configurations for Alexander and other cultural sociologists inspired by
Durkheim’s original theorization are categories of thought that separate the sacred from the
profane, the pure from the polluted (Douglas [1966] 1984), us from them, civilization from
barbarism, legitimacy from illegitimacy, rationality from irrationality, and morality from
immorality. The stark categorizations aid those attempting to justify hegemonic violence as
rationalizations are based both on their own virtues as well as the supposed inhumanity of the
other.

Blending these ideas with dramaturgical analysis and critical race and gender theory, as outlined
in the next section, and the methods of strong program cultural sociology detailed in the next
chapter, with current thinking in the sociology of politics and violence allows us to better
understand not only this case, but also American cultural values and preferences.
Cultural Trauma, Melodrama, Character, and Plot
The authorized discourse about the raid on Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound constructs
righteous retaliation for the cultural trauma of the attacks of September 11, 2001. The
construction of 9/11 as a cultural trauma benefits diverse hegemonic actors. The collective
understanding of 9/11 as a spontaneous act of evil constructs an unambiguous enemy for the
state to act upon, as well as offering opportunities to display morally justified military might on
the international stage, a key component to maintaining the status of global hegemon and
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unipolar superpower. The media benefits as well. Media content producers may be motivated by
a duty to inform the public and document history, but there is no denying that the intensity of
coverage of a historical moment like 9/11 or the death of bin Laden is also profitable. With the
mandate to document major historical events, outlets such as the Smithsonian Channel and the
History Channel documented the 20-year hunt for bin Laden. News networks draw in more
viewers when they cover suspenseful events live. More, without necessarily having overt interest
in reinforcing state power or policies, news media largely echoes state narratives (Knightley
2004).7 Entertainment production companies profit from the high demand for the motif of the
American military and intelligence community’s fight against Islamist terrorism. The existence
of a terrorism industry made up of “not only various risk entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, but also
most of the media and nearly all politicians” (Mueller 2006:33) is justified, enriching many who
benefit from securing the hegemonic status quo. Finally, individuals are offered a digestible and
moral national narrative that helps them make sense of, favor the continuation of, and have pride
in American hegemony.

To understand the symbolic mechanics of righteous retaliation, I conduct a dramaturgical
analysis of the plot, characters, and genre to elucidate the workings of the post-9/11 cultural
hegemony. The first step in a deep dive into the cultural construction of righteous retaliation is to
bring to light the story architectures, plots, and events in which the characters act. The second
7

Knightley (2004:529) argues this echoing has intensified in the coverage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: “A
radical American plan for managing wartime media perpetuated an illusion that the Iraq war was a triumph for
modern media and its technology. In reality, it was an overwhelming victory for the military and its propagandists.
The principal architect of the American media plan was Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Its
essence can be summed up in four points: 1) Emphasize the dangers posed by the Iraqi regimes; 2) Dismiss and
discredit those who cast doubt on these dangers; 3) Do not get involved in appeals to logic but instead appeal to the
public’s hearts and minds, especially hearts; 4) Drive home the message to the public: ‘Trust us. We know more
than we can tell you.’” A key tactic to accomplish this end was to disrupt the flow of independent journalism by
requiring reporters to formally embed with military units (Knightley discusses this and it was corroborated by
several of the content producers I interviewed.)
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step is to analyze the essential triad of character work (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018) – villain,
victim, and hero – and the cultural values they embody to make this genre resonant.
Concurrently, concepts from critical gender studies and historical background about racialization
and orientalism in American history place post-9/11 hegemony within the broader culture within
which it operates.

In what follows, I detail scholarship on cultural trauma, melodramatic genre, character analysis,
and story formulas and set up my approach to using the hunt as an analytical device to better
understand the plot and characters. This literature sets up the three substantive chapters where I
present evidence from the authorized discourse and discussions with interviewees and focus
group participants that 1) Osama bin Laden was constructed as a formidable counterhegemonic
villain worthy of being hunted down, 2) the American people were cast as innocent and moral,
undeserving of a violent attack, and 3) the Navy SEAL Team was introduced to the public as the
once-secret and now famous hegemonic, heroic hunters tasked with restoring moral order after
the cultural trauma of 9/11, and that these characters acted within familiar, formulaic, and
resonant plot structures. I conclude with relevant literature from critical race and gender studies
that I will employ throughout the analyses.

Cultural Trauma
Trauma, most broadly, is a bodily or psychic wound, often so devastating “memories of the
catastrophic moment return” (Simko 2015:9). Casper and Wertheimer (2016:2) explain the
breadth of the field trauma studies
Historically, clinical and psychological perspectives dominated trauma studies,
for example in understandings of PTSD. However, new perspectives in sociology,
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comparative studies, cultural studies, literary studies, gender and race studies,
history, and other fields have broadened the scope of trauma studies to encompass
a more critical understanding. At the conceptual heart of critical trauma studies is
a set of tensions between the everyday and the extreme, between individual
identity and collective experience, between history and the present, between
experience and representation, between facts and memory, and between the
“clinical” and the “cultural.”
There is a body of clinical literature that refers to acute, individual trauma experienced as a result
of 9/11 (e.g. Danieli and Dingham 2004); however, my focus is on what has been termed
cultural trauma by Jeffrey Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Neil Smelser, and other cultural
sociologists (particularly in the edited collections Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity
(2004) and Narrating Trauma (2011).) For these scholars, cultural trauma is when “members of
a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks
upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future
identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander et al. 2004a:1). As Simko (2015:9)
explains, cultural traumas “produce a breach in collective narratives, creating ‘wounds to social
identity’ and setting off a ‘deep-going public discourse’ that questions and interrogates the very
foundation of that identity.” Centrally, cultural traumas are social processes, according to
Alexander et al. (2004a:10), “Events are one thing, representation of these events quite another.”
Eyerman (2012:573) elaborates,
Collective identities are rooted in beliefs that are maintained in everyday life
through routine practices. Routines provide confirmation and security in that they
allow beliefs to be taken for granted and to be, in a sense, forgotten…Since
shocking events…break everyday routines and can call into question fundamental
taken-for-granted beliefs, it is, thus important that those in positions of authority
act quickly to reaffirm those basic identities.
In other words, cultural trauma relies on descriptions that are mediated by cultural agents: “the
spiral [of signification] is spun by individual and group carriers. It is people who make traumatic
meanings though they do so in circumstances which they have not themselves created and which
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they do not fully comprehend” (Alexander 2012:xxiii). Alexander (2004a:11) uses Weber’s
notion of ‘carrier groups’ as an umbrella term for the agents involved in this meaning-making
activity. Eyerman (2012:573-574) expounds,
Such groups articulate and represent trauma, making it available for
communication and shared understanding. They help transform emotional
response into words and images that can be dispersed and remembered. Artists,
writers, journalists, and political and religious leaders are important social
categories in this articulation and play an important role in the trauma process, but
the idea of carrier groups is broader than these professional categories…Carrier
groups are not only central to the making of cultural trauma, they are important in
its continued affect. Carrier groups are bearers of memory…
The active construction of shared meanings and memories by an array of carrier groups is a
particular facet of broader projects of cultural hegemony maintenance. The authorized discourse
universally describes the 9/11 attacks as culturally traumatic, rituals mark the day, and the death
of bin Laden was reported by many of the same anchors as a resolution to the story that began
that day. Neil Smelser (2004:264) writes, “If the screen industry’s most talented scriptwriter had
been asked to draft a scenario for a quintessential cultural trauma, that script could not have
surpassed the actual drama that occurred on September 11, 2001.” He details the “traumatic
ingredients” of the attacks, including the symbolic value of the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon as targets, “an initial reaction of shock, disbelief, and emotional numbing,” “fear,
anxiety, terror, and some evidence of mental disturbances,” “widespread collective mourning,
both spontaneous and officially scheduled with a level of emotionality perhaps unprecedented in
a nation not especially known for its affective openness,” “an immediate sense of the indelibility
of the trauma,” “a sense of national brooding over the events,” “a collective endowment of the
events with sacred character…a general recognition that they stand as a monumental instant in
the history of the nation,” “the emergence of deliberate efforts to remember the events
collectively,” “sustained public interest in the remembering process,” and “a culminating sense
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that American identity had been altered fundamentally – wounded, perhaps sobered and
strengthened, but in all events, marked permanently” (2004:266-267).

While cultural trauma fundamentally changes collectivities, scholars who utilize this theoretical
concept do not assume that an event framed as culturally traumatic by carrier groups, even 9/11,
necessarily results in shared interpretations by all individuals within the collectivity. According
to Eyerman (2012:573)
Even when speaking of a collective, one must ask, ‘trauma for whom?’ (Giesen
2004, Eyerman 2008). Imaginary collectivities, like nations or ethnic groups, are
rarely unified or univocal. One effect of a traumatic occurrence can be to provide
a sense of coherence and collectivity, even if this is also imaginary and
temporary…The attack on New York’s World Trade Center in 2001 appeared to
unify the American nation into an emotional collective, producing ritual practices
that helped sustain it, just as the phrase ‘9/11’ is meant to evoke and signify
shared experience and collective understanding. But digging beneath that
ephemeral surface, in large part facilitated through mass-mediated
representations, one would undoubtedly find individuals, and even groups, who
would dissent in that feeling. In this sense, a traumatic occurrence has the
potential to both unify and divide, to create insiders and outsiders.8
With this perspective in mind, I argue that hegemonic agents attempted to weave a coherent and
nearly monolithic discourse that relied on cognitive and emotional simplification built on
dichotomous cultural constructions of self and other. It is important to note that my argument is
limited to the recasting of an imperialist superpower as victim of cultural trauma and its reactions
as purely defensive and retaliatory. While the meanings and consequences of all traumatizing
violence and abuse are defined on a cultural level, my critique emphasizes specificities of the
legitimation work of a powerful global hegemon. The defensive violence of oppressed groups
without hegemonic power in response to interpersonal violence and abuse is a distinct

8

For example, Abu-Ras and Abu-Bader argue in an article for the Journal of Muslim Mental Health that response to
9/11 has had traumatic effects on the well being of Arab Americans in New York City (2008:217-239).
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phenomenon. I now turn to genre of the discourse that mediated 9/11 as cultural trauma:
melodrama.

Melodrama
Melodrama, is “a mode of popular culture that presents images and characters through
hyperbolic, binary moralistic positions and arranges them within a plotline that restages the
eternal battle between good and evil,” but, “melodrama is not merely a type of film or literary
genre, but a pervasive cultural mode that structures the presentation of political discourse and
national identity in contemporary America” (Anker 2005:23).9

Narratological analyses of 9/11 and war on terror discourse tend to focus on genre10 – “a
category of representation characterized by similarities in form, style, or subject matter (“genre,”
Oxford English Dictionary Online) – and within these scholarly explorations, 9/11 and war on
terror discourses are most often described melodrama.11 For example, Loseke (2009) attends to
the emotional codes in melodramatic presidential speechmaking. The hunt for bin Laden, as a
part of the broader policy environment, is no exception.

9

For a broader view on melodrama as a cultural mode beyond 9/11, see Playing the race card: Melodramas of black
and white from Uncle Tom to O.J. Simpson Linda Williams (2001). Williams argues melodramatic discourses about
race are central to the development of American collective identity.
10
Melodrama is not the only genre associated with 9/11 and terrorism discourses, of course. For example, Monahan
(2010:4) analyzes news as a public drama– “an engrossing story that offers an enticing mixture of compelling
characters, dynamic plot, captivating settings, and other story elements,” while Smith (2005) emphasizes the
apocalyptic genre so often exemplified in war discourse.
11
Identifying the melodramatic genre is not intended to advance the normative claim that the threat of terrorism is
overestimated or unnecessarily dramatic, rather it has to do with the structure of the storytelling (although some do
make that claim, see Mueller’s (2006) Overblown, for example). I follow film theorist Linda Williams (2000) in her
assertion that melodrama does not have to mean excess.
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Anker (2005:24) provides a five-point definition for melodrama that squarely establishes 9/11
discourses as part of the genre. The qualities include:

1) “A locus of moral virtue that is signified throughout the narrative by pathos and suffering
and can be increased through heroic action.”
In the authorized discourse the American people are presented as innocently going about their
daily routines in a free and open society, represented by a government that does and represents
good in the world. The suffering caused by a deadly surprise attack deserves empathy, but the
authorized discourse often reminds audiences that the world should not forget that the US is
simultaneously a superpower and the world’s self-proclaimed moral police. A strong, swift
decisive response has the capacity to convert victimization into heroism.
2) “The three characters of a ruthless villain, a suffering victim, and a heroic savior who can
redeem the victim’s virtue through an act of retribution though the latter two can be
inhabited in the same person: the virtuous victim/hero.”
The Navy SEALs, at once elite heroes and representatives of the victimized American people,
killed villainous Osama bin Laden by shooting him in the face to “bring him to justice” for the
9/11 families in particular and fearful Americans in general. This quality of melodrama accounts
for some fluidity between innocence and powerful violence.
3) “Dramatic polarizations of good and evil, which echo in the depictions of individuals and
events.”
George W. Bush began this framing on the night of September 11, 2001 with his very first
description of the 9/11 attacks: “evil, despicable acts of terror.” The news and popular culture
largely adopted this Manichean presentation within discourse about all violent acts committed by
groups associated with Islamism. While some discussions about what constitutes terrorism have
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become more critical in recent years, bin Laden remains nearly universally thought of as evil or
in a class unto himself, or only in the ranks of Hitler.
4) “A cyclical interaction of emotion and action meant to create suspense and resolve
conflict.”
News coverage of 9/11 and the Abbottabad raid largely alternated between language telling
Americans how to feel and descriptions of actions. On 9/11, anchors spelled out how tragic the
day’s events were juxtaposed over imagery of the twin towers collapsing. Anchor Brian
Williams opened NBC Nightly News the evening after the raid had been announced from Ground
Zero, by stating “A chapter is now over while a new one begins,” before immediately turning to
Pentagon Correspondent Jim Miklaszewski for a play-by-play of the raid. More in-depth
reporting retold the story of the many cold trails over the years and frustration among 9/11
families due to lack of resolution or closure, finally satisfied by the success of American
intelligence that led to bin Laden and the Navy SEALs who killed him.
5) “The use of images, sounds, gestures, and nonverbal communication to illuminate moral
legibility as well as to encourage empathy for the victim and anger toward the villain.”
Throughout the sample of documentaries and news specials, heart-pounding music usually heard
in action movies plays throughout narrations of action or re-enactments. In news coverage,
human-interest stories about victims and soldiers’ sacrifices include tearful loved ones.
Descriptions of al Qaeda and its members highlight the lethality of the attacks without context or
effort to understand motivations as rational, using imagery that exoticizes or humiliates, such as
the infamous mug shot of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, as seen in Figure 2, to be sure the villains
are not relatable.
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Figure 2
The US government decided to release the far-right photo of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, determining the first two photos of him
were too dignified and would not sufficiently deter would-be terrorists.
Source: McKelvey, BBC America Magazine, September 11, 2013

These qualities of melodramatic collective representations frame 9/11 as a specific type of
cultural trauma, one where innocent victims experienced undeserved injury that can only be
healed by retributive heroic action against the villain. Three crucial insights can be gleaned from
this perspective. First, melodramatic discourses play a major role in the formation of American
collective identity and the reinvigoration of traditional aspects of collective consciousness (see
also Williams 2001). Although collective identity can be problematic (Jasper and McGarry
2015), since it is never monolithic and is always fluid, historically and spatially contingent,
“through the melodramatic narrative, ‘the American people’ become a united entity whose
shared values and social solidarity create a homogenous body” (Anker 2005:25).
Second, it is important to consider how melodrama obfuscates state power. Anker (2005:26)
notes, “melodrama frames a narrative that requires reparation for suffering endured; it demands
heroic action in order to challenge any villainous attack on the country.” In other words,
melodramatic discourses legitimate violent state retaliation. Rogin (1988:xiii), for example,
argues that through American self-conception of victimhood and the near-constant “creation of
monsters…by inflation, stigmatization and dehumanization of political foes,” American foreign
policy and military action that might otherwise undermine American benevolent selfidentification are justified. More, Anker (2005:35) explains
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just a few hours after the events on 9/11, political concerns were sealed by moral
deliberations over good and evil. There was a blockage of discussion over the
complicated and vague causes, effects, and understandings of the
attack...designations of right and wrong became depoliticized because they were
codified as universal moral truths. Hence, they became unaccountable to public
debate...Framing America's response to the September 11 attacks as a compulsory
rejoinder to evil brushed the political questions and concerns that the attack
evoked under the rug of transcendent morality and hence made state action seem
absolutely moral and unquestionable. An ambiguous situation was made to appear
clear, and an uncertain response, obligatory.
Third, while there is robust literature on terrorism as social drama (e.g. Matthews 2016; Oliverio
1998; Romania and Tozza 2017; Wagner-Pacifici 1986) most analyses stop at genre, noting the
melodramatic nature of the discourse, but this is only a point of departure. Melodrama’s reliance
on characterization – heroes, victims, and villains, no matter how cartoonish they may be –
necessitates a deep dive into the characters that operate in the narrative. As Jasper explains,
“Character work hides – and is meant to hide – complex combinations, teasing out one action or
dimension to associate with an individual, making symbols out of flesh and blood” (Jasper
forthcoming:4).

Why character?
A story’s characters – agents to execute actions within the plot – are an essential dramaturgical
component to any narrative. Propp ([1968]) 2009:21), the author of arguably the seminal work
on character analysis, suggests, “the functions of dramatis personae [“an act of a character,
defined from the point of view of its significance for the course of action”] are basic components
of the tale, and we must first of all extract them.” Audiences empathize with protagonists who
display traits that reflect esteemed cultural values; for Americans, this tends to be individuals
who face adversity, danger, injustice, fear, or inner struggles (Brooks 1995). Likewise, viewers
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jeer at antagonists and hope they do not achieve their often-destructive goals. Familiar and
resonant characters make all the difference in reactions to the same narrative.

Cultural trauma can be built through melodramatic discourse. This genre is familiar, which
facilitates the internalization of the core narrative by those only passively absorbing the
authorized discourse. Its three characters – victim, villain, and hero – each play a role in the
construction of cultural trauma and righteous retaliation. Victims offer state agents an innocent,
vulnerable, and injured population in whose name they act. Human-interest stories, recordings of
frantic phone calls from the planes, and interviews with 9/11 families inject pathos into the
stories told by news and entertainment media. Heightened collective identity and social solidarity
after the rupturing effects of 9/11 allowed Americans far from New York and Washington to
identify with civilians and first responders who died in the attacks. Association with heroes and
victims is palatable and persuasive, therefore also making it profitable. Empathy with victims
necessitates othering an archetypal villain for contrast.

Often, melodramatic characters, much like their predecessors in medieval morality or mystery
plays, are anthropomorphized values. In Wagner-Pacifici’s (1986) study of the 1978 abduction of
Italian politician Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, she argues terrorism narratives mirror the
structure of the morality play – diametrically opposed characters battling for “civilization’s”
sake, portraying embodiments of moral categories rather than complex individuals. Oliverio
(1998:95) adds,
In a melodrama, the polarization of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is exaggerated to the point
where the audience is not asked or allowed to contemplate the morality or
psychological natures of the characters or the complexities of the events or plot.
The characters are in fact depersonalized and become objectifications of
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normative values. The audience is expected to praise the heroes and blame the
villains.
Each character functions not only to advance the plot, but also to make a broader statement about
the overall morality of the individual character as representative of a group. In-depth study of
character provides an additional layer of understanding to genre analysis. Oliverio (1998:71)
explains, “One of the most significant aspects of a stage or theater production is the actors and
their characters…The development of actors or characters is significant to the development of
plot. Depending whether the production is a comedy, tragedy, or melodrama, characterization is
viewed as one of the most distinguishing features of genre.” In melodrama, it is rare to see
complexity, ambivalence, and shades of gray in protagonists and antagonists. Rather, an
unthinkable villain perpetrates an act so reprehensible that “morally powerful victims” are
“ensnared” in a scenario that must be rectified by “heroic retributive action” (Anker 2005:23).

Character analysis is central to studies of politics and public opinion because moral characters
offer a vehicle to combine “cognitive understandings, moral judgments, emotional responses,
and expectations for behavior” and “are conveyed by diverse media, both fictional and
nonfictional” (Jasper forthcoming:2). Many familiar characters –

“a recurrent, simplified

package of intentions and capacities that we expect to fit together” (Jasper forthcoming:2) – have
long crossed back and forth between fictional and political narratives. According to Jasper
(forthcoming:7), “Ever since traditional folktales and epics, there have been immediately
recognizable characters. Such types remain central in the political stories of modern society,
through which citizens try to understand the structures and events going on around them, and
through which they are mobilized or frozen out of political action.”
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Alexander (2004a:13-15) suggests scholars studying culturally traumatic discourses ask four
questions about the narration of events by carrier groups:
•
•
•

•

The nature of the pain: what actually happened – to the particular group and to the wider
collectivity of which it is part?
The nature of the victim: What groups of persons was affected by this traumatizing pain?
Were they particular individuals or groups, or “the people” in general?
Relation of the trauma victim to the wider audience: To what extent do the members of
the audience for trauma representations experience an identity with the immediately
victimized group?
Attribution of responsibility: Who actually injured the victim? Who caused the trauma?

All of these questions, put another way, can be answered after a rigorous analysis of the
authorized discourse of carrier groups tasked with framing the fracturing and terrifying events of
September 11 for the characters – Who is the victim? Who is the villain? – and plots – How are
their actions emplotted and described? Through both authorial interpretation and based on
recollections of interviewees and discussion participants, I emphasize what the construction of
these familiar story formulas and consistent caricatured characters lays bare about aspects of
American collective identity and self-concept.

This character analysis is a contribution to empirical literature on 9/11. The vast majority of
media analyses focus on the immediate wake of 9/11, the lead up to the Iraq war, and more
recently, the rise of ISIS. I devote my analytic attention to the books and films made following
the announcement of bin Laden’s death, offering a new trove of data to work with. More, most
scholarship that considers the characters in the 9/11 narrative attends to victims and victimhood
(e.g. Loseke 2009, Jackson 2005, Cole 2007), victimage ritual (Blain 2012), and consolation
(Simko 2015), and even those that consider hero construction as well, do not attend to the US
Navy SEALs. While there is sociological work on ‘evil, inhuman, alien’ “terrorists” (e.g.
Jackson 2005) and literary analyses of fictional characters (e.g. Mohamad 2015; al Sultany
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2012), I explore Osama bin Laden’s character construction in particular. Finally, I discuss the
ways the character analysis advances ideas from classical social theory. The characters are
constructed along Durkheim’s sacred and profane binary and melodramatic discourse facilitates
social solidarity and the building of collective identity and consciousness. We can go beyond the
neutral assertion that carrier groups engage in meaning-making activity and instead consider the
construction of the characters to be part of a project of cultural hegemony maintenance in which
hegemonic agents are legitimating state actions that reassert supremacy (through pathos, best
accomplished through loved or hated characters) in order to stay in power.

Why Narrative?
Humans are storytelling animals. Narrative “is simply there like life itself…international,
transhistorical, transcultural” (Barthes qtd in White 1980:5). Peter Brooks (1984:1) begins his
influential book on reading plot in narrative as follows:
Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories that we tell
and hear told, those we dream or imagine or would like to tell, all of which are
reworked in that story of our own lives that we narrate to ourselves in an episodic,
sometimes semiconscious, but virtually uninterrupted monologue.
Polletta et al. (2011:111) argue that story and narrative can be used interchangeably as both
constitute “an account of a sequence of events in the order in which they occurred to make a
point.” When people tell stories they “narrativize reality” (White 1980). Humans do so because
“People may cognitively process stories differently than they do non-narrative messages,
suspending their natural proclivity to counterargue when they are absorbed or transported by a
story…Unlike an explanation, then, a narrative represents cause and effect relations through its
sequencing of events rather than by appeal to standards of logic or proof” (Polletta et al.
2011:111-112).
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Brooks’ seminal work on plot provides an analytic vocabulary to better understand the emotional
and cognitive effects of narrative. In particular, he defines plot as “a structure for those meanings
that are developed through temporal succession…a structuring operation elicited by, and made
necessary by, those meanings that develop through succession and time” (1984:12). Further,
Brooks (1984:11) explains,
Plot as it interests me is not a matter of typology or of fixed structures, but rather
a structuring operation peculiar to those messages that are developed through
temporal succession, the instrumental logic of a specific mode of human
understanding. Plot, let us say in preliminary definition, is the logic and dynamic
of narrative, and narrative itself a form of understanding and explanation. Such a
conception of plot seems to be at least compatible with Aristotle’s understanding
of mythos, the term from the Poetics that is normally translated as ‘plot.’ It is
Aristotle’s claim that plot (mythos) and action (praxis) are logically prior to the
other parts of dramatic fictions, including character (ethos). Mythos is defined as
“the combination of incidents, or things done in the story” and Aristotle argues
that of all the parts of the story, this is the most important. Plot, then, is conceived
to be the outline or armature of the story, that which supports and organizes the
rest.
For these reasons, I begin my analysis by presenting the plot – its beginning, middle, and
crucially, with the death of bin Laden, its end – before moving to the role of character. In
melodrama, characters are embodiments of cultural values, but they are constructed in context;
they must be emplotted, their actions sequenced in ways that provide perspective that justifies
loving or hating them. My emphasis in the discussion of the hunt for bin Laden as the familiar
story structure of The Hero’s Journey is on temporal sequencing, the order of events, to
understand both the dramatic arc and assertions of offensive versus defensive, moral versus
immoral, preemptive versus unprompted violence.
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Karen Cerulo (1998:3-4), in her exploration of the role of sequencing in the interpretation of
violence, explains, “In assessing violence, vastly different meanings can be attributed to virtually
identical acts. Stories of violence unfold before an audience – stories with completely
comparable parameters – and in some cases the violence is deemed unacceptable, in other cases
it is viewed as potentially justifiable, and in still other cases, the violence is considered too
difficult to classify.” She suggests “sequencing – the specific formats that organize what media
audiences see, hear, or read in connection to a violent event,” informs audience perceptions of
deviant versus justified violence (1998:5). Further,
sequence operates as a silent narrator, one that initiates and meticulously guides
the way in which the story unfolds. Thus, a sequence functions as a roadmap or a
“directing voice” that moves individuals through the facets of a verbal account or
visual image. In so doing, a sequence imposes a rigid perspective on information;
it guides an audience’s “gaze” in very distinctive ways (1998:34).
The events of 9/11 are told again and again using a “victim sequence” which “present[s] violence
from the perspective of the injured party” (Cerulo 1998:5). Conversely, accounts across the
authorized discourse of bin Laden’s final moments, whether experienced first hand or
reconstructed through interviews are told using a “performer sequence” which “unfold violent
events from the perspective of the person who commits the act” (Cerulo 1998:5), more often
directing meaning-making processes toward legitimation of violence.

More broadly, Cerulo’s framework explains why it is so important to keep in mind that the
authorized discourse clearly marked 9/11 as the beginning of the story, and a not a moment
within a longer story arc of conflicts over American foreign policy in the Middle East:
In defining an event’s beginning, a sequence creates what Merleau-Ponty referred
to as a “point-horizon” structure. A story’s beginning becomes the point from
which audience members view the dimensions of the broader horizon. Audience
members come to inhabit the point, grasping all other elements of a story as they
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are presented to the point of entry (1962: 68)…Beyond beginnings, a sequence
guides audience members through developing action. Each progressive step
through a series of facts and observations limits the options ahead, thus ensuring
the endpoint of an informational journey…Further, certain sequences
differentially emphasize the components of a violent account. Some sequences,
for example, map a linear trip through a violent story, thus providing equitable
emphases on the various dimensions of an account. Other sequences circle
individuals through an account, providing a double emphasis on the account’s
initiating material…[S]tory sequences come to signify a matrix of good and evil.
The perspective imposed by an account’s sequence establishes a moral gauge, one
that locates the acceptability of an event under scrutiny (1998:7).
Beyond sequencing, the familiarity of the story structure and the genre of the narrative also play
an important role. The Hero’s Journey provides a structure for the plot: a mundane, peaceful
world is disrupted by an event or threat, activating a reluctant hero who is called to action, after
some hesitation and preparation the hero sets off, encountering obstacles and plot twists along
the way, defeating several enemies, both external and internal, returning home a celebrated hero
who has something to offer to transform a society touched by the (threat of) trauma of the
original call to action. The Hero’s Journey is part of the anatomy of America’s national myth
(Morden 2016): the heroic settler who is challenged to cross the threshold into Indian Country to
put down savage violence, the slave patrols managing the social fears of revolts and violence
against white people, the World War II soldier crossing the threshold into the Pacific or
European theaters to save the world from fascism, all operate within this structure.

Further, the series of events that led to bin Laden’s death are almost exclusively referred to as a
(man)hunt throughout the sources of data. This labeling provides a crucial clue into the roots of
the narrative and its characters, and thereby their role in facilitating resonance of the authorized
discourse for audiences. The Hunt is a particular manifestation of The Hero’s Journey. The hunt
is a successful frame, in part, because of the strong cultural symbolism of hunting and hunters
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across time and place. On one hand, the hunt is a powerful force for social solidarity. In stories
of the hunt, men’s roles as hunters were often uplifted through narratives of solidarity: humans,
in this frame, are one of the very few species of mammals that hunt cooperatively; in huntergatherer societies, survival was built on the ability to cooperate to overcome big game (Lenski
[1966] 1984).12 When humans are reimagined as animal prey, (man)hunts reaffirm cultural
values and boundaries to in-group membership. In witch-hunts for example, women who did not
conform to prevailing gender norms were dehumanized, hunted down, and killed to establish
patriarchal capitalism in “the New World” (Federici 2004). Likewise, melodramatic narratives
about cultural traumas like 9/11, contribute to increases in social solidarity. One way to maintain
heightened social solidarity and firm boundaries between in-groups and out-groups as time
passes after the traumatic trigger is for the society to figuratively, and for security forces to
literally, hunt down the source of threat to the collective.

On the other hand, the hunt has a stratifying effect. Some hunters are esteemed and hold
prominent places in social hierarchies.13 Just as narratives about hunting, especially big game,
served as a route to high social status among men in hunter-gatherer societies, so too are the
terrorist hunters of today often rewarded for performing this social role. In Homer’s The Iliad, a
boar is destroying the land of Calydon when the king neglects to make a sacrifice to a goddess.
The king’s son – a javelin expert with a reputation for near invincibility – leads a team of
warriors to slay the boar, ultimately doing so himself. The successful hunter, Meleager, is lauded
for his accomplishment and the act solidifies his place as a hero in Greek mythology (despite

12

These narratives emphasize the importance of men’s hunting although women’s gathering-labor supplied far more
of the overall food supply, demonstrating the enduring gendered constructs in the hunting narrative.
13
While not esteemed in their own right, rural American hunters from lower socioeconomic statuses hunting small
game attempt to embody a militarized masculine aesthetic to gain access to this historical construct.
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dying at his mother’s hand at the end of the story). Thousands of years later, in Cork, Ireland in
1905, as depicted in the 2016 film Lost City of Z, a British military officer and his wife are
preparing to attend a gala the evening after the officer had killed the deer in a stag hunt earlier
that day. In response to the officer’s insecurities about his rank and how he’d be received at the
gala, his wife says, “You got the deer. All eyes will be on you this evening.”

According to Simeon Messan Adagba (2006:1), across the world in Ewe-mina culture, an ethnic
group in Benin, Ghana, and Togo,
Hunters are powerful and respected personalities in their communities. They are
believed to have some supernatural powers. They often have great stories to tell
that emphasize their achievements and their hunting skills. People often praise
them and celebrate their exploits. This is especially true when they come home
with big animals like an elephant or a lion.
The difficulty of the hunting mission, the size and threat of the hunted animal, and the stakes of
the hunt play a role in determining the caliber of the prize associated with killing the
predator/hunting prey. A mission that requires conquering difficult terrain, such as the network
of caves in Afghanistan’s mountains, the anarchic area at the border with Pakistan, and the
significant cultural and linguistic barriers constitutes a stewardship over nature and people by the
hunters. While routine hunting for food is also revered, when narratives represent the hunted as a
threat to the community, such as the tiger Shira Khan in Kipling’s ([1894] 2017) The Jungle
Book, a lion that routinely terrorizes a Ewe-mina village, or a man with plans for future terror
attacks like Osama bin Laden, the social rewards for eliminating the threat reach veneration.

To understand how the hunt can at once be a source of solidarity and stratification, one can
separate the ritual and story architecture of the hunt, that I work through in Chapter 3, from the
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social types of “the hunter” and “the hunted,” essential to Chapter 4 and 5’s character analyses.
Durkheim ([1915] 2008) asserted that rituals that draw upon and reinforce sacred social values
are a source for solidarity and an opportunity to reaffirm collective consciousness. Alexander
(2004b:527) explains, “Ritual effectiveness energizes the participants and attaches them to each
other, increases their identification with the symbolic objects with the observing audience, the
relevant ‘community at large.’” He goes on to argue that in “contemporary, large-scale, and
complex social organizations” such as American society, today, “the centrality of such ritual
processes has been displaced” (Alexander 2004b:527). However, after an event is presented as
unparalleled in its traumatic capacities, such as the 9/11 attacks, scholars have noted a resurgence
in social solidarity based on a much more coherent collective identity than during business-asusual (Anker 2005; Smelser 2004; Wagner-Pacific 2017:133-134). More, as I’ve argued, the
hunt is a common frame across time and place and therefore provides a framework that many can
relate to on their own terms.

For Simmel ([1950] 2015), social types are roles that carry with them certain expectations from
others that come from their position in social structure. Impressions about particular social types
come not from individual traits, but from the structural position held. In other words, the hunt is
a ritual that can be a source of social solidarity, while the hunter is a social type with high
prestige and the hunted serves the structural purpose of an unsympathetic villain to rally against.

I use genre in two different senses. In conjunction with story structure, there are four archetypal
genres (Aristotle 1997; Frye 1957): mimetic (mundane, low stakes, low drama), romantic (“the
triumph of the hero over adversity. Not necessarily about love…a fundamentally optimistic
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genre marked by the belief that actions can make a difference and that change for the better is in
the air” (Smith 2005:26)), tragic (characterized by “the futility of human striving, the fall from
grace, the missed opportunity and horror of suffering, the disintegration of society…” (Smith
2005:25)), and apocalyptic (high stakes, highly polarized stories: “when radical evil is afoot in
the world there can be no compromise, no negotiated solution, no prudent efforts to effect
sanctions or to maintain a balance of power. This evil is so absolute there is no possibility for
trust or for upward conversion…” (Smith 2005:27)).

Genre can also refer to a dominant motif. In this sense, “the frontier Western,” which is most
often part of the romantic archetype, is also a genre. The Western provides insight into
“American identity, memory of the past and the embattled and protean nature of American
national and political consciousness” (Aston 2012:78). George W. Bush set the tone for the
American reaction to 9/11 with an Old West aesthetic, truer to 1950s and 60s fictional depictions
than frontier life in the nineteenth century, animating subsequent framing with the cultural logics
of the genre. The Hero’s Journey is so ubiquitous there is a resonant familiarity for audiences in
most of its manifestations. The move from the more common romantic genre to the post-9/11
apocalyptic genre reshapes the tone of the dominant narrative about the hunt for and killing of
Osama bin Laden, raising the stakes of the Hero’s Journey. Taken together, attention to plot and
sequence, as well as genre, reveal how the authorized discourse carefully constructed a gripping
narrative that capitalized on cultural tropes and ideal self-conception.

Critical Gender Studies
Connell (1987; Carrigan, Connell, and Lee 1985) began the scholarly efforts to apply the notion
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of hegemony to the power dynamics between various groups of men as well as to enhance
explanations of men’s dominance over women. Connell offers a broad definition of hegemonic
masculinity. Just as “a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes by
means of a combination of coercion and persuasion” (Simon 2002:22), “[a]t any given time, one
form of masculinity rather than others is culturally exalted” (Connell 1995:77). Connell, and
others, argue that although the contents of hegemonic masculinity vary across time and place
(Beasley 2008; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, Heeg Maruska 2009), there is most often an
idealized form of masculinity that serves a similar function. For the purposes of this analysis, I
argue that venerated hunters are typically hegemonically masculine in their cultures and that
from the vantage point of the authorized discourse American hegemonic masculinity is distinctly
militarized.

While contested and critiqued (e.g. Beasley 2008; Demetriou 2001; Whitehead 2002), scholars
have successfully operationalized the term and applied it to a variety of case studies (Barrett
1996; Messerschmidt 2010). Hegemonic masculinity is a particularly useful analytic for
examining cultural influences on behavior within institutions. Many feminist scholars (e.g. Acker
1990; Britton 2000; Cohn 1993; Haney 1996; Sjoberg 2013; Tickner 1992) argue that most
organizations and the state in particular are masculine social institutions. Acker (1990:140)
explains, “assumptions about gender underlie the documents and contracts used to construct
organizations and provide the commonsense ground for theorizing them.” Hegemonic
masculinity, then, can refer to a prevailing cultural logic of an institution, such as the national
security apparatus (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and Ocasio 1999).14

14

For example, in her essay, “War, Wimps, and Women,” Cohn (1993:228-231) relays an anecdote about a
physicist working on nuclear weapons. He “blurts” out his horror about the number of immediate fatalities that
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In this sense, hegemonic masculinities do not necessarily correspond with sexed bodies; that is,
women can conform to the strictures and many men do not aspire to nor reach the hegemonic
ideal. For a variety of reasons explored in Chapter 5, the lead bin Laden CIA targeter Alfreda
Frances Bikowski and her fictional depiction as “Maya” in Zero Dark Thirty (2012), for
example, had access to hegemonic masculinity and hegemonically masculine spaces. Further,
hegemonic masculinity is deeply relative; the hierarchies shift depending on the setting. For
example, when protagonists in country western films are nearly silent or the SEALs engage in
“quiet professionalism,” it is rooted in the hegemonically masculine norm of action based on
morality and not accolade and demonstrates confidence. However, when bin Laden is described
as “quiet,” it is associated with the weakness and passivity of a subordinated masculinity.
Moreover, while militarized masculinities tend to sit at the top of hierarchies of masculinity
across contexts, within the US military, SEAL Team Six stands at the apex (see Barrett 1996 for
analysis of hierarchies of masculinity in the US Navy).

Recently the conversation in critical gender studies has focused on the great diversity of gender
identities, expressions, and sexualities. There is an emphasis on multiplicity over essentialist
binaries, with empirical research exploring subcultural negotiations of gender and sexualities.
would result from remodeling a particular attack. His colleagues fell silent and would not even look at the physicist.
He says he felt like a wimp, like a woman, and vowed never to make such a claim again. Cohn explains this
anecdote supports her argument about gender discourses: she is “not only talking about words or language, but about
a system of meanings, of ways of thinking, images, and words that first shape how we experience, understand and
represent ourselves as men and women, but that also do more than that; they shape many other aspects of our lives
and culture…[T]he physicist who felt like a woman…was transgressing a code of professional conduct. In the
civilian defense intellectuals’ world, when you are in professional settings you do not discuss the bloody reality
behind the calculations…so the physicist violated a behavioral norm…but even worse than that, he demonstrated
some of the characteristics on the ‘female’ side of the dichotomies…Thus, he marked himself not only as
unprofessional but as feminine, and this, in turn, was doubly threatening. It was not only a threat to his own sense of
self as masculine, his gender identity, it also identified him with a devalued status – of a woman – or put him in the
devalued or subordinate position in the discourse.”
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Hegemonic masculinity has largely been treated as a problematic construct since it conceptually
reifies gender as binary. Despite the significance of these recent contributions to social science
research on gender as lived experience, I argue that institutions, especially the national security
apparatus of the state, are not multifaceted like individual performances in terms of the gender
regimes that guide policy in “urgent” situations. More concretely, while there may be increasing
space within the state for employees to have a wider variety of “acceptable” gender
performances and sexual identities, the cultural logics of national security still limit what can be
considered viable policy options (Cohn 1993; Tickner 1992) and can thereby silence individual
players. The presence of women, sexual minorities, and nonbinary state agents may at some
point begin to reshape what can be thought, said, and acted upon at the highest levels of
government, but the state still operates under deeply gendered, albeit “outdated” institutional
logics, especially in response to crisis. For the purposes of this analysis, then, the authorized
discourse presented the national security apparatus in general and SEAL Team Six in particular
as hegemonically masculine.

As the hegemon, the state must secure its hold on power. One of the many tools at its disposal is
to draw on deeply held conceptions of gender relations where masculine protectors (the state,
particularly the military) must protect feminine victims (innocent Americans) against fearsome
masculine adversaries (bin Laden and al Qaeda). Petchesky (2001:4117) explains,
Militarism, nationalism, and colonialism as terrains of power have always been in
large part contests of the meanings of manhood. Cynthia Enloe remarks that
‘men’s sense of their own masculinity, often tenuous, is as much a factor in
international politics as the flow of oil, cables, and military hardware.’”
Therefore, in a broader mission to present itself as provider of societal security – competent,
adept, and worthy of its hegemonic status – the state engages in behaviors that normalize and
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naturalize its values against alternatives: subordinated forms of masculinity.

Subordinated masculinities are any gender expression or identity that is constructed as inferior to
the hegemonic variant. As Connell (1995:78) explains, “Hegemony relates to cultural dominance
in the society as a whole. Within that overall framework there are specific gender relations of
dominance and subordination.” In other words, subordinated masculinities must be controlled,
restrained, dominated, and disparaged by agents of the hegemonic variant to sustain it.
Subordinated masculinities are diverse, multiple, and shifting. That is, subordinated masculinities
may include marginalization on the basis of race, class, or sexuality, among other categories, and
within any one category, such as gay masculinities, there exists tremendous variation in gender
and sexual identities.15 One manifestation of this construct is seen in the relationship between socalled Muslim masculinities versus the hegemonic masculinity in the United States. As a
subordinated masculinity, values traditionally associated with Islam are homogenized,
demonized, and used as a point of comparison to justify the hegemonic regime of gender
relations in the West (Aslam 2012). Although gender relations and expressions in Muslim
subcultures vary widely not only at the regional or country-level, but also among individuals, the
significant diversity is homogenized into one category, united on the basis of their marginalized
status. Osama bin Laden’s masculinity was subordinated in two simultaneous ways. On one
hand, his association with Muslim masculinities made his opinions on gender relations inferior to
the American liberal variant. On the other hand, his gentle and soft-spoken presence set him
apart from “tough guy” militarized masculinity.

15

See Lorber (1991) on the categories of “A” and “not-A,” Connell (1995) on gay masculinities, Ferber (2007) on
black masculinities, Fine et al (1997) on working class masculinities.
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While hegemony maintenance is a constant project, there are times when the hegemon(ic
masculinity of the state) is confident in its grip on power and cultural supremacy. 16
Counterhegemonic agents are not perceived as capable of usurping power and establishing a new
hegemonic order. Rather, they are systematically and successfully put down by force, or more
often, through cooptation and inclusion in the ever-broadening coalition that supports the
hegemonic status quo. Heeg Maruska (2009:247) argues this was the case before 9/11: “The
threat of global annihilation was gone…In the post-Cold War era, it seemed, the United States
did not need to be cowboy-tough, as it had during the ‘hottest’ periods of the Cold War…the
United States pursue[d] a ‘humble’ foreign policy.” Building upon this line of argumentation,
9/11 constituted a turning point event in which bin Laden and al Qaeda, previously subordinated
but not immediately threatening, do pose an overwhelming threat to the maintenance of
hegemony. This leads to two concurrent shifts. First, the subordinated group is reconstructed as a
destabilizing masculinity – a group that illegitimately performs traits previously associated with
and only permissible for the hegemon. As perceptions of the use of illegitimate violence by a
particular group increase, the state must bring the threat into submission. In so doing, state
actions must simultaneously and continuously be justified to the public. Accordingly, part of the
construction of a destabilizing masculinity includes 1) vilifying the character and motivations of
the group, 2) highlighting the traits traditionally reserved for the hegemon now being adopted by
the group, and 3) the group’s capacity to establish a new hegemonic order underpinned by values
deemed antithetical to the current hegemon. Second, while even confident agents continuously
prop up hegemony in relation to subordinated others, with the rise of a destabilizing masculinity
16

While confidence and anxiety are human emotions, I argue that cultural logics used to legitimate violence
discursively are also susceptible to an overall emotional tenor (cf Loseke 2009), which thereby have the capacity to
influence behavior at the level of institutions. My aim is not to personify the hegemon, but rather to note the ways
emotional states become institutionalized and enable, constrain, and limit not only actions of individuals, but also
the quality of information put forth by hegemonic agents, which influences public opinion.
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and amplification of public fears, the hegemonic masculinity of the state converts into a
distinctly anxious mode. For the purposes of this analysis then, I argue that the within the
dominant narrative, emasculation the Bush administration experienced during the years bin
Laden remained at-large had to be re-cooped by the Navy SEALs to restore confidence to the
American hegemon.

Critical Race Theory
While Sa’id’s (1979) original formulation of Orientalism, alongside more contemporary
applications (e.g. Al-Sulthany 2012; Nayak 2006, 2009), is the dominant theoretical framework I
use to attend to race and racism, there are several other concepts from Critical Race Theory
(CRT) that are important to understanding the symbolic mechanics of this case. While CRT is a
broad field that began in legal studies and expanded throughout the social sciences and
humanities and not all CRT scholars agree on the foundational philosophies, there are several
core premises, to which most would agree, that inform my interpretations throughout the
dissertation.

First, CRT scholars assert, “racism is ordinary, not aberrational...the usual way society does
business” (Delgado 2001:7). It is an operational premise that the United States is built on
legacies of racism and exclusion of different groups. It can be very difficult for those socialized
in white supremacy to accept this premise for at least two reasons. First, history is taught through
what Feagin (2009:3) calls “the white racial frame” – “an overarching worldview, one that
encompasses important racial ideas, terms, images, emotions, and interpretation…a foundational
frame from which a substantial majority of white Americans – as well as other seeking to
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conform to white norms – view our highly racialized society.” Second, when racism is a part of
conscious awareness for white and white-passing people, as people at the top of racial
hierarchies who disproportionally benefit politically and materially from white supremacy and
racism, they “have little incentive to eradicate it” (Delgado 2001:7).

CRT assumes that race is socially constructed, “products of social thought and relations, not
objective, inherent, or fixed…races are categories that society invents, manipulates, or retires
when convenient” (Delgado 2001:7, see also Omi and Winant 1986). Most relevant to this
project, then,
the dominant society racializes different minority groups at different times, in
response to shifting needs…In one era, a group of color may be depicted as
happy-go-lucky, simpleminded, and content to serve white folks. A little later,
when conditions change, that very same group may appear in cartoons, movies,
and other cultural scripts as menacing, brutish, and out of control, requiring close
monitoring and repression (Delgado 2001:8).
Jack Shaheen (2008), in Guilty: Hollywood’s Verdict on Arabs After 9/11, the sequel to his
pivotal encyclopedia of Arab stereotypes in film, Reel Bad Arabs (1998), and Evelyn AlSulthany (2012), in Arabs and Muslims in the Media, document the ways depictions of Arabs
and Muslims have changed in Anglophone media over time. Shaheen (2008:xvi), writes, “All
those reel desert nomads and obese oily sheiks were suddenly dispatched to the dressing rooms
to make room for the new head attraction: Arab as crazed Islamic fundamentalist bent on
destruction” Al-Sulthany (2012:8) concurs, “images of Arab men shifted from lazy sheikhs
reclining on thrones to new images of rich, flashy oil sheikhs who threaten the US economy and
dangerous terrorists who threaten national security.” There are continuities and changes in
representation, both with deleterious consequences, as “during times of war, government
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campaigns and media systems exert an especially strong influence in helping to create and shape
public attitudes about the ‘other’” (Shaheen 2008:xii).

Al-Sulthany (2012:9), regarding the historical legacies of conflating Arabs and Muslims, adds,
This recurring conflation [All Arabs are Muslim, all Muslims are Arab] advanced
by the US government and media discourses at this historical juncture, serves a
larger narrative about an evil Other than can be powerfully and easily mobilized
during times of war. The Arab/Muslim conflation is strategically useful to the US
government during the War on Terror because it comes with baggage. It draws on
centuries-old Orientalist narratives of patriarchal societies and oppressed women,
of Muslim fundamentalism and anti-Semitism, of irrational violence and suicide
bombings. With this conflation established, it is easy to conceptualize the United
States as the inverse of everything that is ‘Arab/Muslim’: the United States is thus
a land of equality and democracy, culturally diverse and civilized, a land of
progressive men and liberated women.
In American media’s self-conscious attempts at multiculturalism, there are more Arab and
Muslim characters, however, since the vast majority of these characters are either entirely
assimilated Arab Americans who often reject Islam and/or serve as state agents, just as willing as
their non-Arab/Muslim counterparts to hunt terrorists, al-Sulthany (2012:16) argues, “these
seemingly positive representations of Arabs and Muslims have helped to form a new kind of
racism, one that projects antiracism and multiculturalism on the surface, but simultaneously
produces the logics and affects necessary to legitimize racist policies and practices.”

From a different angle, while the experiences of indigenous, black, Japanese, Chinese, the Latinx
community, and other groups of color should not be compared or pitted against one another,
lessons from history about these communities within white supremacy can shed light on the
vilification of Arab/Muslims, especially post-9/11. A subfield of CRT puts forth a “revisionist
history,” where scholars “reexamine America’s historical record, replacing comforting
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majoritarian interpretations of events with ones that square more accurately with minorities’
experiences” (Delgado 2001:20). While I do not attend to other cases in-depth, this dissertation
reimagines the hunt for bin Laden in oppositional terms and places it within the realities of the
violently racist historical legacies of the United States.

Finally, CRT is often intersectional, attending to gender and other social statuses alongside race.
For example, cultural logics about fear and criminalization of black men do not only draw on
raced imagery of African Americans, but also a gendered and sexualized frame. In her discussion
of the political economy of slavery, Patricia Hill Collins (2005:56) explains “White elites
reduced Black men to their bodies, and identified their muscles and their penises as their most
important sites…This combination of violence and sexuality made black men inherently
unsuitable for work until they were trained by White men and placed under their discipline and
control. To explain these relations White elites created the controlling image of the buck.” AlSulthany (2012:71) attends to the ways sympathy is solicited for Muslim women, since “in
innumerable ways, and from both ends of the ideological spectrum, these women have been
represented as veiled, oppressed and in need of rescue,” while sympathy for Muslim men is
regulated “through particular explanations of how these men became involved in
terrorism…Popular discourses can promote an absence of sympathy (versus an excess of
sympathy in the case of the oppressed Muslim woman) by obscuring the ‘why’ of the story so
that political violence perpetrated by Arabs or Muslims is decontextualized and portrayed as
senseless” (2012:103).
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Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), a founding critical race theorist who coined the term
Intersectionality, explains,
When feminism does not explicitly oppose racism and when anti-racism does not
incorporate opposition to the patriarchy, race and gender politics often end up
being antagonistic to each other and both interests lose…The concept of political
intersectionality highlights the fact that women of color are situated within at least
two subordinated groups that frequently pursue conflicting political
agendas…The problem is not simply that both discourses fail women of color by
not acknowledging the “additional” burden of patriarchy or of racism, but that the
discourses are often inadequate even to the discrete tasks of articulating the full
dimensions of racism and sexism (1991:1252).
In other words, the hypermasculinization of Navy SEALs, the emasculating orientalist discourse
about bin Laden, the feminization of homeland and victimhood, and the instrumentalization of
Afghan women’s rights as justification for war are inextricably linked.

These various premises of CRT come together to describe and sometimes subvert the cultural
hegemony in which white supremacy is normalized, Orientalism appears natural, and bin
Ladenism seems entirely deficient of rationality. Many CRT scholars draw on Gramsci and his
work on hegemony explicitly. Crenshaw (1995:108), explains, “Gramsci concluded that ‘when
the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was only an
outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earth-works…’ Some
CLS [Critical Legal Studies] scholars place great emphasis on understanding the ‘fortifying
earthworks’ of American society.”
Dissertation Road Map
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical overview of strong program cultural sociology, cultural
performances, which I use as a methodological device, and the structural hermeneutic approach
to data analysis, as well as a detailed description of the data generated and utilized for this study.
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The remainder of the dissertation is a dramaturgical analysis of the story architectures and
characters that operate in the dominant narrative about the hunt for and killing of Osama bin
Laden. I argue that the familiar plots (the melodramatic story of victory over a grave threat after
collective injury) and characters (an evil villain, innocent victims, and moral and masculine
heroes) and their connections to esteemed or reviled cultural values enhance resonance for
individuals. In particular, I demonstrate the deployment of traditional gender norms and
historical racialization in the construction of plots and characters.

In Chapter 3, I weave together the chronology of the dominant narrative of the hunt for and
killing of Osama bin Laden as put forth by the authorized discourse using Christopher Vogler’s
(2007) Hero’s Journey, an Americanized and abbreviated reinterpretation of Joseph Campbell’s
(1949) Hero With A Thousand Faces. I further scaffold the chapter by including the ways the
Calydonian boar’s hunt from Homer’s The Iliad (1998) follows the same structure. I offer data
from across the various sources and theorize the implications of the story’s easy fit into a
familiar, formulaic, and ubiquitous story architecture.

We begin in the pre-apocalyptic 1990s, quickly moving into the nearly monolithic American
narrative about the September 11 attacks as cultural trauma.17 I then describe the various stages
of the hunt, and the role each plays in the unfolding suspenseful drama. Finally, I discuss
reactions to it: the virtuous heroes return home to celebrations and credit for restoring moral
order and further sanction to continue to protect the community and competing narratives or
meanings are successfully quashed. This establishes both the nature of the injury and the plot of
the hunt with its suspense, close calls, high hopes, and dashed dreams. Bin Laden’s near capture
17

Most counternarratives are described as conspiracy theories or “un-American” even though they do exist.
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by US Special Forces and the CIA in the mountains of Tora Bora in 2001, the sporadic
videotaped communications with few clues as to where they were recorded, the amount of time
that passed between 9/11 and bin Laden’s death, and the like, all enriched this backstory.

In addition to providing readers with essential background on the events under study, I make two
theoretical interventions. First, I assert that righteous retaliation as a resolution to a culturally
traumatic injury necessitates that people perceive 9/11 as an entirely unprompted and irrational
attack. As President Obama put it in his remarks on bin Laden’s death, “The American people
did not choose this fight. It came to our shores, and started with the senseless slaughter of our
citizens” (Obama 2011). This temporal sequencing is central to self-conceptions about American
use of violence. Second, I suggest the plot structure and ubiquity of “the hunt,” both literally and
metaphorically, helps to explain the fairly uniform reception of the event in the memories of
interviewees and focus group participants. The hunt itself and the actions of the hunters during
the raid, as told in the authorized discourse, retain the melodramatic construction of heroes using
force appropriately to administer justice to the deserving villains.

In Chapter 4, I attend to the story’s villain. I describe “Osama bin Laden,” a character who is
invented by the authorized discourse by emphasizing particular traits and actions while
minimizing others. Nuance that could make him empathetic is rebranded to delegitimate him.
His structural placement as melodramatic villain for the injured hero to hunt down and punish
renders a flat, ruthless archetype that embodies evil and radicalism, which must be eliminated to
begin a restoration of the hegemonic order he sought to unseat. I trace the ways the authorized
discourse presents bin Laden as a privileged fraud, an evil ideologue with irrational grievances,
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an elusive cave-dweller, and upon his death, an old has-been who was not living his political
values. These depictions of bin Laden reveal and reinforce particular self-conceptions about
America, Americans, the West, “civilization,” and their corresponding values. In fact, the content
of the character of “Osama bin Laden,” seems to say more about American culture and its
esteemed and reviled cultural values than about bin Laden, the man.

Chapter 5 explores the story’s victims and heroes. First, I explore the human victims of the 9/11
attacks as well as the cultural values, such as “freedom,” that were transformed into victims by
the authorized discourse. I contrast their treatment to nameless and faceless Afghan victims of
American violence. Meanwhile, plenty of attention is paid to the victimization of Afghan women
at the hands of the Taliban, transforming the United States into a protector and liberator, rather
than an aggressor.

I then turn to the story’s heroes. After presenting a brief history of the Navy SEALs and JSOC
and exploring the proliferation of their memoirs and movies, I argue the SEALs represent classic,
familiar masculine warrior heroes and provide contrast to villainous bin Laden. The evil, cavedwelling terrorist versus the gallant American soldier who practices “sheepdog” masculinity –
violent only to wolves who threaten the sheep – are part of a broader series of binary cultural
codes that have long histories in justifying other colonial/neoliberal projects and wars.

Finally, I argue that while the classic warrior hero was crucial to the hegemony maintenance
project, audiences have become too sophisticated for this familiar story to resonate on its own.
To complement it, director Kathryn Bigelow and screenwriter Mark Boal, after unprecedented
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access to state agents, produced Zero Dark Thirty, a major motion picture that tells the story of
“Maya,” a young female CIA targeter that leaves only twenty minutes at the end for the SEAL
raid. The character is based on a real agent, but the ways the fictional character was modified,
paired with what information is publicly available about her real-life counterpart, Alfreda
Frances Bikowsky, makes plain American cultural preferences for heroes that break the
hegemonic mold in representation while still enacting many of the same esteemed cultural traits
(cf Al-Sulthany 2012 on media depictions of Arabs/Muslims as counterterrorist operatives).

Throughout the dramaturgical analysis, I argue that hegemonic agents draw on existing cultural
logics to legitimate new actions that audiences will want or at least accept. It is impossible to
exhaust the myriad logics that play a part in the construction and reception of any narrative, let
alone the hunt for bin Laden. Opting for depth over breadth, thick description (Geertz 1973) over
survey, I focus on two cultural logics: gender and race. I engage feminist international relations
theory and critical race and gender studies to work through the gendered and racialized
dimensions of the characters.

The authorized discourse portrays both American displays of “global dominate masculinity”
(Messerschmidt 2010) as well as “the logic of masculinist protection,” (Young 2003) that relies
on chivalrous safeguarding, rather than hypermasculine posturing. Heroes are constructed in line
with traditional American gender norms and restore confidence through their physical capability
to use force that is understood as defensive and protective in nature. The prevalence of SEALrelated media replaces the everyman firefighter or infantryman with a highly trained, elite, nearsuperhero.
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Meanwhile, most generally, the villain represents an imagined premodern and hyperpatriarchal
Muslim gender regime, where violence is constructed as irrational and offensive, often against
women. I also explore the ways Zero Dark Thirty’s “Maya” is granted access to hegemonically
masculine spaces and how bin Laden was emasculated after his death. Describing the war on
terrorism in general and the hunt for bin Laden in particular in gendered language constitutes a
ready-made interpretive framework (Jackson 2013) for audiences to connect destabilizing times
to traditional gender relations that appear familiar and even natural to many women and men,
comforted by the contemporary feel of the role of women in leading the SEALs to bin Laden.
Additionally, presenting the conflict between “terrorists” and “civilization” as a battle of
competing expressions of masculinity provides additional texture to the general binary cultural
codes that may explain the resonance of the characters and narratives of the bin Laden story
among many Americans.

Attention to race deepens the historicization of the cultural logics that make the hegemonic
narrative about bin Laden’s death part of a much larger and longer story. To that end, through a
discussion of the tone Bush set after 9/11, the decision to use codename Geronimo, and the roots
of the white male prerogative to use lethal self-defense legitimately, or at least legally,
throughout American history, I place the racializing and Orientalizing of bin Laden onto a
continuum, as Silliman (2008) puts it, the “‘Old West’ in the Middle East.” The normalization of
violence against Muslims, both as collateral damage in war and in Islamophobic, discriminatory
domestic policies, such as the “Muslim (Travel) Ban,” has its roots in America’s legacies of
settler colonialism and slavery.
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The war on terror is the new Indian war with bin Laden as its Geronimo. Muslims living in the
United States are the threat from within, the menace living in their midst. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, bin Laden became an external enemy and Arab and Muslim Americans became
the new internal enemy. The authorized discourse utilized 9/11 to terrify the population in ways
that militarized civilian life and enhanced a culture of armed white nationalist killing, harassment
and discrimination against black and brown people in the name of security.

In other words, to better understand how 9/11 came to be understood as the ultimate injustice
with bin Laden’s death as a just response I consider select examples from wars and dispossession
of indigenous people, lynching and retributive policing of black people, and Japanese
internment, alongside the historical development of white American hegemonic masculinity, to
remove the analysis from its post-9/11 vacuum and place it within a broader history of
dichotomous characters, melodramatic story arcs, and the binary cultural codes that underpin
both.
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CHAPTER 2
STRUCTURAL HERMENEUTIC ANALYSIS OF THE
OF THE AUTHORIZED DISCOURSE AND AUDIENCE RECEPTION
Most civilians experience military conflict through the signs and symbols of its depiction, their
impressions derived not from the battles in distant lands but from the manner they are rendered
at home…Struggles over war’s true meaning, its values and necessities, play out on television
screens and in photographs of newspapers and magazines, the cultural outpouring influenced by
commercial, political, and military pressures.
-Robin Andersen (2006:xvi), A Century of Media, A Century of War
…the general liberal consensus that ‘true’ knowledge is fundamentally nonpolitical (and
conversely, that overtly political knowledge is not ‘true’ knowledge) obscures the highly if
obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced. No one is
helped in understanding this today when the adjective ‘political’ is used as a label to discredit
any work for daring to violate the protocol of pretended suprapolitical objectivity.
-Edward Sa’id (1979:10), Orientalism
This chapter details the data I generated and analyzed for this study, my rationale for inclusion,
and my approach to analysis. While qualitative research that relies solely on authorial
interpretation cannot be replicated, I aim to be transparent enough that others could look at the
same data and come to their own conclusions or use the same methodological approach to
answer other research questions. Ultimately, I use strong program cultural sociology as a
methodology for interpreting and analyzing my data. Cultural sociology is, of course, a
theoretical and empirical subfield as well; however, I am using the strong program’s methods to
think about the data within the more meta-theoretical frame of cultural hegemony maintenance
as outlined in the previous chapter. While the Durkheimian-inspired18 understanding of cultural
codes and categories of thought and the overview of the concept of “cultural trauma” discussed
in the last chapter both come from the same school of cultural sociology, I limit my discussion
here to aspects directly related to data and methods. Thus, after I describe the data that I gathered

18

Methodologically, I follow cultural sociologists Alexander’s (2006), Smith’s (2005), and Alexander and Smith’s
(2003) use of Durkheim’s “sacred” and “profane,” which serves as a framework for understanding inclusion – “us”
– and exclusion – “them.” In Durkheim’s (1915) original formulation, “sacred” refers to a marked category, good or
evil, while “profane” refers to the unmarked, mundane features of social life.
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to constitute the authorized discourse on the hunt for Osama bin Laden and my approach to
generating human subjects data, I devote the rest of the chapter to a discussion of strong program
cultural sociology’s core premises, aspects of the notion of cultural performances that are
relevant to my research questions, and conclude with both a general explanation of the structural
hermeneutic method, as well as a step-by-step explanation of what I did to analyze the data and
generate my theories for this project.
Data
The data for this project has two major components: textual data and human subjects data. First I
describe how I reconstituted the authorized discourse by collecting textual data, including visual
data, and then I explain my process for conducting interviews and focus groups to better
understand audience reception of particular aspects of the authorized discourse.

Reconstructing the Authorized Discourse
No set of data can completely capture the ideological landscape of a particular era of cultural
hegemony or exhaust where people’s impressions about terrorism and its stakes come from.
Individuals sit on a broad spectrum of consumption about topics related to terrorism. At one
extreme there are those who do not listen to presidential speeches, who do not consume any
mainstream news, and who rarely watch television or movies. At the other end are those who
might be termed “enthusiasts,” voracious consumers of political rhetoric and news, who spend a
great deal of time watching TV and film, and some will have read most of the popular
nonfiction, mostly by investigative journalists, about the history of terrorism, the history of al
Qaeda, psychological profiles about terrorists and terrorist organizations, etc. My intention with
this project was to collect a manageable sample of textual materials – small enough for close
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reading, but large enough to capture the middle of this spectrum, what might constitute the
authorized discourse. For example, while none of my interviewees or focus group participants
had read the English-language book Al-Qaeda in its Own Words, some had read the bestselling
account No Easy Day written by Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette under the pseudonym “Mark
Owen,” and nearly all participants had heard at least one presidential speech that addressed bin
Laden and/or al Qaeda. To that end, this section details the exact data sources engaged for this
project.

Government Rhetoric
The first component of government narration of the hunt for Osama bin Laden is presidential
speeches. Since a key rationale for this study is that the episode had concluded, I collected
speech transcripts from UC Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project Database from the
evening of the 9/11 attacks through Barack Obama’s second inauguration in January 2013, with
the exception of one counterterrorism-specific speech from May 2013. A total of 552 speeches in
that time frame mention bin Laden by name, 1,674 mention terrorism, and 28 mention the Navy
SEALs.19 The vast majority of quotations from the speeches I use to evidence certain claims
come from the most widely publicized speeches, namely Bush’s speeches on the evening of 9/11,
the declaration of the war on terrorism on September 20, 2001 and the announcement that the
United States would go to war with Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, each of his state of the
union addresses, and speeches dedicated solely to the war on terror, such as a series of 2006
speeches entitled the “Address to the Nation on the Fifth Anniversary of September 11,”
“Remarks on the War on Terror” and “Remarks on the Global War on Terror: the enemy in their
19

Since the founding of the SEALs in 1962 until 2006 they were mentioned three times: twice by Ronald Reagan
and once by Bill Clinton, therefore 28 mentions from 2006 to the present is significant. Of the 28 mentions, George
W. Bush made five and Barack Obama made the remaining 23.
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own words.” The selection of speeches by Obama include specific mentions of returning focus to
hunting bin Laden in his 2008 campaign speeches and his emphasis on his oversight of the
successful operation that killed bin Laden in his 2012 campaign speeches, his state of the union
addresses, his 2013 “Address to the Nation on United States Counterterrorism Strategy,” and his
announcement of bin Laden’s death. Where relevant, I examined statements by high profile
public officials besides presidents, such as New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani.20

While the average American is unlikely to read most government strategy documents, the 9/11
Commission Report (2004) was a high-distribution document21 sold in retailers and the National
Security and Counterterrorism strategies are provided to news organizations and play a major
role in framing the public discourse on the topics they attend to. Going forward, when I say
“government rhetoric,” I am referring to these widely consumed speeches, statements, and
documents that narrate, frame, and characterize events for the public.22

News Coverage
The time period under study was at the dawn of the new social media landscapes. Traditional
news broadcasts and newspapers still dominated pre-2005 and while decline in these media was
indisputable, they still best capture the core of the dominant narrative and remain ubiquitous –

20

Speeches are cited in-text and listed in the references; they do not appear in the methodological appendix. Bush’s
speeches have been archived in one PDF. All but two citations of Bush’s speeches refer to the pagination of this
document. The two speeches not included in the document are cited separately in the reference list. Obama’s
speeches have yet to be compiled in a unified document, therefore I reference them separately in-text and in the
bibliography.
21
The publisher W.W. Norton ordered 800,000 copies printed when the report was released in 2004. In addition to
the copies sold in intervening years, the report is available for free full download online.
22
The 9/11 Commission Report and a CIA Presidential Daily Brief are the only government documents I cite
directly, but a list of the other widely circulated documents that informed my analysis appears in the methodological
appendix.
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for example, even an individual who does not consume a lot of news might see CNN’s Headline
News in a waiting room, place of business, and the like.

The Vanderbilt Television News Database (VTND) has recorded network evening news
broadcasts since the 1969 moon landing. Since I wanted to include analysis of imagery and nonverbal cues, I did a comprehensive analysis of NBC and CNN’s coverage of the weeks
immediately after 9/11, bin Laden’s death, and mentions of him in the intervening years, as those
are the networks for which VTND has video and not transcripts only. For coverage on the night
of 9/11 and the night of the bin Laden raid I also examined ABC, CBS, PBS, and Fox News as
these broadcasts had such high ratings they are widely available on YouTube. Additionally, I
analyzed news magazine specials on Osama bin Laden such as CBS’s 60 Minutes, PBS’s
Frontline, ABC’s Nightline, and NBC’s Rock Center with Brian Williams.23

My print news analysis includes the American newspapers with the top three readerships: USA
Today (2,301,917), The New York Times (2,101,611), and The Wall Street Journal (1,337,376),
as well as Time Magazine (3,032,581)24 and headlines from the mornings after the 9/11 attacks
and the bin Laden raid from a wider cross section of newspapers, such as prominent New York
dailies New York Post, New York Daily News, AM New York, and national papers such as
Washington Post, LA Times, and Chicago Tribune.25 I also analyzed online-only content from the
New York Times’ Times Topic on Osama bin Laden.26

23

News broadcasts and specials are cited in-text and included in the reference list.
Circulations for top ten US newspapers in 2014: https://www.cision.com/us/2014/06/top-10-us-daily-newspapers/
25
Print news that I cite directly appears in the reference list. The list of headlines and magazine covers from the
morning after the Abbottabad raid appears in the methodological appendix.
26
https://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/osama-bin-laden-19572011
24
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Entertainment Media/Popular Culture
I approached my collection of entertainment media in four broad categories. First, I studied six
monographs27 and eleven documentary and feature films28 about the hunt for bin Laden, as well
as a comic entitled Killing Geronimo. Each book was written by an “expert” with a slightly
different vantage point. Peter Bergen’s Manhunt is the culmination of a career devoted to
studying bin Laden, the man. Mark Bowden’s The Finish takes the hunt for bin Laden as a
particular case within a larger story about the war against terrorism. “Mark Owen’s” No Easy
Day and Robert O’Neill’s The Operator are competing accounts, each written by Navy SEALs
who were part of the operation. Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy’s The Exile covers the time
period largely unknown to American audiences from when bin Laden disappeared from the
mountains of Tora Bora in 2001 until he was located in 2010-11 and offers an account of the raid
from the perspective of bin Laden’s wives and children who were also in the compound. Finally,
investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (2016) offers a diametrically opposed counternarrative,
claiming that Pakistan had full knowledge of the mission and cooperated extensively.29 The
documentaries were largely produced by major American cable channels such as the History
Channel, the Discovery Channel, and the Smithsonian Channel. I also screened two feature
films, the National Geographic Channel’s SEAL Team Six and the Hollywood blockbuster and
Academy Award nominated Zero Dark Thirty.

Second, I sampled films, television shows, books, and video games about Navy SEALs, beyond
the bin Laden raid itself. Every year since the bin Laden raid there has been at least one
27

Full list in methodological appendix alongside a list of in-depth biographies on Osama bin Laden that are too
specialized for the authorized discourse, but constituted a basis for comparison.
28
Full list in methodological appendix
29
I consider Hersh’s account part of an oppositional discourse, not the authorized discourse, therefore its citation
appears in the reference list and not in the methodological appendix.
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Hollywood film about SEAL missions.30 The Fall 2017 American primetime network television
lineup includes three new shows that center on special operations teams, SEAL Team on
CBS, Valor on the CW, and The Brave on NBC. Many Navy SEALs have also written memoirs
and accounts of now high profile missions.31 Finally, SEALs consult on video games that depict
their missions, such as Medal of Honor: Warfighter. To supplement these accounts, I also
viewed SEAL public appearances, such as Lone Survivor’s Marcus Lautrell’s Republican
National Convention speech and American Sniper’s Chris Kyle’s talk show appearances.

Third, I included clips from three satiric talk shows, John Stewart’s The Daily Show, Stephen
Colbert’s The Colbert Report, and Conan with Conan O’Brien. In addition to their popularity
based on entertainment value, many Americans get their news from late night comedy shows
rather than traditional news channels, according to Pew Research Center’s “The Modern News
Consumer Report,”32 so these three constitute my sample of that landscape. Finally, I studied
reactions to news of bin Laden’s death at sporting events the evening of the raid such as the
Mets/Phillies Major League Baseball game and the WWE wrestling championship. Taken
together, these representations in popular culture are ubiquitous enough that counterterrorism
efforts in general and the mythologized bin Laden raid in particular have seeped into American
livingroom and are in high demand by audiences. Notably, even with the passing of time since
9/11 and some targeted opposition to the war on terror, each of these products presents the
dominant narrative of the hunt for and killing of Osama bin Laden told from an American
perspective.

30

Full list of films referenced and screened in methodological appendix.
Full list of books referenced and analyzed in methodological appendix.
32
http://www.journalism.org/ 2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/
31
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Human Subjects
I discussed the hunt for bin Laden with more than 60 individuals, some through intensive oneon-one interviewing, some in group discussion. I also interviewed 30 “content producers,”
government speechwriters/communications professionals, news producers, reporters, and editors,
as well as an author from a prominent account of the bin Laden raid.33

Interviews were semi-structured. Each participant was asked to tell me what happened on 9/11:
who was attacked? What are core American cultural values? Who did the attacking? Why, what
was the ideology? This led into more specific questions about who bin Laden was, what they
know about and think of the US Navy SEALs, etc. Finally, I asked their opinions on these
matters, like how did 9/11 change their lives, policy, and war, and what did they think about
these changes? What did they think about night raids and targeted drone strikes in general and
the instance at the bin Laden compound in particular?

Focus groups were more open-ended. I asked many of the same questions, but the group
discussion allowed participants to debate among themselves. In several of the focus group
discussions I screened media clips for participants to react to or participants showed relevant
clips that came to mind to illustrate their points. Some groups knew each other already; for
example, I spoke with a group of ironworkers from the same union, a group of friends who knew
each other through volunteer work at a direct services organization, and a class at a university.
33

I do not include a dedicated analysis of the expert interviews nor do I use more than a direct quote or two in the
substantive chapters, but they inform and corroborate many of the claims I make about the media landscape and
process. More specifically, these interviews with content producers helped me to understand the extent to which the
dominant narrative was institutionalized or adaptable, the relationships between government and media, and the
process by which speechwriters, journalists, and creatives found out information about the raid and the surrounding
events. While I do not directly engage these interviews in the dissertation they will be useful in future revisions and
expansions of the project.
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Others were brought together through an anchor, for example one recruit invited “media
professionals of color.” Some groups were convened based on availability, but there was no
group where participants did not know at least one other participant in advance (for reasons
detailed in Gamson (1992)). In total, I conducted six focus groups – the aforementioned group of
media professionals of color, ironworkers, volunteers for an Arab American direct services
organization, as well as police officers, recent college graduates and graduate students, and one
mixed group representing a cross section of ages, races, and genders.

I used snowball sampling and references from early interviewees to recruit participants. While
there is some stratification in the sample in terms of age, race/ethnicity, and gender, most of the
people I spoke with were lower-upper middle class.34 This sample includes several registered
republicans and a focus group discussion with police officers, but by and large, my participants
identified as “left of center” and some even viewed themselves as “radical.” Although I spoke
with mostly individuals who think of themselves as anti-war, nonviolent, and wary of their
government, the extent to which participants repeated the mainstream narrative and offered
dominant decoding or very minor negotiated decoding is demonstrative of the persuasiveness
and pervasiveness of the hegemonic version of events.
Methods: The Promise of Cultural Sociology
Cultural sociology provides the methodological tools to illuminate the cultural codes and
categories of thought that aid in meaning-making (Alexander and Smith 2003). While my
analysis draws on a wide array of scholars who study culture including neo-Marxist cultural
studies (i.e. Althusser, Gramsci, Hall), culturalist cognitive sociology (i.e. Brekhus, Cerulo,

34

A table with the demographics of all interviewees and focus group participants appears in the methodological appendix.
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DeGloma, Zerubavel), and those who also study narrative and character (i.e. Brooks, Jasper,
Polletta), in this section I provide an overview of the elements of the strong program in cultural
sociology relevant to my methodological approach.

Heavily influenced by Emile Durkheim’s (1915) work on symbolism, the strong program in
cultural sociology’s proponents assert that individuals and communities narrate and construct
specific interpretations of events (Eyerman 2011). As agents frame and characterize, they both
draw upon and produce codes and logics that then serve as the basis for norms and values. The
process of normalization is often implicit and unconscious in individuals and this approach to
scholarship seeks to “bring them up for view,” critically interrogate them, and even create
opportunities to challenge them. (Alexander 2003:4). The strong program in cultural sociology
(Alexander and Smith 2003) has three key components. First, in line with social theorist
Margaret Archer (1996), cultural sociologists must carefully separate and consider culture and
social structure. Second, culture must be understood as an explanatory variable that can shape
and influence structure and agency, rather than a mere reflection or epiphenomenon of power
hierarchies and social structure. Third, they argue that if the research is conducted in a rigorous
way – ideally using structural hermeneutics – then causal claims can be made through “models
that can be applied across cases and contexts” (Alexander and Smith 2003:26) despite the
staunchly interpretative approach to data analysis inspired by anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s
(1973) “thick description.”
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Cultural Performance
In the context of state violence, agents participating in the authorized discourse attempt to weave
culturally resonant narratives to legitimate acts of violence. It is productive to understand this
legitimation work by the state as cultural performances – “the social process by which actors,
individually or in concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation” (Alexander
2004b:527). Successful cultural performances rely on actors’ skillful mobilizations of
background symbols and foreground scripts – “immediate referents for action” – in hopes of
performative fusion, in which actors inspire in audiences both psychological identification with
and emotional attachment to the meanings presented (Alexander 2004b:531). This analytical
framework determines several methodological considerations.

Uncovering the background symbols mobilized throughout the authorized discourse necessitates
hermeneutic analysis, thematic organization, and historicized interpretation of the presentation of
the hunt for bin Laden. Understanding the authorized discourse as performance helps us to tie
violence legitimation to culture: the symbolic systems, social structures, and historical contexts
that help actors to communicate with audiences. Background symbols with cultural and historical
salience inform the foreground scripts for the performance. Actors then communicate complex
messages to an audience using these scripts (which can also be visual). If after a performance,
the audience experiences cognitive and emotional investment, the performance is successful and
Alexander terms this performative fusion; the fragmented and conflictual discourse gives way to
shared understanding. When actors’ process of encoding symbols and scripts results in a
performance that audiences experience as contrived, the performance can be described as “de-

68

fused” – cognitive and emotional interpretations remain fragmented and fraught, failing to be
received by the audience as the actors intended.

Alexander (2004b:547) argues that performances “stand or fall on their ability to produce
psychological identification and cultural extension” but “reception is dictated neither by
background nor foreground representation, nor by social power, effective direction or thespian
skill” (2004b:563). With Alexander’s framework to understand the success and failure of
performance in mind, we can also examine audience reception of the authorized discourse. A
systematic analysis of the construction of the performance via the deep cultural codes mobilized
by state agents, newsmakers, and entertainment professionals better attunes us to the mechanics
of and relationships between the codes, so even if audiences have not consumed the vast majority
of the individual products that comprise the authorized discourse, they still have in some way
been exposed to the dominant narrative and whether they experience performative fusion, defusion, ambivalence, or indifference, they are still making sense of the existence of the
performance, somehow.

Structural Hermeneutics
Structural hermeneutics is the method of choice for the strong program in cultural sociology
(Alexander and Smith 2003). Smith (2005) exemplifies the approach in his comparative work on
the cultural logics of war discourse. He explains that “culture structures,” the foundations for
categorical organization of sociocultural life and thereby the construction of norms and values,
are very often arranged “in patterns of binary opposition” (Smith 2005:13). Most generally these
binaries follow Durkheim’s (1915) distinction between the sacred and the profane adapted by
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cultural sociologists to more closely resemble Douglas’s (1984) demarcation between the pure
and polluted. In this case, “America” is portrayed as a legitimate, moral victim with rights to
invoke cultural trauma after the 9/11 attacks, where heroes use force defensively, while Osama
bin Laden and al Qaeda are depicted as illegitimate, immoral, evil perpetrators who used force
offensively, based on fabricated grievances, and therefore have no rights to invoke trauma.
Further, Smith (2005:14) argues, “narrative structure – in effect stories and story architectures –
are pivotal as the bearers of meaning.” Narratives provide the chronology of events and therefore
have major implications for who are acting offensively and defensively, who are justified to
retaliate and who “started it.” Taking binary cultural codes and the importance of narrative
structure together, Smith (2005:14) explains,
In the paradigmatic dimension binary codes are responsible for classifying the
world and so doing according to moral criteria, detailing the qualities and
attributes of the sacred and profane, polluted and pure. Along the syntagmatic
axis, however, narrative structures place actors and events into plots…Binary
codes provide building blocks, but narratives add subtlety to our understanding of
the world and convert situations into scenarios (emphasis added).
A structuralist approach to hermeneutics helps us to “understand culture not just as a text (a la
Geertz) but rather as a text that is underpinned by signs and symbols that are in patterned
relationships to each other” (Alexander and Smith 2003:24). The United States constructed itself
and its actions during in the aftermath of 9/11 as pure and defensive and al Qaeda’s as polluted
and offensive by adding to the extant, patterned narrative about enemies of American hegemony
in general and Islamist political violence in particular.
Process
I began the project knowing that I wanted to study the presentation and reception of the hunt for
Osama bin Laden, but did not formulate specific research questions or hypotheses, as I planned
to utilize constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz 2014). Grounded theory methods, according

70

to Charmaz (2014:1), “consist of systematic yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing
qualitative data to construct theories from the data themselves…Grounded theory begins with
inductive data, [and] invokes iterative strategies of going back and forth between data and
analysis.” To that end, I first gathered all of the textual data and read or viewed it without
specific questions in mind. I wanted to consume the authorized discourse as an individual might
have in real time, obviously realizing I would be on the “enthusiast” end of the spectrum of
participants, given my scholarly attention to this issue over the years.

During my second pass over the data, I engaged in what Charmaz calls “initial coding,” sticking
very closely to the language of the data itself. It became clearer to me after the initial coding
process that I would need to attend to the telling of the chronological story itself and the
differential judgments about actions based on which characters were doing the acting. My initial
codes lead me to a third round where I began coding for the dramaturgical analysis. First, I
attended to the paradigmatic dimension where I coded actions along the binary cultural logics. I
was able to discern I’d collected enough textual data as I hit thematic theoretical saturation.
Next, I went back through the data with an eye on the syntagmatic dimension where I looked not
to moral judgments about actions, but instead to the chronology of the narrative, the order of
events, who acted offensively and who defensively, for example. Finally, with the concept of
cultural performance in mind, I examined the data for the background symbols that underpinned
the contemporary foreground scripts. These initial codes helped me to establish my authorial
meaning-making process. As I made sense of the authorized discourse, I noted the bank of
cultural referent imagery that both built familiarity and resonance for me, as well as
contradiction and opposition.
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At this point in the process, the structural hermeneutic analysis revealed two prevailing features
of American culture in the telling of the story and its characters. First, it was evident that
exceptionalism was key to American self-concept. In line with Hughes (2003), Americans,
according to the authorized discourse, are chosen, moral, innocent people. American victims,
first responders, and military troops are consistently described as hard working, honest, and
generous. America(ns) promote human rights, freedom, equality and rule of law at home and
abroad. America is a beacon of morality, a city on a hill, a force for good who will keep the
world safe from democracy and freedom. Therefore, when Americans use violence, it is
righteous and retaliatory.

Next, it was apparent that, according to the authorized discourse, there are times when violent
retaliation is righteous and morally acceptable; for Americans, there is such a thing as just war
and the war in Afghanistan to root out bin Laden and al Qaeda after 9/11 was one of these wars.
Taken together with the first cultural logic, the authorized discourse tended to describe the
United States as a passive conduit of justice. For example, “bin Laden was brought to justice,”
was invoked far more often than “the United States killed bin Laden.” It was at this point that I
discerned that a pivotal research question would ask about the cultural construction of righteous
retaliation.

It is essential to note, in line with Louis Wagner’s introduction to the second edition of Vladimir
Propp’s Morphology of the Folktale ([1968] 2009:xiii), that “structural analysis is not an end in
itself! Rather, it is a beginning not an end. It is a powerful technique of descriptive
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ethnography…it lays bare the essential form of the folkloristic text. But the form must ultimately
be related to the culture in which it is found.” With this consideration in mind, I took note of the
deeply gendered and racialized language and imagery in the textual and visual data. The United
States was often presented as a masculine, intimidating superpower that represents AngloAmerican cultural ideals and should not be challenged without the assumption that an attack
would be met with the full weight of the highly trained and well-financed US military.
Protagonists present a chivalrous albeit violent masculinity, modeling traditional paternalistic
gender norms reminiscent of early settler colonialism. Antagonists have an alternative
presentation of masculinity, in this case, “terrorists” are presented as violent and repressive
against women, hyperpatriarchal, and backward, which is also tied to ethnicity and an orientalist
view of Islam. The gallant masculine protector restores moral order after a violation by
extinguishing the racialized, foreign threat for good.

Next, I began my recruitment of lay and expert interviewees and focus group participants. I
crafted open-ended questions to find out if people already shared the meanings that I had
discerned from the authorized discourse and to determine their reactions to particular aspects of
the discourse they may not have consumed on their own. After transcribing the interviews I then
went through the same coding process looking first for evidence of binary cultural codes, then
chronology and its implications, and finally discerning the individuals’ meaning-making process
(like I did for my own interpretations.) Did individuals present a dominant, negotiated, or
oppositional decoding (Hall 1977, 1980) of the authorized discourse? Did audiences feel
empathy and psychological identification with the meanings presented? In other words, was
performative fusion (Alexander 2004b) accomplished? Sometimes I use specific quotes and
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anecdotes from interviewees to support particular analytical points, sometimes I mention patterns
and trends across individual or group responses, and other times there are general claims that
apply to nearly all of the interviewees.

At this stage, I generated the meta-theory that draws on Marx, Weber, Durkheim, critical race
and feminist theory to answer my questions about the process of constructing bin Laden’s death
as righteous retaliation. When the cultural values of American exceptionalism and just war from
the authorized discourse are confronted the realities of 1) American domestic racist
infrastructure (the fact that the American economy is built on a history of slavery, convictleasing, unfair wages for marginalized communities, exploitation of foreign labor, and mass
incarceration, and space – residential neighborhoods and commercial districts alike – that is
heavily segregated by race and class) and 2) the history of global imperialism (deprival of selfdetermination, ousting of democratically elected leaders, pillaging of natural resources, and
nearly 800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories) a hegemony maintenance
project was continually structuring attention toward American exceptionalism and just war,
underpinned by gendered and racialized rhetoric, to maintain legitimacy of authority.
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CHAPTER 3
THE STORY STRUCTURE OF RIGHTEOUS RETALIATION
There is no such thing as a merely given, or simply available, starting point: beginnings have to
be made for each project in such a way as to enable what follows from them…The idea of
beginning, indeed the act of beginning, necessarily involves an act of delimitation by which
something is cut out of a great mass of material, separated from the mass, and made to stand for,
as well as be, a starting point, a beginning.
-Edward Sa’id (1979:16), Orientalism
The Hero’s Journey is not an invention, but an observation…From this model, infinite and highly
varied copies can be produced, each resonating with the essential spirit of the form.
-Christopher Vogler (2007:xiii), The Writer’s Journey
The Hunt and The Hero’s Journey
The hunt for Osama bin Laden by the United States intelligence and military apparatus was
framed and packaged, repeated and reinforced, and deployed vigorously through government
narratives, news coverage, and popular cultural representations. Commentators exclaimed that
the 9/11 attacks and the operation that killed Osama bin Laden were more cinematic, dramatic,
and thrilling than Hollywood could ever dream up. In this chapter, I retell the story of the hunt
for and killing of Osama bin Laden, as told in the authorized discourse, using Joseph Campbell’s
(1949) “Hero’s Journey,” as adapted by Christopher Vogler ([1998] 2007), to make plain the
familiar, formulaic, and ubiquitous story architectures utilized throughout the authorized
discourse to produce performative fusion in audiences, and by extension, consent for violent
American cultural hegemony.

Vogler (2007) drew from psychologist Carl Jung and mythic studies scholar Joseph Campbell’s
The Hero with a Thousand Faces to explicate a 12-step story architecture as presented in Figure
3.
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Figure 3
Vogler’s abbreviated Hero’s Journey
Source: movieoutline.com

Vogler (2007:xv) emphasizes that Campbell did not “create” this framework, rather the great
accomplishment is “articulat[ing] clearly something that had been there all along.” While
Campbell drew on ancient myths and Vogler claims there is a universalism in the Hero’s
Journey, his adaptation is distinctly American, the hero is an “admirable, virtuous” warrior who
brings about “happy endings and tidy resolutions” by “overcoming evil by individual effort”
(2007:xix), and distinctly masculine, “sometimes critiqued…[as] cooked up by men to enforce
their dominance, and with little relevance to the unique and quite different journey of
womanhood” (2007:xxi). While these can be severe limitations of the framework in other
circumstances, in the context of this study, these are strengths as they highlight American
cultural traits and preferences and highlight the valorization of the masculine warrior hero
deployed to retaliate against Osama bin Laden.

Heroes – innocent Americans who banded together to help each other as a group, George W.
Bush and later Barack Obama, national security officials and intelligence agents and analysts,
first responders, military troops in general and US Navy SEALs Matt Bissonnette and Robert
O’Neill in particular – are introduced in The Ordinary World before September 11, 2001, where
they receive The Call to Adventure as agents of righteous retaliation for the 9/11 attacks. These
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heroes, and American society more broadly, then Cross the First Threshold into The Special
World, literally in terms of deployments to the rugged terrain of Afghanistan and culturally
through a massive shift in policy and public opinion on homeland security. Once across the
threshold, a CIA-Special Forces unit fails to capture bin Laden in the mountains of Tora Bora in
late 2001 and the long hunt continues. The heroes encounter Tests, Allies, and Enemies,
confronting one frustrating obstacle after another while bin Laden remained at-large.

In late 2010 the CIA uncovered the identity of an al Qaeda courier, known up until then only by
nom-de-guerre Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, and followed him back to the ominous, secretive, and
suspicious compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. From that plot twist until May 1, 2011, the night
of the operation, the heroes – all those involved with vetting the intelligence and planning the
raid – Approach the Inmost Cave. Crossing a second threshold, the SEALs endure The Ordeal
during the raid – a helicopter crash, enemy fire, managing women and children on site, the
specter of the Pakistani military – but ultimately take possession of their Reward, bin Laden’s
corpse. Obama and his team experience The Ordeal from the White House. The SEALs returned
to the thanks of their president, desperate gratitude for closure from many Americans, raucous
celebrations across the United States, and extensive news coverage and analysis. The SEALs
Returned with the Elixir, in this case not a physical trophy from the Special World, but a story
with the power to heal. While some 9/11 families were not comforted by bin Laden’s death and
some commentators were critical of the operation, these oppositional and negotiated positions
were aggressively silenced when they attempted to penetrate the authorized discourse.
Ultimately, the heroes return to The Ordinary World where the story began. Many perceive their
actions as serving justice and restoring some semblance of moral order, but an extreme,
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militarized, security-seeking social and cultural order had already taken hold and things will
never be quite as they were.

As I move through each phase of the Hero’s Journey framework, keeping in mind the larger
project of tracing the construction of cultural trauma of and righteous retaliation for the 9/11
attacks using melodramatic tropes and genre as a tactic of hegemony maintenance, I detail
specific works from the authorized discourse as well as how these stages manifest in the
Calydonian Boar’s Hunt in Homer’s The Iliad, to demonstrate the cultural entrenchment of the
formula and to understand its resonance. I conclude by presenting the various ways interviewees
and focus group participants grappled with the story structure of the hunt and their experiences
with performative fusion or aggressive silencing of alternative narratives and opinions about bin
Laden’s death.
The Ordinary World: Post-Cold War, Pre-9/11
In The Iliad, Meleager, son of King Oineus and Queen Althea of Calydon, is a famous hero, a
brave hunter, and a javelin expert. His days are fairly static; he goes about his everyday life
embodying the status of nearly-invincible warrior.
Countless politicians, media commentators, and public intellectuals describe the clear blue
September sky on the morning of the 9/11 attacks as a symbol of a more innocent time, a
purportedly peaceful status quo. The time between the end of the Cold War and the attacks of
September 11, 2001 is largely remembered in the United States as prosperous, quiet, and stable.
Dinesh D’Souza (2002:3; excerpted in the New York Times, July 7, 2002) glibly put it, “Before
the terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center, crashed a plane into the Pentagon, and began
their campaign to bring to America the horrors of the war-ravaged Middle East, life in the United
States was placid and even a little boring” as he itemizes the various frivolous concerns
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dominating American news at the turn of the 21st century.35 President Bill Clinton certainly had
his detractors and there was ample discussion about America’s role in the world, but with the end
of the Cold War the United States sat atop the newly-unipolar international order, a confident
hegemon, finally victorious over the formidable ideological counterhegemony of the Soviet
Union. This was bolstered by a booming economy, a quick and decisive masculine clapback at
Iraq after its military invaded maiden Kuwait, and growing cultural pride in subtle changes in the
American collective consciousness toward “tolerance,” “multiculturalism,” and “inclusion.”

In pre-9/11 Ordinary World America, terrorism was not a primary concern. According to an
April 2000 Gallup Poll, only 4% of Americans were “very worried” and only 20% were
“somewhat worried” about terrorism. When asked again on September 11, 2001, these numbers
skyrocketed to 23% and 35%, respectively, and those “very” or “somewhat worried” about
terrorism hovered around or exceeded 50% through the most recent sample taken in December
2015, except for a brief lull to the high thirties in 2011 after the death of Osama bin Laden
(Gallup 2015). The news reflected this trend in public opinion. Pew Research reports that after
9/11, “[t]he number of minutes devoted to coverage of foreign policy was up 102%, according to
ADT’s data. Coverage of armed conflict rose 69%. Coverage of terrorism rose 135%” (Pew
Research 2015).36

This, to some extent, reflects military and political history. Scahill (2013:51) discloses that while
35

The peace and prosperity narrative was conjured in hindsight to contrast to the needs of the new threat. On one
hand, during the 1990s the United States was deeply critiqued from without for both ignoring humanitarian crises,
particularly in the Balkans and Rwanda, and for poorly conceived military action. On the other hand, domestically,
the Right panicked about the collapse of moral order and was already churning out deeply Islamophobic rhetoric, as
exemplified in Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations.”
36
Pew examined “the four years of network newscasts prior to 2001 (1997 to 2000) and the four years since (2002
through 2005) according to data generated for the Project for Excellence in Journalism by ADT Research, which
publishes the Tyndall Report” (Pew Research 2015).
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the founders of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC, <jay-sock>) “conceived of it as an
antiterrorist force,” before 9/11 it was mostly used for “other types of missions.” He goes so far
as to say Special Operations Forces “were used with trepidation for the decade preceding 9/11”
(2013:53). While before 9/11 there did exist a CIA Bin Laden Issue Station, more popularly
referred to as Alec Station, named for its first chief’s Michael Scheuer’s son,
Alec Station was so low-profile it was housed ‘off campus’…Scheuer and his
staff of 15 or so – mostly junior-grade, mostly female – toiled in their
cubicles…A bunker mentality set in at Alec Station. Them against us. Up on
Langley’s seventh floor, in the executive suites, the top brass started to view
Scheuer as a hysteric, spinning doomsday scenarios… ‘The Manson family,’
some started calling him and his staff” (Zeman et al., Vanity Fair, November
2004).
Finally, while President Clinton faced tremendous criticism within the national security
establishment over failing to assassinate bin Laden, most in the highest ranks did not consider the
threat to be unprecedented or high priority. For example, according to Scahill (2013:14),
“Ironically – for all of [former Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld’s bravado about the
weakness of the Clinton era, and neocon charges that the Democrats had been asleep at the wheel
watching al Qaeda – Rumsfeld himself was initially dismissive of the imminence of the threat
posed by the group prior to 9/11.”

Overall, American civilians, government officials, and military brass alike were living in The
Ordinary World, fairly “oblivious to the adventures to come” (Vogler 2007:10). When the books,
documentaries, and films about the hunt for Osama bin Laden attend to this preliminary stage,
they are offering audiences the opportunity to learn about the hero’s nature, their outlook, and
their capabilities to anchor the hero and to build identification with and empathy for the hero’s
position in the adventure to come, a topic I return to in Chapter 5.
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The Call to Adventure: September 11, 2001
King Oineus fails to make a sacrifice to the goddess Artemis. As punishment, she sends a boar to
“ravage” the land of Calydon. The King calls upon his son Meleager to hunt down and kill the
boar.
During the Call to Adventure, heroes experience a direct threat to peace, to the safety of their
community, and to their way of life. This could include a destructive boar, a monster, asteroids,
or any threat one could dream up, but in this case, the 9/11 “terrorist attacks” were the Call to
Adventure for the story’s heroes. The event disrupts the comfort and complacency of the
Ordinary World. The very naming of the event as “9/11” solidified and reinforced it as a turning
point event (Wagner-Pacifici 2017). I will discuss the quest the heroes were presented with in
The Crossing of the First Threshold. For now, I seek to establish that the attacks were presented
within the authorized discourse as 1) entirely unprompted and irrational or evil, 2) of
unprecedented magnitude, and 3) worthy of revenge. Taken together, with 9/11 constructed as
cultural trauma, violent retaliation can be constructed as a righteous necessity.

President George W. Bush set the wheels in motion for cultural carrier groups to construct 9/11
as an attack on American values and way of life of unprecedented proportions, that would
forever alter shared history and identity: a cultural trauma (Alexander et al. 2004a). On the
evening of the attacks, Bush said,
Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in
a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts…Thousands of lives were suddenly
ended by evil, despicable acts of terror…America was targeted for attack because
we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one
will keep that light from shining (2001:57).
On September 20, 2001, he added,
Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city
on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before
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on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and
night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack
(2001:66).
NBC’s Andrea Mitchell reminded American audiences of this original framing in her reporting
the morning after bin Laden was killed. Her segment included file footage of Bush stating, “Our
responsibility to history is already clear: To answer these attacks and rid the world of evil”
(NBC, Today Show, May 2, 2011).

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:1), a fact-finding government document, describes its
mission in the preface: “September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in
the history of the United States. The nation was unprepared. How did this happen, and how can
we avoid such tragedy again?” Its authors’ subjective framing is then contrasted against the
moments before the traumatic violence, “Tuesday, September 11, 2001 dawned temperate and
nearly cloudless in the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for
work” (2004:1). Readers are not encouraged to understand the attacks as anything other than a
traumatizing disruption to an innocent existence.

While President Barack Obama quickly discontinued official use of Bush’s “global war on
terrorism,” he maintained continuity in constructing 9/11 as culturally traumatic: unprecedented,
unprompted, and unacceptable. On March 27, 2009, he stated, “The United States of America
did not choose to fight a war in Afghanistan…Nearly 3,000 of our people were killed on
September 11, 2001 for doing nothing more than going about their daily lives” (Obama 2009a).
Obama reiterated this interpretation of events to a global audience in his June 2009 speech in
Cairo, when he explained Americans didn’t go to war “by choice, we went because of
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necessity…Let us be clear: al Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 people on that day. The victims were
innocent men, women and children from America and many other nations who had done nothing
to harm anybody. And yet al Qaeda chose to ruthlessly murder these people” (Obama 2009b). A
2013 speech on US policy on drones in counterterrorism reinforced his earlier narrations with his
renowned and enticing prose:
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad,
and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home. And for a moment, it
seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then, on September 11,
2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as
clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a
different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the
principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as
they could. And so our nation went to war (Obama 2013).
This discursive framing by the state, uninterrupted but by no means given, was fundamental to
the news coverage of the Abbottabad raid in 2011. Before Rahema Ellis’s recap of NBC’s
reporting the morning of 9/11 on NBC Nightly News’ broadcast the evening after the raid, anchor
Brian Williams said, “Every so often we’re forced to remember in detail what happened on 9/11.
Tonight it’s probably useful to remember what Osama bin Laden did to us here” (NBC, NBC
Nightly News, May 2, 2011). The same evening, CNN’s The Situation Room anchor Jack
Cafferty reminded, “The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 were unlike anything most
Americans had ever seen before. Three thousand innocent people murdered in cold blood on our
own soil, it was an event that saddened and terrified the entire country” (CNN, The Situation
Room, May 2, 2011).

The films and books about the hunt for and killing of Osama bin Laden echo this framing and
explicitly use the traumatic wound of 9/11 as the Call to Adventure, the narrative drive that sets
the plot of the book or film in motion. Zero Dark Thirty, the Hollywood feature, begins with
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recordings of the frantic phone calls coming from the four hijacked flights before the film’s
action begins in a CIA interrogation years later. The Smithsonian documentary, The Hunt for bin
Laden, opens, “For most of the world, September 11, 2001 is a catastrophe without warning”
(Smithsonian Channel 2012). The narrator of CIA Confidential: Operation Jawbreaker, a
documentary about the 2001 Battle of Tora Bora states, “On 9/11, bin Laden had brought his
holy war from his base in Afghanistan to American soil. The attacks forever changed the game
for the CIA. Now the gloves are off” (National Geographic Channel 2009). The Discovery
Channel’s Killing bin Laden and The History Channel’s Targeted: Osama bin Laden both
emphasize the starting point of the conflict with al Qaeda: their offensive aggression. Killing bin
Laden’s narrator states, “The al Qaeda leader who unleashed 9/11 on America and sparked a ten
year long war on terror has been struck down” (Discovery Channel 2001, emphasis added) and
Col. Brian Hiferty, of US Combined Forces Command, Kabul, reminds the filmmakers of
Targeted: Osama bin Laden, “We’re here in Afghanistan because of September 11, 2001. 3,000
innocent men, women, and children were killed by al Qaeda. And so we came here to bring
justice to those people” (History Channel 2004, emphasis added).

In The Finish: The Killing of Osama bin Laden, one of the two journalistic expert recountings of
the hunt and raid, Mark Bowden (2012:64-66), author of Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern
War and Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw, writes of 9/11:
The events were unprecedented. America has had its share of bloodshed, invasion,
and surprise attack. Pearl Harbor was a living memory for millions…[9/11] was
heedless slaughter of our fellow citizens right before our eyes…Some persistent
critics of the United States would argue that the country had brought this on itself.
They would blame, among other things, self-serving Middle East policies,
attitudes of cultural supremacy, and a steadfast disregard for growing global
disparities in wealth and opportunity. Obama’s own statements hinted at this. But
it was apparent to most that the attacks were rooted in something darker.
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Washington’s global strategies, intrigues, and alliances stirred anger in many parts
of the world, particularly the Middle East. Anti-Americanism was real and
dangerous. But this…went to some deep well of hatred. The death of innocents
has always been a tragic consequence of war, but this was random murder as
strategy. It was something new, or, perhaps, something very old (emphasis in
original).
Bowden spends considerable time in the opening chapter, “A Definition of Evil: September 11,
2001,” casting 9/11 as so culturally traumatic, even a measured, liberal scholar like Obama
owned the need for retaliation,
But on September 11 he confronted something that challenged that hopeful
insight. Search as he might for some logic to justify or mitigate these attacks, no
reach of empathy or reason got him there. Bin Laden’s hateful beliefs could not
be reconciled. Despite the soft tone of his remarks to the Hyde Park newspaper
[immediately after the attacks], Obama also spoke of “a fundamental absence of
empathy on the part of the attackers: an inability to imagine, or connect with, the
humanity of suffering of others” (2012:68).
He also cites Obama’s memoir,
“It’s beyond my skill as a writer to capture that day and the days that would
follow. The planes like specters vanishing into steel and glass, the slow-motion
cascade of towers crumbling into themselves. The ash-covered figures wandering
the streets. The anguish and fear. Nor do I pretend to understand the stark nihilism
that drove terrorists that day and drives their brethren still. My powers of
empathy, my ability to reach into another’s heart cannot penetrate the blank stares
of those who would murder innocents with abstract, serene satisfaction”
(2012:69-70).37
Later Bowden (2012:153-154) adds,
Those who had been paying close attention to Obama were not surprised [by
“Obama’s appreciation and enthusiasm for the Special Operations
Command”]…Just over a year after the September 11 attacks….Obama…was
invited to speak at an antiwar rally in Chicago [where he said] “After September
11, after witnessing the carnage and destruction, the dust and the tears, I
supported this administration’s pledge to hunt down and root out those who would
slaughter innocents in the name of intolerance, and I would willingly take up arms
myself to prevent such a tragedy from happing again.”

37

I cite Bowden rather than Obama’s memoir directly because the Bowden book is part of my “authorized
discourse” dataset.
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The Navy SEALs who have written accounts of the raid within the broader memoirs about their
lives and service, each characterize 9/11 in similar terms: a catalyst, a beginning that swept them
up. Mark Bissonnette, writing under pseudonym “Mark Owen” (2012:3-4), wrote about his
thoughts as his helicopter approached bin Laden’s residence the night of the operation38:
This was the mission I’d dreamt about since I watched the September 11, 2001
attacks on TV in my barracks room in Okinawa. I was just back from training and
got into my room in time to see the second plane crash into the World Trade
Center. I couldn’t turn away as the fireball shot out of the opposite side of the
building and smoke billowed out of the tower. Like millions of Americans back
home, I stood there watching in disbelief with a hopeless feeling in the pit of my
stomach. I stayed transfixed to the screen for the rest of the day as my mind tried
to the make sense of what I’d just witnessed. One plane crash could be an
accident. The unfolding news coverage confirmed what I had known the moment
the second plane entered the TV shot. A second plane was an attack, no doubt. No
way that happened by accident. On September 11, 2001 I was on my first
deployment as a SEAL, and as Osama bin Laden’s name was mentioned I figured
my unit would get the call to go to Afghanistan the next day…We never got the
call. I was frustrated. I hadn’t trained so hard and for so long to become a SEAL
only to watch the war on TV…Now, as the Black Hawks flew toward our target, I
though back over the last ten years. Ever since the attacks, everyone in my line of
work had dreamt of being involved in a mission like this. The al Qaeda leader
personified everything we were fighting against. He’d inspired men to fly planes
into buildings filled with innocent civilians. That kind of fanaticism is scary and
as I watched the towers crumble and saw reports of attacks in Washington, D.C.,
and Pennsylvania, I knew we were at war, and not a war of our choosing.
Likewise, Navy SEAL author Robert O’Neill (2017:5) dedicated his book, The Operator: Firing
the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL Team Warrior, to “the victims
of 9/11 and their families who never asked to be in the fight, but were and are. It was in memory
of you that I fought.” Chuck Pfarrer, author of SEAL Target: Geronimo (2011:154), a searing
indictment of and purported correction to the news coverage of the raid that emphasizes
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Throughout the substantive chapters, I refer to Matt Bissonnette by his name. I attribute quotes from No Easy Day
to his pseudonym, Mark Owen. While Bissonnette believed he needed to remain anonymous, and, for example,
appeared on his 2012 60 Minutes interview in prosthetic makeup, it is common knowledge that the account is by
Bissonnette and news refer to him as such. Intermittently, I remind readers of this in the text.
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government failings over biographical context asserts, “Even now, America struggles with a sort
of posttraumatic shock about 9/11.”
The construction of cultural trauma through the temporal sequencing of events is essential to the
activation of agents of righteous retaliation. They started it. In America’s cultural and moral
framework about violence, the attacks could not be rooted in rational grievances about American
foreign policy because that would require the United States to engage in real dialogue and selfreflection and make fundamental changes to policy, engagement the hegemony sought to avoid.
If al Qaeda would relentlessly and irrationally attack the US, punishing retaliation is the only
alternative. Bowden (2012:74) summarizes that lawful and just warfare must be a “necessity
(violence as a last resort),” must engage “distinction (targeting the right people),” and must
ensure “proportionality (not killing the wrong people)” and argued in this framework that “very
few would argue that the nation was not justified in using force to protect itself from Osama bin
Laden and his movement, bent on suicidal acts of mass murder.”

Cerulo’s (1998) use of Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) point-horizons, in her work on the role of
sequencing in interpretations of violence, explains why, according to Nikhil Pal Singh
(Intercepted, February 14, 2018), “the one thing that was disallowed right from the beginning of
9/11, you could not make an argument that there was motive. You could not make an argument
that the people who committed that act might have had even a kernel of rational grievance that
motivated it. It could only be the act of what came to be called terror. And the only answer that
we can engage in, in response to that, is our own kind of traumatizing violence.”
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The interpretations of the attacks offered by agents across the authorized discourse are not given,
natural, or inevitable. While objective physical violence undoubtedly occurred, it does not
“speak for itself.” As Jackson (2005:58) suggests, “different kinds of words and language could
have been employed by officials. Employing a dissimilar vocabulary would have fixed a
different set of meanings and a different set of options for responding to those attacks.” Rather,
this framing, “establish[es] American understanding of the events as part of a long and heroic
struggle against totalitarian and murderous ideologies such as fascism and communism…[T]he
attacks were part of the eternal struggle between the forces of enlightened progress and the dark
forces of backwardness, primitivism, and savagery (Jackson 2005:57-58). In this frame, the hunt
was a moral imperative.

The Hero’s Journey includes Refusal of the Call to Adventure and Meeting the Mentor. As
Vogler (2007:xvii) explains, the structure is a “form, not a formula…it should be employed
sparingly and with great sensitivity for the needs of the particular story” (2007:xviii). Neither
Meleager in The Iliad nor Bush and his armed forces were reluctant heroes filled with self-doubt,
nor did they require training to prepare for the battle to come. In these particular manifestations
of the hunt, the hunters were lying in wait.
Crossing the Threshold: Declaration of Wars and The Cultural Shift
Meleager leads the team of hunters into the wilderness in search of the ravaging boar. All of
Calydon is gripped with fear, relying on the heroes’ success.
Just one week after the 9/11 attacks, the United States was ready to begin its retaliation. On
September 18, 2001 Congress passed the sweeping Authorization of the Use of Military Force
(AUMF). It granted extraordinary powers to the president, utilized an amorphous definition of
threats, and characterized all violence henceforth, across borders, as defensive:
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Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence were committed
against the United States and its citizens; and
Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United
States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both
at home and abroad; and
Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States posed by these grave acts of violence; and
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States; and
Whereas, the President has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter
and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States…That the
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons
(AUMF, Public Law 107-40, emphasis in original).
While the AUMF was dangerously broad (and still underpins lethal US counterterrorism
measures today), Bush also maintained focus on Osama bin Laden. The same day, USA Today
reported, “Harkening back to the Old West mythology he remembers from his childhood, Bush
said in response to a question about whether he wants militant mastermind Osama bin Laden
dead, ‘I want justice. And there's an old poster out West, that I recall, that said, ‘Wanted: Dead or
Alive’” (Hall and Benedetto, USA Today, September 18, 2001). Bush also mentioned bin Laden
by name on September 20, 2001, when he addressed a joint session of Congress to declare a war
against terrorism.

He began the speech by remarking on the traits and behaviors of the heroes, at this point in the
story, everyday Americans from The Ordinary World: “in the normal course of events,
presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the union. Tonight, no such report is
needed; it has already been delivered by the American people…My fellow citizens, for the last
nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of the union, and it is strong” (Bush
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2001:65). He then moves to the task at hand, announcing the war on terror and convincing
Americans that “crossing a threshold” is necessary and appropriate:
Tonight, we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our
grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies
to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. Our war on terror
begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated… From this day
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded
by the United States as a hostile regime (2001:65).
The president asked Americans to accept major changes at home and abroad, warning them this
long-term effort would require patience and tenacity, exemplifying the stark ‘us and them’
thinking emblematic of his presidency:
Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes.
Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other
we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert
operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them
one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no
rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every
nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you
are with the terrorists. From this day forward any nation that continues to harbor
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime
(2001:69).
Next, on the home front, he describes a “comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our
country against terrorism” including the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security
headed by Tom Ridge, who he described as “a military veteran, an effective governor, a true
patriot, a trusted friend” (Bush 2001:69). Bush also explains improvements to air safety and
“additional tools” for law enforcement to “track down terror here at home” (Bush 2001:71).

Finally, crucial to global hegemony maintenance, Bush asks the world to cross the threshold into
a perpetual, comprehensive “war against terrorism” alongside the United States:
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This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just
America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is
the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom…An
attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America’s side.
They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own
citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, cannot only bring down buildings, it
can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what – we’re
not going to allow it (2001:57).
In the face of this declarative position on what was to come, the Taliban in Afghanistan refused
to hand Osama bin Laden over to the United States. On October 7, 2001, Bush announced,
More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific
demands: Close terrorist training camps. Hand over leaders of the al Qaeda
network, and return all foreign nationals, including American citizens unjustly
detained in your country… None of these demands was met, and now, the Taliban
will pay a price…On my order, U.S. forces have begun strikes on terrorist camps
of al Qaeda, and the military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
(2001:75).
The intransigence of the Taliban, then, much like the murderous irrationality of al Qaeda, forced
the hand of the United States. They chose war. The military action in Afghanistan altered the
status of the story’s heroes. While everyday Americans from the Ordinary World were heroic in
the first month after the attacks, now that the warrior heroes have crossed the threshold into the
Special World – the unfamiliar, dangerous, and rugged terrain of Afghanistan to hunt down the
villain to bring him to justice – Americans back home are asked to cross their own threshold as
victims that would involve major transformations in civil liberties in the name of security. The
“rapid sedimentation of core narratives, metaphors, and discourses surrounding terrorism,” the
passing of legislation like the PATRIOT Act, “widespread use of securitization and risk
management practices which spread across many sectors of society,” as well as “the enactment
of new legal measures and the institutionalization of counterterrorism agencies and procedures,”
particularly the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and its Transportation
Security Agency and the “1271 government bodies and 1931 private contractor companies
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working on aspects of counterterrorism in the United States, employing nearly a million people,
(Pilkington 2010)” and

the “memorialization, or the collective remembering and

commemoration of events and lives lost,” all enabled normalization of a culture of terrorism
fears (Jackson 2013:271-273). In these early days, according to Gallup Polls, 8 in 10 Americans
supported the war in Afghanistan (Moore, Gallup News, November 1, 2001) and 7 in 10
Americans hoped that if the United States was able to apprehend bin Laden alive, he would be
given a death sentence (Jones, Gallup News, December 19, 2001).

One way to make sense of the extensive and significant cultural changes that accompanied the
declaration of war on Afghanistan (and terrorism itself) is to examine the gendered and racialized
dynamics that destabilized the confident hegemon. The so-called status quo of the 1990s, in
which the (white) hegemon(ic masculinity of the state) was confident in its grip on power and
cultural supremacy, gave way after the turning point event of 9/11. Once al Qaeda illegitimately
performed traits and engaged in actions previously associated with and only permissible for the
hegemon, subordinated Muslim masculinities were reconstructed as a destabilizing terrorist
masculinity. As John Dower (2010:61) puts it
The shocking success of the little Muslim men abruptly endowed them with
hitherto undreamed-of powers and capabilities…As another counterterrorism
expert put it, “we magnified our mental image of terrorists as bogeymen.” Yet
another posed the rhetorical question “Are they ten feet tall?” and deemed it
necessary to answer this. “They’re not,” he assured his audience.
“They’re not,” but the hegemonic masculinity of the state converted into a distinctly anxious
mode. This was amplified after 9/11, but did not begin there. Rather, there was a strong historical
legacy to draw upon. Oliverio (1998:68), writing before 9/11, explains that sometimes
the use of force by the United States served as a warning to the whole world not
to challenge the superpower…the US state reaction [to the hijacking of TWA
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Flight 847] was an attempt not only to deter future similar acts, but also to educate
the international community and to display its political prowess…[D]espite the
state emphasis on eliminating such action by reacting forcibly to it and thereby
punishing those who challenge its authority, the actual response or levying of
punishment is not done for the sake of the offender, but for political purposes. We
need only to refer to the analogy of a similar situation at the national level in the
United States: the expansion of criminal law and punitive sanctions, which has led
to an increase in prison populations – not the opposite. The use of violence to
control terrorism is viewed as a socially acceptable state response to the act.
Of the roots of anxious masculinity in American history, Susan Faludi (2007:191-192) writes,
the post-9/11 effort to restore Americans’ confidence in the country’s
impregnability…ran deep in the American past, far deeper than the superhero
fantasies we constructed around our leaders. The attack on home soil triggered a
search for a guardian of the homestead, a manly man, to be sure, but one
particularly suited to protecting and providing for the isolated American family in
perilous situations. He was less Batman than Daniel Boone, a frontiersman whose
proofs of eligibility were the hatchet and the gun – and a bloody willingness to
wield them.
This “bloody willingness” was legitimated through the construction of the masculine protector
defending his family by reasserting supremacy over terrorizing native populations and freed
slaves, absolute threats to his people’s innocent existence.

Justified subtly through these long-standing cultural logics, the president, an aficionado of John
Wayne’s Old West, asked the collective victims of the attacks to support the heroes crossing the
threshold into war. Only then could the United States reassert supremacy and restore America’s
rightful confident position atop the Anglo-American-led international hierarchy where no foreign
entity can use violence against the West. Those who assumed Afghanistan would be a quick
masculine clapback like the first Persian Gulf War were sorely mistaken and the obstacles to
come would only enhance the role of anxious masculinity in the story of the hunt for Osama bin
Laden.
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Tests, Allies, Enemies: The Battle of Tora Bora, The Long Hunt, and The Cold Trail
Meleager and his hunting party face obstacles, enemies, and allies as they search for the boar,
increasing the anticipation for its eventual capture.
“Once across the First Threshold,” Vogler (2007:13) explains, “the hero naturally encounters
new challenges and Tests, makes Allies and Enemies, and begins to learn the rules of the Special
World.” For the American civilians who had crossed a cultural threshold over time to varying
degrees, submitting to normalized surveillance and screening, especially at airports, this meant
coming to terms with hyper-securitization “against terrorism,” and its corresponding racial
profiling and futile inconvenience, as a way of life. For the US military and intelligence officers
tasked with ousting the Taliban and killing or capturing bin Laden, this meant facing the
challenges of the physical and political landscape in Afghanistan.

Set to heart-pounding music common to action movies, the narrator of the documentary film CIA
Confidential: Hunt for Bin Laden (National Geographic Channel 2009) sets the stage for the first
major event of the post-9/11 hunt, the 2001 Battle of Tora Bora:
It was the mission that would change the face of warfare. The CIA’s top-secret
infiltration of one of the most dangerous regions on the planet. A rapid response
team from the CIA will slip into Afghanistan and covertly build the foundation
for war. And this isn’t business as usual, it’s personal. Now a small band of CIA
officers will brave terrible odds and a brutal landscape in order to crush al Qaeda,
destroy the Taliban, and find and kill the man responsible for attacks of
September 11.
After deposing39 the Taliban by November 13, 2001, according to Henry Crumpton, former
deputy chief of operations for the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center who led the CIA’s Afghanistan
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“Deposed” is the term used across the authorized discourse to describe the temporary American victory over the
Taliban in 2001. Much like the word “engage” is used by Navy SEALs when they mean “shoot” and “eliminate” is
used to mean “kill,” this sanitized word obscures the human impact: What this looks like in practice is that within 90
days of 9/11, the United States killed 10,000 members of the Taliban, according to CIA Confidential, and 2,567-
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campaign 2001-2002, “a group of 20 US CIA National Clandestine Service and 5th Special
Forces Group team members, code-named Jawbreaker, were inserted by helicopter in Jalalabad,
Afghanistan” and subsequently followed bin Laden to “a mountainous, lawless region in the
blast dust mountains of Tora Bora.” The film’s narrator adds: “By December 16, Osama bin
Laden escaped the most powerful military machine on earth and disappeared across the border to
Pakistan” (National Geographic Channel 2009).

Two distinct chances to first capture and then kill bin Laden were missed in Tora Bora. In early
December, bin Laden offered a negotiated surrender, but Gary Berntsen, Former CIA Senior
Operations Officer, said, “absolutely not” to bringing the United Nations in, claiming it was
more important “to break any possible truce between the Afghans and al Qaeda instantly,
because that would be time he’d use to escape.” Second, on December 15, the day before bin
Laden escaped, he was spotted and the US bombed the reported location for three hours. Delta
Troop commander at Tora Bora Thomas Greer, known by his penname Dalton Fury in public
life, said, “at the time when we left the battle of Tora Bora we believed he was buried in that
cave.” Either he was not there or managed to escape undetected (National Geographic Channel
2009).

Throughout the authorized discourse, bin Laden’s escape was broadly attributed to the
topography and a combination of 1) failure to commit American ground troops to his pursuit, 2)
the treachery of deserting local mercenaries and militaries who had pledged to serve as back up
to the US Special Forces unit (both the Afghan Eastern Alliance in Tora Bora and the Pakistani

2,974 Afghan civilians, according to "Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing" (Herold
2001)).
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military at the border, only 20 miles away, in the event of an attempt to flee into Pakistan) and 3)
the villainy of bin Laden, himself, who told his fighters to stave off the Americans no matter the
losses incurred, while he sneaked away out “the mountain’s back door” (National Geographic
Channel 2009). The authorized discourse routinely grapples with whether Afghan and Pakistani
fighters, political leaders, and military personnel can ever be allies. Are they enemies?

The desertion by the Eastern Alliance40 at a pivotal moment in the hunt was explained in
essentialist terms about “culture.” Berntsen, who also wrote a 2005 book41 about the battle and
his role, told CIA Confidential’s filmmakers, “Afghans are tribal. They don’t get along with one
another. And when they do cooperate it’s usually against foreign invaders. This is what makes it
difficult.” The film’s narrator explained, “The money and weapons they’d supplied the Eastern
Alliance can’t erase long held tribal ties and a local reverence for the target of the war. Killing
bin Laden would make someone a hero in the West but here in the heavily tribal Pashtun region
it’s a stigma no one wants to carry.”

The small force on the ground also felt hung out to dry by American military brass. Mary Anne
Weaver wrote for a September 11, 2005 New York Times’ Magazine piece, “The view prevailing
among senior American military leaders was that overwhelming air power, suitcases full of cash
and surrogate militias could win the war. The intricacies of Afghan tribal life appeared to elude
everyone” (Weaver, New York Times Magazine, September 11, 2005). Crumpton explained to
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The Eastern Alliance was a coalition of three militias led by former anti-Soviet mujahedeen who helped to
overthrow the Taliban in mid-November 2001. The Associated Press typically referred to it in lower case as the
“eastern alliance,” and it is often referred to only as "anti-Taliban forces in Eastern Afghanistan" or simply
“America's Afghan allies.”
41
I cite the film and not the book because only “enthusiasts” would have read it, but this television documentary
aired on PBS and The National Geographic Channel in Primetime.
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CIA Confidential, “The pentagon had no military plan to engage al Qaeda in Afghanistan so the
CIA, based on intelligence collected over the years, based on its networks, provided the plan for
the engagement in Afghanistan.” As such, requests for more support were denied from the
outset. After the Eastern Alliance backed out, the team on the ground in Afghanistan asked for
800 Army Rangers to block the escape routes. This request was also denied. The Special
Operations Forces Report, SOFREP, a news site operated by former Navy SEAL Brandon Webb,
explained,
The truth is we didn’t get Bin Laden at Tora Bora because we made a conscious
and very effective decision to go into Afghanistan light. Peter Feaver (National
Security Council member) said it best. “The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
succeeded because of the ‘light’ approach used. Losing OBL at Tora Bora was the
price of that light approach. We had Bin Laden within reach at Tora Bora
precisely because we were willing to try the very light-footprint approach.” We
didn’t have the aircraft. We didn’t have the troops. We didn’t have the logistics
(fuel, FARPs and ability to mass troops). We didn’t have the time to decide, plan,
resource and execute. Finally, we didn’t have the conclusive evidence to change
any of the above (SOFREP, March 2, 2017).
This first schism between Special Forces on the ground and military brass foreshadows
contentions between Special Operations Command and other more conventional units within the
military raised later in this chapter and explored further in Chapter 5.

The “light” approach brought another long-term alliance into question. When it was decided that
no further military support would be sent to the 12-man Special Forces team in Tora Bora, the
United States delegated guarding the Afghan/Pakistan border to the Pakistani military. The
tenuous relationship with Pakistan has been a conflictual and unpredictable one for most of its
history and was still at play after the 2011 raid. Weaver (New York Times Magazine, September
11, 2005) asked when reflecting on the Battle of Tora Bora, “Was Pakistan an ally who would
turn bin Laden over as soon as he crossed the border?” She “asked Gary Schroen, the former
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C.I.A. officer, ‘How would this affect [then-Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf if he agreed?’
[…] He thought for a moment, and then he replied, ‘If his hand was ever seen as the one that
turned bin Laden over, he wouldn't be able to survive.”

Finally, according to the authorized discourse, perhaps the greatest challenge stemmed from Tora
Bora’s physical geography and the “enemy’s” familiarity with their own terrain, which was
completely new and foreign to the Americans. As stated by Bernsten, “Afghanistan is a hostile,
harsh environment…In the winter, it is harsh, it is an unforgiving place.” Of Tora Bora itself, he
remarked, “This is an area where it is very, very jagged, rough terrain.” Referring to the Afghan
people, he continued, “It’s their territory, their ground, they know the ground very well and they
are prepared to fight on it…and [the Americans] are going up into these mountains in search of a
superior force that is more than 100 times their size” (National Geographic 2009). Weaver (New
York Times Magazine, September 11, 2005)
asked Masood Farivar, a former Khalis [Eastern Alliance] officer who had fought
in Tora Bora during the jihad, to tell me why the caves were so important.
“They're rugged, formidable and isolated,” he said. “If you know them, you can
come and go with ease. But if you don't, they're a labyrinth that you can't
penetrate.” They rise in some places to 14,000 feet, and for 10 years the Soviets
pummeled them with everything they had, but to absolutely no avail. Another
reason they're so important is their proximity to the border and to Pakistan.
The emphasis on “dangerous” and “brutal” geography is significant. Conquest over nature is a
core component of American hegemonic masculinity from expansionist settler colonialism to the
contemporary military (Faludi 2007; Light 2017). The hypermasculine American terrorist
hunters were attempting to protect and avenge their feminized, violated homeland against these
cave dwellers, but the terrain was just too challenging to restore masculine pride.
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The Bush administration tried to play off the failure. For example, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld “sought to put the best face on the frustrating and so far fruitless search for Mr. bin
Laden: ‘He’s either dug in some tunnel, or he's alive. And if he's alive, he's either in Afghanistan
or he isn’t. And it does not matter; we’ll find him one day’” (Gordon and Schmitt, New York
Times, December 19, 2001.) Behind closed doors, however, the frustration was palpable. Bin
Laden’s escape was maddening and emasculating for the Bush administration. Peter Bergen
writes,
As the years passed after 9/11, President Bush abandoned his early “dead or
alive” rhetoric about finding bin Laden and rarely mentioned him in public. If he
did, it was to say, as he did in March 2002, that bin Laden had been
“marginalized.” After all, there was no need to add to the al Qaeda leader’s
already-mythic profile by reminding the world that he continued to elude
America’s grasp. In private, though, Bush never let the subject go. Michael
Hayden, the CIA director during much of Bush’s second term, recalls, “As I
would walk into the Oval Office about 8 o’clock on a Thursday morning, the
President would kind of look up from the desk and say, ‘Well, Mike, how’re we
doing?’ And there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that was in the Oval, what he
was talking about. He was talking about the pursuit of Osama bin Laden””
(Bergen 2012:103-104).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Bush’s Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend corroborated
that this was a daily request. A former director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center, Jose
Rodriguez, recalled,
I was asked where bin Laden is all the time. When I went to testify before
Congress the first thing they asked was “where is bin Laden?” I went to the Oval
Office a number of times, I was asked by the president, “where is bin Laden?”
Everyone would ask the same question, “where was bin Laden?” It was very
frustrating to basically have to admit you didn’t know. One time, one of my
colleagues came in to talk to me about where’s bin Laden and I told him, look, I
am so tired of this, the next time the next person asks me “where is bin Laden?”
I’m gonna say, you know what, Fuck you. Fuck you. And later that day, when I
went home, my wife asked me “where is bin Laden? And why can’t you find
him?” (HBO 2013)
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Michael Hayden lamented, “The trail was cold. When I say the trail was cold, I mean the trail
was cold” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). The authorized discourse portrayed the public doubt the
Bush administration feared. For example, Weaver (New York Times Magazine, September 11,
2005) explained, “Tora Bora was the one time after the 9/11 attacks when United States
operatives were confident they knew precisely where Osama bin Laden was and could have
captured or killed him. Some have argued that it was Washington's last chance.” Dead or alive,
hunting down and punishing bin Laden transfixed the American national security apparatus after
9/11 as a way to “restore masculine confidence in American civilization and secure moral
certitude” (Cole 2007:146).

For the next six years, “the hunt for bin Laden sputtered, encountering dry hole after dry hole.
Any news that came into the Counterterrorism Center about al-Qaeda’s leader was only in the
form of ‘Elvis sightings’…[which] still had to be run down, ‘because after 9/11 the senior
officers in the Agency and everywhere in the intelligence community were covering their asses’”
according to founder of the CIA bin Laden unit Michael Scheuer (qtd in Bergen 2012:84). The
next close call would come in 2007. In the comprehensive accounts of the 20 year hunt for bin
Laden, this mission is the next Test for the hunting heroes, but in reality, it may not be a
coincidence since “until mid-2007, ‘they were just all Iraq, all the time,’” David Kilcullen,
General David Patraeus’s advisor in Iraq and Condoleezza Rice’s advisor at the State
Department, told Peter Bergen (2012:80).

Matt Bissonnette was on the 2007 mission and describes it as a “wild-goose chase looking for
bin Laden and his white flowing robes” (Owen 2012:149). A single source reported that he saw
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bin Laden near Tora Bora and since “until this point, there was no credible intelligence to his
whereabouts, we all wanted to believe it. But the details weren’t adding up,” (Owen 2012:149).
He describes the trouble with working with the Pakistani military: “It was awkward because I
didn’t know if I could trust the PakMil officers. Everyone had a different story, and I was stuck
in the middle trying to keep it all together” (Owen 2012:150). In the end, “for all that time and
effort,” he writes, “we essentially bombed some empty mountains and my teammates went on a
weeklong camping trip. There was no sign of any man in flowing white robes. When we finally
got back to Afghanistan a week later, ‘flowing white robes’ became an inside joke for a bad
mission” (Owen 2012:151). This incident constituted another dashed hope for righteous
retaliation and raised the stakes on the intelligence about Abbottabad three years later as no one
wanted to get their hopes up only to anger Pakistan and fail publicly once again.

Approach to the Inmost Cave: The Anatomy of a Lead, The Rehearsals, The Decision
Meleager and the hunting party head deeper into the boar’s territory. It is mountainous and
difficult. What is ahead is unknown. The consequences of failure are life and death for the
hunters and all of Calydon.
During the Approach to the Inmost Cave, according to Vogler (2007:14),
The hero comes at last to the edge of a dangerous place…Often it’s the
headquarters of the hero’s greatest enemy, the most dangerous spot in the Special
World…When the hero enters that fearful place he will cross the second major
threshold. Heroes often pause at the gate to prepare, plan, and outwit the villain’s
guards…The Approach covers all the preparations for entering the Inmost Cave
and confronting death or supreme danger.
The working theory for bin Laden’s whereabouts until a 2010 breakthrough was that he was still
in the cave complexes of Tora Bora or in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of northwest
Pakistan. The terminology “Inmost Cave” could have been quite literally applied. However, it
turned out to be only figurative: bin Laden’s “lair” was a million dollar compound in a breezy
resort town. I devote attention to the attempts to animalize bin Laden and emphasize his
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fraudulence – given he was living like an American and not a 7th century ascetic – in Chapter 4.
What made it so dangerous was its location, not only on sovereign Pakistani land, but also one
mile from Pakistan’s equivalent to West Point, and of course, to hegemonic agents, its
inhabitants.

The authorized discourse tells the story of the lead up to the raid from three different vantage
points. Each brings to bear a different kind of anticipation for audiences as they await the details
of the raid itself. First, audiences hear from President Obama and national security officials
through interviews with news media, book authors, and documentarians. These state agents
describe the intelligence and the vetting procedure, as well as the various options for action and
Obama’s decision-making process. The uncertainty of the intelligence, the weight of the
decision, the postponements, and the concerns held by these seasoned experts all build
anticipation. Second, audiences can access the narrative from the perspective of the CIA. Feature
films Zero Dark Thirty (Columbia Pictures 2012) and SEAL Team Six (National Geographic
Channel 2012) and documentaries Manhunt (HBO 2013) and The Last Days of Osama bin Laden
(Storyhouse Productions 2011) depict the long road from cold trail to substantive lead, providing
audiences with insight into the painstaking patience that went into the decade-long hunt. Third,
Navy SEALs’ accounts emphasize the rehearsals and tactical preparations that allow audiences
to marvel at their capabilities and honed-skill and vicariously experience the anticipation of those
whose lives were literally on the line after the Approach.

Mark Bowden (2012:68-69), based on extensive interviews with those involved in the planning
of the raid, explains in his book, The Finish: The Killing of Osama bin Laden,
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The essence of leading any very large enterprise was maintaining priorities, and
while bin Laden had never slipped from the top during the Bush years, the list
itself had become very crowded. The bottom line, as Obama put it to [CIA
Director Leon] Panetta and [Director of the United States National
Counterterrorism Center Michael] Leiter, was that bin Laden’s trail had gone
cold. The president wanted it warm again. Now, more than a year later, the
[central intelligence] agency had something to report. It had found an unusual
compound just outside Abbottabad while looking for an al Qaeda figure who went
by the name of Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.
It is unclear from the dominant narrative whether Obama’s re-prioritization and dedication of
resources to locating bin Laden contributed to the break. In Zero Dark Thirty, Kathryn Bigelow’s
feature film that was mired in controversy over the access granted by an Obama administration
campaigning for re-election, the break happens how and when it does due solely to the tenacity
of CIA analyst, Maya. The film quietly depicts her transformation from a young, obsessed
analyst to an insistent and confident targeter who makes the connections, demands the necessary
tactical support, and ultimately gets her man. The story of the lead itself, however, is consistent
across the authorized discourse. Peter Bergen (2012:128-130), author of Manhunt: The Ten-Year
Search for bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad, writes
It was not until 2010 that the CIA had a series of significant breakthroughs
regarding the Kuwaiti, the elusive courier. Earlier, with the help of a “third
country” that officials won’t identify, the Agency had been able to tie him to his
real name, Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed. Still his whereabouts remained unknown.
Then, in June 2010, the Kuwaiti and his brother both made changes in the way
they communicated on cell phones that suddenly opened up the possibility of
“geolocation” of their phones. Knowing this, the Agency painstakingly reviewed
reams of “captured” phone conversations from the Kuwaiti’s circle of
associates…the Kuwaiti received a call from an old friend…[and said] “I’m back
with the people I was with before”…CIA officials took this call as confirmation
that the Kuwaiti was still likely working with al Qaeda…The National Security
Agency was listening to this exchange and through geolocation technologies, was
able to zero in on the Kuwaiti’s cell phone in northwestern Pakistan…In August
2010 a Pakistani “asset” working for the CIA tracked the Kuwaiti to
Peshawar…he was able to follow him as he drove home to Abbottabad…The
large compound where the Kuwaiti finally alighted immediately drew interest at
the Agency because it didn’t have phone or Internet service…One official
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remembers her reaction when she first saw the compound: “Holy Toledo! Who in
al Qaeda would the group spend this kind of money on?”
Bowden (2012:70), in his nearly identical version of events, expounds about the mysterious
compound:
The compound was eight times larger than any of the surrounding
residences…The walls that surrounded it were built unusually high, topped by
two feet of barbed wire. There were even walls around a patio at the back of the
third floor. There was no way to see inside the house itself, from the ground or
above. The windows were made of reflective glass or had been coated to achieve
the same effect…And in addition to the high walls, it seemed the brothers
observed extraordinarily strict security measures. They even burned all of their
trash on-site. Other than to attend the local religious school or to visit a doctor,
none of their children left the compound…The CIA had been known to
misinterpret many things, but one thing it knew inside out was high operational
security.
Different accounts of the lead up to the raid vary on how this intelligence was received by
national security officials in the White House. Obama told CNN for a special report on the fifth
anniversary of the raid, “We had seen our intelligence slowly build a case that a high value target
was in Abbottabad. We could not definitively say it was bin Laden. But there were couriers who
we knew were associated with bin Laden. Clearly something was going on” (CNN, We Got Him,
May 1, 2016).42 Zero Dark Thirty portrays reluctant and unconvinced higher-ups taking their
time to act despite protagonist Maya’s unwavering certainty. An iconic series of scenes, as
depicted in Figure 4, shows her defiantly writing the number of days since a decision was
promised on the window of a superior’s office.

42

Even after the significant criticism Obama received for working so closely with the news media and entertainment
industry on telling the story of the raid, he chose five years later to allow CNN to interview him for this special
report in the White House Situation Room, the first time in its history a journalist has joined the president there.

104

Figure 4
Jessica Chastain as “Maya,” pressuring her superiors to act on the intelligence that bin Laden is likely to be in the
Abbottabad compound.
Source: Columbia Pictures, Zero Dark Thirty

In Manhunt, Bergen (2012:204), describes the process to vet the intelligence, “On Saturday,
April 23, Leiter went to the White House to meet with [Counterterrorism advisor John O.]
Brennan, enumerated the gaps that he saw, and suggested that he put together a Red Team of
analysts who would be tasked to come up with alternative explanations for the intelligence that
had been gathered.” “At the end of this exercise,” Bergen (2012:207) continues, the low end of
the Red Team analysts were “only 40 percent confident that bin Laden was living at the
compound, while one of the CIA analysts was on the high end, with an estimate in the 60 percent
range. Still, all the analysts concluded that none of the alternative hypotheses was as likely as the
theory that it was bin Laden at the compound.”

Obama was presented with three options: 1) conventional aerial bombing with a B-2 bomber, 2)
a drone strike 3) or a Special Operations assault on the compound. According to Bergen
(2012:188), “The B-2 strike had some attractions. Anyone who was in the compound or in any
possible tunnels underneath it would die, and no American forces would be at risk. But a B-2
raid also had significant downsides. To destroy the compound, which sprawled over one acre,
would require a large pay load of bombs…Such blunt force would certainly incur civilian
casualties, not only of the women and children known to be living at the compound but also
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people in neighboring homes.” A drone strike would mitigate some of these issues, “but a bomb
with a small payload might not actually kill bin Laden. And because the CIA had no way to see
inside the compound, there was also the possibility that bin Laden might shelter in a vault hidden
inside the building, or even escape through a tunnel to live another day” (Bergen 2012:189).
While consideration for civilian life certainly reflects the humanitarian and moral United States
of which Obama saw himself at the helm, perhaps of greater concern, neither aerial option would
allow for the collection and testing of DNA to confirm the kill. This would only be possible if
Vice Admiral William McRaven, then commander of JSOC, planned a special ops night raid.
Bergen (2012:180) notes, “During McRaven’s tenure at JSOC, the ‘jackpot’ rate – the rate of
missions in which Special Operations forces captured or killed their targets in Afghanistan or
Iraq – soared from 35 percent to more than 80 percent.” McRaven told Obama’s need-to-know
national security team,
this is a relatively straightforward raid from JSOC’s perspective. We do these
[raids] ten, twelve, fourteen times a night. The thing that makes this complicated
is it’s one hundred and fifty miles inside Pakistan, and logistically getting there,
and then the politics of explaining the raid, is the complicating factor. I want to
think about it a little bit, but my instinct is to put a very seasoned member of a
special unit to work directly with you who will come to CIA every day and
basically begin to plan and flesh out some options (qtd in Bergen, 2012:181).
Bowden (2012:146) describes the raid option as “far more complicated” as “it would require
planning and rehearsal, and involve a variety of special talents.” The options sat before Obama.
His group of “read-in” advisors was small, but they represented political, intelligence, and
military components of national security. Some, including then-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton and John Brennan, supported the idea of the raid. However, some, especially Defense
Secretary Robert Gates and many claim Vice President Joe Biden, were quite opposed. As
referenced above, there is a tense relationship between conventional military brass and Special
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Operations. Bowden (2012:143) elaborates, “the very idea of ‘special ops’ had long been
regarded critically by the conventional military. The elite, secret units that conducted these
operations sucked up enormous resources and key personnel for occasional acts of amazing
derring-do.” The contention and dissent is presumably exciting for audiences. What will Obama
decide?

In order for the president to have enough information to make the call, McRaven needed the
SEALs to train and rehearse so he could finalize his proposal based on practical experience with
the specific details of the compound. He had a full-scale model built for the SEALs to practice
and tweak a wide array of plans, preparing for all possible contingencies.

The SEALs’ accounts add additional dimensions of anticipation. First, the SEALs are not read-in
on the intelligence at first and were left to speculate about the mission. Robert O’Neill recalls,
Now this was looking like a bigger deal – especially considering that our
Commanding Officer and Master Chief were supposed to have made the trip with
us, but at the last minute had gone to Washington instead. Something was
definitely up. (2017:543)…Almost the entire leadership of our squadron – both
officers and enlisted leaders – were there [in the Team Room in Virginia Beach],
many having been recalled from other assignments. This wouldn’t have raised any
eyebrows if we’d been on standby. But we were supposed to be training around
the country. This was brand-new, and very odd. Nobody knew what the hell was
happening (2017:547). Although the target, insertion method, and reason for
being there were vague (and intentionally misleading), we planned the best we
could with the information given (2017:559).
Matt Bissonnette, writing as “Mark Owen” (2012:148), echoes O’Neill’s thoughts about the
group gathered in the Virginia Beach Team Room: “there was a lot of experience in the room.
They’d drawn us from different teams. On most teams, the new guy usually carries the ladder
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and the sledgehammer. But looking around the room, I saw we had all senior guys. It looked like
some kind of dream team they were putting together.”

After a chapter of speculation, O’Neill (2017:569-570) then writes about when the SEALs were
told the target was, in fact, bin Laden:
“We have a line on UBL [Osama bin Laden]. This is the best intelligence we’ve
had on his position since Tora Bora.” A man I’d figured for the Agency moved up
to the front of the room as one of the four women passed out documents for us to
sign. As we did the man…and two of the other women began the brief…they
were particularly interested in one man. He was usually dressed in white, taller
than everyone else in a compound in Abbottabad, which he never left. Ever. He’d
just walk around the interior yards and gardens day after day. They’d dubbed him
“The Pacer.” The Pacer walked in the garden for hours at a time, stopping to talk
to children and the other men who lived in the compound. But he never did
anything menial. If some of the inhabitants were gardening or digging, he’d
occasionally stop near them but was never seen helping with any task. The
intelligence analysts were convinced that The Pacer never interacted with anyone
from the outside.
Bissonnette arrived in North Carolina for rehearsals the day after the SEALs learned this. When
he heard, he reacted: “We had never had any good leads. He was like a specter hanging over the
whole war. We all dreamed about being on the mission to kill or capture him, but no one really
thought about it seriously. There was too much luck involved. We all knew it came down to
being in the right place at the right time” (Owen 2012:158).

“Owen” and O’Neill provide nearly identical accounts to Bergen and Bowden as well as Zero
Dark Thirty and SEAL Team Six, about the courier lead, the physical description of the
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compound, the habits of “The Pacer,” and both SEALs provide a detailed description of the
rehearsals the SEALs went through to perfect the raid.43 Owen (2012:173-174) explains,
The whole mission had become muscle memory. Besides some time hacks that
were called out over the radio, the net was silent. Everyone knew their individual
jobs. We had years and years of experience among the groups, so everything
moved smoothly. This target wasn’t any more complicated than hundreds of
others we’d assaulted over the years. The rehearsals were less about training and
more about selling to the White House that we could do it.
Second, while the stakes of the decision were high for Obama, only the SEALs were literally
putting their lives on the line to execute the mission, so sharing their experiences leading up to
the decision about the raid include visceral fear and apprehension. O’Neill (2017:582) says, “I
started calling our team, only half-jokingly, the Martyrs Brigade, because if the house blew up
when we were on top of it, we were fucked.” He describes making an impulse purchase as he
awaited Obama’s decision, “Hell, a week from now I’ll be dead. Or maybe I’ll live through the
raid after all and have to steal a car and drive to the embassy in Islamabad. Shit happens. The
sun’s going to be out and I’m going to need sunglasses” (O’Neill 2017:590).

Ultimately, on Friday, April 29, 2011, Obama concluded, it was a “go” for the next evening:
what was clear from all my advisors was that the importance of getting bin Laden
to defeat al Qaeda was critical. The odds that it was bin Laden were probably
50/50. There was some dispute, even within the Intelligence Agency. But there
was good reason to think it might be him. Part of my thinking was shaped by the
43

In a 2014 interview with Fox News for a biopic documentary about O’Neill, he clearly indicates he changed his
initial position from Team Leader for external security to the team that would be dropped on the roof of the
compound to enter through the third floor, where the CIA targeter assured him bin Laden would be. However, in his
book, published in 2017 he deliberately indicates that he initiated the change for the good of the mission: “as I was
watching the scenario play out in training, something seemed off… ‘This is bin Laden we’re talking about, and
we’ve only got a couple shooters. We need as many as we can get in there’…‘ I need to be on the rooftop team.’
Willy thought that maximizing the number of shooters inside the compound – sharpening the point of Neptune’s
spear – made sense. The change was made” (O’Neill 2017:580). Bissonnette was also assigned to the external
security team. He wrote, “I knew the guesthouse was a peripheral assignment; I’d be lying if I told you for a split
second I didn’t wish I was going to be part of the team that was tasked with going to the roof of the main
building…If all went as planned they would be the first team to make entry into the third floor, where bin Laden was
thought to be living. That wish quickly faded and I focused on what I was tasked with. There was plenty of action to
go around, and I was just happy to be part of the mission” (Owen 2012:159).
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extraordinary confidence I had in our Special Forces, and Bill McRaven…Having
weighed all that, I thought about the 9/11 families who I’d met. And their
continuing pain, and sense that it was important for us to bring him to justice. And
I thought about the fact that during that time, we were still monitoring on an
ongoing basis, plots that were being developed by al Qaeda and the importance of
us being able to reduce those threats (CNN, We Got Him, May 1, 2016).
With the decision made, anticipation is further cultivated for audiences when the raid is
postponed. The official story is that the raid was planned for Saturday night, but was postponed
due to inclement weather in Pakistan.44 NBC’s Savannah Guthrie reported the evening after the
raid, “On Friday morning the president gave the official order, then went on with business:
touring storm ravaged Alabama, giving a commencement speech in Florida, even attending the
annual White House Correspondents Dinner, where he gave no hint of what was about to unfold”
(NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011). The broadcast plays footage of comedian Seth Meyers’
introduction to The White House Correspondent’s dinner, aired for the public on C-SPAN:
“People think bin Laden is hiding in the Hindu Kush, but did you know that every day from 4 to
5 he hosts a show on C-SPAN?,” quickly panning to Obama laughing heartily. O’Neill’s
(2017:596) impression of Obama’s demeanor at the event and especially his reaction to Meyers’
joke aligns with other accounts:
The camera panned to Obama, and his reaction, which you can see on the
Internet, is priceless: He slouched his shoulders at a comfortable angle, threw
back his head – a handsome smile spreading from cheek to cheek – and chuckled
amiably as if this were the best joke of the night. Nobody in that audience could
have guessed what must have been going through his mind at that moment.
Within twenty-four hours, the world would know either of America’s great
44

According to O’Neill (2017:595), “the possible launch nights were the two nights that month with zero
illumination from the moon. On Saturday, the mission was pushed to Sunday. The official cause according to the
commanders was inclement weather, but we all knew the weather was fine. The real reason was that Obama had
been scheduled to attend the annual White House Correspondents’ Dinner, a high profile event broadcast live on CSpan. He didn’t want to cancel at the last moment, or get up and leave in the middle of it, which would have
attracted worldwide attention and tipped everyone that something big was up.” While “inclement weather” may or
may not be true, many accounts corroborate the importance of Obama being at the dinner without having to leave to
monitor the raid.
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triumph in eliminating its most bitter enemy, or its abject humiliation in trying
and failing to do so.
Obama’s cool composure is an important part of his heroism at this point in the story. After
laughing at the White House Correspondent’s dinner Obama played a round of golf the next day,
a typical Sunday morning in casual clothes and a windbreaker, to maintain the image of
normalcy.

O’Neill reports that the SEALs were also nervous as time to depart to execute the raid neared,
but it was important to focus on all of this being business as usual. He recalled McRaven’s
speech moments before departure:
He said he had watched Hoosiers the previous night, one of his favorite movies.
He talked about a scene in the movie in which tiny Hickory High is about to play
for the state championship in a gym bigger than any they’ve ever seen, with
bleachers set up for thousands of fans. The Hickory High players are all farm
boys used to tossing balls at bushel baskets and shooing cows off the court.
They’re looking around at this huge arena with their jaws dropping. The coach
tells the smallest kid on the team to get up on the shoulders of the tallest kid and
stand in front of the hoop. Then he gives him a tape measure and asks, “What’s
the height?” “Ten feet, Coach.” Now he tells them to measure from the back of
the rim to the free throw line. “What’s the distance?” “Fifteen feet, Coach.” The
coach says, “Those are the exact same measurements as your gym back in
Hickory, it’s just a bigger building. More people are watching. That’s it.
Otherwise it’s the exact same” (O’Neill 2017:601-602).45
You do this every night, sometimes more than once a night, he told them. Across the authorized
discourse, Obama, other state agents, news commentators, and counterterrorism experts reiterate
just how often the Navy SEALs conduct raids on private homes under cover of night, recall
McRaven telling the national security officials they do more than ten a night. Typical of tropes in
45

Ironically, while O’Neill (2017: 602) feels McRaven was “born to give that speech,” in No Easy Day, “Owen”
(2012:207) writes, “McRaven showed up with little fanfare. As he walked up, we all gathered around. His speech
focused on the strategic level, something he was more comfortable talking about. Nothing he said really stuck with
me, as my mind was focused on what was about to happen.”
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hegemony maintenance projects, this heart wrenching detail largely goes unnoticed and
unquestioned.

Sunday, May 1, 2011 helicopters took off from a US military base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for
Abbottabad, Pakistan under a completely moonless, pitch-dark sky, a negative image of the
beautiful blue-skied morning of the Ordinary World where the heroes’ journeys began.
The Ordeal: Operation Neptune’s Spear
At last Meleager and the hunters come face to face with the ravaging boar.
Years of frustration that the perpetrator of the traumatic injury remained unscathed, false starts,
and intensive planning culminated in The Supreme Ordeal: the raid on Osama bin Laden’s home
in Abbottabad, Pakistan. “The hero must draw upon all of his skills and his experiences gathered
on the path to the inmost cave in order to overcome his most difficult challenge” (Vogler
2007:15). Was this agents of white hegemonic masculinity’s chance to restore pride and
confidence after egregious destabilization by an illegitimate racial other? Was this where and
how justice would be served?

If the SEALs executed the exact plan they had rehearsed within the allotted 30 minutes without
any resistance, facing the deadly foe would be anticlimactic for audiences. Rather the SEALs
faced a helicopter crash, a significant change of insertion method, enemy fire, unarmed, terrified
women and children as well as “hostile” women on site, the possibility of the house being rigged
with explosives or combatants in suicide vests, and taking longer than planned, increasing the
likelihood of capture by the Pakistani military. NBC’s Jim Miklaszewski offered the following
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“trailer” of the raid on the Today Show, just hours after Obama announced bin Laden’s death the
previous evening:
1 a.m. Monday morning Pakistan time, in a scene straight out of an action thriller,
US helicopters loaded with American commandos closed in for the kill. On
approach, one helicopter had mechanical problems and crash landed, but no one
was on board was hurt. Within seconds the two Special Forces teams flooded the
compound and immediately came under heavy fire, and it was obvious bin Laden
would not be taken alive. US officials say armed with an automatic rifle, the alQaeda leader fired on the Americans, who then shot and killed bin Laden. In the
exchange, the Navy SEALs also killed two al-Qaeda couriers and one of bin
Laden's adult sons. One woman, who the al-Qaeda gunman used as a human
shield, was also shot and killed. When the shooting stopped, the Americans
loaded bin Laden's body on a helicopter to be transferred to Afghanistan. Nearly
10 years after 9/11, the operation to kill bin Laden was over in 40 minutes. Now,
bin Laden's body was buried at sea, in part to prevent any gravesite from
becoming a shrine to terrorists. But before that, intelligence analysts made
detailed comparisons to photos of bin Laden to make sure that it was him. And as
to make a positive identification that it was bin Laden, DNA testing should be
completed later today.
While some of this may have genuinely transpired, much of it did not, even according to other
facets of the authorized discourse. These first accounts are all many Americans heard. The
exaggerations and mistakes in the news coverage, whether intentional or inadvertent, contributed
to construction of the raid as the climax in a familiar story arc.

The Helicopters
In order to penetrate Pakistani air space undetected, the SEALs were flown in, low to the ground,
on a new stealth helicopter. Navy SEAL Robert O’Neill (2017:587) recalls, “we got called to a
briefing on the famous mystery helicopters we’d be flying into the compound on…I said, ‘Well,
I used to say it was a ninety percent chance that we were going to die. Now I think it’s about an
eighty percent chance we’re going to live because I didn’t know they were sending us to war on
Transformers.’ They were some of the coolest things I’d ever seen.” Seated in the state-of-the-art
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American helicopter with unparalleled stealth technology on his way to ambush a sleeping
family in the middle of the night, O’Neill still believed he was the unquestionable underdog,
likely to die. He recounts calming himself by counting up and down, “between random numbers”
when suddenly he found the strength he needed to get the job done. He recalls, “I began to
repeat, ‘Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward, and freedom will be
defended.’ It was the first line of President George W. Bush’s address to the nation on the
morning of 9/11. I have no idea where that came from, or how I remembered it verbatim, but I
just started saying it in my head, over and over. I could almost hear President Bush’s voice over
the whirring rotor above me” (O’Neill 2017:611). The reminder that 9/11 was culturally
traumatic, that this was an act of righteous retaliation, that this was the moment he and his SEAL
brothers had been waiting for, was what he needed to shore up for battle. His fellow SEAL Mark
Bissonnette did not need to rally. Confident and focused on the tactical task at hand, he slept on
the chopper and woke up six minutes away from the target (Owen 2012:209).

O’Neill (2017:613-614), from aboard helicopter “Dash 2,” witnessed the infamous crash:
Our pilot had seen Dash 1 try to hover inside the walls above the courtyard and
fail. According to two US officials who praised the skill of the pilot, the chopper
lost the lift necessary to hover because it entered a “vortex” condition. At least
two factors were at play, they said – hotter than expected air temperature and the
compound’s eighteen-foot high walls. In our North Carolina simulations, the
walls, although to scale, were essentially fences, allowing air to flow through
them…Our pilot saw this and knew that if Dash 1 couldn’t hover inside those
walls, neither could we. So he just put us back down. Talk about effective
nonverbal communication.
Bissonnette was on the other helicopter and describes his first crash experience:
The pilots never had an issue holding a hover during rehearsals. Something was
wrong. We all desperately wanted out of the helicopter and onto the
ground…Suddenly, the helicopter kicked to the right ninety degrees and I could
feel my stomach drop like I was riding a roller coaster. The rotors above me
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screamed as the Black Hawk tried to claw its way back into the air. With each
second, the helicopter slipped closer toward the earth. From my side of the
helicopter I could see the compound rushing up at us through the open door…I
felt Walt’s hand grab my gear and pull me deeper into the cabin. His other hand
shot out and grabbed the sniper next to me. I leaned back with all my strength. My
legs kicked the air as I tried to get them inside. I knew if my legs were exposed
when we hit, they would get pinned or cut off (Owen 2012:211-212)…One
minute, the ground was rushing up at me. The next minute, I was at a dead stop. It
happened so fast, I didn’t even feel the impact (Owen 2012:214).
In an exclusive interview with CBS’s 60 Minutes (May 15, 2011) entitled “The President’s
Story,” Obama described the tense mood in the Situation Room when something went wrong
with the helicopters. He relays that he and CIA Director Leon Panetta did not interfere as Vice
Admiral McRaven made the tactical decisions to maneuver to a Plan B from the base in
Jalalabad, Afghanistan (CNN, We Got Him, May 1, 2016). The evening after the raid, broadcast
news had already created CGI animation of the helicopters and the compound, as pictured in
Figure 5. NBC’s Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszewski, over such animation slightly
revised his morning broadcast to report:
It was half past midnight in Pakistan. American helicopters loaded with Navy
SEALs hugged the ground to avoid detection by Pakistani radar as they closed in
for the kill. As the choppers approached the heavily fortified al-Qaeda compound,
small arms fire erupted from the rooftops, and then panic. One of the helicopters
suddenly lost altitude and was forced to land in the middle of the compound. No
Americans were injured, and within minutes as many as two-dozen commandos
swarmed the complex in search of bin Laden.

Figure 5
Source: NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011

It looked and sounded more like an action movie trailer than a report for NBC Nightly News.
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CNN’s Wolf Blitzer, anchoring a broadcast riddled with the same errors as NBC’s (and the other
major network’s) early reporting, stated the evening after the raid, “contrary to some of the
earlier reports, information we were getting from U.S. officials, the Navy SEALs did not come
down from those helicopters on what's called that fast rope. They lower a rope. Then they climb
down. They -- apparently, the helicopters just landed. Did you pick up that at your briefing?”
Correspondent Ed Henry responded, “I have not heard that specific piece of information yet. But
what I do have that sort of fits into that -- and the reason why, so our viewers understand, why
we're piecing through this bit by bit is that one senior administration official told me, basically,
that because of the fog of war there is some confusion about some of those specific details”
(CNN, The Situation Room, May 2, 2011). The press was explicit that it was reporting
information as it was received and not once it was confirmed.

Inside the Compound
Bissonnette’s team began in the compound’s guesthouse. He recalled, “We knew that as one of
bin Laden’s most trusted couriers, Ahmed al-Kuwaiti lived in the guesthouse with his family. We
expected at least one wife and several children. Since the kids lived there, I didn’t expect any
booby traps” (Owen 2012:218). As one of his teammates approached the stairs that led to the
roof of the guesthouse, “AK-47 rounds tore through the glass above the door, narrowly missing
him. I rolled away as the bullets cracked just inches over my head…‘That is not a suppressed
weapon,’ I thought. It was easy to tell who was firing, since we had suppressors on our weapons.
Unsuppressed rounds meant enemy fire. Someone inside had an assault rifle. Aiming chest high,
he fired a blind barrage. He was a caged animal. There was nowhere he could go and he knew
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we were coming” (Owen 2012:220-221). Just as the team was going to open the door to throw a
grenade inside, they heard the lock unlatch, “Owen” (2012:221-223) writes:
The door cracked open slowly, and I could hear a woman’s voice calling out. That
didn’t mean we were safe. If she was coming out with a suicide vest on, we were
dead. This was bin Laden’s compound. These were his facilitators. Shots were
fired, so we knew they were willing to die to protect him. Through the sweat
running down my face and the grit in my eyes from the rotor wash, I could just
make out the figure of a woman in the green glow of my night vision goggles. She
had something in her arms and my finger slowly started applying pressure to my
trigger. I could see our lasers dancing around her head. It would only take a split
second to end her life if she was holding a bomb. As the door continued to open, I
saw that the bundle was a baby. Al-Kuwaiti’s wife, Mariam, came out with the
child pressed against her chest. Behind her, three more kids shuffled out of the
house…Will did a quick pat down of the woman…I was crouched at the right side
of the door and pushed it open. I spotted a pair of feet lying in the doorway of the
bedroom. There was no way of knowing if he was still alive, and I wasn’t taking
any changes…I shouldered my rifle and squeezed off several rounds to make sure
he was down.
Meanwhile, O’Neill heard gunfire from two locations – from somewhere inside the main house,
where he was, and what was presumably Bissonnette’s team killing Ahmed.46 He recollects,
I came around the corner to see one of our guys in the aftermath of a gunfight in
front of the main house. The fight had only lasted two seconds. He shot through a
window, and a man and woman were down inside. He was still looking at them
while clearing the room as best he could from outside. I could see them lying dead
together. He looked concerned. “I just killed one of the women, too,” he said.
“She jumped in front of him right as I was shooting. Am I going to be in trouble?”
“Let’s not worry about being in trouble,” I said. “Let’s finish this mission.” Okay,
I thought. Now the women are martyring themselves. This is definitely the right
place (O’Neill 2017:616).
Given the construction of the American “DIY Security Citizen” (Light 2017), a topic I discuss at
length in Chapter 5, where men are expected to be armed to protect their family in the event of
home invasion, it is a notable act of dehumanization of the Ahmeds that the SEALs perceive

46

I am referring to Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, the courier’s real name, by his last name. Although the SEALs refer to
him as Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, Ahmed was his family name. They refer to his brother as Abrar al-Kuwaiti, although it
would make more sense to call him Abrar Khan (his pseudonym before the brothers were discovered) or by his
given name, if available.
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their gunfire as offensive use of force, rather a justified act of defense they too would take should
their homes be invaded in the middle of the night.

“Owen” (2012:226) based on later conversations with those present, explained that when the
SEALs heard movement on the first floor of the main house,
The point man snapped off a shot. The round struck the occupant, later confirmed
to be Abrar al-Kuwaiti, and he disappeared into the room. Slowly moving down
the hall, the team stopped at the door. Abrar al-Kuwaiti was wounded and
struggling on the floor. Just as they opened fire again, his wife Bushra, jumped in
the way to shield him. The second burst of rounds killed both of them. The team
say another woman and several children huddled in the corner, crying.
Bissonnette’s team makes it into the main house and now all the SEALs are clearing the rooms
on the first floor. Both SEALs relay similar accounts of what happened next. Both report that
“the woman intel analyst” according to O’Neill, “Jen” according to “Owen,” told the SEALs
they should expect 23-year old Khalid bin Laden to be on the second floor, “armed and ready,
his father’s last line of defense” (O’Neill 2017:619). Another SEAL whispered, “Khalid, come
here” in both Arabic and Urdu. According to O’Neill (2017:620),
Khalid was confused by hearing his name called, poked his head around the
banister and said, What?” That was his final word. The point man shot him in the
face. The bullet entered above the chin and exited out the back of his head. Khalid
dropped where he stood. Blood pooled around his head and soaked into his bright
white blouse. The train started moving up the stairs to the second floor with me in
the back. Each man stepped over Khalid on the way up.
Not exactly the immediate “heavy fire” NBC and CNN describe. But, as will be elaborated upon
in Chapter 5, the hero’s actions during the Ordeal represent the cultural values of his community
and American violence is narrated throughout the authorized discourse as defensive and
minimally invasive, therefore the threat posed by those killed to this point is exaggerated. While
the SEALs describe a quiet creep toward Osama bin Laden on the third floor of the main house,
in which Ahmed, his brother and his wife, and Khalid bin Laden were each killed with just a
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couple of bullets each, NBC’s Miklaszewski describes “a firefight that raged on for nearly 40
minutes,” and portrays these four deaths, three of which happened in the main house, as follows:
“the SEALs first killed two al-Qaeda operatives in a small building at the edge of the
compound… [Later,] [t]he SEALs shot back, killing bin Laden's son and a woman caught in the
cross fire” (NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011).

Although much of this was retracted by NBC the following day, the broadcast included grainy
footage that appeared to be the live stream Obama supposedly watched from the Situation Room,
providing “proof” to increase the legitimacy of the narration. This in-depth treatment of
Miklaszewski’s reporting is not to single out him or NBC. Similarly, CNN’s Chris Lawrence
reported, “the assault team was fighting its way through the main building. Two women were
wounded in the firefight. There were children inside. At one point, one of the residents grabbed
Osama bin Laden’s wife against her will...She was shot and died” (CNN, The Situation Room,
May 2, 2011).

The Ultimate Test: Facing the Villain
As most of the SEALs cleared the second floor after Khalid bin Laden was killed, one other
SEAL followed an unnamed “point man” upstairs. O’Neill and Bissonnette both claim it was
them.

According to “Owen” (2012:235-236):
We were less than five steps from getting to the top when I heard suppressed
shots. BOP. BOP. The point man had seen a man peeking out of the door on the
right side of the hallway about ten feet in front of him. I couldn’t tell from my
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position if the rounds hit the target or not. The man disappeared into the dark
room…The point man reached the landing first and slowly moved toward the
door. Unlike in the movies, we didn’t bound up the final few steps and rush into
the room with guns blazing. We took our time. The point man kept his rifle
trained into the room as we slowly crept toward the open door. Again, we didn’t
rush. Instead, we waited at the threshold and peered inside. We could see two
women standing over a man lying at the foot of a bed. Both women were dressed
in long gowns and their hair was a tangled mess like they had been sleeping. The
women were hysterically crying and wailing in Arabic. The younger one looked
up and saw us at the door…She yelled out in Arabic and rushed the point man.
We were less than five feet apart. Swinging his gun to the side, the point man
grabbed both women and drove them toward the corner of the room. If either
woman had a suicide vest, he probably saved our lives, but it would have cost him
his own. It was a selfless decision made in a split second. With the women out of
the way, I entered the room with a third SEAL. We saw the man lying on the floor
at the foot of his bed. He was wearing a white sleeveless T-shirt, loose tan pants,
and a tan tunic. The point man’s shots had entered the right side of his head.
Blood and brains spilled out of the side of his skull. In his death throes, he was
still twitching and convulsing. Another assaulter and I trained our lasers on his
chest and fired several rounds. The bullets tore into him, slamming his body into
the floor until he was motionless.
O’Neill (2017:623-624) wrote of the same moments:
We swiftly moved up the stairs to the curtain and he pushed it aside. Two women
stood there screaming at us. The point man lunged at them, assuming they had
suicide vests, tackling both and landing on the floor on top of them. If they blew
up, his body would absorb most of the blast, and I’d have a better chance of
surviving and doing what we’d come there to do. I turned to the right and looked
through a door into an adjoining room. Osama bin Laden stood near the entrance
at the foot of the bed, taller and thinner than I’d expected, his beard shorter and
hair whiter. But it was the guy whose face I’d seen ten thousand times. He had a
woman in front of him, his hands on her shoulders. In less than a second, I aimed
above the women’s right shoulder and pulled the trigger twice. Bin Laden’s head
split open, and he dropped. I put another bullet in his head. Insurance. The
woman, who turned out to be Amal, the youngest of bin Laden’s four wives, kind
of fell on top of me. I carried her over to the bed. Her calf was bleeding. She’d
seen the point man coming up the stairs, leveling his gun at her husband, and
jumped in front just as the point man pulled the trigger. She didn’t seem to be
seriously injured, but was almost catatonic. I don’t think we even cuffed her. For
the first time, I noticed a little boy, bin Laden’s youngest son, a two-year-old,
tottering on fat little legs in a corner of the room. He’d watched the whole thing,
but it was so dark and he was so young, he didn’t know what was going on,
except that it wasn’t good.
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Again drawing on Cerulo (1998:5), all accounts of these final moments, whether experienced
first hand or reconstructed through interviews are told using a “performer sequence” which
“unfold violent events from the perspective of the person who commits the act,” more often
directing meaning-making processes toward legitimation of violence.

Both SEALs then describe examining and photographing the body and forcing bin Laden’s
“hysterical” daughters and wives to identify him. Once the women had no fight left in them and
provided “dual confirmation,” another unidentified SEAL radioed McRaven to say, “For God
and country, Geronimo, Geronimo EKIA” – enemy killed in action (O’Neill 2017:628; Owen,
2012:246; Smilde, 2011).

O’Neill’s version of events differs slightly from “Owen’s,” likely motivated by bragging rights,
but it is still a far cry from what the news reported in the first days after the raid. Miklaszewski
reported: “US officials say as the SEALs closed in, bin Laden opened fire with an automatic
weapon.” CNN’s Chris Lawrence introduced his report, which also included grainy footage to
give the impression of live video feed of actual events and CGI animation, by stating: “they were
told going in, don’t expect these people to surrender. They will fight you hard. And true to that,
Osama bin Laden died with a gun in his hand.” Lawrence’s voice plays over an old photo of bin
Laden holding a Kalashnikov in Tora Bora, “The SEALs killed the two men defending bin
Laden and his son. Bin Laden himself shot back, but with a shot to the head, the SEALs took him
out” (CNN, The Situation Room, May 2, 2011). To the contrary, “Owen” (2012:248) writes,
“Before I left, I noticed a shelf that ran above the door. It was just above where he was standing
when we got to the third deck. I slid my hand up and felt two guns, which turned out to be an
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AK-47 and a Makarov pistol in a holster. I took each weapon down and pulled out the magazine
and checked the chambers. They were both empty.”

The SEALs had not yet released their first-hand accounts so the news largely built anticipation
for audiences by describing the raid from the perspective of the national security officials
huddled in a small conference room near the Situation Room in the White House. NBC White
House correspondent Savannah Guthrie reported:
They were prepared to take bin Laden alive, but expected him to fight and die. He
was shot twice in the left eye by a commando who encountered him on the third
floor of the compound and instantly recognized him as Osama bin Laden…Today
aides are describing the incredibly tense moments inside the Situation Room. As
NBC first reported, the president was able to monitor the 40-minute operation as
it unfolded, getting what a top US official described as audio and visual updates
from the ground. Getting word of bin Laden's capture, a senior aide says applause
broke out in the Situation Room. The president remarked, “We got him.” Then,
minutes before midnight, nearly 10 years after that awful September day, the
president addressed the nation (NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011).
Countless media outlets speculated about the emotions filling the Situation Room, captured in
Pete Souza’s iconic photo (Figure 6). Many focused on then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s
facial expression, since, uncharacteristic for such a setting, she “was thought to be gasping out of
emotion” (Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals 2014:34). Clinton laughed it off in an interview, saying
that it was “the face I usually make when my husband drags me to an action movie” (NBC, Rock
Center with Brian Williams, December 27, 2012). Such is the scrutiny that comes from being a
woman with access to (white) hegemonically masculine spaces. She stood out against the sea of
white male faces: Bill Daly, Chief of Staff; Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor; Dennis
McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor; John Brennan, Counterterrorism Chief, as Brian
Williams put it, “They were that morning the four most important Irishmen this side of the
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Atlantic” (NBC, Rock Center with Brian Williams, December 27, 2012). Regarding President
Obama, Jake Blake (2011) wrote for CNN.com,
The photo crosses one threshold of race in its unusual framing of an AfricanAmerican man threatening violence…For much of U.S. history, the black man has
often been portrayed as the threat to America's safety -- the angry man, the thug,
the one you cross the street to avoid. Obama has always been careful to avoid the
angry black male stereotype in his public persona, but has acquired another image
-- that of detachment, even weakness…The photo of Obama hunkered down with
his national security team watching the stalking and killing of bin Laden solves
both problems.
Blake quotes Jerald Podair, a history professor at Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin,
“He can now appear strong without being threatening. After all, he's on our side. Obama can now
take up his white predecessors’ mantle of ‘protector in chief,’” (qtd in Blake 2011). In other
words, in this moment of tension the black president gained access to the white hegemonic
masculinity of the violent American state.

Figure 6
From left to right around the table: Joe Biden, Barack Obama, Marshall B. Webb, Denis McDonough, Hillary
Clinton, and Robert Gates. From left to right, standing: Michael Mullen, Tom Donilon, Bill Daly, Tony Blinken,
Audrey Tomason, John Brennan, and James Clapper
Source: whitehouse.gov

Exfiltration
Even with a confirmation that bin Laden had indeed been killed, the excitement of the hero’s
journey was not over. They were still on sovereign Pakistani land without consent. McRaven did
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not preemptively celebrate. In his only interview about the details of the operation he said,
“Frankly, I’m watching the clock and I am watching what is going on around the compound. Of
course, by this time we have a helicopter that's down in the compound, the Pakistanis we know
are beginning to realize something is happening in Abbottabad, and you can begin to see them
trying to figure out what best to do” (CNN, We Got Him, May 1, 2016).

The SEALs moved as quickly as they could to destroy the proprietary technology in the downed
helicopter, take DNA samples to load onto the helicopter without the body, collect as many
papers and computers as they could, and load onto the Chinook helicopter on standby. Once on
the helicopter, O’Neill was convinced they were going to be shot down, and even cooler “Owen”
(2012:256) writes, “Right when I thought I could relax, I noticed the gas gauge was blinking red.
I’m not a pilot, but I knew enough to realize that blinking red lights in a cockpit were never a
good sign.” After a quick refuel and an uneventful ride back, to both of their surprises, O’Neill,
Bissonnette and all of the other SEALs, pilots, and translators made it back to Afghanistan. They
survived the Supreme Ordeal and Osama bin Laden was dead.

Reward (Seizing the Sword): “Justice Has Been Done”…?
Meleager gives the boar a deathblow and the hunting party returns to Calydon.47
With a defeated enemy and the Ordeal behind them, “hero and audience have cause to celebrate”
(Vogler 2007:16). The raid brought Obama broad bipartisan support, Americans filled the streets
in celebration, many 9/11 families and firefighters tearfully thanked the heroes for closure or for
exacting revenge, (for example New York Times’ columnist Maureen Dowd wrote in “Killing
47

The applicability of the Calydonian Boar’s hunt ends here. While Meleager does indeed kill the boar, a huntress
named Atalanta, who Meleager loved, took first blood. As such, he gave her the reward of the boar’s hide. Others in
the hunting party, including Meleager’s uncle, do not think this was right. In the confrontation Meleager kills his
uncle. When they return to Calydon, Queen Althea, Meleager’s mother, is enraged to find out what transpired and
kills Meleager.
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Doesn’t Make Us Evil,” on May 7, 2011, “I don’t want closure. There is no closure after tragedy.
I want memory, and justice, and revenge” (Dowd 2011)), the news media could not contain their
excitement over such a newsworthy event, and the entertainment industry poised to pounce on a
real-life story of such high stakes that so perfectly fit profitable formulas for action movies and
tell-all accounts. As Mahler (2015) put it for New York Times’ Magazine, “the killing of bin
Laden was not only a victory for the U.S. military but also for the American storytelling
machine, which kicked into high gear pretty much the moment the terrorist leader’s dead body
hit the floor” (Mahler, The New York Times, 2015).

With confirmation that the Navy SEALs had bin Laden’s body in their custody and made it
safely back to Afghanistan, the cramped conference room off the White House Situation Room
filled even further with a collective sigh of relief. While officials balked at the accusation that
they celebrated the news of a death,48 Obama was crystal clear on his view about the morality of
the operation in his first television interview after the raid: “As nervous as I was about this whole
process, the one thing I didn’t lose sleep over was the possibility of taking bin Laden out. Justice
was done. And I think that anyone who would question that the perpetrator of mass murder on
American soil didn’t deserve what he got needs to have their head examined” (CBS, 60 Minutes,
May 15, 2011). This sentiment echoed his remarks the evening of the raid when he said, “Indeed,
Al Qaida (sic) has slaughtered scores of Muslims in many countries, including our own. So his
48

President Obama told NBC’s Brian Williams, “I think it’s the wrong thing to say that I did a high five because
you have a picture of a dead body, but understanding the satisfaction for the American people, what it would mean
for 9/11 families, what it would mean for children of folks who died in the Twin Towers who never got to know
their parents, I think there was a deep-seated satisfaction for the country at that moment” (NBC, Rock Center with
Brian Williams, December 27, 2012). Hillary Clinton added, “It wasn’t so much a high five moment, kind of looking
around and just feeling together as almost one body that…ok, it’s over…It was both a professional responsibility
that I had as secretary of state, but it was also personally so important to me. I was at ground zero the next day and I
will never forget what it was like flying over that. Seeing those burning hulks and all the bodies that were buried
there. It is probably the most impactful combination of personal and professional responsibility I’ve ever had”
(NBC, Rock Center with Brian Williams, December 27, 2012).
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demise should be welcomed by all who believe in peace and human dignity” (Obama 2011). The
press lauded his accomplishment, for example, CNN’s Candy Crowley said, “It was breathtaking
and the moment of Barack Obama’s presidency so far. Criticized as naïve and timid in foreign
policy, President Obama was steely in the crunch, approving a risky US-only mission inside a
sovereign country. Imagine if it had all gone wrong. Instead, we’re told it all went right…This
will help him politically because it helps Americans psychologically. Their moment is his and
vice versa” (CNN, The Situation Room, May 2, 2011).

A Grateful President
Obama couched his victory lap in gratitude. In his address to the nation the evening of the raid,
he profusely praised the intelligence community for their “painstaking work,” “Tonight, we give
thanks to the countless intelligence and counterterrorism professionals who’ve worked tirelessly
to achieve this outcome. The American people do not see their work, nor know their names. But
tonight, they feel the satisfaction of their work and the result of their pursuit of justice” (Obama
2011).

Likewise, he added to his history of praise for Special Operations going back to the rescue of
American Captain Phillips from Somali pirates in 2009: “A small team of Americans carried out
the operation with extraordinary courage and capability…We give thanks for the men who
carried out this operation, for they exemplify the professionalism, patriotism, and unparalleled
courage of those who serve our country. They are part of a generation that has borne the heaviest
share of the burden since that September day” (Obama 2011).49

49

According to a “Special Ops source who worked on Horn of Africa policy at the time,” quoted in Scahill
(2013:281), “‘The President personally invited the leaders of the Special Operations forces to the White House, and
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While Obama, as military commander-in-chief and political leader of the state, was certainly
“rewarded” for authorizing the operation – he earned praise from the right wing from John
McCain and George W. Bush to Rush Limbaugh (Blogs, LA Times, May 2, 2011) and was reelected the following year after touting the killing of bin Laden on the campaign trail and in
debates (“‘Osama bin Laden is dead and General Motors is alive,’ Joe Biden was fond of
boasting on the campaign trail” (Mahler, New York Times Magazine, October 15, 2015) – he
gave credit to and bestowed rewards upon the SEAL team. Five days after the raid, Obama
travelled to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to privately thank the SEALs. “Coming to Fort Campbell,
Obama said, ‘is a chance for me to say on behalf of all America and people around the world,
‘Job well done.’…Obama recognized the full assault force with the Presidential Unit Citation,
the highest honor that can be given to a unit. Obama said they represented ‘the finest small
fighting force in the history of the world’” (Tapper, Schifrin, and Hopper, ABC News, May 6,
2011).

An awestruck news media
At 9:30 p.m. EST on Sunday, May 1, 2011, the White House notified the press that Obama
would be making an important announcement related to national security at approximately 10:30
p.m. The speech did not begin until 11:30 p.m., leaving the news networks with two hours of live
airtime to speculate, opine, confirm, narrate, and frame the event for audiences. About halfway
through the wait, speculations that perhaps the United States had killed Osama bin Laden were

asked them to have an integral role in policy…[Obama] asked for their professional military advice in how to best
carry out operations. That was absolutely unheard of in the previous administration, in that they would dictate what
the policy was and they would tell the Pentagon, and the Pentagon would ensure that the subordinate commands
would carry that out.’”
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confirmed. The news media gushed with overwhelming admiration, awed by Obama’s decision
and the SEALs’ feat.

Fox News’ Geraldo Rivera was conjecturing that the United States had killed Libyan leader
Muammar Gadhafi when a producer informed him that it was not Gadhafi, but Osama bin Laden
who had been killed.
Gadhafi’s Gadhafi. He’s a schmuck, he’s a bum, he’s a killer, he took down
PanAm 103, we hate him, but Osama bin Laden…BIN LADEN IS DEAD, BIN
LADEN IS DEAD, URGENT, CONFIRMED, BIN LADEN IS DEAD. Happy
Days! Happy Days, everybody <high fives a general sitting beside him> this is
the greatest night of my career! The bum is dead! The savage who hurt us so
grievously. And I am so blessed, so privileged, to be at this desk at this
moment…I think his continued existence on this earth, Osama bin Laden’s
continued existence on this earth has represented a continuing humiliation to the
United States of America. He defied George W. Bush 43 and President Barack
Obama 44, for all this time. I don’t care if he died falling into a mudhole or hitting
his head on a car, the fact that he is dead…isn’t this wonderful news, a great way
to start your week?...A major, major chapter in American history is closed by this.
We have exacted our revenge. We have in the old testament-sense taken the eye
for the eye and never was it more deserved (Fox News, Special Broadcast, May 1,
2011).
This sensationalist framing was not specific to Fox News. Centrist CNN’s John King was
equally animated in his reporting:
Almost ten years since the 9/11 attacks…the president of the United States is to
walk into the briefing room on a Sunday night to tell the nation after all this
waiting, all this heartache, all this search, all this failure, that the United States
government is now convinced that it has the body of Osama bin Laden. You
remember where you were when 9/11 took place, where you were when you
heard the name Osama bin Laden… he became the household name, the face of
terrorism, the face of global terrorism, the face of al Qaeda on 9/11. We are
approaching the 10 year anniversary and so many times the United States has said
it’s close to Osama bin Laden, Tora Bora, so many times it’s said it has lost the
precise location of Osama bin Laden. So many times it’s tried to say it’s not about
Osama bin Laden, it’s about disintegrating and dismantling al Qaeda networks,
but of course it’s always been about Osama bin Laden because of his personal
role in the largest, most devastating terrorist attack against the United States in its
history…Osama bin Laden has been the singular face of global terrorism, of anti-
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American terrorism for ten years now. This is a huge development, a hugely
significant development. It does not erase al Qaeda from the face of the earth, but
it does erase, when the president makes the announcement, it does erase the
singular face. It closes a page, a chapter, of that moment tonight…Ask the people
of New York City. Ask people who lost lives at the Pentagon. This is the
announcement they’ve been waiting for for ten long years…He as the central
leader has been the central, unifying, the dramatic figure representing al Qaeda for
more than the last decade so this is a signature achievement…Imagine the
magnitude of that sentence: Osama bin Laden is dead (CNN, Special Broadcast,
May 1, 2011).
The next evening, CNN’s Jack Cafferty added,
[9/11] also unified us in a way that we hadn’t been maybe since the end of the
Second World War. Sadly that unity was short-lived. We’ve been a pretty divided
nation since soon after 9/11. The partisan politics that have taken over
Washington over the past few years have made things increasingly ugly in this
country. But last night, with the news that Osama Bin Laden had been killed,
Americans were once again united. They converged on the streets of Lower
Manhattan near Ground Zero and outside the White House in Washington. There
was singing and dancing and waving American flags. There was a sense of
victory, but a sense of remembrance too. We haven’t seen this sort of patriotism
and sense of victory and justice in a very long time. The United States hasn't had
much success in the wars that we've gotten involved in since World War Two.
That was the last one we won outright. It's been pointed out that both Osama bin
Laden and Adolf Hitler were declared dead on the same day, May 1, more than 65
years apart, bin Laden yesterday courtesy of U.S. special forces. Hitler turned a
gun on himself when he realized his dreams of world domination for Germany
were a lost cause. In the end, he was just another little coward (CNN, The
Situation Room, May 2, 2011).
Across the authorized discourse, nearly all news reports in the days following the raid included
coverage of the outpouring of celebration of bin Laden’s demise. After broadcast news took to
the air, but before Obama’s speech, people began to gather outside the White House. CNN
anchor Wolf Blitzer suggested over a shot of the crowd waving flags, singing the national
anthem, punching fists into the air, and cheering, “Let’s zoom in to see if we can hear the
chanting, the screaming, the excitement” (CNN, Special Broadcast, May 1, 2011). Later, he
reported, “this is not only happening in Washington. I’m being told by Twitter followers around
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the world that people are gathering to celebrate the death of Osama bin Laden, the architect of
9/11 who was killed in a mansion, we’re told” (CNN, Special Broadcast, May 1, 2011).

After CNN aired the president’s speech, correspondent Ed Henry added:
This crowd behind me outside the White House gates was building literally as the
president spoke…The president sort of called on the nation to come together. He
said “let us think back to the unity after 9/11.” He said I know it’s been frayed
sometimes but now is a moment to come together. And I can tell you, Wolf, there
are a lot of people. It started with 30 or 40 people now it’s hundreds of them out
there now who are coming together to celebrate this moment in American history.
It’s been lighting up on social media, many of them students from George
Washington University, as you know just a few blocks away, I can also see a lot
of tourists out there. It’s dark out here, it’s getting very late, but this crowd is so
excited, there are American flags being waved, they’re chanting U-S-A, U-S-A,
others are chanting “hey, hey, goodbye to bin Laden,” very angry at him
obviously these many years later, but mostly very positive in chanting U-S-A, US-A, and singing as well, the national anthem (CNN, Special Broadcast, May 1,
2011).
Another correspondent, David Gergen, reminding viewers of the framing of 9/11 as entirely
unprompted according to the original Call to Adventure, also opined,
Wolf, this is a momentous, rare moment, when all Americans can celebrate. I
thought the President captured that well tonight. This moment of unity. Not since
Adolf Hitler can I remember a single person who had been so hated by Americans
as Osama bin Laden – the architect of an attack out of the blue on us – and also
part of this elation tonight comes from ten long frustrating years since the attack.
We’ve been drawn into two wars, our way of life has changed here at home, we
have to go through all these, this craziness at our airports, and we haven’t had a
victory until now and this was the first clear cut victory tonight we can all
celebrate and thank those troops and thank those intelligence officers and yes,
thank President Obama and President Bush (CNN, Special Broadcast, May 1,
2011, emphasis added).
The correspondents do not seem to critically reflect on their own role in these gatherings, given
they were live reporting that people all over the world were and should be celebrating.
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The following evening, NBC’s Lester Holt reported that U-S-A! U-S-A! “was the refrain [that]
echoed from every corner of America. As the news began to spread, crowds descended on the
White House and Times Square in New York. From college campuses to the stands at a
Philadelphia Phillies game, to the streets of Boston, there were unabashed celebrations over the
death of a villain” (NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011). Holt’s narration was interspersed with
reactions from people on site. One man said, “The job is completed.” A woman said, “he was the
mastermind of so many terrorist attacks and so many terrible things that have happened to US
people, so I’m happy he’s dead!” (NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011).

Perhaps most powerful of the responses the authorized discourse reported on, were the reactions
from 9/11 families. CBS’s Katie Couric interviewed widow Ginni Bauer, grinning ear to ear,
who said, “I’m just so proud of our country, it was a long time coming but we were successful,
they did it, they got him!” Carie Lemack, who lost her mother, said, “our voices were stronger
and louder than that of the terrorists, and today we know that bin Laden’s voice has been
silenced” (CBS Evening News, May 2, 2011). A firefighter who lost his son said, “we’ll always
have a hole in our heart, but it’s nice to know that the men who bragged that they have killed our
children have met death” (CBS Evening News, May 2, 2011). A firefighter at Ground Zero the
morning after the announcement of bin Laden’s death told NBC’s Rahema Ellis, “There was a
dark cloud looming over this place as long as he was alive. Now that he’s dead, the cloud is gone
and the sun is shining” (NBC Nightly News, May 2, 2011).

Audiences were told in these initial reports how to feel. Audiences’ emotions are typically
directed by word and image choices, music and tone of voice, and referents to hegemonic
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ideology. However, the explicit appeals to social solidarity had a notable effect in this case.
Typically dispassionate anchors, large crowds, 9/11 families, the president, and what was
represented as the entire country were coming together in the spirit of unity. Celebrating was cast
as honoring the closure bin Laden’s death purportedly brought about, harkening back to the last
time American social solidarity was as strong and cohesive. Permission, even expectation, to
celebrate death reaffirmed the exceptionalism of American use of violence as defensive,
protective, and targeted. More, the initial stories about the long, patient CIA effort, paired with
the valiance and capability of the SEALs to carry out the operation surgically coincides with
American cultural scripts from television and movies, alongside the news.

As time passed and Americans did not experience any major decrease in war or counterterrorism
operations as a result of bin Laden’s death, the entertainment industry stepped in to remind
audiences about the harrowing tests and lead-up to the dramatic raid. The Obama administration
granted unprecedented access to Kathryn Bigelow and Mark Boal to make Zero Dark Thirty and
to Bowden and Bergen to write their books, Matt Bissonnette penned his tell all account as Mark
Owen with Kevin Maurer, a slew of television features and documentaries were produced, and in
2014 Robert O’Neill came forward first anonymously in an Esquire magazine piece entitled
“The Shooter,” (Bronstein 2013) then made a Fox News documentary called “The Man Who
Killed bin Laden,” and finally published his own book, The Operator in 2017. In it he says,
when he donated the shirt he was wearing during the raid to the 9/11 Museum, he was pressured
to tell the story of the operation to some 9/11 families. He recalls,
A man came up with his grandson. His son, the boy’s father, had been one of
those who through no fault of his own ended up dying on 9/11. The man said,
‘Every single day, my grandson has asked me, ‘Why did God do this?’ and I
always say, ‘God didn’t do this. The devil did this.’ He looked up at me, a tear
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running down his cheek and a defiant gleam in his eyes. He said ‘You, sir, killed
the devil.’ (O’Neill 2017:672).
These accounts enshrined the death of Osama bin Laden as a conclusion to the melodrama that
ensued after the cultural trauma of 9/11, whether the symbolic or operational significance
warranted such a place in history.

Return with the Elixir: Aggressive Silencing of Counternarratives50
In this final stage of the Hero’s Journey, “the hero Returns to the Ordinary World, but the
journey is meaningless unless she brings back some Elixir, treasure, or lesson from the Special
World. The Elixir is a magic potion with the power to heal” (Vogler 2007:18). There was no
physical trophy from the raid. While officials later emphasized the importance of the intelligence
gathered, critics reminded that as soon as they publicized the raid any potential plans uncovered
in Abbottabad would promptly be changed by bin Laden’s successor (e.g. Pfarrer 2011). More
literally, Obama decided 1) not to release photographs of bin Laden’s corpse and 2) that bin
Laden’s body should be given a “burial at sea” according to Muslim funeral rites, stating,
It is important for us to make sure that very graphic photos of somebody who was
shot in the head are not floating around as an incitement to additional violence, as
a propaganda tool. You know, that’s not who we are. You know, we don’t trot out
this stuff as trophies. You know, the fact of the matter is this was somebody who
was deserving of the justice that he received. And I think Americans and people
around the world are glad that he’s gone. But frankly, we took more care on this
obviously than bin Laden did when he killed 3,000 people. He didn’t have much
regard for how they were treated and desecrated. But that’s, again, something that
makes us different.

50

Vogler’s Hero’s Journey also includes The Road Back and Resurrection after The Reward but before The Elixir.
One might argue that Matt Bissonnette experienced these stages: he was valorized for his role in the hunt, then
chastised for publicizing his version of events, and while the SEAL community never accepted the violation of the
“quiet professional” aspect of the SEAL ethos, he still claims a heroic place in American history. Some of these
nuances are discussed in Chapter 5.
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In this case, then, the story was the Elixir. Bin Laden’s elusiveness in late 2001 and for the next
decade with his occasional “taunting” video communications and the risk involved in the raid
made the eventual “victory” over him sweeter, more worthy of celebration, more significant,
enhancing the prestige of America’s hunters. Most of all, it was a legacy of empowerment after
tragedy. The supposed “healing” power of the Elixir, in other words, was the symbolism of a
dramatic and decisive defeat of the villain to replace the malaise of perpetual wars of attrition.
Thus, those who bring the healing power of that narrative into question must be shamed,
ostracized, or punished by hegemonic agents.

This claim is not to ignore the oppositional discourse about the veracity of the details of bin
Laden’s death that raged online on Twitter, personal blogs, and in the comments on articles and
YouTube videos. However, while some 9/11 families felt killing bin Laden did not accomplish
anything but to add another death to the already astronomic toll, some commentators questioned
the morality of the celebrations and later the veracity of some of the details of the operation, and
some were outraged at the SEALs writing about the mission for personal gain, these oppositional
and negotiated positions were aggressively silenced when they attempted to penetrate the
authorized discourse.

There were three different ways counter-narratives were silenced. First, from the outset there was
a very high tolerance for inconsistencies in the official narrative. The White House retraction of
official statements that bin Laden had used his wife, Amal, as a human shield was written off
quietly although it continued to reverberate (Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals 2014). For example,
even though the retraction was made on May 3, 2011, a Discovery Channel special that aired on
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May 15 used clips of interviews with NBC’s Jim Miklaszewski and press conferences with
administration officials making that claim. The rush to publish, the fog of war, and the secrecy of
the mission all somehow made this tolerable for audiences without causing any significant
mainstream discourse about whether Americans should believe the narratives woven by the state.

Second, audiences were overwhelmed with versions of the official narrative from newspaper and
magazine pieces to full-length books and television documentaries. Zero Dark Thirty, which,
according to Jonathan Mahler,
grossed $130 million at the box office and was in many ways the dominant
narrative of the killing of bin Laden. The filmmakers, in numerous interviews,
went out of their way to promote their access to government and military sources:
The opening credits announced that the film was based on “firsthand accounts of
actual events.” And, as a trove of documents made public via the Freedom of
Information Act amply demonstrated, the C.I.A. eagerly cooperated with the
filmmakers, arranging for the writer and director to meet with numerous analysts
and officers who were identified as being involved in the hunt for bin Laden. The
director, Kathryn Bigelow, has described the film as “the first rough cut of
history” (New York Times Magazine, October 15, 2015).
“There are different ways to control a narrative,” Mahler writes. “There’s the old-fashioned
way: Classify documents that you don’t want seen and, as [former Secretary of Defense Robert]
Gates said, ‘keep mum on the details.’ But there’s also the more modern, social-media-savvy
approach: Tell the story you want them to believe. Silence is one way to keep a secret. Talking is
another. And they are not mutually exclusive” (Mahler, New York Times Magazine, October 15,
2015). Nicholas Smilde published “Getting bin Laden: What Happened that Night in
Abbottabad” in The New Yorker in August 2011. Peter Bergen’s Manhunt, Mark Bowden’s The
Finish, “Mark Owen’s” No Easy Day, and Zero Dark Thirty were all released in late 2012. A
victorious, re-elected Obama did one-on-one interviews for CBS’s 60 Minutes in May, just two
weeks after the raid, and again for NBC’s Rock Center with Brian Williams in December 2012
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after his reelection. The bombardment of cultural products that repeat the dominant narrative
until it feels familiar is sizable and significant enough that it provides all of the textual data for
this dissertation.

By early 2013 the news media had caught up to these accounts and there was a fairly monolithic
account within the authorized discourse about the hunt, centering on the courier lead, and the
raid, settling on the fire taken by the Ahmed brothers and the SEALs shooting bin Laden in the
face, even if there was not such a dramatic firefight preceding it. While the oppositional
discourse continued online whenever a new cultural product or detail was released (or when
there was a terrorist attack or SEAL raid that led some to ask what it was all for), there were only
two significant attempts to penetrate the authorized discourse with a counter-narrative. First on
November 8, 2011, Navy SEAL Chuck Pfarrer, author of best-selling Warrior Soul: The Memoir
of a Navy SEAL, published SEAL Target Geronimo. In it, he describes the aggressive silencing
he experienced after doing so:
The administration’s pushback started even before SEAL Target Geronimo hit its
publication date. For the first time in history, the US Special Operations
Command (US SOCOM) singled out a military history book for criticism –
calling SEAL Target Geronimo “a fabrication,” and branding me, its author, “a
liar.” Those are serious accusations to a third-generation naval officer, and I take
exception to them. But lost in the government denunciation was a statement that
may provide an explanation of why the book was such an annoyance, at least to
politicians. An AP article quoted a SOCOM spokesman as saying that Admiral
Bill McRaven “…was concerned that the book would lead Americans to doubt the
administration’s version of the story.” You may count me as a doubter, and an
early one. When politics is mixed with military history, the result is not often
pretty. One need only recall the press stories involving Specialist Jessica Lynch,
Ranger Pat Tillman, or “Mission Accomplished” to know what happens when
politicians put their spin on battlefield facts.
Indeed, the administration’s handling of the narrative could not have been worse:
a premature, politically driven announcement, followed by a contradictory story,
crowned by a highly negative magazine account and a television dramatization
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that depicted the raid as a cold-blooded hit…But worse, much worse, by almost
immediately confirming that the United States had conducted the operation,
President Obama rendered worthless hundreds of items of actionable intelligence
– enough to put al Qaeda out of business forever. As the news of the raid spread
around the world, al Qaeda operatives, including Ayman Zawahiri, bolted for
cover. The intelligence gathered by the SEALs was squandered in an instant –
bartered for a bump in the polls (Pfarrer 2011:12-14)
The next attempt came from acclaimed investigative journalist Seymour Hersh. First in a 10,000
word essay for The London Review of Books in 2015, then in a book of four essays that address
“a common theme – false steps by an American president who came to office in 2009 after a
brilliant campaign in which he spoke of ‘hope’ and ‘change we can believe in’…Yet he is a
president who told the world a series of lies about the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011,
some of which recklessly put an ally at risk” (Hersh, 2016:1). Hersh asserts “The White House’s
story might have been written by Lewis Carroll: would bin Laden, target of a massive
international manhunt, really decide that a resort town forty miles from Islamabad would be the
safest place to live and command al-Qaida’s operations? He was hiding in the open. So America
said” (Hersh, 2016:1). He goes on to explain that 1) Pakistan had detained bin Laden in the
compound since 2006, 2) bin Laden was monitored and funded by Saudi Arabia for fear America
would find out about Saudi financial ties to bin Laden in 2001, 3) a Pakistani “walk-in” to the
CIA station in Islamabad alerted the United States to bin Laden’s whereabouts, 4) there was no
firefight at all; the SEALs had express permission from the Pakistanis to conduct the raid as long
as Obama waited 7-10 days and then announced a mutually agreed upon narrative, but Obama
could not resist the political opportunity and double crossed the Pakistanis. In essence, he
suggested as Mahler puts it, “the audacious raid on bin Laden’s compound, our greatest victory
in the war on terror, would have been little more than a ‘turkey shoot’ (Hersh’s phrase). Above
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all, our government would have lied to us” (Mahler, New York Times Magazine, October 15,
2015).

Hersh received an aggressive and condescending reaction from the White House, from news
anchors, and from other bin Laden experts, such as Mark Bowden who said, “either I am
completely wrong, or he is completely wrong…To me it’s ridiculous that I’m spending even as
much time as I am talking to you about this” (Schulson, Salon.com, February 13, 2016) refusing
to dignify the Pulitzer-prize winner who unmasked the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and the Abu
Graib prison sexual abuse in Iraq with any real engagement on particular points. Further, White
House Press Secretary Josh Ernest said,
I can tell you that the Obama White House is not the only one to observe that
[Hersh’s] story is riddled with inaccuracies and outright falsehoods. The former
deputy director of the CIA, Mike Morell, has said that every sentence was wrong.
And, Jim, I actually thought one of your colleagues at CNN put it best: Peter
Bergen, a security analyst for CNN, described the story as being about 10,000
words in length, and he said, based on reading it, that “what’s true in the story
isn’t new, and what’s new in the story isn’t true.” So I thought that was a pretty
good way of describing why no one here is particularly concerned about it (Press
Briefing with Press Secretary Josh Earnest, May 11, 2015).
If one believed the media’s assault, the most logical conclusion might be that one of the most
credible investigative journalists of the 20th century had lost his mind in his old age. However,
esteemed journalist Carlotta Gal corroborated in a New York Times article that she also had a
high level source in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, its counterpart to the CIA,
who confirmed Pakistan had been holding bin Laden prisoner in Abbottabad (Gall, New York
Times Magazine, May 12, 2015), Andrea Mitchell, Richard Esposito, Matthew Cole, and Robert
Windrem, among NBC’s top correspondents, published (and later revised to downplay the
significance) a piece entitled, “Pakistani Asset Helped in Hunt for Bin Laden, sources say,”
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(May 11, 2015, NBCNews.com) and Jonathan Mahler reported for New York Times Magazine
that “editor [at The London Review of Books], Christian Lorentzen, told me that three factcheckers worked on the bin Laden article, and he also spoke directly to Hersh’s key sources,
including the retired American intelligence official identified in the article as the ‘major U.S.
source for the account’” (Mahler, New York Times Magazine, October 15, 2015).

Mahler, who spent a day with Hersh for his magazine article in 2015, told him that he “wasn’t
going to offer a definitive judgment on what happened…this [w]as more of a media story, a case
study in how constructed narratives become accepted truth” (Mahler, New York Times Magazine,
October 15, 2015).51 The same goes for its place in this analysis. It is beyond the scope to opine
about the truth or falsehoods or reliability of Hersh’s story and source. What is of interest here is
the reaction. The cultural hegemony could not afford for Hersh to puncture the symbolic victory:
a moment of command and control over a melodramatic villain after a violent affront. Mahler
captures the weight of the story as Elixir exactly:
Symbolically, it brought a badly wanted moment of moral clarity, of
unambiguous American valor, to a murky war defined by ethical compromise and
even at times by collective shame. It completed the historical arc of the 9/11
attacks. The ghastly image of collapsing towers that had been fixed in our
collective minds for years was dislodged by one of Obama and his senior advisers
huddled tensely around a table in the White House Situation Room, watching
closely as justice was finally brought to the perpetrator (Mahler, New York Times
Magazine, October 15, 2015).
Ultimately, only radical media outlets like Democracy Now! and The Intercept took Hersh’s
story seriously and any influence it might have had as a legitimate counter-narrative has faded
completely.

51

Peter Bergen wrote a scathing response to Mahler’s article for even dignifying Hersh that much:
https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/18/opinions/bergen-new-york-times-bin-laden-death/index.html.
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Those who adopted the dominant version of events but questioned their meaning or morality also
experienced aggressive silencing. For example, New York Times’ columnist Maureen Dowd
wrote,
We briefly celebrated one of the few clear-cut military victories we’ve had in a
long time, a win that made us feel like Americans again — smart and strong and
capable of finding our enemies and striking back at them without getting trapped
in multitrillion-dollar Groundhog Day occupations. But within days, Naval Sealgazing shifted to navel-gazing…In another inane debate last week, many voices
suggested that decapitating the head of a deadly terrorist network was some sort
of injustice…Those who celebrated on Sept. 11 were applauding the slaughter of
American innocents. When college kids spontaneously streamed out Sunday night
to the White House, Ground Zero and elsewhere, they were the opposite of
bloodthirsty: they were happy that one of the most certifiably evil figures of our
time was no more….The really insane assumption behind some of the secondguessing is that killing Osama somehow makes us like Osama, as if all killing is
the same. Only fools or knaves would argue that we could fight Al Qaeda’s
violence non-violently. President Obama was prepared to take a life not only to
avenge American lives already taken but to deter the same killer from taking any
more. Aside from Bin Laden’s plotting, his survival and his legend were
inspirations for more murder. Morally and operationally, this was
counterterrorism at its finest. We have nothing to apologize for (Dowd, New York
Times, May 7, 2011).
Her derision is emblematic of a distinctive dismissive American snark common to editorial
journalism and social media in the 2010s. It is a knowing arrogance of American exceptionalism
that privileges the starting points and turning points of narratives and makes “the American way”
appear normal, natural, inevitable, and above all, just.

Performative Fusion or Aggressive Silencing?: Familiar, Formulaic, and Ubiquitous
The preceding analysis makes plain that the story of the hunt was told and retold, that it followed
the familiar formula of the Hero’s Journey common to myths and movies, and that attempts to
counter-narrate were disregarded, mocked, or silenced. How did the interviewees and focus
group participants experience the narrative? Did it begin with 9/11? Is the raid remembered as
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dramatic and dangerous? Does the sequencing (victim sequencing of 9/11 and performer
sequencing of the raid (Cerulo 1998)) change participants’ classification of violence as
acceptable or not? Does the story feel familiar and formulaic and if so does that increase or
decrease its resonance? Do any participants believe a counter-narrative or have a negotiated or
oppositional decoding of the meanings of the events? Have these individuals experienced
resistance, been called un-American, or conspiratorial, when they voice such opinion? In other
words, was the narration a successful hegemonic project in producing psychological
identification with and empathy for American righteous retaliation among participants?

Overall, the participants repeated the dominant narrative arc with 9/11 as a starting point or at
least a turning point that “sparked” the ten-year hunt for bin Laden that ended in May 2011 when
he was killed in Abbottabad. Joe, a white middle school social studies teacher in his early 30s
said
It was the first time in my lifetime that a significantly traumatic event happened in
the United States where there were Americans that were killed as a result of the
actions of people from elsewhere which was not new in the world but new to the
United States. And so I feel like that level of trauma combined with the cultural
significance of Manhattan and the World Trade Center, which were well known
to people not in Manhattan, made it into a traumatic event. We’ve never dealt
with anything like that.
Many of the respondents over 35 said the hunt for bin Laden did not begin with 9/11 and instead
pointed to terrorist attacks preceding 9/11 that had already landed bin Laden on the FBI’s most
wanted list. Bob, a unionized ironworker in his 50s, worked on the repairs to the World Trade
Center after the 1993 bombing, and saw 9/11 not as a beginning, but as “them finishing the job.”
Gino, a Russian-born 40-year old lawyer, clarified that while there were attacks before 9/11, the
targeting of civilians made it qualitatively different:
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The state also has an obligation to respond to attacks on the military but
that’s a bit of a different thing. We’ve had bombings, you know, the USS
Cole bombing, we’ve had attacks, in Yemen and other places where the
military was attacked by insurgents or by terrorists who have these
grievances against the United States. Tanzania, you know. When an
embassy gets attacked, that’s in a way one thing. It still has to be
responded to. But when your political grievance is killing American
citizens on our own soil, it does not matter what the reason is in terms of
the response.
Most of the younger participants almost robotically began with 9/11 in their narrations, usually
specifying that they were in elementary or middle school for the events, but understood how
consequential they were based on unprecedented school protocols and conversations with their
parents. Several talked about the cultural environment in which 9/11 was defined as the turning
of a tide, including a young African American media professional, Evelyn, who said “9/11 was
not a major turning point without the media narration of it and the government reaction to it,
which was what it was.”

One focus group participant, 23-year old graduate student Na’ama, who left a Hasidic Jewish
upbringing after starting college, forcefully described bin Laden and al Qaeda’s motivations as
legitimate responses to American imperial military aggression in the Middle East. Pulling no
punches, she said, “If I was Osama bin Laden I would have fucked shit up in the US a long time
ago.” The other participants acknowledged her claim; for example, 25-year old Ben said “yeah,
yeah, the US isn’t perfect,” but continued the hegemonic narration of temporal sequencing and
motivations which squarely put the United States in a position of moral superiority.

More generally, older white participants were more likely to believe that the government could
generally be trusted, guilty of omission more often than deception, and when the state withheld
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information from the public they believed it was usually in the public interest. The American
born participants of color were warier of the intentions of the state to protect all of its citizens,
and were more likely to draw on other instances of government oppression. For example, Joan,
an African American woman in her 60s who works as a “nonprofit sector consultant”
specializing in the creation of wealth for minority communities, drew on black radical
philosophers she had read in college, saying it is ironic that the United States is always on quests
to overthrow oppressive regimes around the world when she grew up “colored and unable to use
a damn water fountain when her parents were millionaires.”

Immigrants to the United States and younger people trusted the government much less. A
Moroccan French national, Samia, who began wearing a hijab after 9/11 in solidarity with her
more religious friends who were routinely attacked physically and verbally by Islamophobes,
reminded, “France, America, they are built on lies to get the gaulois [white French people] to kill
us for them. The same is here.” In the focus group of recent college graduates and graduate
students, not only did four of the five participants say “no,” without further elaboration when
asked if they trust the statements of government officials, 24-year-old Adele, an Irish American
graduate student from Silicon Valley, added, “I wish you guys could understand the amount of
anxiety that I have right now because I feel like the NSA definitely hacked into my phone…”
Na’ama interrupted, “They have been, if anything.” Adele continued, “Oh, God, girl, I know,
literally” then to her phone “I know you’re listening!” She explained, “I’m telling my phone. I’m
like, I know you’re listening; calm down.” Ben, 25, said he did not trust the Trump
administration, but of Obama he said, “I wouldn’t question the truth. But I would also sort of
accept that there are probably aspects of the operation that didn’t see the public eye, and sort of a
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symbol of that narrative was given.” He turned to Adele and asked, “why are we doing
something wrong?” Adele quickly retorted, “No, absolutely not. But do I think of the United
States as rational? No. So why would I now think of the United States, and specifically the NSA,
as rational? I just don’t. Do I feel safer? No.”

While opinions about 9/11 as catalyst and trust in the government narrative of the hunt was not
surprising in terms of race, citizenship status, and age, knowledge about the raid was somewhat
unpredictable. Of all interview and focus group participants, the three “enthusiasts” with the
greatest exposure to accounts of the raid across the authorized discourse, were 28-year old
Nigerian-born video game developer Victor, 41-year old Jordanian-American Christian, Reem,
and Mike, a white political operative at the state level, in his 40s. These individuals had near
total recall of specific plot twists and spoke passionately, often using military parlance and
abbreviations seamlessly.

Mike, who I interviewed one-one-one laid it all out, conspicuously crediting the Navy SEALs
with the narrative drive:
It’s clear to me Bin Laden was in Afghanistan during the invasion, he was in
Afghanistan all the way till the end when the United States and the Northern
Alliance who are our allies in Afghanistan were pushing the Taliban into the
mountains. And from what I remember at the time, he escaped into the caves in
the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. We lost track of him, we
weren’t aggressive enough in pursuing the attacks on those installations and
bombing them and he escaped. And that to me was and to most Americans was
the biggest failure of the war in Afghanistan. I mean, you went in, you kicked out
the Taliban, it took a couple of weeks to do but then you allow the criminal, the
cause of all this to escape. And that was a major problem.
And so from there the Navy Seals, U.S Special Forces, the CIA and intelligence
services spent, literally, the next ten years trying to find him wherever he was.
And for much of that time they were unsuccessful. They would just miss him in
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places, they wouldn’t be able to find him, he would still release his videos and
that pretty much lasted until 2011 when the Navy Seals located and killed Bin
Laden in that raid that day. So what I remember about it is it being messily
frustrating that somebody like this who is the most wanted man on the planet
could somehow escape into the mountains and nobody could find him for 10
years. I really felt taunted by him, I mean, he would pop out from time to time and
taunt, I think, the country as a whole and say, “Haha, I’ve got away and I’m so
active and you guys are failing” or whatever he would say.
Victor was a part of a focus group of media professionals of color who all knew a fair amount
about the details of the hunt and the raid compared to other interviewees and focus groups. With
the details all volunteered, they discussed whether they believed the raid to be a kill mission
from the outset and whether it mattered that bin Laden was unarmed. They concluded that
specialized kill missions of high value targets, whether using drones of Special Operations
teams, were preferred in the face of limited options, due to their light footprint and precision.
Joan added “institutional memory,” reminding the younger participants that she was a White
House correspondent for a major network in 1980. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, she
recollected, was present for Operation Eagle Claw, the failed attempt to rescue American
hostages in Tehran that resulted in a collision in the desert that killed eight American soldiers,
and added that incident must have weighed heavily on the choice to use Special Forces at all and
for the bin Laden raid in particular. This group had an explicit discussion about gender dynamics
during a discussion of Hillary Clinton’s facial expression in the Situation Room photograph.
Joan said the room looked like “a coil that was about to spring open,” and Eddie, a 30-year old
Liberian who had volunteered for Obama’s campaign in 2008, agreed, adding “and I bet all the
white guys in the photo feel exactly how she looks.” Sarita, an Indian-American in publishing
commented that even though media commentators talked about how small Obama makes himself
in the photo in his casual windbreaker, that in her view, “Bush was emasculated he couldn't get
bin Laden and then Obama puffed up all masculine because he did.”
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Reem enthusiastically shared her American patriotism and appreciation for the military and
police. She was a minority opinion among a group of volunteers for an Arab American direct
services organization that have dealt with ever-expanding community surveillance since 9/11.
Samia called her a “dupe” and a “sell-out” several times, and Reem retorted that the raid was
“badass” and “clear-cut” even if Samia had a problem with other post-9/11 American security
policies. I mentioned that it was an Arab American woman who had followed the raid most
closely of everyone I had spoken with to date to the focus group of ironworkers. I noted that she
knew details about the helicopters I could only corroborate on specialized websites about
technology created by military veterans, for example, and she was among the most certain that it
was a heroic act worthy of celebration. Bob explained
You should really have a conversation with the [Arab Christian] neighbors here,
downstairs, next door, in the basement, because they have a totally realistic view
on everything; because they have family over there now, in Syria, in Lebanon.
You see, I speak with them a lot. Our neighbor next door is Syrian Christian;
neighbors downstairs are Lebanese Christian; in the basement, Lebanese
Christian. They’ve been fighting the Muslims since they were kids. And
everything that’s going on there now affects everybody. Now, our government
right now is looking to finance the Syrian rebels to fight the government that are
protecting the Christians in Syria, which is ridiculous; because then you just
condemn all the Christians in Syria to death if you get rid of their government.
Justin added, “And it destabilizes everything we know. Because they hate the Muslims more
than Americans do!” George further clarified, “My enemy’s enemy is my friend, kind of thing.”

Almost all participants used victim sequences, telling me the story from the American
perspective, highlighting what happened to “us” on “that day.” Many added “contextual
sequences” which, according to Cerulo (1998:5) “prioritize the circumstances surrounding a
violent act” when describing the raid, while the textual data much more often used performer
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sequences, telling the story from the perspective of Obama and the national security officials, the
SEALs, or later, after the release of Zero Dark Thirty and HBO’s documentary version of
Manhunt, from the perspective of CIA analysts.

When I shared excerpts from Kathy Scott-Clark’s and Adrian Levy’s (2017) account of the raid
from their book The Exile that was excerpted as a newspaper article entitled “Watching Daddy
Die,” (May 14, 2017, The Times), written from the perspective of bin Laden’s wife, Amal, that
offers a different interpretation of the same actions the SEALs document, but centers how they
were experienced by the wives and children, most of my participants had genuinely never
thought about the violence from their perspectives. While several participants struggled for a few
minutes as they thought it through, most came to the conclusion that collateral damage is an
unfortunate, but inevitable part of war and still thought the United States did what it had to,
given the circumstances.

As for comments on the structure of the story, Patritzia, a Mexican-American writer in her 20s,
first brought The Hero’s Journey to my attention. She explained to me why she believed it to be
such a resonant framework, despite being so common that it can feel formulaic when poorly
executed:
So there’s this whole circle the characters go through. And with that, action
movies follow that. And that’s also the journeys that we take in our own life.
Even if it’s just something like getting your MBA, there’s a journey to that.
There’s setting off, there’s a decision to it, there’s the struggle, there’s maybe
having a mentor. These are all thing that actually happen in stories too. And we
crave that. That’s why we like listening to stories better than learn lessons. And so
that’s one reason why I feel like we like action movies, because they’re very
typical of that, what we experience as humans, as going through struggles and
then eventually, hopefully, achieving those goals. With bin Laden, there’s
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probably some people that crave that kind of thing, from both a spectator point or
participating.
Finally, focus group participants and interviewees provided important insights about the
aggressive silencing of individuals who were open to counter-narratives or alternative meanings
and interpretations of the dominant narrative. Only one participant doubted that bin Laden was
actually dead. Early on in our phone interview, Adam, 35, said
Quite frankly, does anyone believe the story about how he died? We’re going
down rabbit holes here, but these are all connected events [referring to counternarratives of 9/11 as an “inside job.”] Like, the thing that’s important about 9/11
is that it laid the groundwork for a very, very, very small but powerful group of
people to further their grip and tighten their grasp on how they control the world.
And on one level, on a day-to-day basis, it’s almost like who cares. You still have
to get up and go to work, you’re still at your job, you still get your paycheck,
same old stuff. But what they’re taking from you is the ability to live life outside
of the confines of what essentially is allowed. This is a question of freedom. If
you want to say that 9/11 was seriously a conspiracy, you have to ask what the
conspiracy was for and it was to take away personal freedoms…And if you talk
about Osama bin Laden, everyone was happy when he died…but there was never
a body…This guy, he’s supposed to be an enemy of the state; we’re going to, like
suddenly, for no reason whatsoever, respect his religious beliefs and dump him in
the ocean and never let anyone see a body? Come on. The sitting president just
needed a boost in points…I get a lot of push back when I say this, but I find it’s
simply on an emotional level and they’re not taking their time to think about it. So
if maybe they lost somebody close to them or they need to love a great
country…but tell your patriotic boss that and you lose your job, tell somebody
who never experienced violence but lost someone in 9/11 or the wars, they freak
out, because it all has to be for something. They can’t deal with me.
Despite his enthusiastic support for the killing of Osama bin Laden, Gino was vigorously
opposed to most other post-9/11 security polices, especially the wars and the PATRIOT Act. I
asked if he had ever expressed his concerns in public and if he had, did he ever get shut down as
being unpatriotic. Painfully aware of his positionality he glibly responded, “So for the sake of
this tape, I’m a white guy, I don’t get shut down. I wrote editorials in my law school paper in
October 2001 talking about pumping the oil barrel. And no one shuts me down personally and no
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one calls me unpatriotic. I have a stock of responses when certain things happen to me. Most of
them are a stern, ‘fuck you.’”

During a focus group with police officers, I asked people how they felt about the raid. Javier, a
police officer in his 20s, said he didn’t think the United States should have killed bin Laden. I
asked him if he told anyone that he felt that way right when it happened and he said, “No, I
mean, I’ll be honest; I’m going public with it now.” A retired captain asked if Javier had always
thought that and he confirmed he had, but always felt like he needed to keep it to himself. I asked
him why and he responded,
Because, you know, you just watch everybody else and it was like a victory for
the country. Even in policing we have to follow the law and that means the social
laws too; we socially make laws. So you try to stay within that neutral zone. So
I’ve always stood neutral, like, you know what, maybe that’s not my place to
comment, you know, politics, religion, and sexual creed or whatever. But nothing
like 9/11. I’m young so the guys always say, “you weren’t there. You weren’t
there. You didn’t lose friends. You aren’t dying.” It’s not true, but I just can’t.
You never really get into it because you don’t want to start a debate, or you don’t
want to start a fight, or you know what; you don’t want somebody looking at your
differently. So that’s why I’ve always kept it to myself.
While the recent college graduates and graduate students mostly sat quietly when Na’ama
suggested al Qaeda might have rational grievances, when I asked how they felt about bin
Laden’s death, Israeli-American Ari, 24, said
I’m definitely relived that he’s no longer making these kinds of plans and stuff
like that. He inspires Palestinians too, not just attacks on Europe and the US. But I
do see that they clearly attacked places that meant something; the Pentagon, the
World Trade Center. Maybe it’s not enough for us to slowly give back power that
wasn’t ours and maybe it’s crazy to think they’ll just receive it calmly without any
violence or anything like that. I think it’s definitely good that we got Osama bin
Laden off the map.
When I probed about whether he had ever shared what seemed to be very preliminary
oppositional decoding, he said he never would in a “mixed crowd.” He elaborated, “a lot of

149

people lost their lives. And when you’re talking about an incident of this magnitude, you can’t
handle it so lightly. It’s a shitty situation, honestly, I think that we got ourselves into, and we had
to get ourselves out of it. That’s as far as I’m willing to go.” Na’ama retorted, “I say outrageous
things, so I’m used to it. If some very patriotic person was in a space when I was talking about
all this, I would take apart the argument from the very unspoken premises that are driving the
other person’s argument in the first place.” She got quiet, and then added, “I’ll only say it if I
could destroy any argument afterwards that anyone would try to throw at me. If not, then I
probably would take a safer stance, but not for any reason aside from trying to avoid people from
throwing shit at me. Labeling my arguments conspiracy theories is just lazy.”

In sum, while many participants quickly added caveats, nuance, and interpretations to the
dominant narrative they overwhelmingly fall in line when they are presented with social
consequences surrounding events that have been constructed as socially and culturally sacred.
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CHAPTER 4
THE OBJECT OF RIGHTEOUS RETALIATION:
THE EVIL VILLAIN
Character work hides – and is meant to hide – complex combinations, teasing out one action or
dimension to associate with an individual, making symbols out of flesh and blood.
James M. Jasper (forthcoming:4), Moral Characters
Osama bin Laden is dead. The man who killed thousands of innocent people, that man who
launched United States into two wars in the name of that attack, the man who changed the way
we have to live in this country; the man who did all of this was killed by US Special Forces
acting on orders from President Obama. We first learned his name back when there was still
smoke rising from ground zero behind us here. The US came close to getting him, but could not.
He was villainized. He became something of a cartoonish cave-dwelling creature over time. In
the end, though, we learned he was living well under deep cover, but it wasn’t deep enough. As
the president and his national security team watched on live TV in real time at the White House,
two choppers full of Americans landed in his compound in Pakistan, rappelled down ropes and
came in shooting. He died along with several others in the attack. He’s already been buried at
sea. A chapter is now over while a new one begins.
-NBC Nightly News Anchor, Brian Williams, May 2, 2011
In the previous chapter, I retold the story conveyed by the authorized discourse about the hunt
for Osama bin Laden. The chronology demonstrates that 9/11 is described as an unprompted,
irrational act of aggression that justified new counterterrorism policies in general and the killing
of bin Laden in particular. The narrative had familiar story formulas that normalized hegemonic
reactions and enriched content producers. Anyone who deviated from the official narrative about
the raid and “appropriate” reactions to it was aggressively silenced. Future terrorist attacks were
labeled as re-traumatizing for suffering victims and the savviness of villainous bin Laden in
eluding capture frustrated would-be heroes. In the next two chapters, I describe these three key
characters in this melodramatic story and analyze the insights that can be gleaned about
American culture given the ubiquity of certain details and the near absence of others. Character
analysis, in other words, offers a window into the presentation of orientalist and gendered codes
and counter-codes. In this chapter, I ask, who was Osama bin Laden according to the authorized
discourse and how was he portrayed as embodying and exemplifying the polluted side of
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American binary cultural codes? In the next chapter, I ask, who are the Navy SEALs and how do
they represent the pure side of American binary cultural codes? What is the role of the innocent
American victims in justifying the Navy SEAL raid as righteous retaliation?
***
Osama bin Laden is a cultural icon throughout the world. In some places he’s revered, in others
reviled, but in all cases mythologized. In the United States, in particular, however, bin Laden has
been “sequestered from humanity” (Margolin qtd in Eren 2017:176); not fully human, but rather
“the world’s most reviled symbol of terror” (Miller, New York Times, September 14, 2001). In
this chapter, I describe not Osama bin Laden the man who was born in 1957 and died in 2011,
but “Osama bin Laden,” the character, imagined, co-created and disseminated, through the
authorized discourse and imagined and remembered by focus group participants and
interviewees. I argue bin Laden, as evil villain in a Manichean struggle, was transformed into an
object for heroes to hunt and kill to avenge victims and to provide resolution to the melodramatic
narrative. His symbolism constructed a mortal public enemy to concretize a diffuse threat and
ideology, which, unlike a human, cannot be killed. His structural placement as melodramatic
villain for the injured hero to hunt down and punish renders a ruthless archetype that embodies
evil and radicalism, which must be eliminated to begin a restoration of the hegemonic order he
sought to unseat.

Throughout the authorized discourse, some details are repeated again and again, while others are
conspicuously absent. In other words, the authorized discourse structures public attention toward
and away from particular aspects of his biography, traits, and actions to construct a character that
is flat – two-dimensional, uncomplicated, static, easily summarized and rarely surprising. Flat
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characters are merely tropes to advance a narrative, and as such, lack complexity, nuance, change
over time, and varied or contradictory traits. Throughout widely circulated biographical
information about bin Laden within the authorized discourse – including physical descriptions,
personal history, depictions of his ideology, and assessments of his lethality via recounting of the
many attacks he financed and/or planned – any paradoxes are presented as inconsistencies and
contradictions to delegitimate his ideology, rather than texture that humanizes him and “rounds”
his character. This is not to discount biographers’ attempts to provide a more nuanced picture.
For example, in The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader, Peter
Bergen (2006:xxvi) explicitly states, “maybe bin Laden will remain forever a sphinx without a
riddle an enigmatic smile playing on his lips, or perhaps he will emerge as something fuller.”
This book, which compiles rich firsthand accounts indeed offers a fuller picture, but it is ranked
1,379,420 on Amazon’s bestsellers list. Compared to the combined readerships of the print news
sample alone, totaling nearly nine million readers, this intimation that there are more nuanced
accounts that round out bin Laden’s media persona, is dwarfed as a component of cultural
hegemony maintenance. Most importantly, the flat characterizations of bin Laden reveal and
reinforce particular self-conceptions about America, Americans, the West, “civilization,” and
their corresponding values. I argue that the contents of the character of “Osama bin Laden” say
more about American culture than about bin Laden, the man. The authorized discourse is about
bin Laden, but it is for Americans.

Bin Laden, the Privileged Fraud
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Osama bin Laden was born in 1957 and grew up in Saudi Arabia with “wealth, power, and
privilege” (NBC, Special Broadcast, September 11, 2001). His place of birth immediately injects
him into Orientalized frame, drawing on centuries of referent imagery and assumptions. The
prominence of his family in a highly stratified society casts him as elite, disconnected from the
people, and lucky, not the archetypal revolutionary who has nothing but his principles and
comrades in his fight to change the world. This alone can stir robust public anger toward him to
justify more extreme measures to defeat him. Repeated, sometimes misleading, emphasis on
particular aspects of his biography while deemphasizing others reinforces his association with
these devalued cultural attributes and constructs him as a cartoonish villain.

His New York Times’ obituary describes him as “the son of the Saudi elite,” insinuating he
collectively belonged to a community who, in fact, largely shunned him. At the personal level,
Osama bin Laden grew up differently from many of his siblings. The same obituary reports,
“Osama was the only bin Laden child who never traveled abroad to study” and “some people
close to the family paint a portrait of bin Laden as a misfit” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York
Times, May 2, 2001). On a September 2001 CNN segment entitled, “The Man Behind the
Attacks,” Boettcher explained to audiences, “But Osama bin Laden doesn't come from a family
of extremists. He was born the son of a billionaire Saudi businessman, the 17th of 52 children
some of whom live in the United States. His father built the largest construction business in
Saudi Arabia. Osama joined the family operation at a young age developing an expertise in
demolition. But in 1979 the religious 23-year-old left his comfortable life and took a radical
turn” (CNN, The Man Behind the Attacks, September 14, 2001).
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At the collective level, bin Laden was a thorn in the side of the Saudi government – often
expressing outrage over Saudi-American relations. According to Worldwide Entertainment’s
2011 documentary Osama bin Laden: A Decade to Justice, bin Laden offered the mujahedeen
who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan to the Saudis as an alternative to allowing more US
troops into the region when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Not only was he rebuffed, “The Saudi
government exiled the clerics and undertook to silence bin Laden by removing his passport”
(Worldwide Entertainment 2011). However, placing him as an elite Saudi brings to mind for
many Americans an imagined Arab royal family portrayed in movies like Aladdin and TV shows
like FX’s Tyrant.

Beyond his historical and cultural placement, the authorized discourse directs attention to the
economic privilege he was afforded as a child. With great derision, Lisa Beyer writes for Time,
“He was inspired to take on a second superpower [The US, after defeating the Soviets], and he
was funded to do so: by a fortune inherited from his contractor father, by an empire of business
enterprises, by the hubris that comes from being a rich kid whose commands had always been
obeyed by nannies, butlers and maids” (Beyer, Time Magazine, September 24, 2001). New York
Times’ columnist David Brooks brought biographer Stephen Coll’s (2008) research for The Bin
Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century to the authorized discourse. He describes
bin Laden’s childhood as “a suburban existence. [He] …was sent to an elite school, wearing a
blue blazer…taught by European teachers” (Brooks, New York Times, May 2, 2011), giving the
impression that bin Laden had more exposure to and benefited from Western culture than his
cultivated image – “a self-glorifying mythology” (Brooks, New York Times, May 2, 2011) –
could allow. Much of the authorized discourse after his death mused that his arrogance about his
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own leadership and image, which manifested as daily operational control from hiding, is what
enabled the US to defeat him and stemmed from his entitled upbringing. For example, Mustafa
Ansari, a Saudi journalist with unique access to the bin Laden family told the filmmakers of
HBO’s Manhunt, “What was bin Laden’s mistake? His love of power. He was regularly sending
the courier back and forth. He wanted to stay in the picture, in constant contact with his deputy.
He could have stayed quiet and stayed safe. Bin Laden’s ideology revolved around death and
jihad. The truth is, he never really sought death. He used to say that death for his cause was a
beautiful thing. But he never sought death himself. He hung onto life for as long as he could. He
did everything possible to stay alive” (HBO 2013).

Beyer in 2001 and Brooks in 2011 were not the only journalists to describe bin Laden as a bratty
rich kid barking orders; this was a widespread device that served to make him even more
unlikable by playing into American anti-elitism.52 More than a distaste for unearned privilege,
the authorized discourse also used his wealth to discredit the foundation of his credibility: his
religious piety and his self-concept as a savior of a noble religion under attack. Peter Bergen, in
the documentary The Last Days of Osama bin Laden, notes, “Born in 1957, into a wealthy Saudi
family, little in his privileged upbringing suggests he will become a firebrand of Islamist jihad”
(Storyhouse Productions 2011). Judith Miller, for the New York Times, called him “an unlikely
spokesman for the oppressed and dispossessed” although “he styles himself as a humble man of
the Muslim people” (Miller, New York Times, September, 14 2001). Later in the same article,
Miller writes, “Born in the mid-1950’s…he enjoyed a youth of wealth and privilege. While many
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While there is certainly American cultural fascination with elite lifestyle that manifests as voyeurism of celebrity
culture, evidenced by the high ratings of TV shows like Keeping Up with the Kardashians, the mythology of the
American Dream makes self-made millionaires with strong entrepreneurial spirit preferable to those with hereditary
wealth.
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Saudis of his era sweltered in the desert sun, he had air conditioned houses and private stables,
and was pampered by servants,” (Miller, New York Times, September, 14 2001) serving to frame
his ascetic lifestyle as an adult as a cynical performance, especially once the world discovered he
had been living in a million dollar compound in a serene suburb rather than sleeping on the floor
of a cave in Afghanistan. Jack Shaheen (2008:xii), a well-known critic of Arab stereotypes in
media, suggests that Orientalized images rely on villains “dwell[ing] in a primitive place.” Until
his death, the orientalist narrative depended on the image of bin Laden in the caves. However,
the authorized discourse seems to suggest that the only thing worse than being a cave-dwelling
terrorist is to be a fraud. Perhaps bin Laden’s upbringing, many imply, was authentic to his true
self and his religious and political convictions were the performance.

The emphasis on wealth, entitlement, and access provides a flat character for American
audiences to feel anger toward. There are complexities in his background, however, that could
have made him more relatable. His obituary authors explain:
His father, Muhammad (sic) bin Awad bin Laden, had immigrated to what would
soon become Saudi Arabia in 1931 from the family’s ancestral village in a
conservative province of southern Yemen. He found work in Jidda as a porter to
the pilgrims on their way to the holy city of Mecca; years later, when he owned
the largest construction company in Saudi Arabia, he displayed his porter’s bag in
the main reception room of his palace as a reminder of his humble origins
(Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2011).
The authorized discourse pays little attention to the relationship Osama had with his father before
Mohammed bin Laden’s death, but biographers posit the relationship was the difficult
combination of distant, yet inspirational. Although Mohammed bin Laden was not religious like
his son Osama, and unlikely to be true, “Osama bin Laden would recall proudly that his father
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had sometimes prayed in all three holy places in one day” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York
Times, May 2, 2011).

More, Osama bin Laden was the only child of his mother, Alia Ghanem. From a poor family of
fruit tree farmers, only fifteen years old when he was born, she was “the last of his father’s four
wives, was from Syria, and was the only one not from Saudi Arabia. The elder bin Laden had
met her on a vacation…Within the family, she was said to be known as ‘the slave’ and Osama
‘the slave child’” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2011). Mohammed bin
Laden divorced her soon after Osama was born and Alia and Osama moved out of the family
compound. Not only does this fact, to a certain extent, disrupt the image of an elite childhood in
the bustling bin Laden household, his relationship with his mother is the first of bin Laden’s
gender expressions that are used to discredit him. Drawing further on Coll’s (2008) biographical
work, David Brooks quotes family friend Khaled Batarfi who told Coll that Osama “adored his
mother. As a teenager, he ‘would lie at her feet and caress her…he wouldn’t sleep if he knew she
was upset about something’” (Brooks, New York Times, May 2, 2011). In the Smithsonian
Channel documentary, The Hunt for bin Laden, FBI agent Jack Cloonan goes further than merely
passing over this context, as is most often the case in the authorized discourse, to use bin Laden’s
childhood to delegitimate and humiliate him by attributing his relationship with his mother to
other expressions of a subordinated masculinity: “He was a hypochondriac. He was a mama’s
boy. He was very close to his birth mother…He slept two or three hours a night, he was very
careful about what he ate…does bin Laden wear disguises? Yes. Did bin Laden ever dress as a
woman? Yes. Would he fight if cornered? Would he commit suicide?” (Smithsonian Channel
2012).
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While these details – the immigrant background, his father’s American Dream-style ascent, the
likelihood of childhood trauma – are by no means secret, they appear in the very same obituary,
they are not fleshed out, nor do the authors explicate the implications. Rather, his placement as
“son of the Saudi elite,” whose father happened to benefit from rare social mobility in Saudi
Arabia, counters efforts to place Osama bin Laden as a revolutionary or freedom fighter – he is
no workingman, son of a struggling community; he was born with a silver spoon in his mouth,
one that he could melt down and remake as a weapon in that his wealth enabled him to finance
an illegal war against the United States.

Bin Laden, the Evil Ideologue with Irrational Grievances

Bin Laden is portrayed throughout the authorized discourse as the embodiment of an ideological
movement, a “radical, violent campaign to recreate a seventh-century Muslim empire [that]
redefined the threat of terrorism for the 21st century” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times,
May 2, 2011). This description captures two central themes of bin Ladenism, as depicted by
hegemonic agents: 1) the counterhegemonic aims to move the world back in time, to the
“lifetime of the prophet Mohammed,” and 2) the hypocrisy, contradictions, and illegitimacy of
the strategy and tactics al Qaeda engages to express grievances. Most generally, the ways his
ideology and corresponding actions are described reveal how bin Laden and his actions were
associated with the cultural codes that help classify him as an uncontested evil villain. For
example, while it might be accurate to characterize bin Laden’s ideology as radical and violent –
his views advocated for extreme changes to social order and power dynamics and he believed
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violent tactics could best achieve these goals – describing it as such paints a picture of
illegitimacy, irrationality, and the senseless use of criminal violence to take human life and
implies that American military campaigns and domestic security apparatuses are not also radical
and violent.

More specifically, both of these themes rely on racialized and gendered hierarchies. Bin Laden’s
race and religion make his imperial aims unacceptable and his ideology dangerous. The United
States and its hegemonic coalition hold a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence while
violent tactics to oppose its hegemony are condemned in favor of nonviolent negotiation. As
Peter Gelderloos (2007:23) explains, this racialized double standard
ignores that violence is already here; that violence is an unavoidable, structurally
integral part of the current social hierarchy; and that it is people of color who are most
affected by that violence. Pacifism assumes that white people who grew up in the
suburbs with all their basic needs met can counsel oppressed people, many of whom
are people of color, to suffer patiently under an inconceivably greater violence, until
such time as the Great White Father is swayed by the movement’s demands or
pacifists achieve that legendary “critical mass.”
The simultaneous misunderstanding and demonization of gender relations in Islam and
emasculation of bin Laden as an individual come together to further discredit him and the
supposed backwardness of his ideology. Bin Laden’s gentle presence, elaborated upon below,
does not mitigate the Western image of oppressive Islamic gender relations, nor does his
association with hyperpatriarchal gender norms serve to mitigate the subordination of bin
Laden’s masculinity.
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The authors of the 9/11 Commission Report (2004:xvi), tasked with exploring the lead-up to the
attacks of September 11, 2001, narrate what they learned about “the enemy’s” ideology and
evolution throughout their investigation:
We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal.
The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and Muslim world by demanding
redress of political grievances, but its hostility toward our values and us is
limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and political pluralism, the
plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no distinction between military
and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its lexicon.
Similarly, in an address two years after the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, Bush
(2006:394) echoes characterizations of the rationality of “the cold brutality of the enemy who
inflicted this harm on our country.” Bush (2006:395) stated,
The terrorists who attacked us on September the 11th, 2001 are men without
conscience – but they’re not madmen. They kill in the name of a clear and
focused ideology, a set of beliefs that are evil, but not insane. These al Qaeda
terrorists and those who share their ideology are violent Sunni extremists. They’re
driven by a radical and perverted vision of Islam that rejects tolerance, crushes all
dissent, and justifies the murder of innocent men, women and children in the
pursuit of political power. They hope to establish a violent political utopia across
the Middle East, which they call a “Caliphate” – where all would be ruled
according to their hateful ideology.
The report and speech describe a formidable counterhegemonic movement that goes far beyond
an oppositional consciousness that is incapable of subverting the cultural hegemony of the
United States (Mansbridge and Morris 2001). Both play up the surprising sophistication of the
enemy, while also downplaying the role of years of American imperial aggression, in favor of
the narrative that centers al Qaeda’s contempt for American culture. Therefore, while some
internal logical consistency is attributed to bin Laden’s coherent ideology, his grievances are still
described as being rooted in unreality.

Further, Rygiel (2006:148) argues that while there is

161

nothing new about shoring up hegemonic masculinity through constructions of
subordinate masculinities…what is new, however, is that while construction of
‘the terrorist’ often have relied on Orientalist images (for example, Arab/Muslim
men as ‘uncivilized,’ ‘uneducated,’ and so on), the image of the ‘terrorist’ is now
frequently associated with young, educated, professional men in the most
economically productive age brackets, often employed in fields such as computer
programming, business, science and technology and as foreign students studying
abroad.
Muslim masculinities have historically been marginalized, but framed as distant and
unthreatening to Western gender regimes. With this reframing of “Terrorists” as savvy,
scientific, and living in the West, comes the perception that they now pose a legitimate threat.53

The authorized discourse continues to flatten bin Laden’s character, when in fact, violent and
radical as bin Laden’s ideology may have been, there were times when he was a voice of
moderation within al-Qaeda, a detail left out of news media narrations. For example, bin Laden
was deeply opposed to the wanton violence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al Qaeda in Iraq,
the precursor of ISIS. Bergen (2012:145), in his retelling of the hunt for bin Laden published
after bin Laden’s death, explains:
In November 2005, as bin Laden was settling into his new life at the Abbottabad
compound, Rahman wrote a seven-page letter to the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq,
the astonishingly cruel Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had made a habit of
personally beheading his hostages and videotaping the results for global
distribution on the Internet. Rahman’s letter, which clearly reflected the views of
bin Laden, was a polite but blistering critique of Zarqawi, who had recently
directed suicide bombings at American hotels in Amman, Jordan, that had killed
sixty people, almost all of them Jordanian civilians attending a wedding. The
bombings had severely tarnished al Qaeda’s image in the Arab world and came on
top of Zarqawi’s indiscriminate slaughter of any Muslim who didn’t precisely
share his views. Like a dissatisfied boss delivering a performance review,
Rahman told Zarqawi that he should henceforth follow instructions from bin
Laden and cease counterproductive operations such as the hotel bombings in
53

In memoirs about the bin Laden raid there is oscillation between the “cave dwelling terrorist” narrative and the
“savvy urban sleeper cell” narrative. Those subscribing to the more primitive image are usually described as being
behind the times.
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Jordan…bin Laden was worried that Zarqawi had grievously harmed the al Qaeda
brand, and in October 2007, al Qaeda’s leader even issued an unprecedented
public apology for the behavior of his followers in Iraq, scolding them for
“fanaticism.”
Hegemonic narrations of bin Laden’s ideology trace its development through his personal
biography. During his college years he met the men who would influence his theological and
political positions and with whom he laid the ideological and logistical foundation for al Qaeda.
In Afghanistan in the 1980s, warriors were actually fighting the invaders he had only learned
about in college. Engaging in combat for the first time, successfully recruiting and training
mujahedeen to fight on behalf of the ideology, and ultimately playing a pivotal role in defeating
a superpower emboldened bin Laden. He planned many attacks throughout the 1990s after being
expelled from Saudi Arabia and shared more details with the Western world about his ideology.
A gradual escalation in violence paired with increasing communications and operational
capacity, culminated in the attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks alone would construct bin
Laden as an “enemy,” but the binary cultural logics attributed to his individual character traits
catapulted him into a realm of “evil” that obsessed CIA targeters, politicians, and aggrieved
families.

Abdullah Azzam and Abdulaziz University
In 1979, bin Laden enrolled at Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he
purportedly gained an interest in politics. He majored in business and economics, but he spent
more time at the cross-sections of his religious and political interests. He joined the Muslim
Brotherhood and attended many lectures held by Islamic scholars, especially a Palestinian
disciple of Sayyid Qutb – an Egyptian Islamic theorist who was a leader of the Muslim
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Brotherhood in the 1950s – named Abdullah Azzam, who is often referred to as “the father of
global jihad.”54

Many accounts of bin Laden’s college years emphasize that bin Laden was at once an
impressionable boy and a formidable recruit given his propensity for radical ideas and bloodlust,
paired with his deep pockets. For example, in Targeted: Osama bin Laden (2004), part of the
History Channel’s series “Reign of Terror,” the narrator states, “bin Laden falls under the sway
of an influential professor who preaches a radical Islamic doctrine,” historian and ‘terrorism
expert’ Simon Reeves then goes on to describe him as an “insignificant young man looking for
purpose in life,” to which the narrator follows up: “In 1979, forces from the Soviet Union invade
the Afghanistan capital of Kabul. Bin Laden has found his purpose (History Channel 2004).
Similarly, Miller wrote for the New York Times, “Mr. bin Laden fell under the influence of the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, seasoned militants who had helped assassinate President Anwar el-Sadat
in 1981. They persuaded him that the jihad had to be expanded to other Muslims who were living
under autocratic ‘infidel’ regimes” (Miller, New York Times, September 14, 2001). These
characterizations constitute infantilization, a gendered and racialized institutional practice where
“certain political actors/communities [are represented] as vulnerable, helpless and backward
children” (Nayak 2006:48). Nayak (2006:48) explains, “infantilization is a form of racialized and
gendered violence because it violently denies agency based on race and gender and strongly
justifies military action.” Descriptions of how bin Laden was introduced to fundamentalist Islam
are part of a larger effort to emphasize how his character traits diverge from hypermasculine men
in general and respected warriors in particular. Painting the picture of a young, lost man,
vulnerable to manipulation, and highly desirable due to his wealth and access is a risk for
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hegemonic agents, as it develops a mildly sympathetic character. However, it also undercuts any
admiration for his convictions or originality, and the risk seems to pay off.

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:51) summarizes Qutb’s writings that inspired Azzam and bin
Laden as follows: “First, he claimed that the world was beset by barbarism, licentiousness, and
unbelief…Second, he warned that more people, including Muslims, were attracted to…material
comforts than to his view of Islam…Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a
struggle between God and Satan. All Muslims – as he defined them – therefore must take up
arms in this fight. Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of
destruction.” Azzam’s lectures introduced bin Laden to an interpretation of “jihad” as a holy war
to expel the political domination and cultural influence of “infidels” in Muslim lands. If
successful, throughout the Muslim world, American influence would be replaced with
fundamentalist regimes that would eventually unite into one caliphate, an empire lead by an
Islamic steward in the image of society during the time of the prophet. While Qutb and Azzam
advocated offense – to achieve this, all Muslims must be ready to take up arms – it is actually a
defensive doctrine as jihad responds to unwanted, extant military, economic, political, and
cultural influence.

In 2006, at the Military Officers Association of America gala, George W. Bush (2006:395)
articulated for audiences the ideology bin Laden adopted during these early years:
This caliphate would be a totalitarian Islamic empire encompassing all current
and former Muslim lands, stretching from Europe to North Africa, the Middle
East, and Southeast Asia. We know this because al Qaeda has told us. About two
months ago, the terrorist Zawahiri — he’s al Qaeda’s second in command —
declared that al Qaeda intends to impose its rule in “every land that was a home
for Islam, from [Spain] to Iraq. He went on to say, “The whole world is an open
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field for us.”… The goal of these Sunni extremists is to remake the entire Muslim
world in their radical image. In pursuit of their imperial aims, these extremists say
there can be no compromise or dialogue with those they call “infidels” — a
category that includes America, the world’s free nations, Jews, and all Muslims
who reject their extreme vision of Islam. They reject the possibility of peaceful
coexistence with the free world. Again, hear the words of Osama bin Laden
earlier this year: “Death is better than living on this Earth with the unbelievers
among us.” These radicals have declared their uncompromising hostility to
freedom. It is foolish to think that you can negotiate with them. We see the
uncompromising nature of the enemy in many captured terrorist documents.
These excerpts from the state use a framework of binary cultural codes to determine what aims
and actions are acceptable for different actors. Both present the problem with al Qaeda’s rigid
and dichotomous categorization schemes, while engaging similar, albeit opposite, conceptual
frameworks. Further, Bush and the 9/11 Commission’s descriptions of the foundations of “jihad”
both emphasize that it seeks to impose its way of life on others. Then-US Vice President Dick
Cheney had written a defense Planning Guidance document for the Project of the New American
Century, which argued, “The United States must be the sole superpower and take all necessary
actions to deter ‘potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role’”
(qtd in Scahill 2013:7).55 Therefore, imperial aims and the pursuit of global cultural hegemony
are not uniformly unacceptable. They highlight that al Qaeda is uncompromising, yet the United
States has an official policy that Americans “do not negotiate with terrorists.” Therefore, there is
not, according to this narrative, an on-going political struggle between two competing empires;
rather, American empire – and its culture that values “freedom” for its citizens to pursue material
comfort – must be preserved and protected from extremism. The United States took a similar
position when, at the turn of the 20th century, Japan began to engage in expansionist and
militaristic behavior typically reserved solely for the West. The United States and its European
allies strongly condemned Japan when it defeated Russia in 1905, annexed Korea in 1910 under
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an East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and invaded Manchuria in 1931. Japanese political and
military leaders explained they were a resource-poor island nation in search of natural resources
that would allow their people to prosper, much like the United Kingdom (Dower 2010). This
explanation was harshly rebuffed and to this day, Japan is not permitted to have a military
because of this “aggression.” More, when the United States won the war with the nuclear attacks
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they expected the Japanese emperor to denounce his own divinity
because the US deemed Shintoism, the national religion, too jingoistic to remain in play. This
points to an explicitly racialized element of hegemony. What is acceptable for Anglo-American
hegemony is not accessible to racial others.

Additionally, bin Ladenism is constructed as an existential threat throughout the authorized
discourse. There are plenty of fringe political groups around the world that hold hostile views
toward American political and cultural dominance, but they are not narrated as formidable
threats to the continuation of the United States’ global hegemony and Western ways of life.
Simultaneously, bin Laden’s alternative to American hegemony is described in dismissive, even
snarky language. One way to present these imperial aims as oppositional to American cultural
values was to emphasize the regressive aspects: this vision sought to march progress on human
rights backward. Moving the world back in time, to the lifetime of the prophet Mohammed, is
antithetical to American values about progress and separation between church and state (still
invoked in principle despite the rise of the religious right in American politics). Bin Laden’s
atavistic goal and dogmatic infusion of (a non-Christian) religion into governance is exacerbated
by the imperial nature of the ideology and transforms the threat posed by bin Laden’s ideology
and actions into counter-hegemonic activity with the goal of remaking the United States, as well
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as secular governments in Muslim-majority countries, in this image. With such framing,
narratives about legitimate grievances as motivation for action are silenced and extreme
measures to respond to the threat posed by such an ideology are justified.

The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:51-52) traces the ideology back to bin Laden’s college
influences to explain his worldview. The authors characterize his ideology as evil, radical, and
violent, and emphasize that it is irrationally built on illegitimate grievances:
Bin Laden shares Qutb’s stark view, permitting him and his followers to
rationalize even unprovoked mass murder as righteous defense of an embattled
faith. Many Americans have wondered, “Why do ‘they’ hate us?” Some also ask,
“what can we do to stop these attacks?” Bin Laden and al Qaeda have given
answers to both of these questions. To the first, they say that America had
attacked Islam; America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims. Thus
Americans are blamed when Israelis fight with Palestinians, when Russians fight
with Chechens, when Indians fight with Kashmiri Muslims, and when the
Philippine government fights ethnic Muslims in its southern islands. America is
also held responsible for the governments of Muslim countries, derided by al
Qaeda as “your agents…Bin Laden’s grievance with the United States may have
started in reaction to specific US policies but it quickly became far deeper. To the
second question, what America could do, al Qaeda’s answer was that America
should abandon the Middle East, convert to Islam, and end the immorality and
godlessness of its society and culture…if the United States did not comply, it
would be at war with the Islamic nation, a nation that al Qaeda’s leaders said
“desires death more than you desire life.”
The authors describe the ideology as “stark,” interpreting it for audiences as unambiguous and
rigid, implying that the American position in all of this is more nuanced and rational. They also
repeat an oft-used quote from bin Laden on death because the notion of suicide in battle is so
foreign to American culture. As Former CIA field agent Robert Baer puts it, “The problem with
bin Laden and his organization is they are people who want to die, unlike us. The objective in
war is to live and kill the other guy. Them, they don’t mind dying” (History Channel 2004).
During World War Two, the Japanese in general and Kamikaze in particular were cast as a
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subhuman enemy, since they did not fear death, used suicidal tactics, and were “willing to fight
to the last man, woman and child,” to justify the use of extreme, unprecedented measures against
them.

More, the authors of the 9/11 Commission Report weigh in that bin Laden’s attacks are
unprovoked – not based on legitimate political interpretations of American state behavior and
foreign policy in the Middle East – and imply that Islam is not an embattled faith, but rather
suggest that this narrative is used for political expediency. Preceding the excerpt above, the
authors had already delegitimated bin Laden’s and al Qaeda’s grievances, by characterizing the
ideology as cynically manipulating their historical moment:
It is the story of eccentric and violent ideas sprouting in the fertile ground of
political and social turmoil. It is the story of an organization poised to seize its
historical moment…Seizing on symbols of Islam’s past greatness, he promises to
restore pride to the people who consider themselves the victims of successive
foreign masters. He uses cultural and religious allusions to the holy Qur’an and
some of its interpreters. He appeals to people disoriented by cyclonic changes as
they confront modernity and globalization. His rhetoric selectively draws from
multiple sources – Islam, history, and the region’s political and economic malaise.
He also stresses grievances against the United States widely shared in the Muslim
world (NCTAUS 2004:48)…He draws on fundamentalists who blame the
eventual destruction of the Caliphate on leaders who abandoned the pure path of
religious devotion…For those yearning for a lost sense of order in an older, more
tranquil world, he offers his ‘Caliphate’ as an imagined alternative to today’s
uncertainty. For others he offers simplistic conspiracies to explain their world
(NCTAUS 2004:51).
Although the authorized discourse emphasizes a restoration of pride for Americans after bin
Laden’s death, and some directly link the re-establishment of pride to a return to a monopoly on
hegemonic masculinity, it is unthinkable that anyone would try to “seize Islam’s past greatness.”
The political and economic history the 9/11 Commission Report provided to inform readers on
the background of this “fertile ground” is meant to seem like a brief, authoritative, neutral
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account. However, it is polemical in its assertion bin Laden manipulated a broader trend that
misassigned blame on the US, when national and regional problems offer a more salient
explanation for inequality and instability. The authors explain that bin Laden’s ideology assumes
that America attacked Islam first, but then disparage this grievance by dismissing it as an overreaction that places blame for problems in far-flung parts of the world where the US has little
strategic influence. The grievance that the United States has historically meddled in domestic
politics in the Arab world, influencing elections and supporting corrupt regimes, is also
dismissed, presenting instead some sort of distorted personal obsession, irrational and evil on top
of being immoral and lethal. The authors also exaggerate what bin Laden and like-minded
political operatives expect Americans to do if they want to prevent any future attacks; the
caliphate is meant to exist in historically Muslim lands free from external influence, yet
hegemonic agents claim the ideology is fueled by so much zealotry and fervor, the demands so
outlandish, that there is no alternative to decimating al Qaeda, its leaders, its followers, and its
ideology.

Others attribute bin Laden’s trajectory to the political effervescence in the Muslim world when
he began college, for example, his New York Times’ obituary contextualizes his college
experience as follows: “The Middle East was becoming unsettled in 1979, when Bin Laden was
at the university. In Iran, Shiite Muslims mounted an Islamic revolution that overthrew the shah
and made the United States a target. Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty. And as the year
ended, Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2,
2001). This echoes Miller’s 2001 report for the New York Times: “He has said he was galvanized
by three events in the late 1970s: the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel, the
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overthrow of the Shah of Iran in a radical Islamic revolution, and the Soviet incursion in
Afghanistan. ‘I was enraged,’ he told the newspaper Al Quds al Arabi” (Miller, New York Times,
September 14, 2001). The 9/11 Commission Report (2004:54) takes it one step further to argue
that this historical context not only explains bin Laden’s influences, but also his successes: “Yet
as political, social, and economic problems created flammable societies, bin Laden used Islam’s
most extreme, fundamentalist traditions as his match. All these elements – including religion –
combined in an explosive compound…Bin Laden remained credible as other leaders and
symbols faded.” Bin Laden earned much of the currency that contributed to his legitimacy as a
symbol of a revolutionary movement during his years in Afghanistan in his early 20s; he
demonstrated that “jihad could defeat a superpower” (Smithsonian Channel 2012).

Afghanistan: Jihad Works
According to Peter Bergen in the documentary, The Last Days of Osama bin Laden, “At age 22
he joins up with the Afghan mujahedeen to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Bin Laden
considers it a holy war, a struggle to repel an infidel force. By war’s end he’s cultivated the
image of a fearsome military commander” (Storyhouse Productions 2011). He traveled back and
forth to Afghanistan throughout the 1980s to raise money to set up a Bureau of Services to
provide fighters with the logistical necessities to participate (e.g. covering family expenses, local
housing, etc.), established several training camps, built roads and organized other infrastructure
projects, and in 1988, with several Egyptians he allied with during the Afghan-Soviet War,
founded al Qaeda – “the base.”56 Experts believe he saw at least one battle and was wounded,
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When bin Laden first began to support the effort in Afghanistan, he and Abdullah Azzam coordinated a “Bureau
of Services” (BoS) together. Bin Laden had Azzam had significant differences in the management of BoS, mostly
notably that Azzam did not want to spread efforts too thin and therefore advocated that BoS focus exclusively on the
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essential to his masculine credentials. In the documentary Manhunt, based on his book, Bergen
explains, “He was recruiting, basically, very idealistic Saudi university students to come to fight
the Soviets… [coming to Afghanistan] is an intensely religious experience for these very
idealistic, young, Muslim men. And you know these magazines [like Jihad, available for sale in
Muslim-majority countries around the world, founded in 1984] have many stories about people
being martyred fighting the Soviets who didn’t decompose or whose bodies smelled like
perfume. This was highly effective propaganda to get people to volunteer” (HBO 2013). The
infantilized, impressionable young boy had evolved into the manipulator.

Hegemonic agents understand and articulate this appeal, for example, The New York Times
obituary notes, “To young would-be recruits across the Arab world, bin Laden’s was an
attractive story: the rich young man who had become a warrior. His own descriptions of the
battles he had seen, how he had lost the fear of death and slept in the face of artillery fire, were
brushstrokes of an almost divine figure” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2001).
An unidentified CIA agent quantifies bin Laden’s impenetrable reputation: “Here we have this
very distinctive 6 foot five, thin, Arab living in Afghanistan, one of the two or three poorest
countries on the planet and a $50 million pay day available for somebody who could lead us to
him and no one has taken us up on it” (History Channel 2004). Associates interviewed before
9/11 and for the documentaries made after the raid about bin Laden’s life talk about his “wide
smile of peace” (Noman Bentoman qtd in Smithonian 2012) and described him as being “Very
generous. He'd give you his clothes. He'd give you his money” (Abdullah Anas qtd Engelberg,
New York Times, January 14, 2001).

Afghan cause. Azzam was killed by a rival and bin Laden transformed BoS into the basis for a more complex
organization: al Qaeda.

172

There is, therefore, a concerted effort in the authorized discourse to demystify and debunk any
myths about bin Laden’s war experiences. Both pre- and post-9/11 stories from the New York
Times about bin Laden quote an interview with Abdullah Anas – “who is now a leader of an
Algerian Islamic political party…not a dispassionate observer, [who] opposed Mr. bin Laden”
(Engelberg, New York Times, January 14, 2001) – to assert that bin Laden was not a fierce
warrior or a brilliant political strategist; he was merely wealthy: “But unlike the others,” says
Anas, “what he had was a lot of money. He's not very sophisticated politically or
organizationally. But he's an activist with great imagination” (Engelberg, New York Times,
January 14, 2001). The Smithsonian Channel documentary, Hunt for bin Laden, suggests “his
checkbook was much more important than his use of a Kalashnikov” (Smithsonian Channel
2012). Drawing on similar research, David Brooks wrote, “He was not a fighter himself, more of
a courier and organizer, though after he survived one Soviet bombardment, he began to fashion a
self-glorifying mythology” (Brooks, New York Times, May 3, 2001). In the official New York
Times obituary, the authors report “While he built his reputation on his combat experience
against Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, even some of his supporters questioned
whether he had actually fought…Intelligence sources insist that bin Laden actually saw combat
only once…‘Afghanistan, the jihad, was one terrific photo op for a lot of people,’ [CIA officer]
Milton Bearden…said…adding ‘There’s a lot of fiction in there’” (Zernike and Kaufman, New
York Times, May 2, 2001). Some of his followers highly value the image of the mythic warrior
so on a surface level this work merely discredits him as a fraud. However, these assertions also
serve to emasculate him, removing the masculine credential and instead invoke the image of a
weak and cowardly financier, drawing on anti-Semitic cultural imagery exemplified by Shylock,
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the unscrupulous Jewish moneylender in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice (who is ultimately
defeated and forced to convert to Christianity.)

In an interview with the New York Times in 2008, former chief of the Osama bin Laden unit at
the CIA Counterterrorist Center, Michael Scheuer explained, “The U.S. government sees him as
a nihilistic gangster, so they are not interested in finding out that he has any kind of talent” (qtd
in MacFarquar, New York Times, September 10, 2008). There were also discussions in the
authorized discourse about how to understand bin Laden’s anti-Americanism considering
Americans and the mujahedeen were on the same side in Afghanistan, against the Soviets. His
New York Times’ obituary conceives of this complexity as deception about the past: “In the
revisionism of the Bin Laden myth, his defenders would say that he had not worked with the
Americans but that he had only tolerated them as a means to his end” (Zernike and Kaufman,
New York Times, May 2, 2001).

These efforts to delegitimate bin Laden were, of course, directed toward American and Western
audiences and years after the fact. At the time, according to biographer Simon Reeves, in an
interview with the filmmakers of Targeted: Osama bin Laden, “He left Saudi Arabia virtually
unknown and returned to the country as a great warrior. He traveled around the country
delivering speeches, invited to mosques and private homes telling them about his escapades”
(History Channel 2004). His increased popularity, confidence, (re-masculinization), and selfconcept as a leader of a political organization are pinpointed as the reasons his violence escalated
during the 1990s.
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Escalation in the 1990s: Saudi, Sudan, and Afghanistan
Most accounts identify 1990 as a turning point or breaking point for bin Laden. According to his
New York Times’ obituary,
The breaking point – for Bin Laden and for the Saudis – came when Iraq invaded
Kuwait in August 1990. Bin Laden volunteered to the Saudis that the men and
equipment he had used in Afghanistan could defend the kingdom. He was
“shocked,” a family friend said, to learn that the Americans – the enemy, in his
mind – would defend it instead. To him, it was the height of American arrogance.
The United States, he told an interviewer later, “has started to look at itself as a
master of this world and established what it calls the new world order” (Zernike
and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2001).
Miller, in a New York Times article published three days after 9/11, also contextualizes this event
in terms of his views of the United States:
While the United States had worked alongside him to help oust the Russians from
Afghanistan, Mr. bin Laden turned violently anti-American in 1990 after King
Fahd invited the United States and its allies to station forces in Saudi Arabia to
help defend the oil-producing kingdom against an invasion by Iraq. The presence
of American soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad
and the home of the two holiest Muslim shrines, enraged Mr. bin Laden and other
Arab militants (Miller, New York Times, September 14, 2001).
According to Targeted: Osama bin Laden, “Humiliated, [he] voices his anger with the Saudi
regime in fiery speeches. In 1991, the royal family offers to put him on a flight out of Saudi
Arabia…Bin Laden blames America for his exile and for the corruption of Islam in Saudi
Arabia” (History Channel 2004). In 1991, he relocated to Sudan. In Smithsonian Channel’s Hunt
for bin Laden, the narrator suggests Sudan was “a refuge for international terrorists” and that it
was there that bin Laden started “to turn al Qaeda into a force of global terror, “preserv[ing] his
Afghan army by bringing the veterans to Sudan” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). Likewise,
Targeted: Osama bin Laden describes how “on the banks of the blue Nile, bin Laden starts to
raise a terrorist army” due to lax immigration rules that made Sudan “a haven for Islamic
terrorists.” Biographer Simon Reeves describes his activity as follows: “He established training
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camps where they were taught how to use explosives, how to use weaponry, and brainwash them
into believing in his cause.” Robert Baer, Former CIA field agent adds, “He was starting to learn
how to be a master terrorist” (History Channel 2004).

The implication throughout these accounts is that bin Laden was unrealistic, arrogant, and brazen
to think that his troops were an equivalent replacement for the United States military or that the
Saudis would consider his proposal. He had let his victories in Afghanistan and his newfound
popularity go to his head. His characterization of the United States as an imperial aggressor, and
thereby an enemy according to his interpretation of jihad, are all but laughed off as the
reactionary naiveté of an idealist. Further, it is around this point that narrations of bin Laden
move from mocking bin Laden’s subordinated masculinity – his thin frame, his “reedy,” quiet
voice, his love for his mother – to treating his growing violence as a destabilizing masculinity,
one capable of challenging the American hegemonic masculinity.

These portrayals also reek of orientalism. The language used to describe al Qaeda’s early days
would never be used to describe American military activity. These accounts echo descriptions in
the 9/11 Commission Report (2004:55) of the mujahedeen as “young Muslims from around the
world [who] flocked to Afghanistan to join as volunteers” and later as “agents [who] roamed
world markets to buy arms and supplies” (emphasis added). Both delegitimate military strategy
and justify surveillance of Islamic institutions. The authors also state: “Plans to attack the United
States were developed with unwavering single-mindedness throughout the 1990s. Bin Laden saw
himself as called ‘to follow in the footsteps of the Messenger and to communicate his message to
all nations” and to serve as the rallying point and organizer of a new kind of war to destroy
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America and bring the world to Islam” (NCTAUS 2004:48, emphasis added). This language is
menacing and fear-mongering, but using similar language to describe American militarism
reveals how culturally contingent the language is: Plans to attack al Qaeda were developed with
unwavering single-mindedness…the United States saw itself as called to serve as the rallying
point and organizer of a global coalition fighting a new type of war to destroy al Qaeda and
bring the world to liberalism.

Most of the authorized discourse adopts these descriptions of bin Laden’s time in Sudan and skip
over the fact that bin Laden heavily invested in Sudan, employing people and bringing his
construction equipment to build needed infrastructure. According to a college friend and
contemporary, “He made farms, roads, factories” (Jamal Khalifa qtd in History Channel 2004).
In terms of hegemony maintenance, these descriptions clearly communicate to American
audiences that Saudi Arabia is a justifiable American ally and made attempts to thwart bin
Laden’s terrorist activity. Bin Laden’s character is used to mitigate the failures of the Saudis to
constrain him; he was relentless.

In 1993, there were two attacks on Americans that, “though the depth of bin Laden’s
involvement remains a mystery, it was a clear propaganda victory for the al Qaeda leader”
(History Channel 2004). While bin Laden himself was never legally tied these attacks, those who
were formally linked to the attacks had trained in his camps. First, US Marines were attacked in
Somalia in an incident known as “Black Hawk Down.” In Osama bin Laden: A Decade to
Justice, red and white text on a black screen with bin Laden’s face behind barbed wire as a
watermarked background reads, “Mogadishu: Rebel forces entered and took the city in 1990,
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forcing the then president to flee to Kenya. A contingent of United States Marines landed near
Mogadishu on December 9, 1992 to spearhead the United Nations peacekeeping forces during
operation Restore Hope” (Worldwide Entertainment 2011). The attack produced many casualties
and “a notorious black-eye for US special operations” (Discovery Channel 2011). The Hunt for
bin Laden, reminds, “The images of dead U.S. soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu
will burn into American memories” (Smithsonian 2012). Mark Bowden, author of a book on the
subject in addition to The Finish about bin Laden’s death, explains to the filmmakers of
Targeted: Osama Bin Laden, “they were effective in causalities on American troops and forced
the United States to abandon its mission in Somalia. That illustrated to Osama bin Laden that the
United States could be frightened, manipulated, bullied, forced to change its national policy by
inflicting a relatively small amount of pain” (History Channel 2004). What made matters worse,
on top of a humiliating and public defeat, was bin Laden’s emasculating taunting. For example,
when speaking about the US Marines in Mogadishu, Beyer reports for Time, “In interviews, bin
Laden has said that his forces expected the Americans to be tough like the Soviets but instead
found that they were ‘paper tigers’ who ‘after a few blows ran in defeat’” (Beyer, Time
Magazine, September 24, 2001).

Second, On February 26, 1993, a truck bomb was detonated below the North Tower of New
York’s World Trade Center (WTC). Journalist Charles M. Sennott, who was a police reporter for
the New York Daily News at the time, explained that it took some time to realize what had
happened was an act of terrorism. “Remember, this was 1993, no one was thinking about
terrorism back then. Firefighters and cops thought it was a generator explosion” (interview,
August 2016). Sennott ran over to the scene from a nearby diner, “sneaked past the police lines
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and saw the five-story deep crater, with cars all tumbled down into it” and knew right away,
“without any confirmation from the bomb squad, from [his] experience in Belfast and Medellin,
that it was a bomb” (interview, August 2016). “It turned out to be a lot more than a daily
headline in the New York newspapers. It was the first strike by the movement that would
become known as al Qaeda.” (interview, August 2016). In the retelling of the events of the 1990s
produced after 9/11, these events are cast as the start of something new, and revealed to
specialists that there was something much bigger than isolated, intermittent attacks. Cindy
Storer, an original member of the CIA’s bin Laden targeting unit explained, “So now it’s after
the war, in the early 90s and we started to get all these reports about things blowing up all over
the world by people who had fought in Afghanistan…is it some kind of organization, a social
movement, what was it?” After Black Hawk Down and the 1993 WTC bombing, she continued,
“Then it hit me. This is a bureaucracy” (HBO 2013).

Post-9/11, commentators were astonished by the organization of al Qaeda, implying that it was
surprising an Islamist group could be so bureaucratic and well-managed, once again associating
bin Laden and al Qaeda with the binary opposition to esteemed cultural traits like entrepreneurial
savvy. FBI agent Mark Rossini described it as “almost like an organized crime family, in which
you basically had Bin Laden as the godfather” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). Jack Cloonan, also
FBI, said, “It’s extremely organized. There are membership lists, there are employment
contracts…There are benefits, there are agreements, there are committees” (Smithsonian
Channel 2012). They were “far more sophisticated than we thought,” he continued, “it would
have been foolish to make fun of Bin Laden and al Qaeda, to think it was just some sort of
harebrained idea of a radical Islamist who had no future. It was an organization top to bottom,
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Bin Laden the CEO” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). At the same time, David Brooks highlights
the complications with attempts to use organizational knowledge to stop al Qaeda’s plans,
We think of terrorists as trying to build cells and organizations, but Bin Laden
created an anti-organization — an open-source set of networks with some topdown control but much decentralization and a willingness to embrace all recruits,
regardless of race, sect or nationality. We think of war fighters as using violence
to seize property and power, but Bin Laden seemed to regard murder as a
subdivision of brand management. It was a way to inspire the fund-raising
networks, dominate the news and manipulate meaning (Brooks, New York Times,
May 3, 2011).
After Black Hawk Down and the first World Trade Center bombing, the United States began to
put pressure on Sudan to expel bin Laden. This marked the beginning of American frustration
(and emasculation) over not being able to simply arrest and prosecute bin Laden. Former White
House Counterterrorism Czar Richard Clarke explained, “What the White House was told was
that the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States, had just won the cold war and
didn’t have the ability to get one guy in Khartoum” (Smithsonian Channel 2012).

In 1994, Saudi Arabia revoked bin Laden’s citizenship (formally attributing the decision to
weapons smuggling charges.) In 1995, a truck bomb set off at a US-operated Saudi National
Guard Training Center killed five Americans. The following year there was a second similar
attack on Americans in Saudi Arabia, assumed to have been planned and financed by bin Laden
from Sudan. By this time, the US agreed with its Saudi allies that bin Laden was a clear threat.
Sudan offered to send bin Laden back to Saudi Arabia for trial. According to The Hunt for Bin
Laden, “fearing bin Laden’s immense popularity in his homeland, the Saudis decided they can’t
afford to try him inside the kingdom.” Stephen Coll explains, “The Saudis decided bin Laden
was just too much of a hot potato,” and Baer adds, “He’s too popular. If we bring him into Saudi
Arabia it’s going to cause a revolution.” The Americans were not willing to try bin Laden in the
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US either, according to Coll, “They were told that while the justice department was beginning a
quite serious criminal investigation into bin Laden’s financing of terrorist activities, they did not
yet have enough evidence for a formal criminal indictment” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). Sudan,
caving to US pressure, expelled bin Laden in 1996 and he relocated to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
Even though the US “let” it happen, many of the documentaries that trace bin Laden’s
whereabouts treat the move as a set back for his hunters. Back in Afghanistan he was “beyond
the reach of his pursuers” says the narrator of The Hunt for Bin Laden. “[He] might as well have
been on the moon,” says Cloonan (Smithsonian Channel 2012).

The move, according to the authorized discourse, also inspired strong emotions in bin Laden.
“Just as Muhammad saw the Koran revealed to him amid intense persecution,” add his New York
Times’ obituary writers, “Bin Laden regarded his expulsions from Saudi Arabia and then Sudan
in the 1990s as signs that he was a chosen one. In his vision, he would be the ‘emir,’ or prince, in
a restoration of the khalifa, a political empire extending from Afghanistan across the globe.
‘These countries belong to Islam…not the rulers’” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May
2, 2001). Painting bin Laden as suffering from a persecution complex and delusions of grandeur
where he has a pre-ordained role in a divine mission serves to delegitimate his ideology and his
interpretations of interactions with the United States. Linking these delusions to the quest to
establish a global caliphate implies there was a madman, not a formidable political competitor, at
the wheel. Time Magazine’s Lisa Beyer, for example, describes bin Laden’s anger at US foreign
policy as a “fixation” on America (Beyer, Time Magazine, September 24, 2001). As Targeted:
Osama bin Laden’s narrator frames it, “bin Laden’s exile from Sudan brings bin Laden’s hatred
for the United States into even clearer focus” (History Channel 2004).
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To be taken more seriously, some suggest he transformed these feelings of marginalization into
action by drafting “The Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the
Two Holy Mosques” published in the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi in the form of
a fatwa – a decree derived from interpretation of Islamic law. According to biographer Stephen
Coll, “That summer of 1996 he sat down and at some great length wrote out a declaration. In the
course of composing this declaration of war, he even wrote a poem, singling out the secretary of
defense William Perry in stanzas predicting the United States would soon be swimming in
blood” (History Channel 2004). Attributing the declaration to his decidedly un-masculine
reaction to banishment and drawing attention to the poem moves bin Laden out of the frame of a
conventional military adversary into an Orientalized figure who operates under entirely different
norms and practices. Likewise, when the 9/11 Commission Report (2004:47) recounts these
events, the language paints bin Laden as a fraud. The authors remind “a fatwa is normally an
interpretation of Islamic law by a respected Islamic authority, but neither bin Laden, Zawahiri,
nor the other others who signed this statement were scholars of Islamic law.” They ridicule the
fatwas, calling them “long, disjointed,” “self-styled,” and “only the latest in a long series,”
“although novel for its open endorsement of indiscriminate killing” (NCTAUS 2004:48). The
emasculating and orientalist cultural codes about the style diminish the seriousness with which
the content is taken.

On one hand, the declaration indeed seized specialists’ attention and contributed to the founding
of Alec Station – a special CIA targeting unit tasked with “pursuing bin Laden and bringing him
to justice” (HBO 2013). On the other hand, the American press barely reported on it. On August
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31, the same day it was published, the New York Times published the brief Associated Press wire
story on the publication of bin Laden’s letter that limited its exposition on the content to the
following: “A Saudi Arabian dissident who is believed to be using his wealth to finance Islamic
militant groups has called on his supporters to begin a guerrilla war against American troops to
drive them out of the country, an Arabic-language newspaper reported today” (Associated Press
for the New York Times, August 31, 1996).

While there was insignificant coverage at the time of publication, the authorized discourse after
his death uses it as an important development to examine bin Laden’s trajectory in hindsight. In
particular, the declaration was the first evidence of the distinguishing feature of bin Ladenism
compared to similar Islamist ideologies: a shift in focus away from local struggles to “the far
enemy,” the United States. In Hunt for Bin Laden, Stephen Coll describes the Declaration of
Jihad as “a new war doctrine in which he would confront both the government of Saudi Arabia
and the United States, but seek to really shock the United States with direct attacks, with the
hope that by doing so he would change the equation inside Saudi” (Smithsonian Channel 2012).
The unidentified CIA agent interviewed for Targeted: Bin Laden specifies it was a “declaration
of jihad against the United States, specifically noting that he would incrementally increase the
power and lethality of the attacks on the United States… His goal is basically to get us out of the
region. His argument was all of these governments are tyrannies. And they exist because of their
friendship with the United States to keep oil prices at below market levels” (History Channel
2004).

183

The authors of bin Laden’s obituary explain that this first “fatwa” also warned of bin Laden’s
new tactical plan: “The imbalance of power between American forces and Muslim forces
demanded a new kind of fighting, he wrote, in other words, to initiate a guerrilla war, where sons
of the nation, not the military forces, take part in it” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times,
May 2, 2001), but it was not until his 1997 interviews with ABC and CNN that bin Laden
showed another evolution in his ideology: “Muslims should kill Americans, civilians included,
wherever they could find them” (qtd in Beyer, Time Magazine, September 24, 2001). In the CNN
interview he said, “we do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are
concerned, they are all targets” (CNN, Interview with Peter Arnett, March 1997). He codified the
shift in February 1998 through a fatwa entitled “World Islamic Front,” published in the same
Arabic-language London newspaper as the 1996 letter. The declaration of war on the United
States might have been dismissed as the insane rantings of an irrational religious radical who was
more financier than fighter, but the declaration of war on civilians crossed into sacred territory
for the United States. While the American military kills scores of civilians, the legal designation
of collateral damage and the laws of war that prohibit the targeting of civilians are drawn on like
civil scriptures (Simko 2015) in discussion of ethics and war.

Like the 1996 letter, says CNN interview team member Peter Bergen, “The impact of the
interview at the time was pretty muted. It didn’t get a lot of play. Because at the time, of course,
he hadn’t really done anything,” (Storyhouse Productions 2011), but, again, it is relied upon
heavily in the authorized discourse after 9/11 for clues about his ideology and intentions. In the
HBO documentary Manhunt, Peter Bergen says of the interview, “He gave a laundry list of
complaints about American foreign policy in the Muslim World” and most importantly, quoted
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bin Laden directly on several positions, unimaginable to Americans: 1) “We believe that getting
killed for the cause of Allah is a great honor, wished for by our Prophet,” 2) “The hearts of
Muslims are filled with hatred toward the United States of America and the American president.
The President has a heart that won’t listen to words. Because the American government is an
unjust government,” 3) civilians “are not exonerated from responsibility, because they elected
their government,” and 4) “We know the Americans are listening. We’re launching a
psychological war to shatter the enemy’s prestige” (HBO 2013).

As this interview is looked back upon, significant work is done to discredit bin Laden and make
him appear to be disturbing and even disgusting. His 1997 CNN interviewers reported “Before
[the] CNN crew…was allowed to leave, his media advisers insisted on editing out unflattering
shots. He summoned reporters to a cave in Afghanistan when he needed to get his message out,
but like the most controlling of CEOs he insisted on receiving written questions in advance”
(Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2001). CNN Interview cameraman Peter
Jouvenal described bin Laden’s handshake as “Sort of like a dead fish. Cold like Aberdeen. It
wasn’t a strong grasp. I compare it sometimes to a bank manager’s shake” (HBO 2013). This
echoes other descriptions that both emasculate and dehumanize bin Laden or make him appear
spine-chilling. Miller opens her post-9/11 New York Times piece, “With his gentle eyes, skeletal
frame, long black beard and habitual Kalashnikov, Osama bin Laden has become the world’s
most reviled symbol of terror.” She then adds, “While they once debated Mr. bin Laden's
specific connection to the terrorism his networks have spawned, they now acknowledge that this
frail, squeaky-voiced Saudi has mobilized hundreds of Muslims in far-flung countries to fight
and die for his embittered vision of Islam, if not for him” (Miller, New York Times, September
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14, 2001). His New York Times’ obituary writers continue this imagery, stating, “His reedy voice
seemed to belie the warrior image he cultivated, a man whose constant companion was a
Kalashnikov rifle that he boasted he had taken from a Russian soldier he had killed” before
describing him as a “shadowy figure” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2001).

The two published fatwas and the television interview, according to al Qaeda clerics’
interpretation, cleared bin Laden of the moral responsibility to warn his enemy before attacking.
According to the authorized discourse, he followed up his ideological statements with action: the
1998 bombings of American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and the
attack on US Naval-guided missile destroyer, the USS Cole, off the coast of Yemen in 2000.
While none of these attacks took place on American soil, all targeted Americans. FBI Agent
Mark Rossini highlights for the filmmakers of The Hunt for Bin Laden the disregard of Muslim
lives when carrying out the embassy bombings, which served to further “other” al Qaeda from
any imagery or definitions of a legitimate, rival military. He recounts an interrogation with Al
Wali, a would-be suicide bomber who survived: “You killed a lot of Muslims and Kenyans in the
street rather than Americans. And you did it on a Friday, the holy day. He said, ‘well, all those
good Muslims should have been in the mosque, so I did them a favor, essentially, by killing
them, and they actually deserved to die’” (Smithsonian Channel 2012). Not only did these
attacks constitute escalation in scale and coordination, the loss of civilian life was significant.

The 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole are used in the post-9/11
authorized discourse to explore the various internal cleavages that contributed to the failure to
stop bin Laden and al Qaeda before the events of September 11, 2001. President Clinton
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attempted a retaliatory strike after the embassy bombings, but it missed bin Laden at the training
camp and struck not a chemical weapons factory but a legitimate pharmaceutical facility. The
FBI was investigating the Cole bombing (as a criminal act) and did not share information with
the CIA who was searching for bin Laden for acts of war. FBI Agent Coleman expressed regrets
that the US did not act during this time, “What was the response to Mogadishu? We pulled out.
What was the military response to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam? We fired a couple of cruise
missiles and killed a couple of bums on the ground. Nobody important. What was the military
response for the Cole? None. None. Zero” (Dan Coleman qtd in Smithsonian Channel 2012).

As discussed in the previous chapter, this framing intensifies the enmity of the antagonist:
opportunities were missed to kill the villain before the major injury, damaging the masculine
warrior hero’s resolve. The protagonist will always have to wonder what might have been if the
villain had been eliminated before executing the 9/11 attacks. It also makes the eventual kill
seem inevitable, justified, and even worthy of celebration. The attacks themselves were certainly
unprecedented in style and execution and produced intense feelings of vulnerability and
insecurity in a culture that had a near-immortality complex. All of this helps to illuminate what
made al Qaeda so counterhegemonic: in line with bin Laden’s assertions that the US would
eventually destroy itself trying to respond to al Qaeda, it exposed imperfections in hegemonic
culture and policy. The attacks were, in part, explained as the result of a president timid to use
force to prevent future attacks, a failure to classify bin Laden’s actions as acts of war rather than
crimes, coordination failures between the CIA and the FBI, and a lack of knowledge about
terrorism outside of specialist circles. When these imperfections in the hegemon are revealed,

187

when the hegemon’s grip on legitimacy wavers, the contributors to the authorized discourse
double-down on the villainization of bin Laden.

9/11
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four American passenger planes. Two planes
struck New York City’s World Trade Center towers, one plane hit the headquarters of the United
States Defense Department, the Pentagon, in Arlington, Virginia, and a fourth plane crashed in
Pennsylvania. The morning of the attacks the news media suggested the possibility of Osama bin
Laden’s involvement. Most of the long-form biographical pieces were produced and published
within four days of the attacks, although there was still no evidence he had planned, financed, or
claimed responsibility for the attacks. For example, on September 14, 2001, Miller wrote, “While
his connection to this week's devastating attacks in New York and Washington has yet to be
definitively established, his image has evolved in the last decade from that of financier of terror
to its most prominent promoter, catalyst and mastermind” (Miller, New York Times, September
14, 2001).

In terms of hegemony maintenance, 9/11 was an undisputable turning point. Jackson (2013:271)
argues,
following the 9/11 attacks there was a cultural and discursive burgeoning
followed by a rapid sedimentation of the core narratives, metaphors, and
discourses surrounding the terrorist threat across society. This can be seen in the
tens of thousands of novels, films, television shows, comic books, video games,
plays, websites, blogs, jokes, cartoons, artistic exhibitions, poetry, popular songs,
children’s books, and other texts that portrayed and reiterated scenarios of
fanatical terrorists attacking Western cities with weapons of mass destruction or
otherwise threatening massive destruction and loss of innocent life.
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The various discursive modes that provided a new meta-security frame, profitable in nearly all
sectors, do not all explicitly and directly refer to Osama bin Laden. However, his influence, the
existence of his character, underlies all of them. Although the image of the male Arab terrorist
certainly predates 9/11 (Shaheen 1998), bin Laden made famous the combination of traditional
Islamic expression (e.g. the beard and religious garb) with a military aesthetic of a camo flak
jacket and his Kalashnikov.

Terrorism is an amorphous tactic and bin Laden’s ideological interpretation of jihad had a
decentralized and diffuse base of support. Neither a tactic nor an ideology can be defeated or
killed. A human villain alone can serve that role. The 9/11 attacks got the American attention bin
Laden seemed to have been seeking, according to the authorized discourse, and he was
transformed from man to villain; a symbolic embodiment of the cultural trauma. This attention to
symbolism is crucial because once semiotically transformed into a signifier, humans become
characters (Jasper forthcoming). As his obituary authors wrote, “With the attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, Bin Laden was elevated to the realm of evil in
the American imagination once reserved for dictators like Hitler or Stalin. He was a new national
enemy, his face on wanted posters” (Zernike and Kaufman, New York Times, May 2, 2001).

Bush’s invocation of Old West mythology post-9/11 is also notable. The cowboy aesthetic set a
tone that “summon[ed] the history of Native American and US military encounters, particularly
those of the 19th century, in ways that interpret the present in light of the past, that retell (or
reinterpret) the past through present political filters, and that forecast the future while justifying
the present” (Silliman 2008:237). His statements are “reminiscent of the US ‘Wild West’ with
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gunslingers, sheriffs (a.k.a. ‘cowboy presidents’), John Wayne attitudes, and overall
lawlessness,” but also operate as a “powerful heritage metaphor” for the US armed forces across
the Middle East (Silliman 2008:237). They convey an image of “hostile, unpacified territories in
active war zones” as hunting down enemies in “Indian Country” (Silliman 2008:237).

Von Drehle (Time Magazine, May 20, 2011) sums up bin Laden’s path to 9/11 in a hyperbolic
and cinematic fashion, emblematic of the authorized discourse’s overall tenor about the life of
bin Laden and the meanings of 9/11:
He understood the power of the underdog to turn an opponent's strength into a
fatal weakness. If your enemy spans the globe, blow up his embassies. If he fills
the skies with airplanes, hijack some and smash them into his buildings. Bin
Laden learned this judo as a mujahid fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
and he perfected it against the U.S. In 1996 he laid down a marker, literally
declaring war on the world's lone superpower – an incredibly audacious act of
twisted imagination. And then, with patience and cunning, he somehow made the
war come true. No Hollywood filmmaker ever staged a more terrifying spectacle
than 9/11, which bin Laden conjured from a few box cutters and 19 misguided
martyrs. When the Twin Towers collapsed, he became the real-life answer to the
ruthless, stateless and seemingly unstoppable villains of James Bond fantasy.
The reconstruction of bin Laden from unknown entity or slippery, wealthy financier into the face
of evil, the symbol of terror, and the object of this hunt involved highlighting two themes. First,
the authorized discourse zeroed in on his complex of caves, intuiting a barbaric, medieval, and
ascetic lifestyle of extremism to make him even more foreign to American audiences (and later
to discredit him when it turned out he was not in a cave, sleeping soundly, as he had suggested).
Second, content producers emphasized how elusive bin Laden was to increase the political
capital associated with killing him, once his hunters caught up to him.

Bin Laden, the Elusive Cave-Dwelling Emir
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As detailed in the previous chapter, by November 13, 2001, a limited US military force wrested
control of Afghanistan from the Taliban – justified by their refusal to turn bin Laden over to the
Americans – and set its sights on apprehending Osama bin Laden for planning the 9/11 attacks.
Daily news coverage reported that bin Laden was in Tora Bora, a mountainous region of
Afghanistan where he had used family construction equipment to dig out elaborate “cavecomplexes.” Bush narrated at a press conference on October 11, 2001,
One month ago today, innocent citizens from more than 80 nations were attacked
and killed without warning or provocation in an act that horrified not only every
American, but every person of every faith and every nation who values human
life…We're mounting a sustained campaign to drive the terrorists out of their
hidden caves and to bring them to justice. All missions are being executed
according to plan on the military front…In terms of Mr. bin Laden himself, we'll
get him running. We'll smoke him out of his cave and we'll get him eventually
(Presidential News Conference Transcript, Washington Post, October 11, 2001,
emphasis added).
President Bush also explicitly used the word “hunt” to describe the state’s pursuit. This is one
example, among many, of demonization and dehumanization, where “Others [are] turned into
something to be feared and hated, not-quite-humans…Demonization and dehumanization are
forms of gendered and racialized violence because these practices, like infantilization, erase
agency based on gender and race” (Nayak 2006:51, emphasis in original). The emphasis on
caves not only satisfies the orientalist image of a dwelling place unimaginable to audiences, it
dehumanized bin Laden, transforming him into a mountain animal. For example, Osama, which
translates to young lion, referred to one camp he had built near Jaji, the one battle he had
participated in against the Soviets in 1987, as “Al-Masada,” the lion’s den, but American news
media typically spun the name to suggest troops were trying to find his “lair.” Thus in addition to
the Orientalized dwelling, bin Laden is ferocious, unpredictable, stealthy, and sometimes
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slithering animal prey. In reality, the caves are not at all like animal dens. According to Mary
Anne Weaver for New York Times Magazine, “The cave complex had been so refined that it was
said to have its own ventilation system and a power system created by a series of hydroelectric
generators; bin Laden is believed to have designed the latter. Tora Bora's walls and the floors of
its hundreds of rooms were finished and smooth and extended some 350 yards into the granite
mountain that enveloped them” (Weaver, New York Times Magazine, September 11, 2005).

In other terms, the 9/11 attacks, once narrated as cultural trauma, initiated the social ritual of the
(man)hunt. Two distinct social types, the hunters and the hunted, participate in this ritual, but
audiences await the death of the hunted and the victory of the hunters. In the next chapter I
attend to the discourse that characterized the hunters. Here, in addition to bin Laden’s role as
symbol and character, another way of analyzing the ways the authorized discourse described him
is through the social type of “the hunted.” Highlighting particular traits of “the hunted”
reinforces morally acceptable ways the heroic protagonist can act upon its prey. When a human
becomes the target of a (man)hunt, the focus is on the threatening qualities that make the target
the ultimate hunting prize. Bin Laden’s character shares traits with the object of the Calydonian
boar hunt in the Iliad or tiger Shira Khan in Kipling’s The Jungle Book, for example. All three
are rare, dangerous, destructive, and elusive; all of their deaths constitute a significant event.
According to the authorized discourse, bin Laden had no peer or equal in terms of his prowess to
incur civilians casualties in the United States. Commentators emphasize the frustration over his
alternating vanishing acts followed by moments of strategic taunting, when explaining their
exuberance over his death. It is telling that these communications are presented as a game of
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whack-a-mole, where he occasionally pops his head out to goad his pursuers rather than
legitimate political communications from a military adversary.

On the other hand, while bin Laden’s ability to plan lethal and effective terrorist attacks,
maintain operational security, charismatically communicate with and recruit followers, and
evade capture were necessary to justify the threat he posed and the necessity of being taken out
by the hunters, there is a careful balance to strike so audiences also have confidence that
eventually the hegemon will decisively defeat him. While he eludes the US, treating him as “the
hunted,” renders him passive, stripped of his agency. Alongside descriptions of his formidability
as a predator then, he is also constructed as cowardly (and often sickly) prey. Highlighting the
cowardice or debility of the hunted in melodrama portrays “a specific type of evil, as it
immediately implies the weakness of the evildoer and the strength of the victim” (Anker
2005:33).

The combination of emasculation and frustration experienced by intelligence officials and the
president described in the previous chapter, attempts to emasculate and animalize bin Laden, and
other character work that flattens his biography into an evil, enigmatic caricature is crucial, as
the nature of the hunted changes the trajectory and ethics of the hunt itself. But eventually,
according to the authorized discourse, the US was able to capture and kill their elusive cavedwelling adversary. Solomon and Gorman write for the Wall Street Journal, “Until Sunday,
Osama bin Laden, the man whose actions defined much of life in American since 9/11, was the
ultimate survivor. He dodged a global manhunt for more than a dozen years, including a halfdozen attempted strikes on him dating back to before the 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. He
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escaped in 2001 from the U.S. assault on Tora Bora in Afghanistan, having years earlier dodged
Soviet missiles in the same part of the world” (Solomon and Gorman, Wall Street Journal, May
2, 2011).

Bin Laden, “The Old Man with a Clicker”

Former Homeland Security Advisor Fran Townsend told the filmmakers of Hunt for bin Laden
“There was a chart that was prepared for the president [Bush] that basically showed al Qaeda’s
leadership. The president took to keeping that chart because it was a way of keeping track of who
was still outstanding. And he would just mark off as we went along so that he knew who we still
had left. And of course, the name that was still on there with no ‘X’ through it was bin Laden,”
(Smithsonian Channel 2012). Years later, the public would have the image Bush yearned for – in
the form of a Time Magazine cover, seen in Figure 7 – an eliminated bin Laden.

Figure 7
Time Magazine cover, May 20, 2011

However, the “go” order on Operation Neptune’s Spear – the phallic symbolism of the name
evidences to some extent the belief that killing bin Laden could restore the hegemonic
masculinity of the United States – would not come from swaggering cowboy George W. Bush,
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but his successor, erudite winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Barack Obama. Born to a white
American mother and a Kenyan father, spending much of his youth in Indonesia and Hawaii,
many thought Barack Obama may be able to shake the entrenched, institutionalized white
masculinity of US national security culture. However, he never waivered in his assertion that bin
Laden should be hunted down and killed by the United States. At a presidential debate on
October 7, 2008, Candidate Obama said, “we will take them out, we will kill bin Laden, we will
crush al Qaeda; that has to be the biggest national security priority” (Obama 2008). As detailed
in Chapter 3, it was a painstaking process to come to a decision on Operation Neptune’s Spear,
but eventually President Obama opted to unleash the Navy SEALs on the suspicious compound
in Abbottabad. First, the target, or at least the moment of contact with the target, needed a
codename.57

It is unlikely that Obama, himself, chose “Geronimo” as bin Laden’s codename. As Silliman
(2008:238) notes the importance of interrogating the use of “heritage metaphors” – metaphors
that draw upon a “complex framework of already understood but malleable national symbols,” –
is to “discern a pattern of accepted U.S. military and political discourse, not to serve as proof that
everyone in these positions uses or even approves of the terminology.” However, Obama’s
refusal to respond to many requests from indigenous activists and leaders to apologize or retract
the codename for future retellings of the war story, demonstrates the institutional stranglehold of
these “heritage metaphors” and the cultural logics that underpin them.

57

According to some, bin Laden was codenamed Geronimo. According to others, the act of capturing or killing the
target was codenamed Geronimo. In either case, the SEALs knew the codename during training.
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Using codename Geronimo was neither coincidental nor anomalous. Like bin Laden, the famed
Apache freedom fighter evaded capture for more than a decade and “[b]y the time of his
surrender in Arizona in 1886, more than 5,000 troops had participated in the hunt to track him
down” (Tucker, Washington Post, May 3, 2011). He also saw himself not as a chief or political
leader, but again, like bin Laden, thought of himself instead as a military leader. Strategically,
both men were deeply concerned about imperial conquest of sacred land and noted that this
imperialism escalated with the presence of valuable natural resources, oil in the Middle East and
gold in the western regions of the United States and Mexico. Tactically, both military leaders
used guerilla warfare, attacks by small groups in civilian spaces. Both had many victories,
confounding the opposing military’s brass, and both are durable symbols of resistance. To say
that the name was chosen out of a hat would be quite disingenuous.

Despite the obvious similarities from the perspective of American military history, the
comparison outraged many. The appropriation was particularly egregious, considering so much
of what transpired after 9/11 rested on the premise that
the attacks on 9-11 were so extraordinary that they legitimized an unprecedented
transformation in the laws of war. The first traumatic attack on American soil was
of course not 9-11 but what [Ned] Blackhawk calls the ‘indigenous trauma’ and
‘epic ordeals’ of native peoples caught in the maelstrom of white expansionist
dispossession, mass slaughter and forced removals. What was new about 9-11
was who was attacked, and where, but this did not prevent the doctrine of newness
from becoming the sole rationale for what was in fact genuinely unprecedented:
the Bush doctrine of perpetual, preemptive global war (McClintock 2014:822,
emphasis in the original).
Fort Sill Apache Tribal Chairman Jeff Houser “sent a letter to President Obama, decrying the
linking of ‘the legendary Apache warrior’ to a ‘mass murderer and cowardly terrorist….Unlike
the coward Osama bin Laden, Geronimo faced his enemy in numerous battles and engagements.
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He is perhaps one of the greatest symbols of Native American resistance in the history of the
United States’” (Susan Montoya Bryan, Associated Press, May 4, 2011).

Schmilde, in his New Yorker piece, had written, “the reasons for dubbing the al Qaeda boss
‘Geronimo’ remain one of the biggest mysteries of the Black Ops mission” (Schmilde, The New
Yorker, August 8, 2011). Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (2014:56) in An Indigenous Peoples’ History of
the United States responds,
The choice of that code name was not a mystery to the military, which also uses
the term “Indian Country” to designate enemy territory and identifies its killing
machines and operations with such names as UH-1B/C Iroquois, OH-58D Kiowa,
OV-1 Mohawk, OH-6 Cayuse, AH-64 Apache, S-58/H-34 Choctaw, UH-60
Black Hawk, Thunderbird, and Rolling Thunder…There are many other current
and recent examples of the persistence of the colonialist and imperialist
sensibilities at the core of a military grounded in wars against the Indigenous
nations and communities of North America.
Winona LaDuke, indigenous activist and author of The Militarization of Indian Country, added
on the independent news program Democracy Now!, “The reality is that the military is full of
native nomenclature. You’ve got Black Hawk helicopters, Apache Longbow helicopters. You’ve
got Tomahawk missiles. The term used when you leave a military base in a foreign country is to
go ‘off the reservation, into Indian country’” (Democracy Now!, May 6, 2011).

Suzan Shown Harjo, a member of the Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma and president of
the Morning Star Institute, testified before Congress on the use of native nomenclature, “It’s
fundamental. It’s overarching. It’s undergirding…This is the kind of stuff that determines the
policy we live under. Members of Congress don’t make good public policy for cartoons” (King,
USA Today, May 6, 2011). The New Yorker reported that the connections between the bin Laden
raid and the history of war between indigenous peoples and colonial settlers in early America
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went far beyond the use of Geronimo’s name, in fact, “before the mission commenced, the
SEALs had created a checklist of code words that had a Native American theme. Each code
word represented a different stage of the mission: leaving Jalalabad, entering Pakistan,
approaching the compound, and so on” (Schmilde, The New Yorker, August 8, 2011). Most,
including Robert Kaplan’s (2005) pro-military popular non-fiction book Imperial Grunts and
critical anthropologist Stephen Silliman’s (2008) “The ‘Old West’ in the Middle East: U.S.
Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian Country,” trace the resurgence of the term
“Indian Country” to the Vietnam war. However, Anne McClintock (2014) traces the genealogy
of “Indian Country” in military parlance to encounters in the Pacific and Asia that pre-date the
Vietnam war:
Indian Country has been used by the United States to characterize as yet
unsubjugated territories in active war zones around the world. After the internal
frontier was closed, the Pacific Islands became the United States’ new western
frontier, and the trope of Indian Country was projected onto the oceanic west and
Japan. The Japanese were frequently referred to as ‘Indians,’ Japanese warfare
was characterized as ‘Indian fighting,’ and Japanese soldiers were described as
‘whooping like Indians’ (Takaki qtd in McClintock 2014:826).
Albert Beveridge (1900), a US Senator who advocated for American takeover of the Philippines
demonstrates the explicit racism that underpins America’s perceived role in the world:
He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish system where
chaos reigns. He has given it the spirit of progress to overwhelm the forces of
reaction through the earth. He has made us adept in government that we may
administer government among savage and senile peoples. Were it not for such a
force as this the world would relapse into barbarism and night. And of all our race
He has marked the American people as His chosen nation to finally lead in the
regeneration of the world. This is the divine mission of America, and it holds for
us all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are trustees of
the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.
Frances Fitzergerald ([1974] 2002:368) argues that the use of “Indian Country” in Vietnam “put
the Vietnam War into a definite mythological and historical perspective: the Americans were
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once again embarked upon a heroic and (for themselves) almost painless conquest of an inferior
race.” Silliman (2008:241) suggests the continued use of the term is because members of the
military “feel historical, cultural, and national kinship with soldiers who similarly waged wars of
pacification against unruly adversaries who could be subjugated with appropriate force…the
U.S. military discourse attempts to convey civilization’s battle against savagery.” Robert Ivie
(2005:56) writes that the metaphor is “deeply rooted in the American political lexicon, its culture
and collective psyche.”

Silliman (2008:241) explicates the various implications of the continued use of this appropriative
language:
Heritage serves to install a widely accepted and unambiguous past…A powerful
feature of heritage is not simply that it provides a static view of the past and its
values for today, but that each performance of heritage does not remake the past
but, rather the story we tell about it. Therefore, metaphors do not simply draw on
a past assumed to be immutable and factual; they also serve as mechanisms for
reinscribing and updating it as heritage in arenas of social and political power.
Calling a current context by a past referent, such as ‘Indian Country,’ serves to
draw on a presumed collective memory at the same time that it contributes to
memory making today…It asks soldiers to draw on their collective national
memory to remember the US military forces have faced such situations before and
to think about doing what their predecessors might have done…New experiences
for individuals take on familiarity from the repertoire of supposedly shared,
collective historical experiences…the terminology also serve to make the
outcome of conflict in ‘Indian Country’ predictable and, therefore, more
acceptable…Indians might have won a battle but they never won the war.
The choice to use codename Geronimo will remain an enduring part of material history.
According to the New Yorker, “The raiding team then presented the President with an American
flag that had been on board the rescue Chinook,” another term appropriated from indigenous
culture, “…the SEALs and pilots had signed it on the back; an inscription on the front read,
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“From the Joint Task Force Operation Neptune’s Spear, 01 May 2011: ‘For God and country.
Geronimo’” (Schmilde, The New Yorker, August 8, 2011).

Susan Faludi (2007:4) notes that despite repeated attempts in the immediate wake of 9/11,
allusions to Pearl Harbor “provided no traction” and instead the 1950s – both the dichotomous
Cold War mentality and the Western film genre – made more sense. She connects the aboveobserved historical connections to the 19th century (as portrayed in the 1950s film) to gender
relations. Light (2017:2) explains, “Faludi explores the nation’s centuries-long obsession with
home(land) security, in which women kept the proverbial home fires burning while white men
fought off wild animals, Native Americans, and foreign threats to the young nation. A longing
for these comforting gender ideals in the service of safety and self-sufficiency reawakened with a
vengeance in response to 9/11 under the new rubric, homeland security.” In addition to drawing
on a racialized narrative that justifies lethal self defense for the US military, the claims
simultaneously relied on a gendered narrative, “…white America restored its sense of national
security through the creation of a compensatory gender narrative [that] establish[es] a national
story that would supplant intense humiliation with invincible invulnerability” (Faludi 2007:214).
The gendered frame on the Orientalized narrative about bin Laden was a key feature of the
authorized discourse following the announcement of the raid.

The Abbottabad raid lifted the curtain on bin Laden’s life. Time’s Von Drehle aptly summarizes:
So he wasn't in a cave after all. Osama bin Laden, master marketer of mass
murder, loved to traffic in the image of the ascetic warrior-prophet. In one of his
most famous videotapes, he chose gray rocks for a backdrop, a rough camo jacket
for a costume and a rifle for a prop. He portrayed a hard, pure alternative to the
decadent weakness of the modern world. Soft Westerners and their corrupt puppet
princes reclined in luxury and sin while he wanted nothing but a gun and a prayer
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rug. The zealot travels light, his blood-red thoughts so pure that even stones are as
cushions for his untroubled sleep. Now we know otherwise. Bin Laden was not
the stoic soldier that he played onscreen. The exiled son of a Saudi construction
mogul was living in a million-dollar home in a wealthy town nestled among green
hills. He apparently slept in a king-size bed with a much younger wife. He had
satellite TV. This, most of all, was fitting, because no matter how many hours he
spent talking nostalgically of the 12th century and the glory of the Islamic
caliphate, bin Laden was a master of the 21st century image machine (Von
Drehle, Time Magazine, May 20, 2011).
Bin Laden was a fraud, he argues. In the end, as this example of a common theme throughout the
authorized discourse indicates, he really was the son of the Saudi elite who had lied about his
commitments to jihadist ideology. He was obsessed with his own image. In his intermittent
videos he had dyed his beard, he was wearing makeup, he had a fake backdrop. It was all smoke
and mirrors. The documentary, The Last Days of Osama bin Laden, opens, “The last days of
Osama bin Laden spent in hiding. Once a proud prince of Islamic jihad, now an old man
watching his own flickering image on a cheap TV. Found after a decade long CIA search by US
Special Operations Forces in a daring secret raid that almost goes wrong.”

Figure 8
Widely circulated still photo from a video of bin Laden watching himself on TV, used as evidence that he had modified his
appearance and was obsessed with his own legacy. Kim Dozier, for The Last Days of Osama bin Laden, said, “It reminded them
of an old football player reviewing his greatest hits” (Storyhouse Productions 2011).
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After the raid, New York Times columnist Maureen Dowd, who once called bin Laden a
“monster,” reduced bin Laden to an “old man with a clicker” and mockingly suggested he should
star in “The Real Housewives of Abbottabad” (Dowd, New York Times, May 10, 2011). It paints
the portrait of an emasculated, sidelined, washed-up has-been. This is the first of several tactics
to disparage any remaining mythic legacy bin Laden may have retained after his death.
Specifically, another tactic by which the authorized discourse in reporting on the raid neutralized
bin Laden’s power, was through several different attacks on bin Laden’s masculinity.

First, Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals (2014:35) argue that “bin Laden’s masculinity was
questioned by focusing on his frailty or his vanity.” The news media obsessed over his deception
to maintain appearances; for example, CBS news reported, “…it’s also clear bin Laden had a
streak of vanity. In all the rehearsal tapes and in the last videotape that was released in 2007, the
terror mastermind appears with a dyed black beard. In a candid tape of his TV viewing session,
bin Laden’s beard was gray, the same color it was last Sunday when he was shot and killed by
Navy SEALs” (CBS Evening News, May 7, 2011).

Second, perhaps worse than cultivating an ascetic image, being image-conscious, deceptive, or
feeble, the authorized discourse emphasized bin Laden’s cowardice. As alluded to in the
previous chapter, John O. Brennan, Chief Counterterrorism advisor to Obama, said the day after
the raid:
from a visual perspective, here is bin Laden who has been calling for attacks,
living in this million dollar plus compound, living in an area that’s far removed
from the front, hiding behind women who were put in front of him as a shield…I
think it really just speaks to just how false his narrative has been over the years,
and so again looking at what bin Laden was doing, hiding there while he’s putting
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other people out there to carry out attacks, again, just speaks to, I think, the nature
of the individual he was (News Conference, May 2, 2011).
Although the White House retracted Brennan’s account the following day, “the narrative of bin
Laden hiding behind a woman, however, enthralled the press for days to come...[because] bin
Laden’s life ended with a ‘final act of indignity’ and cowardice” (Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals
2014:42).

This is echoed throughout the varied accounts of the raid. One might assume the SEALs would
paint bin Laden in a fearsome light to justify his killing in self-defense. However, even with
other discrepancies, the SEALs are quite clear that bin Laden was unarmed and did not fight
back. “Mark Owen” (2012:249), in his controversial memoir wrote of those last moments:
He hadn’t even prepared a defense. He had no intention of fighting. He asked his
followers for decades to wear suicide vests or fly planes into buildings, but didn’t
even pick up his weapon. In all of my deployments, we routinely saw this
phenomenon. The higher up the food chain the targeted individual was, the bigger
a pussy he was. The leaders were less willing to fight. It is always the young and
impressionable who strap on the explosives and blow themselves up.
Everything about bin Laden’s final moments are emasculating. Bin Laden is not manly because
he was not prepared to act and was unarmed, but the press and audiences wanted to believe he
had used his wife as a human shield because it corroborated imagery of Islam’s patriarchal
gender norms that devalue women’s lives. Marginalizing all aspects of bin Laden’s masculinity
in this way is “an ultimate way to demasculinize and humiliate a Muslim man” (PoloniStaudinger and Ortbals 2014:53). As illustrated in the next chapter, this is in direct opposition to
the heroic SEALs who purportedly did all they could to protect women and children during the
raid.
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A third way bin Laden was emasculated in the coverage of the raid was to present him as an
entirely passive object who was acted upon. Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals (2014:50-51) found
out of “406…of 558 articles [about the raid], bin Laden has an action taken against him: he is
hunted down, shielded, killed, and/or buried at sea. Bin Laden is not only passive, he is
unprepared, a coward, and a liar according to some accounts” (emphasis added). Some might
suggest that emphasis on frailty, vanity, cowardice, and passivity are not necessarily
emasculating, but the connection was explicated in blogs, editorials, op-eds, podcasts, and by
comedians. On The Daily Show the night after the raid, for example, Jon Stewart, with a map of
the US behind him, says, “I went on Google Earth last night and got some time lapsed footage of
our southern coast. Not only did we get fully erect, our testicles descended. We’re back, baby.”
As he speaks, Florida separates from the continental United States to look like a penis as a CGI
scrotum appears beneath it (Comedy Central, The Daily Show, May 2, 2011).

According to the authorized discourse, “Osama bin Laden,” is a symbolic, taunting leader of a
formidable counterhegemonic movement with no rational grievances or motivations, ridiculed
for his privileged background, and discredited as a hypocrite and imposter. This image is created
through a five-part process. First, the post-9/11 discourse constructed a biography antithetical to
images fitting American predilections for characters that move from rags to riches despite the
odds. Paired with continually subordinating his masculinity, vilifying the gender norms
associated with his ideology, and depicting him as unsettling, unnerving, cold, limp, and even
spine chilling, bin Laden is an embodied binary opposition for American cultural preferences.
Second, the authorized discourse emphasized how elusive and hard he was to apprehend,
especially after almost catching him in the mountains of Tora Bora, Afghanistan in December
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2001. Third, up until bin Laden was located in the Abbottabad compound, the discourse
emphasized that he was a “cave-dweller,” dehumanizing and Orientalizing him, describing the
complex of caves he had used family construction equipment to burrow out years earlier, as an
animal lair, re-signifying him as animal prey. Fourth, details about his life in hiding discovered
after his death are used to further demonize and debunk bin Laden’s legitimacy. Finally, as I
demonstrate in the next chapter, villainous bin Laden is merely an object for America’s heroes –
the CIA Targeters and SEAL Team Six – to eliminate as moral retribution in the name of
innocent victims for the cultural trauma of the 9/11 attacks.

Ask the Audience: Performative Fusion and Resonance

Shooting Mr. bin Laden and dumping him in the sea may or may not make Americans safer.
Maybe it marks the welcome end of an ugly era. Maybe it marks the start of a fresh cycle of
vengeance and destruction. Who knows? Either way, Mr bin Laden's demise makes most
Americans feel better. It seems to balance the moral scales, which is inherently cathartic. But it
also helps us feel strong again. And, perhaps most importantly, it helps us convince ourselves
that, in the end, we won the war against al Qaeda. That's something we seem to need to believe,
whether or not it's really true. Here's hoping believing it helps. Here's hoping we finally call it a
day.
-Will Wilkinson, “Let’s Call it a Day,” The Economist, May 2, 2011
Based on the interpretations presented here, the authorized discourse transformed bin Laden into
an evil, flat, reductive symbolic villain for the hero to act upon. But did hegemonic agents
accomplish performative fusion? Did audiences feel psychological identification with and
emotional attachment to the dominant narrative? To understand how audiences made meaning
about the raid, I asked focus group participants and interviewees whether they believed killing
bin Laden was justified.
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Overall, the participants could repeat the dominant narrative about who Osama bin Laden was.
Almost all mentioned that he was from a wealthy Saudi family, that he was involved in some
capacity on the same side as the United States in Afghanistan in the 1980s, that he was at-large
for a long time after 9/11, and that he pioneered a particular interpretation of Islam to justify
killing civilians. About half the participants used the terms “jihad,” “mujahedeen,” and
“caliphate” in their responses. Some distanced themselves from the narrative by mentioning that
other security threats are much more dangerous to the United States, especially domestic white
supremacist terrorism. As discussed in the previous chapter, one participant, a white male in his
30s, did not believe bin Laden was dead. He participates actively in online fora with others who
have suspicion about the veracity of the details about the raid, particularly the “burial at sea”
after the state refused to release photos of bin Laden’s body.

While only a few referred to bin Laden as evil – some rejected the idea of evil itself, but still
thought that bin Laden was in a class to himself or in a class only with the Hitlers, Stalins, and
Pol Pot’s of the world – and several participants did not think bin Laden should have been killed
for the sake of operational strategy, not one participant said they felt he should not have been
killed on moral grounds or that they mourned his passing. Scott, for example, a white technician
in his 30s, said,
I barely remember when he died. I was not into the celebrating, though. That’s
hawkish…it glorifies war. But I’m part of the majority that doesn’t think bin
Laden’s death is a bad thing…I don’t think capture would have been more
humane for him either…I would never celebrate a death but there are people I
would never mourn.
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Patritzia, 22, was happy that he died, but felt really hypocritical and ashamed about her response.
Josephina, an office manager in her 40s, told me she did not celebrate, but would have if she had
been in a group environment. Samia, a Moroccan-French woman in her 30s was emphatic:
I don’t feel nothing about him…And I cannot feel sadness because I feel anger at
him. But I also feel anger towards some of the people in my community who
believe that he is doing the right thing. But they are very few. And I’m especially
angry toward the society in general. How can they fall for such crap? How can
they believe that Americans or French can go to Mali or Syria or Iraq to protect
their freedom? The fact that the media and the politicians are dwelling on
terrorism and created that fear, it makes me angry. But I don’t care about Osama
or Obama.
Alongside these ambivalent accounts were those who did not think killing bin Laden was the
best option from a strategic perspective. Daniel, 52, said, “So you’d understand why people
would say the only responses to violence is violence, and take their leaders and kill them. I mean,
I understand where people say Osama Bin Laden, the only right thing for him is a bullet in the
head. But I think we will not get to a less violent place if we follow that course of action.”

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Javier, a police officer in his 20s said
I just think that us killing him, we just targeted the problem and fixed one
problem that created a bigger problem. I don’t think killing him was what they
were supposed to do; I think grabbing him and letting him rot in one of –
extraditing him over here and letting him rot was the thing to do. Because as we
train soldiers, he trained others to take on. So he knew his death was coming. Had
we kept him alive, wouldn’t it hurt the organization that he created more rather
than just killing him? Because all you did was just; all right, now let’s just pass
the sword to somebody else and he’s going to fight the fight. So I think that
killing him, to be honest, we just hurt ourselves as citizens of the United States, as
fighters of the free world and stuff like that. I think that if we held on to him and
sucked the life out of him as he lived, he would have hurt the organization more.
This denunciation of bin Laden’s killing did not constitute a rejection of the authorized
discourse. In fact, the focus group discussion quickly devolved into a conversation about
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interrogation tactics in police work and torture. After three or four participants had contributed,
Greg, a black detective in his 40s responded to the claim from a younger white colleague who
said, “he needs to go to South America, they need to sit him down for a couple of days without
food or water, you know…” by explaining to me
We’re taught that. As detectives, we’re taught that. You put somebody in the box,
what we call the box, the room; you ice them in. That room is kind of cold, it’s
not comfortable. You leave that guy there for awhile. If we would have done that
to this guy, he would have broken down. You ice him and then you come in and
then, you know, all right, let’s talk; what do you need? You want…
Before Greg could finish his sentence the retired captain present ended the session.

Fatima, a Yemeni woman in her 50s, approached me after a focus group with tears in her eyes.
She said she had more to say to me privately. She said,
That man has made life impossible for my family. But I do not celebrate his
death. It accomplishes nothing. It means nothing. But I want to tell you that you
have the great privilege of being able to think, and say, and write that there is an
option to question that. It is your great privilege that you can think maybe it’s not
ok, without being detained as a terrorist. I can’t say I didn’t want him to die
because it doesn’t change anything. I have to pretend to celebrate his death. Just
like I have to state the obvious and say I don’t like it when ISIS kills people. I am
a prop.
With those who did not believe bin Laden was dead, those who did not celebrate or mourn, and
those who did not believe killing bin Laden was the best means to accomplish “punishment” for
9/11 accounted for, the remaining participants heartily supported the killing of bin Laden.

Mike, a white political operative in his 40s, enthusiastically supported the raid and its outcome.
He said, “I was overjoyed about it, I was happy. It finally brought closure on what happened on
9/11…he was finally held accountable for killing those 3,000 people. And so there was certainly
joy hearing his death, I hate to say that about anybody but I certainly felt it about him.” He was
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among several participants who said while they do not typically celebrate death, they felt
differently upon hearing bin Laden had been killed. He argued that beyond closure, bin Laden’s
dangerous cultural ideology needed to be killed. Before 9/11 no one “put bin Laden on notice,”
he argued,
And to me that was weakness, that demonstrated to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden that,
in fact the United States were at war with us but we didn’t know that we were at
war with them, we were treating them like somebody who carjacked somebody,
and that’s an inappropriate way to view what they did. So I would say they were
demonstrating extreme weakness before 9/11…I think the explosions are terrible,
the stabbings, the beheadings, they’re all terrible. But symbolically what they
symbolize is a philosophy which I believe is, if you I can be frank, I think it’s
evil…So for me, this is an ideological difference between good and evil. His
principles are aggressive, they’re bent on not just sort of preserving this view and
the places where it might exist but in spreading that view to other parts of the
world. In this case via forced conversion, via terrorism, via conquest. The
imposition of Sharia Law which is the idea that, essentially, everything that’s
fundamentally in the Quran as it exists, as it said, none of it is hyperbole, none of
it is allegory, it’s all true as is and that’s what we’re going to do including things
like collapsing walls on homosexuals in Afghanistan including beheading people
that they don’t agree with and taking Christians and others that they believe are
less than them as sexual slaves.
They want to spread this philosophy throughout the world, not just in the Islamic
world. So for me, as somebody who believes in pluralism, democracy, separation
of church and state, the ability for my daughters to choose what they want to do
with their lives rather than be told what they ought to do and to cover up their
entire bodies and faces and who wants to tolerate other people’s view points and
other people’s philosophy. That is a massive threat. And it appears that it has
some resonance with some folks. I would call is, probably, collectively the top
security threat that we’ve faced. Certainly, we’re only 17 years in the 21st Century
but it’s clearly the top threat for national security of the United States in the 21st
Century.
Mike selectively highlights the sexual violence that will threaten his family’s way of life if the
evil ideology is allowed to prevail. Killing bin Laden was the antidote to the weakness
demonstrated by the United States when they could have killed him and did not. The physical
violence symbolizes the philosophy and with bin Laden’s death, the symbolic figure head for the
ideological movement, the philosophy will spread just a little bit more slowly.
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Echoing the gendered logics in Mike’s analysis, Joan, a black nonprofit consultant in her 60s,
said that she supported the Afghanistan war because she “felt like a scared, hysterical girl after
9/11,” but in hindsight, she was upset her “elected leaders also behaved like hysterical girls.” She
preferred the raid’s successful, precise planning and execution and felt it supplanted the
memorable “black eye” of the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980.

Further, Jake, a black retail worker in his 50s, asserted killing bin Laden was the way by which
to restore America’s masculine pride:
The US is badass. You don’t mess with us. If you do, we’ll get you. It’s kind of
like with my daughter when guys come pick her up to go out. They have to know
that if they mess with her, it’s me on the other end. And they gotta know how
much they don’t want that to happen. It’s America’s job to take care of
Americans. We’re not the UN. America protects Americans. If we didn’t kill bin
Laden he and the other bad guys will think not only that they can do it again since
we’re weak, but also we just needed to get our dicks back after the whole world
saw us get violated. We gotta show just how much power we have.
Gino, a lawyer in his 40s who has devoted his career to mitigating racist retributive and punitive
approaches in the American criminal justice system, who is a fierce opponent of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, fervently repeated that there was absolutely no alternative to killing bin Laden.
It was not merely that there needed to a show of force to repair a fractured masculine identity.
Unlike the wars and domestic policy changes that were morally and strategically bankrupt, in his
view, “the country has an obligation to exact revenge.” He continued,
The United States as a country has to respond and it has to respond
disproportionately and very aggressively and murderously to attacks on civilians
in the United States…And strictly for reasons of punishment. Even if the response
then breeds more terrorism and even if we’re not engaging a conversation, if
we’re not looking at the root causes, these are things we should do. But the first
response has to be a murderous response. You have to kill the people responsible
just as punishment to them, not as a deterrent to future – I don’t believe that
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works as a deterrent, I don’t believe the death penalty works as a deterrent. So he
needs to be murdered as punishment.
Gino flippantly balked the dominant narrative about the war in Afghanistan, reminding me “in
1978 there were miniskirts in Kabul,” and characterized the war as “going to get those miniskirts
back there again” demonstrating his awareness of the gendered logics of the post-9/11 response.
His evidence that the war was unsuccessful included that “there’s not a thriving democracy there,
there are no miniskirts in Kabul.” Yet he was unwavering in his conviction that bin Laden’s
death “makes people feel better. There is a reason the eye-for-an-eye concept has been around
for so long. I think there is a neurological basis for justice that we all possess. Little kids have it
and they sense what is fair, what is not fair and when something like that [9/11] happens on that
scale it seems like our innate moral compass require us to feel better murdering the murderer.” In
the end, he lamented, it may have been too little too late.

While there are interesting distinctions in the perceptions and memories about Osama bin
Laden’s life and death among the individuals I spoke with, evidencing “negotiated decoding”
where individuals grappled with a nuanced interpretation of the narrative, only one person had a
staunchly oppositional decoding. For the most part, people psychologically and emotionally
identified with Obama’s assertion the night he announced bin Laden’s death that “…as a
country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people
have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We
will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to
those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done” (Obama
2011).
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CHAPTER 5
VICTIMHOOD AND HEROISM IN RIGHTEOUS RETALIATION
Men, this stuff that some sources sling around about America wanting out of this war, not
wanting to fight, is a crock of bullshit. Americans love to fight, traditionally. All real Americans
love the sting and clash of battle. You are here today for three reasons. First, because you are
here to defend your homes and your loved ones. Second, you are here for your own self-respect,
because you would not want to be anywhere else. Third, you are here because you are real men
and all real men like to fight. When you, here, every one of you, were kids, you all admired the
champion marble player, the fastest runner, the toughest boxer, the big league ballplayers, and
the All-American football players. Americans love a winner. Americans will not tolerate a loser.
Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win all of the time. I wouldn’t give a hoot in hell
for a man who lost and laughed. That’s why Americans have never lost nor will ever lose a war;
for the very idea of losing is hateful to an American.
-Patton (Twentieth Century Fox 1970)
In Chapter 3, I explored how descriptions within the authorized discourse of the 9/11 attacks as
traumatic, the familiar ordering of events, and the treatment of counter-narratives sought to
establish American violence as morally superior, necessary, defensive, and world ordering.
Chapter 4 detailed descriptions of the nature of the villain, the perpetrator of the attacks. Bin
Laden’s flat character reduces him from a complex individual to a structural villain – someone
with no sympathetic or redeemable traits whose identity is pinned to an act nearly universally
constructed as abhorrent. He is reduced to an object, little more than a straw man for the story’s
heroes to respond to and act upon. In this chapter, I explore descriptions of who/what was
attacked – the suffering victims – and who avenged the attacks – the exceedingly capable and
lionhearted heroes.

9/11 victims are also rather passive in the authorized discourse, waiting for heroes to restore
moral order by killing the villain in their names. They are flattened into personifications of
suffering and innocence, even in news stories meant to humanize and texture their backstories.
The agents of righteous retaliation, the protagonists of the story, are the terrorist hunters: the CIA
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targeters who located bin Laden and the Navy SEALs who killed him. While they take active
roles, and some have availed themselves of opportunities to narrate the story from their own
perspective, they too, are flattened into archetypes of a distinct variant of militarized masculinity.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of the many facets of victimhood in the story of the hunt
for bin Laden. Individual American victims are referenced throughout the authorized discourse
in ways that construct them as embodiments of esteemed cultural traits, rendering their lives
more valuable, and their deaths and their families’ suffering more tragic. When weeping loved
ones remember victims of the attacks as “innocent” and “hard-working,” for example, their
performance of admired cultural values facilitates access to “true victimhood” (Cole 2007). By
contrast, victims of America’s war in Afghanistan remain nameless and faceless, or are described
in ways that blame existing circumstances for their plight, much like the Vietnamese and victims
of America’s proxy wars throughout the 1980s. The exception to this occurs when the authorized
discourse cynically deploys their victimhood at the hands of the Taliban to justify American
violence.

Afghan women living under Taliban rule, who, according to the authorized discourse endure an
archaic and vicious gender regime, are centered to construct the war as a moral imperative:
Americans must liberate Afghan women from the brutality of a common enemy. “Freedom,”
then – both the American freedom bin Laden purportedly hated which made all Americans
victims by proxy (Anker 2005) and the freedom for Afghan women to live under Western gender
regimes – was transformed into the symbolic victim of 9/11, still under threat, according to the
authorized discourse, until al Qaeda and its offshoots are decimated. The suffering of literal and
figurative victims (and the assertive ignoring of individual victims of American retaliatory
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violence) plays a central role in the development of the melodramatic narrative. In this frame,
centering victims’ suffering as the primary motivation for violence justifies retribution against
bin Laden. This logic is at the heart of righteous retaliation. Once the value “human freedom”
becomes a victim, there is a threat that justifies activation of the warrior heroes who can both
restore moral order by avenging the victims and killing the villain and secure the cultural
hegemony of the United States.

After discussing the various faces of victimhood, I turn to the story’s heroes. There are many
faces of the American heroes who were activated after the 9/11 attacks: President Bush with his
90% approval rating immediately following the attacks (Gallup 2001), the first responders and
everyday Americans lending helping hands at the sites in New York, Washington, and
Shanksville, the first waves of US military troops to deploy to Afghanistan, and the
counterterrorism intelligence analysts who had been largely sidelined before 9/11. In the
authorized discourse’s retelling of the story of the killing of bin Laden, the central heroes are the
members of SEAL Team Six, the “shadowy” special operators who fired the fatal shots. These
men are the contemporary counterpart to Meleager’s boar-hunting party, receiving sanction and
cultural veneration as hunters due to their history and their enactments of particular constructions
of white hegemonic masculinity. Therefore, I begin the second section with a brief historical
overview of the Navy SEALs in general and SEAL Team Six in particular, arguing three
foundational figures laid the groundwork for a particular expression of masculinity that sits atop
the hierarchy of American militarized masculinities.
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As hunters, the SEALs narrate the hunt for bin Laden in particular, but also their broader
experiences of terrorist hunting and the preparations to do so, for the American public.
Therefore, next, I describe the rise of Navy SEALs in American popular culture before exploring
how their performance of “special ops” masculinities casts them as agents of the hegemony, both
in global force projection and within the US armed forces, as demonstrated by the limited
oversight and accountability SEALs have encountered in the face of increasingly extreme
violence. Lastly, I argue the portrayals of their traits, behaviors, identities, and values presented
throughout narrations of their biographies and upbringing, training and team dynamics, and uses
of violence squarely place them on the heroic side of the melodramatic binary.

These observations alone explain their popularity to some extent; however, when contrasted with
the features of bin Laden’s personality and ideology detailed in the previous chapter, the binary
oppositions at work in the post-9/11 American cultural hegemony project become even clearer.
The cave-dwelling terrorist – the object of the hunt – versus the gallant American soldier – the
agential hunters – are part of a broader series of binary cultural codes: the civilized versus
primitive, the moral versus the immoral, surgical defensive response versus unprompted, wanton
offense, human versus animal. These codes are not new. The SEALs, in popular culture and in
American imagination, are contemporary embodiments of historically entrenched American
white hegemonic masculinity – “sheepdog” masculinity – dating back to early settler
colonialism: simultaneously expressing the chivalrous masculinity of the logic of masculinist
protectionism (Young 2003) and the violence of global-dominate masculinity (Messerschmidt
2010).
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Despite the demand for SEAL products by some Americans, there is a broader cultural context
that appears to dilute their appeal. Although the 2010s have brought many setbacks for women,
people of color in general, and immigrants in particular, there is a cultural preference for
multiculturalism, inclusion, and a broader array of heroes, that Jones and Smith (2015) refer to as
the rise of “dark Americana.” Many have tired of the armed white male hero and the formulaic
Hero’s Journey. The feature film Zero Dark Thirty, the Hollywood/White House collaboration
that grossed $130 million internationally and over $95 million at US box offices, defied these
conventions. It is quiet film that follows the development of a young female CIA analyst named
“Maya,” played by Jessica Chastain, leaving just 20 minutes at the end for the SEAL raid, only
after “Maya” has mocked and disparaged the SEALs’ masculine bravado. In some senses, this
film satiated the demand for a darker and more morally ambiguous story with a female lead.
However, in the chapter’s third section, I argue that “Maya,” and other fictionalized depictions of
the analyst on whom she is based, enacted traits and behaviors that permitted access to white
hegemonic masculinity. Ultimately, the other female targeters who worked tirelessly alongside
“Maya,” never acquire the status of the heroic hunters. Much like colleagues made fun of their
“doomsday predictions” before 9/11, blamed the attacks on lack of information sharing and
tensions within the FBI-CIA relationship in general and within the Bin Laden Issue Station in
particular, the other female analysts were never permitted to share in the credit for bin Laden’s
death.

Finally, I turn to responses from interviewees and focus group participants to shed light on their
impressions of American exceptional innocence, the grounds for activating the warrior-heroes
after the attacks, their impressions of the Navy SEALs and the role of race and gender in the
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logics of protectionism, and their reactions to Zero Dark Thirty as a “feminist” film. In sum, this
chapter explores the ways the myth of exceptional American innocence paired with the
glorification of the Navy SEALs and the female CIA analyst reanimate a contemporary
manifestation of the protective “sheepdog” and war hero, demonstrating that the cultural
preferences for a broader array of heroes and more complex plots pales in comparison to the
influence of a rising, culturally exalted “special ops” variant of militarized masculinity that has
rippled throughout American culture.
Not all Who Suffer Are Victims: America’s Exceptional Innocence
“When freedom from guilt and an absolute sense of right go together, they provide perhaps the
most powerful motivating and legitimizing force for exacting revenge”
-Neil Smelser, “September 11, 2001 as Cultural Trauma,” p. 277
Alongside the temporal sequencing of the injury itself and the characteristics of the villain, the
melodramatic narrative’s treatment of victims is central to understanding the cultural logics of
righteous retaliation. Exploration of culturally contingent constructions of innocence and
unjustified suffering a) provides insight into sacred American cultural values, b) illuminates how
human victims are transformed into embodiments of these values, and c) make plain the
premises that purportedly warranted activation of the warrior heroes to retaliate in the names of
the grieving. Importantly, as Jackson (2005:36-37) states, “a sense of victimhood did not have to
be in any way ‘invented.’ It did, however, have to be nurtured and firmly embedded in people’s
minds. Consequently…being the victim constructs American military retaliation as justified selfdefense and its treatment of terrorist suspects as proportionate – an act of justice rather than
revenge.”
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Blain (2012), drawing on Burke’s (1969) theorization of “identification” and “victimage ritual,”
helps to illuminate how the cultural hegemony moves from unjustified suffering to righteous
retaliation:
The first moment of the drama involves an “identification with the victim.” In this
moment the powerful one is the villain persecuting the powerless victim, the
subject who maliciously violates the victim. Identification with the victim
provokes moral outrage at the villainy of the enemy. How could anyone act this
way?...The second dramatic moment in a victimage ritual is some kind of
resolution of the conflict, redemption, or justice. In this moment leaders must
constitute their followers (militias, troops, police, or military forces) as heroic
power subjects, agents who are ready, willing and able to kill and die in life and
death struggles to destroy those villainous powers. This moment involves an
inversion of perspective from the point of view of the powerless, the violation of
the victim by the villain, to the standpoint of the hero and the triumph of the will.
(Blain 2012:55).
As discussed in Chapter 3, George W. Bush consistently narrated the attacks of September 11,
2001 as a cultural trauma. More specifically, alongside immediate condemnation of the attacks
as “shocking” and “evil,” as well as his Wild West retaliatory aesthetic, President Bush quickly
branded the suffering of individual victims of 9/11. There were ample opportunities to fix the
meaning of events: media profiles, public mourning and commemorations, formal and informal
memorialization, as well as narrations by public officials set against iconic city views. At a
National Day of Prayer three days after the planes hit, he said, “we are here in the middle hour of
our grief. So many have suffered so great a loss, and today we express our nation’s sorrow…the
prayers of private suffering, whether in our homes or in this great cathedral are known and heard
and understood…we are not spared from suffering” (Bush 2001:60). In late November 2001, just
as bin Laden was about to disappear in the mountains of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, Bush stated the
attack was “a terrible national shock, an act of evil that caused and continues to cause so much
suffering” (Bush 2001). He solicited renewed pathos for the victims of the attacks one year later,
stating, “a long year has passed since enemies attacked our country. We’ve seen the images so
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many times they are seared on our souls, and remembering the horror, reliving the anguish,
reimagining the terror, is hard – and painful” (Bush 2002).

The news media quickly echoed state narrations. Just as the authorized discourse emphasized
certain traits, behaviors, and actions of bin Laden over others to construct a character, there is
also a fixing of the individual qualities of the victims. Network evening news continued to
regularly profile victims months after the attacks. For example, Jennie Farrell and Michael
Cartier, brother and sister, were interviewed on The News with Brian Williams to describe what
their brother James, an electrician, did “during the last moments of these two buildings.” After
the siblings tearfully describe the phone calls he was able to make from the 105th floor of Tower
Two, Williams concludes, “we can assume that his last moments were spent helping other
people” (NBC, The News with Brian Williams, December 11, 2001), rendering his death more
tragic.

The New York Times compiled 13 profiles of victims for a subsection of the special Pulitzer
Prize-winning reporting, “A Nation Challenged,” entitled “Portraits of Grief: The Victims.” One
describes a man with “no fear of anything” to whom “anything was possible,” extoling American
risk-taking and optimism. A woman’s husband reported his wife “would be up at 5 o’clock every
morning to go to work, and from the minute she got up she was giving…She was giving to me,
to her home, to strangers in the street. She gave herself. And when she was at her job she was
giving 110 percent,” (Kleinfeld et al., New York Times, October 14, 2001) demonstrating
American veneration of hard work and generosity. President Bush explicated the cultural
significance of hard-working Americans in his speeches shortly following the attacks, for
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example, he said, “America is successful because of the hard work and creativity and enterprise
of our people” (Bush 2001:45). As Cerulo (1998:26) puts it, “The plight of a career conformist
stands in contrast to that of the deviant victim. When an ‘upstanding family man’ is assaulted in
a parking lot or an ‘innocent school child’ is killed…those evaluating the violence take account
of the victim’s general conformity; they identify the act as deviant relative to the victim’s
personal history.”

Even as the twentieth anniversary of the attacks draws near, each September 11, on which all of
the victims’ names are read at the 9/11 Memorial, NBC, for example, does a special segment on
the victims with a progress report on families the network has followed and some audiences have
become familiar with. In 2015, they featured a 14-year-old boy who was born in October of
2001. He says his one wish would be to know his father, who sounds to him from stories like he
was a great man. The following year they profiled twins who lost their father, one of whom has
special needs and still lies on the ground crying, begging for his dad to come home. In the years
following the attacks, documentaries often highlighted the individual lives cut short that day,
civilians and first responders alike, and, as alluded to in Chapter 3, many of the documentaries,
films, and books about the bin Laden raid refer to suffering victims and the need to avenge 9/11
families. Jackson (2005:34) argues these accounts “establish the everyday humanity of the
victims through personalized accounts. This is a way of creating empathy and eliciting sympathy
– seeing the casualties as both ordinary people and innocent victims.”
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George W. Bush extends the personal qualities of people who died in the attacks to the American
people as a whole. In his remarks at the National Day of Prayer on September 14, 2001, he
stated,
…our fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave. We see our
national character in rescuers working past exhaustion; in long lines of blood
donors; in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any way
possible. And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice.
Inside the World Trade Center, one man who could have saved himself stayed
until the end at the side of his quadriplegic friend. A beloved priest died giving
the last rites to a firefighter. Two office workers, finding a disabled stranger,
carried her down sixty-eight floors to safety…In these acts, and in many others,
Americans showed a deep commitment to one another, and an abiding love for
our country (Bush 2001:60).
As with disuse of the term “global war on terror,” changes in rhetoric under the Obama
administration were more semantic than substantive. He echoes Bush’s framing of the American
people in his reflection on the 9/11 attacks on the evening he announced the death of Osama bin
Laden: “…in our time of grief, the American people came together. We offered our neighbors a
hand, and we offered the wounded our blood. We reaffirmed our ties to each other and our love
of community and country. On that day, no matter where we came from, what God we prayed to,
or what race or ethnicity we were, we were united as one American family” (Obama 2011). On
the implications of the refrain about the virtuousness of the American people, Jackson (2005:7779) comments, “There is the fixing of all the good qualities of ‘the American people:’ generosity,
kindness, resourcefulness, bravery, sacrifice, love, and unity. These characteristics are identity
markers; they are what make Americans stand out from the terrorist ‘other.’…In this script,
every EMS worker is Bruce Willis in Die Hard, every member of the armed forces is Tom
Hanks in Saving Private Ryan and every ordinary citizen is Mel Gibson in The Patriot.”
Textured portrayals of individual innocent American victims are in stark contrast to descriptions
of Afghan victims at the start of the war, when there was any coverage of the human costs at all.
American media audiences are rarely given faces or names to put to the death tolls in foreign
wars (despite the advent of “the televised war” (Knightley 2004) beginning in Vietnam and
continuing during the early stages of the declared wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), let alone
victims of the undeclared wars and covert wars in many other countries. During early coverage
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of the refugee crisis in Afghanistan in late 2001, families fleeing from the American-led violence
to camps are not described as innocent, their plight a tragedy. Instead they are described in ways
that would be very difficult for most Americans to relate to. For example, in a New York Times
article by Tim Weiner, he quotes 32-year old refugee Tilawat Shah, “I saw a family on the way,
a husband, a pregnant wife, carrying two small children and their belongings…They could carry
them no longer. They kissed their children and left them in the mountains” (Weiner, New York
Times, November 16, 2001). Instead of asking American parents to imagine being in a situation
so dire, the Afghan parents were dehumanized for doing such a thing.
Smelser (2004) points out that in news coverage of the attacks and their aftermath there was an
over-emphasis on children, a nearly universal symbol of innocence, considering how few died in
the attacks. By contrast, the descriptions of Afghan children paint them as nearly feral. The
children, according to Weiner (New York Times, November 16, 2001), “are a huge mass of
people, largely illiterate and mostly unvaccinated – some skilled in the basics of waging war,
others without any moral reference point after being raised under the Taliban’s brand of law.
They are savvy to the street and the steppe, yet without the slightest sense of the world.” There
were reports early on that the war had produced over half a million “homeless and half-starved”
refugees (Weiner, New York Times, November 16, 2001). While 9/11 is treated as a spontaneous
and sadistic act of an obsessed zealot, coverage of the victims in Afghanistan looks to broader
context and problems that existed before the American war began, such as ethnic tensions,
unprecedented poverty, warlords’ opium trade, and Taliban rule. Recall this tactic of hegemony
maintenance was also used in the 9/11 Commission Report (2004) to suggest that the problems in
the Middle East that might have rationalized al Qaeda’s grievances with the United States were
not due to American foreign policy but to existing national and regional governance and
economic issues.
If there was any doubt after a steady stream of similar media coverage, former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared how the American people should understand the cycles of
victimization at work: “We did not start this war. So understand, responsibility for every single
casualty in this war, whether they’re innocent Afghans or innocent Americans, rests at the feet of
the al Qaeda and the Taliban (Wheeler 2002). Jackson (2005:36) explains, “This is the deliberate
use of America’s status of ‘victim’ to justify actions which harm other innocent civilians.
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America’s exceptional status as the primary victim was then reinforced by the decision of
television networks to avoid showing pictures of any bombed Afghan civilians, or even
mentioning them without also recalling the American victims of September 11, 2001.”
Beyond the temporal sequencing of traumatizing violence, the comments of Rumsfeld, others in
the administration, and the news media point to a move on the part of the cultural hegemony to
value some lives over others. The ways in which victims are represented in the authorized
discourse, highlighting particular traits and behaviors, transform them into symbols mobilized to
legitimate the US response. Emphasizing the suffering, the innocence, and the shocking tragedy
of 9/11 justifies activation of the heroes, who, according to the second stage in Burke’s
victimage ritual, can settle the score by killing the perpetrator of the attacks, even if that also
meant scores of Afghan civilians will be killed, maimed, and displaced.
While humanizing details about Afghan victims of America’s war were rare, significant attention
was paid to the plight of Afghan women and children in the abstract, at the hands of their own
government. Young (2003:10) asserts “The Bush administration has repeatedly appealed to the
primacy of its role as protector of innocent citizens and liberator of women and children to
justify consolidating and centralizing executive power at home and dominative war abroad.”
This was “particularly effective because [of the focus] on women. The women of Afghanistan
constituted the ultimate victims, putting the United States in the position of ultimate protectors”
(Young 2003:17).
In his 2002 State of the Union address, George W. Bush said, “The last time we met in this
chamber the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden
from working or going to school. Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan’s new
government” (Bush 2002:103). Later, in 2006, Bush described what al Qaeda’s “radical empire
would look like in practice” based on what prewar Afghanistan was like:
Under the rule of the Taliban and al Qaeda, Afghanistan was a totalitarian
nightmare – a land where women were imprisoned in their homes, men were
beaten for missing prayer meetings, girls could not go to school, and children
were forbidden the smallest pleasures like flying kites. Religious police roamed
the streets, beating and detaining civilians for perceived offenses. Women were
publicly whipped. Summary executions were held in Kabul’s soccer stadium in
from of cheering mobs (Bush 2006:396).
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Of this rhetoric Cole (2007:150) writes,
The [Bush] administration repackaged the war in Afghanistan…as a momentous
struggle for the emancipation of women. Suddenly, conservatives of all stripes
were versed in the entire feminist vocabulary – reproving “misogyny,” “gender
apartheid,” and even “the feminization of poverty.” In another historic first, the
first lady substituted for her husband during the president’s Saturday morning
radio address to christen the new crusade on behalf of third-world women. When
Mrs. Bush announced, “the brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the
terrorists,” she became the female face of the administration’s war against alQaeda and the Taliban. A narrow target to be certain, but the implications, she
explained, are global. “Our hearts break for the women and children in
Afghanistan, but also because in Afghanistan we see the world the terrorists
would like to impose on the rest of us…The fight against terrorism is also a fight
for the rights and dignity of women.
Finally, this deployment of women’s right as a noble cause for violence was a cynical act of
hegemonic coalition building. Gramsci (2010) wrote that while sometimes the state engages in
overt displays of power and physical violence to repress would-be counterhegemonic
movements, more often, the hegemon tempts burgeoning counterhegemonic movements with
incremental gains, seducing them into joining the ever-broadening hegemonic coalition. At first,
due to deeply held logics about gender, good and evil, right and wrong, the plight of Afghan
women sounds objectively horrible to many Americans. And it seems immoral for America, a
country purportedly built on equality and liberty, to stand idly by while this injustice occurs.
However, framing the war this way is also a calculated strategy that draws on the cultural
framework of the rescue narrative; one where not only men save women, but Western women
seek to save women from the Global South. “Linking the terrorist attacks with the oppression of
women and thus, by implication, the war on terrorism with the liberation of women” (Young
2003:18) draws on a rich historical self-conception of “white men saving brown women from
brown men” (Spivak [1989] 1994:92). This problematic cultural script provides justification for
the war, beyond the villainy of bin Laden himself, while totally absolving American violence
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that also tragically disrupted the lives of most Afghan people. Many feminists were quite
outspoken (e.g. Agosín and Craige 2003, Hawthorne and Winter 2003; Joseph and Sharma 2003)
in their anti-war views after 9/11 – in terms of both waging wars and the building of a domestic
security state – but framing the war as one waged by heroic, masculine protectors against evil,
barbaric terrorists who torture and enslave women helped to quell dissent by coopting some
feminists into the hegemonic coalition.58

Afghan “women’s rights” were not the only cultural value-cum victim, according to the
authorized discourse’s morally dualistic accounts of Islamist terrorism. In addition to the
individual human victims of the attacks, the authorized discourse also constructs 9/11 as an
assault on American values, which transforms America into a signifier for those values, thereby
making all Americans victims by proxy. Anker (2005:22) describes this enhanced collective
identity as “nationwide empathic victimization: a collectively experienced pain in response to
unjustified suffering perpetrated by an evil villain.” When George W. Bush declared “freedom
itself was attacked” in his address on the evening of September 11, 2001, and called the nation to
“defend freedom” in his remarks on September 20, 2001, Anker (2005:32) contends “every
American was victimized if America is synonymous with freedom and freedom was attacked.”
She explains further that
…through the melodramatic narrative, ‘the American people,’ become a united
entity whose shared values and social solidarity create a homogenous body. The
American people’s virtue extends naturally from their practice of democratic
freedom; decency and righteousness are intertwined with the designation of
‘freedom loving people.’ American ideals of freedom, free markets, and
democracy serve to reinforce the idea of an honorable and politically unified
nation of virtuous common folk (Anker 2005:25).

58

For example, see feminist playwright Eve Ensler’s mission to “save” Afghan women despite a history of anti-war
activism. (Dominus, New York Times, February 10, 2002).
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Jackson asserts the main consequence of this maneuver is to create a myth of exceptional
grievance. This myth – one that “establishes America’s status as the primary victim” (Jackson
2005:35) – is connected to other myths that combine to produce American exceptionalism more
broadly. Importantly, myths are not necessarily untrue; they are simply “perceptions of core
national values and cultural character” (Hughes 2003:4). After an event is narrated as a crisis like
the 9/11 attacks, Hughes (2003:4) suggests that there is often an “absolutization of myths” where
existing myths are “rejuvenated and solidified” with higher stakes for challenging them.”

Hughes names several myths that form the core of American self-concept. The myth of the
Chosen People refers to the notion “that God chose the American people for special blessings
and privileges in the world,” which “emerged among the Puritans in the colonial period of
American history” (Hughes 2003:6). The myth of Nature’s Nation brought many to believe “that
‘nature’ had ‘decreed’ the removal of Native Americans and the enslavement of blacks” (Hughes
2003:6). The myth of the Christian Nation speaks to the dominance of Christianity in American
life, especially when it is worn as “a badge of cultural superiority, not an incentive to extend
compassion to the poor and the oppressed” (Hughes 2003:6). The myth of the Millennial Nation
came a bit later when Americans, “struck by the wonders of the American system of
government, and especially with the newness of American freedoms, came to believe that the
United States would usher in a millennial age of freedom that would eventually bless all the
peoples of the earth…sometimes willing to force others to be free” (Hughes 2003:7).

First, “the absolutized versions of these myths came together in the nineteenth century to define
the doctrine of manifest destiny” (Hughes 2003:7). Subsequently, the myth of the Innocent
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Nation, according to Hughes, “emerged in the twentieth century and draws its strength from all
the other myths…The myth of innocence is therefore, in many ways, the most powerful myth of
all” (Hughes 2003:8). Hughes argues “a profound sense of innocence characterized the American
experience for much of the twentieth century” (Hughes 2003:153). In the face of atrocities in
Vietnam and against people of color in the United States, somehow, “in the mainstream of
American life, most had no doubt about the ultimate meaning of their nation: America stood for
good against evil, right against wrong, democracy against tyranny, and virtue against vice”
(Hughes 2003:153). The myth of innocence is inextricably bound to notions of American moral
superiority, rationality, and exceptionalism. Taken together, “Americans and America are
‘chosen’ in some special sense that involves a sense of moral superiority among nations and
peoples (Bellah 1975)” (Smelser 2004:277). Jackson (2005:36) concludes, then, that “officials
have tapped into this national myth by suggesting that the suffering caused by the attacks is
unique and special; America is a special kind of victim.”

Before turning to in-depth analysis of how these myths and other cultural values inform the
story’s heroes, it is important to place the deployment of particular constructions of Afghan and
American victimhood within the gendered and racialized terrain of defensive violence. As
referenced earlier, Susan Faludi (2007) argued that early Pearl Harbor allusions to make sense of
9/11 fell short and were quickly replaced with Cold War imagery. She explains,
the cultural troika of media, entertainment, and advertising declared the post-9/11
age an era of neofifties nuclear family ‘togetherness,’ redomesticated femininity,
and reconstituted Cold Warrior manhood. “Security moms” were said to be
salving their fears of terrorists by sticking close to the hearth and stocking their
pantries with canned goods and anthrax antidotes, while suburban dads were
stockpiling guns in their families’ linen closets. Scared single women, the media
held, were reassessing their independence and heading for the altar; working
mothers were ‘opting out’ for the protected suburbs. The nation’s men, from the
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inhabitants of the White House on down, were reportedly assuming a hard-boiled
comportment last seen in post-World War II cinema (Faludi 2007:4).
Even if these descriptions of the gendered cultural shift after 9/11 are overstated, the principle
remains. And the diffusion of the principle was in no small part, facilitated by the construction of
victims. “In this post-9/11 reenactment of the fifties Western, women figured largely as
vulnerable maidens,” Faludi (2007:6) continues. “Never mind that the fatalities that day were
three-to-one male-to-female and that most of the female office workers at the World Trade
Center (like their male counterparts) rescued themselves by walking down the stairs on their own
two feet,” (Faludi 2007:6), the news was dominated by female victims being saved by male
citizen-warriors. For example, conservative commentator Charlotte Allen remarked, “We will
never forget the photos of them, the brawny young man in his helmet carrying the wounded
young woman in his arms,” (qtd in Faludi 2007:6). As he reflected about his motivations on the
helicopter to Abbottabad, Pakistan, Navy SEAL Robert O’Neill (2017:580) did not imagine the
buried firefighters, but rather, “the single mom that went to work on Tuesday morning, and later
that morning made a conscious decision to jump to her death because it’s better than burning
alive. A woman whose last gesture of human decency was holding down her skirt on the long
way to the pavement so no one could see her underwear. That’s why we were going.”

What is more, Faludi (2007:7) continues, “in the absence of female victims at the site, the media
substituted homemakers in the suburbs held hostage by fear and little children traumatized by
television footage. The threat, according to this revised script, wasn’t to our commercial and
governmental hubs but to our domestic hearth.” This pivot made accessible deeply held cultural
logics about defensive violence in the name of women’s innocence and purity. From eighteenth
century white settlers protecting “their” land from indigenous populations to nineteenth century
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xenophobia against immigrants, especially the Chinese, and violent discrimination against
indigenous people and Mexicans in territory acquired through the Spanish-American war, to
lynching of black men in the name of white women’s sexual purity, the perception that white
hegemonic masculinity has a monopoly over the legitimate right to use defensive violence is
built upon the unjustified suffering and innocence of white women and children (Light 2017).

These gendered and racialized images of innocence have at least two further dimensions. First,
the “violation” of the 9/11 attacks are often described using metaphors of rape, gendering the
homeland feminine, vulnerable to threat, al Qaeda as a rapist, and American heroes as defending
the honor and sexual purity of its women. For example, Cole (2007:148) writes,
Another model for framing and representing the events of 9/11 has been the crime
of rape. In recent decades, the experience of rape has become, much like the
European Holocaust, a paradigm of victimhood, often at great remove from actual
violated bodies. Indeed, in the aftermath of attack, public reflections
metaphorically dressed the nation in a skirt. “Gendered images and narratives
migrated from embodied subjects to discursive constructions of the nation,” Mary
Hawkesworth observes. “The US was stripped of its sense of invulnerability. The
impregnable fortress was breeched. America joined the ranks of the violated.”
America’s new poet laureate Billy Collins unambiguously depicts the attacks as
the day the United States “lost our virginity.” The language of sexual violation
genders the victim as less than a man – wounded, exposed, weak, dominated,
invaded, in a word, penetrable. Within this conception, victimization emasculates
or feminizes the victim by constituting a loss that indicates prior lack.
Whether one describes the 9/11 attacks or the invasion of Afghanistan in these terms, the
consequences are similar, as there are dangerous implications to the constructed image of the
nation as a woman under threat of violation and domination for whom her sons must sacrifice to
protect her and maintain her safety (Pettman 1996:49). When imperial power is seen as male
heterosexual rape it conflates the rapes of actual women with the outrage of political defeat or an
act of war. Therefore, “women's pain and rights are appropriated into masculine power politics”
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(Pettman 1996:49), which ultimately compounds men’s dominance as political actors policing
national boundaries and further develops into the policing of women's bodies from men
constructed as “racial other.”

Recalling Cole’s assertion that American neocons had coopted the language of feminism, so too
did they come to understand and utilize the language of victim blaming. She writes, “As of 9/12,
‘blaming the victim’ is commonly uttered to undermine calls to probe the conditions that may
have facilitated the attack, as well as any stance critical of the Bush administration’s policies”
(Cole 2007:149).

The second dimension attends not to the abstract gendering of victimhood, but the gendering and
racialization of individuals, whether victims or agents of defensive violence on behalf of
“deserving” victims. Cerulo (1998:24-25), in her study of perceptions of violence, explains the
historical roots of differing perceptions of violence based on gender and race:
Studies show that violence waged against members of racial, ethnic, gender, or
other social minorities is more likely to be viewed as normal than violence waged
against members of corresponding majorities. Such biases appear linked to longstanding American values and beliefs that subordinate certain social groups, and
thus, legitimate acts waged against them…During the Reconstruction, white
plantation owners argued that their former slaves had reverted to savagery.
Blacks, it was said had become so dangerous as to merit White-inflicted
violence…Thus southern Whites legitimated attacks against Blacks in the name of
protection; they defined violence as a normal response to the perceived threat of
“the beast”…When a racial minority threatens the status quo, the racial majority
may normalize otherwise unacceptable violence as an act of self-defense.
While particularly murderous, the attacks against black people in the name of protection of white
people and property is far from the only example of supposedly defensive racism in US history.
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According to the National Archives regarding “Executive Order 9066: Resulting in the
Relocation of Japanese”:
Between 1861 and 1940, approximately 275,000 Japanese immigrated to Hawaii
and the mainland United States, the majority arriving between 1898 and 1924,
when quotas were adopted that ended Asian immigration. Many worked in
Hawaiian sugarcane fields as contract laborers. After their contracts expired, a
small number remained and opened up shops. Other Japanese immigrants settled
on the West Coast of mainland United States, cultivating marginal farmlands and
fruit orchards, fishing, and operating small businesses. Their efforts yielded
impressive results. Japanese Americans controlled less than 4 percent of
California’s farmland in 1940, but they produced more than 10 percent of the total
value of the state’s farm resources…Envy over economic success combined with
distrust over cultural separateness and long-standing anti-Asian racism turned into
disaster when the Empire of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
Lobbyists from western states, many representing competing economic interests
or nativist groups, pressured Congress and the President to remove persons of
Japanese descent from the west coast, both foreign born (issei – meaning “first
generation” of Japanese in the U.S.) and American citizens (nisei – the second
generation of Japanese in America, U.S. citizens by birthright.) After encouraging
voluntary evacuation of the areas, the Western Defense Command began
involuntary removal and detention of West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry.
In the next 6 months, approximately 122,000 men, women, and children were
moved to assembly centers. They were then evacuated to and confined in isolated,
fenced, and guarded relocation centers, known as internment camps (NAD
EO9066).
As referenced in previous chapters, there was no interpretive framework for Americans to
understand the hypocrisy of Western opposition to Japanese expansion, given the legacies of
European and American imperialism. This extended to the personal level; the internment was
justified as a precaution against those still loyal to Japan, while only 11,000 ethnic Germans of
12.2 million Americans who were born in Germany or had a parent of German origin were
interned (50 U.S. Code § 21; German American Internee Coalition 2009). The internment of
citizens by their government is always egregious, however, the proportions reveal the racism
against the Japanese in the construction of threat.
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Further, then, Light (2017:9) argues,
Our contemporary understandings of law-abiding citizenship and criminality are
neither gender neutral nor color-blind, and self-defense is not a de facto universal
right…The deck is disproportionately stacked against nonwhite men, who are
more likely to be perceived as “reasonable threats”…According to historian
Robin D.G. Kelley, from our nation’s very founding, “predators and threats to
[white] privileges were almost always black, brown, and red.” A selective right to
lethal self-defense – one that privileged white (hetero-)masculine access to power
and property – accompanied this nation’s founding in white European settler
colonialism and slavery. The exclusion of nonwhites and women from the
promises of democracy shapes our seemingly egalitarian ideals of DIY-security
citizenship today.
DIY security citizenship, much like righteous retaliation,
is based on a set of ideologies, rooted in heroic histories, that see lethal selfdefense as a core responsibility of the ideal citizen who stands his ground in the
face of perceived threat rather than retreating from a fight. This contemporary
ideal emerged in response to a growing sense of insecurity, a belief that we must
be prepared to kill or be killed, to shoot first and ask questions later. It rests on an
urgent need to defend oneself from a litany of threatening figures, including (but
not limited to) terrorists, undocumented immigrants, and criminal strangers. In
fact, the DIY security citizen has appeared primarily in opposition to these
perceived threats, and leaves no room for ambiguity between heroic good guys
and dangerous bad guys (Light 2017:viii)
While Light is focused on individual gun ownership, lethal self-defense within the United States
in general and “Stand Your Ground” Laws in particular, the applicability of her analysis of the
role that race and religion play in the authorized discourse about the hunt for and killing of
Osama bin Laden cannot be overstated. Light’s (2017:1) detailed historicization begins,
Standing one’s ground against a perceived threat has long been a white, masculine
prerogative in the United States. When European settlers arrived on American
soil, they justified violence as necessary to their basic survival, seizing land that
was already inhabited while imprisoning or exterminating its occupants. Settler
colonialism, and, later, the idea of Manifest Destiny – spreading civilized
Christianity across the continent – together demanded the subjugation of
nonwhites. And the rights, privileges, and protections of citizenship were
inaccessible to all but white, property-owning men. The legacies of this underrecognized history of repression and exclusion in the name of national survival
haunt us today …Our nation’s past exclusions – ones that ensured that white,
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propertied men held a monopoly on lethal violence – continue to haunt the way
we distribute the rights of self-defense in the present…They are designed to help
all would-be “sheepdogs” defend themselves, their families, and their property
from encroaching “wolves.” (Light 2017:7).
Taken together, American cultural identity, built on the gendered and racialized myths of
innocence and moral exceptionalism, justifies activation of its warrior-heroes whose violence is
defensive and legitimate. From settler colonialists to lynch mobs and from police shootings of
unarmed people of color and the rise of the cultural trope “good guy with a gun,” which
manifests in the United States as “the DIY Security citizen,” (Light 2017), white hegemonic
masculinity is tasked with defending (white) American innocence at home and abroad.
SEAL Team Six: The hegemonic, the heroes, the hunters
Everyone – the military, the Times, Hollywood, right and left – benefits from the mystique of the
SEALs. From Demi Moore’s portrayal in G.I. Jane in 1997 and even before, it’s been clear that
we just love super men (and women), that we want to believe that muscles will ultimately win
out, that endurance will endure, that training (and now technology) will help us prevail. If a
terrorist is killed, if a hostage rescue succeeds, if an embassy is saved, if a lost nuke is found, in
our dreams, we celebrate the eleventh hour recovery. We show our gratitude to the super men by
allowing them to toil in secret; we get out of the way.
-William Arkin, contributing reporter for 2015 New York Times’ exposé on SEAL Team Six, for
Gawker.com, June 8, 2015
While the nature of the “terrorist villain” in the authorized discourse has gone through a variety
of iterations since 9/11 – the imam in religious garb, the masked militant, the Western convert
who can blend among us; al Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS – the near constant in the story of the war on
terror, including but not limited to bin Laden, is the frame of “the hunt”: in the global theater,
gallant American soldiers hunt down and kill cave-dwelling terrorists. On September 11, 2001,
President George W. Bush set this tone when he proclaimed, “Make no mistake, the United
States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts” (Bush September
11, 2001, my emphasis). In his final year in office 15 years after Bush’s statement, President
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Barack Obama called targeted killings of al Qaeda leadership a “centerpiece of U.S.
counterterrorism strategy” (Obama 2016).

I argue, given the fame that came with recognition by the state, the self-aggrandizement of
individual SEALs, and the entertainment industry’s production of SEAL-related media following
the bin Laden raid, the members of SEAL Team Six can best be understood as the elite terrorist
hunters of the early 21st century. As with any Simmelian social type, there is a wide range of
individuals who actually fill the broad social position “hunter” in different cultural and historical
contexts. The SEALs occupying the role of hunters is not metaphor, but it does require extending
the hunt to war to differentiate their role from big game hunters, for example. According to
Washburn and Lancaster (1968 qtd in Cohen 2010:119), “war was viewed in much the same way
as hunting. Other human beings were simply the most dangerous game.” As the previous chapter
explored the orientalist imagery in which human adversaries were dehumanized and reimagined
as animal prey, this section details the ways the authorized discourse constructs SEALs as a
particular manifestation of heroic hunter through their history, foundational figures, personal
backgrounds, training process, and uses of violence. While these constructions rely on the
continuation of extant, historical militarized white hegemonic masculinities they also produce a
particular “special ops” masculinity that has grave implications for extreme violence both within
military operations and among civilians emulating their aesthetic.

SEAL Team Six, Joint Special Operations Command, and White Hegemonic Masculinity
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Terrorist hunting is part of the larger sea change regarding political assassination. After years of
lethal covert operations around the world, in 1976, Gerald Ford signed an executive order
banning “political assassination,” later strengthened further by an amendment signed by Jimmy
Carter. There were several points, including after the 1998 bombings of two American embassies
in Africa, when President Bill Clinton was encouraged to assassinate Osama bin Laden, but the
legal infrastructure to execute high-value targets was slow and cumbersome and precluded this
option. However, Scahill (2013:18) states, “On September 11, all that would change. As the
World Trade Center towers crumbled to the ground, so too did the system of oversight and
review of lethal covert ops that had been carefully constructed over the course of the previous
decade.”59

To evidence how explicit and unprecedented the idea of using political assassination was, Scahill
(2013:22) reports Former Director of CIA's Counterterrorism Center, Cofer Black, told CIA
covert operative Gary Schroen and his team before they deployed to Afghanistan in 2001,
“I don’t want bin Laden and his thugs captured, I want them dead…They must be
killed. I want to see photos of their heads on pikes. I want bin Laden’s head
shipped back in a box filled with dry ice. I want to be able to show bin Laden’s
head to the President”…Schroen said it was the first time in his thirty-year career
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More specifically, the United States designates drone strikes and night raids as “targeted killings,” legal under US
law. However, there is some debate as to whether they are legal according to international law. International Human
Rights Law is in effect during peacetime and holds high standards for the definition of “imminence” of threat to
justify targeted killings. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is in effect during war and carries a much lower bar
for “imminence.” In the months after 9/11, in the AUMF and in other American legal documents, the US national
security apparatus put forth a framework for perpetual, borderless war. This implies the jurisdiction of IHL and it is
through this context that targeted killings are justified as legal. However, given that 1) targeted killings are carried
out in many countries where the United States has not declared war, and 2) that only countries under the American
hegemonic coalition – particularly in Western Europe and Israel – can use targeted killings legally (other actors use
of targeted killings is labeled terrorism), this is a contentious issue in the domestic and international legal
communities. For further readings see https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/8_200721892011-1009TaskForceletterreLawofTargettedKillings.pdf, https://www.lawfareblog.com/legality-targeted-killing-programunder-international-law, and https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/politics/obama-legal-authorization-osamabin-laden-raid.html
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that he had been ordered to assassinate an adversary rather than attempting to
capture.60
US President John F. Kennedy established Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Teams to “develop Navy
Unconventional Warfare capability.” The official Navy website describes the SEALs as follows:
Conducting clandestine missions behind enemy lines. Capturing enemy targets
and intelligence against impossible odds. Bringing a threatening act of sea piracy
to resolution in the blink of an eye. The legendary achievements of Navy SEALs
are matched only by their intense training, fast thinking, unbreakable commitment
and indomitable will…The Navy’s Sea, Air and Land Forces – commonly known
as SEALs – are expertly trained to deliver highly specialized, intensely
challenging warfare capabilities that are beyond the means of standard military
forces. This includes direct action warfare. Special reconnaissance.
Counterterrorism. Foreign internal defense. When there’s nowhere else to turn,
Navy SEALs are in their element. Achieving the impossible by way of critical
thinking, sheer willpower and absolute dedication to their training, their missions
and their fellow Special Operations team members (Navy.mil).
The United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), also known as SEAL
Team Six – whose “name itself was an attempt at Cold War disinformation: Only two SEAL
teams existed at the time, but [Team Six founder] Commander Marcinko called the unit SEAL
Team 6 hoping that Soviet analysts would overestimate the size of the force” (Mazzetti et al.,
New York Times, June 7, 2015) – was created in 1980. The addition of SEAL Team Six was part
of a larger institutional change. More broadly, US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC
<jay-sock>), according to investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill (2013:49), “was formed out of
the ashes of the failed mission to rescue fifty-three American hostages held in the US Embassy in
Tehran, Iran following the Islamic revolution in 1979…[The White House and the Pentagon]
determined that a unified, fully capable special operations all-star team was needed for such
operations that would have its own aircraft, soldiers, SEALs and intelligence.”61
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Schroen also stated this on camera in the Smithsonian documentary, The Hunt for Bin Laden (2012).
Peter Bergen (2012:148), author of Manhunt: The Ten Year Search for bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad, uses
strikingly similar language, demonstrating the entrenchment of the cultural imagery: “Joint Special Operations
Command was born out of the ashes of an American defeat in the deserts of Iran.”
61
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Since JSOC’s (and their naval component, Team Six’s) inception, they “reported directly to the
president and [were] intended to be his small, private army,” (Scahill 2013:49) but were “used
with trepidation preceding 9/11” (Scahill 2013:53). In fact, “JSOC’s commanders claimed that
prior to 9/11 their forces ‘were never used once to hunt down terrorists who had taken American
lives’” (Scahill 2013:53). Bergen (2012:150) reports that President Clinton wanted to use JSOC
against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, “telling General Hugh Shelton, his top military advisor, ‘You
know it would scare the shit out of al Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of
helicopters into the middle of their camp. It would get us enormous deterrence and show the
guys we are not afraid.’” Special Operations chief General Peter Schoomaker told Bergen
(2012:151), “Special Operations were never given the mission. It was very, very frustrating. It
was like having a brand-new Ferrari in the garage and nobody wants to race it because you might
dent the fender.” This is generally attributed to being “scarred by the Battle of Mogadishu”
(Bergen 2012:150), otherwise known as Black Hawk Down, described in Chapter 4. However, in
line with previously mentioned fissures between military brass and Special Operations, “the top
officers who ran the US military were often suspicious of the ‘snake eaters’ in Special
Operations, whom they tended to regard as cowboys” (Bergen 2012:149).

The turn toward small special operations forces began immediately after the 9/11 attacks. Since
“JSOC – unlike the CIA – would not have to brief Congress about its action” (Bergen 2012:152)
and used the F3 methodology – find, fix, finish – where they were charged with “tracking a
target, fixing his location, and finishing him off” (Scahill 2013:50), they were ideal to conduct
missions to hunt down and kill terrorists. Since the first attempts to capture bin Laden in the
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mountains of Tora Bora in 2001, described in Chapter 3, the United States Special Operations
Command forces “have been involved in tens of thousands of missions and operations in
multiple geographic theaters. Former Senator Bob Kerrey, a Nebraska Democrat and a member
of the SEALs during the Vietnam War, elaborated, ‘They have become sort of a 1-800 number
anytime somebody wants something done…’” (Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015).

There are three foundational figures who are central as individuals to the development of SEAL
culture. A 2015 New York Times exposé traces the culture within SEAL Team 6 to the persona of
the man charged with establishing the unit. Its authors write,
The Navy then asked Cmdr. Richard Marcinko, a hard-charging Vietnam veteran,
to build a SEAL unit that could respond quickly to terrorist crises…He flouted
rules and fostered a maverick image for the unit. (Years after leaving the
command, he was convicted of military contract fraud.)62 In his autobiography,
“Rogue Warrior,” Commander Marcinko describes drinking together as important
to SEAL Team 6’s solidarity; his recruiting interviews often amounted to boozy
chats in a bar… “A lot of the enlisted guys think that they really run the show,”
said one former senior member. “That’s part of the Marcinko style.” And they
tend to swagger, critics and defenders say. While the other SEAL teams (called
“white” or “vanilla” SEALs within the military) perform similar tasks, Team 6
pursues the highest value targets and takes on hostage rescues in combat zones. It
also works more with the C.I.A. and does more clandestine missions outside war
zones. Only Team 6 trains to chase after nuclear weapons that fall into the wrong
hands (Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015).
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“Mark Owen” (2012:288-289) mocks Marcinko, adding another dimension to his mixed reputation: “ABC News
had come out with a ridiculous story about how to spot a SEAL. Reporter Chris Cuomo reported that the SEAL who
shot bin Laden was probably a physically fit white man in his thirties with a beard and longer hair. Then Cuomo did
what other reporters did. They found any SEAL who would talk about us, in this case DEVGRU founder Richard
Marcinko. ‘They have gazelle legs, no waists, and a huge upper body configuration, and almost a mental block that
says, ‘I will not fail,’ Marcinko told Cuomo. Other telltale traits: callused hands from firing a weapon, shrapnel
wounds from previous missions, and big egos. ‘They are basically individual egomaniacs that make music together.
They learn to depend on each other. When they are bored they play with each other to keep pushing. Otherwise, they
get in trouble,’ Marcinko told ABC News. We laughed our asses off. I know he was a founder of DEVGRU, but he
was hopelessly out of touch with the modern force. I didn’t know a single SEAL who fit his profile. We’d evolved
past being egomaniacs. There wasn’t a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine in the special operations community that fit
his profile. It wasn’t part of our ethos. We were team players who always tried to do the right thing.”
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In a study of hierarchies of masculinities in the US Navy that did not include the SEALS, Barrett
(1996:140) stated, “There is a contradiction between the masculine display of rugged
individualism/autonomy and the subordination and surveillance to which all military personnel
are subject.” The cultural pillar of relative autonomy and disregard for authority (for a military
unit) sets SEAL Team Six apart from this tension. Masculinities are evolving, developed through
practices. Therefore emphasis on elite brotherhood unencumbered by chain of command, forged
through beer, further solidifies the SEALs place atop the hierarchies of naval masculinities and
allows Team Six, at least in the cultural imagination of aficionados, to embody American white
hegemonic masculinity.

Peter Bergen writes for CNN.com about two other people whose characters and charismatic
personalities influenced the institutional culture of JSOC and Team Six. First, of the second
foundational figure, he writes,
It was [General Stanley] McChrystal who took the special operations Ferrari out
of the garage and drove it to become a killing machine of unprecedented agility
and ferocity. JSOC went from mounting half a dozen operations a month in Iraq
in the spring of 2004 to 300 a month by the summer of 2006. It was McChrystal's
five-year command of JSOC between 2003 and 2008 that helped turn its core
components of SEAL Team 6 and Delta into what is arguably the most agile and
deadly force in history
(Bergen, CNN.com, October 7, 2013).
In his book Manhunt, Bergen (2012:153) elaborates that McChrysal said, “Special Operations
had to go from being just ‘a bookseller to being Amazon.com.’” In addition to growing JSOC,
McChrystal also “harnessed technology to transform JSOC’s operations” (Bergen 2012:154). For
example,
Through the aggressive and early adoption of video teleconferences, McChrystal
tied together JSOC’s far-flung operations…The natural tendency of the
intelligence community is to hoard information. McChystal made his teams share
intelligence, creating a JSOC intranet that everyone in the command could access,
and he teamed with an obscure military intelligence unit in Washington, the
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National Media Exploitation Center, to turn the large volume of paper, CDs,
thumb drives, computers, and other ‘pocket litter’ that his operations were picking
up on the battlefield into ‘actionable intelligence’” (Bergen 2012:154-155).
McChrystal certainly embodies, and some would say flaunts, Marcinko’s brand of irreverent
“badass” masculinity. Of the infamous 2010 Rolling Stones interview that led to his ouster from
Commander of US Forces, Afghanistan, Doyle (Doyle, The Guardian, June 24, 2010) writes
McChrystal, Hastings [the Rolling Stone interviewer] makes clear, fashioned
himself a “bad-ass” early on in life. At the military academy he attended, he
cultivated the art of insubordination, and was rewarded for it: when he got 100
hours of demerits, his classmates applauded him as a “century man.” In the Bush
administration, his willingness to go rogue in the name of accomplishing his
objectives, and his commitment to ignoring niceties like the chain of command,
the truth (he was accused of involvement in the cover-up of a friendly fire
incident) or the rules of engagement (he was connected to a prisoner-abuse
scandal) were likewise rewarded. He was not disciplined; he was given
Afghanistan. And when he had Afghanistan, and found that the new president
didn't agree unreservedly with his ideas about what to do there, well: it was time
to be insubordinate again. Time to go rogue in the name of the mission. Time to
leak reports and twist the president's arm publicly; time to badmouth the
administration to the press; time to be a bad-ass. One imagines that McChrystal
saw himself as something akin to the heroes of the military-suspense potboilers he
wrote at school; he was Harrison Ford in the climactic scene where he confronts
the weak and quivering president and tells him that this! Is what has! To be done!
In addition, though, McChrystal contributes the dimension of “masculinity as technical
rationality” (Barrett 1996:138) with his command over technology. Despite being an army
general, this is essential to the construction of SEAL Team Six masculinities: as the tip of the
spear, they are charged with technological and tactical innovation and testing, a topic I return to
later in the chapter.

Bergen, in his aforementioned piece for CNN.com, also describes the architect of the bin Laden
raid, Vice Admiral William McRaven, then-commander of JSOC, the third foundational figure:
McRaven is a strapping, dark-haired, blue-eyed Texan in his mid-50s. In
conversation as he chugs a Rip It – a heavily caffeinated beverage popular with
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American soldiers in Afghanistan – he speaks in well thought-out paragraphs, but
he also peppers his speech with the occasional “doggone,” as well as other, more
robust swear words. A battle-hardened colleague says McRaven reminds him of
the comic book superhero Captain America, while another says he “is reputed to
be the smartest SEAL that ever lived. He is physically tough, compassionate and
can drive a knife through your ribs in a nanosecond.” Even as a three-star admiral,
about once a month in Afghanistan, McRaven went out with his teams on snatchand-grab missions (Bergen, CNN.com, October 7, 2013).
Scahill (2013:281), through interviews with a Special Ops source who worked on Horn of Africa
policy, suggests President Obama
embraced the Special Ops leaders, particularly Admiral McRaven. His time at the
White House in the early stages of the Global War on Terror “taught him how to
anticipate policymakers’ needs and desires, so JSOC was always ahead of the
curve, they always had the perfect policy prescription for the White
House”…JSOC “knew what they were gonna be asked to do before they were
asked. That’s key. This is why McRaven is a pivotal figure – he bridges those
worlds.”
After Abbottabad, Obama told the team of SEALs, “You are, literally, the finest small-fighting
force that has ever existed in the world” (Schmilde, The New Yorker, August 8, 2011). However,
Obama’s interest in McRaven, he readily admits, stems from his admiration of him as an
individual, because of his persona, referring to him as “one cool customer,” (NBC, Rock Center
with Brian Williams, December 27, 2012).

Mark Bowden (2012), in The Finish, introduces reader to the various characters involved with
the bin Laden raid through narratives about their experiences on the morning of September 11,
2001. Of McRaven he writes,
In San Diego, Bill McRaven watched from a hospital bed in his home…Even flat
on his back, the Navy SEAL captain had a distinct military bearing. His tall body
was lean and muscular. His buzz cut drew defiant attention to his jug ears, and the
upper and lower halves of his face were slightly askew, which set his long jaw at
a slight jutting angle that asserted resolve. Lately, Captain McRaven hadn’t been
doing much of anything beyond easing himself from hospital bed to wheelchair
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and back again. It was a humbling debility for someone so physical…Two months
earlier he’d had a terrifying parachute accident, free-falling 10,000 feet before
colliding with the opened chute of another jumper. Violently spinning and only
half-conscious, he had managed to pull his rip cord, saving his life, but with one
leg tangled in the chute’s cords and the other in its risers, the force of the opening
chute had nearly torn him in two, cracking his pelvis, breaking his back, and
tearing away muscle from his stomach wall (Bowden 2012:21).
McRaven came back from this injury to lead JSOC and then United States Special Operations
Command, of which JSOC is one component. Matt Bissonnette, in his memoir as “Mark Owen”
(2012:176), wrote of his admiration:
McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations
community, including DEVGRU. He impressed me. McRaven, the three-star
admiral atop the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), was tall, lean, and
clean-cut. Most admirals look old or out of shape, but McRaven looked like he
could still get the job done. He knew how to work his level and had a good handle
on the politics in DC.
McRaven, then, contributes a “masculinity of enduring hardship and calmly demonstrating
competence in the face of pressure,” (Barrett 1996:136) as compared the Marcinko’s and
McChrystal’s rogue masculinities. Marcinko’s and McChrystal’s “maverick” styles created the
image of agential, bearded, long-haired commandos in t-shirts, rather than clean-cut infantrymen
following orders. McRaven brings together “well thought-out” paragraphs with everyman
cursing to embody the charismatic authority of kings and chiefs who rode with the enlisted to
battle. With these embodiments of classic, gallant, white hegemonic masculinity the Navy SEAL
brand was born.

And it is a white institutional masculinity. USA Today reported:
Many of the Pentagon's elite commando units – including the Navy SEALs – are
overwhelmingly led and manned by white officers and enlisted troops… Black
officers and enlisted troops are scarce in some special operations units in highest
demand, according to data provided by the Pentagon to USA Today. For instance,
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eight of 753 SEAL officers are black, or 1%...In general, the military has a much
more diverse force than key components such as special operations. African
Americans made up 17% of the 1.3 million-member armed forces in 2013,
according to a recent Pentagon report...The diversity of special operating forces is
closely held information. U.S. Special Operations Command, which oversees all
the services’ commandos, declined to provide data on the racial makeup of its
forces. USA Today had to obtain that data from each service individually, a
process that took months… For the SEALs, the problem extends beyond the
officer corps into the enlisted ranks. Of its enlisted men, 45 SEALs are black, or
about 2% of the 2,242 members of its elite force. There are more SEALs – 99, or
4% of the enlisted force – who are Native Americans or Alaska natives. (Vanden
Brook, USA Today, August 5, 2015)
Surpassing “recruiting posters that seek ‘a few good men,’ popular media images of John Wayne
fearlessly leading the troops in a World War II battle, Tom Cruise as a ‘top gun’ pilot, or
Sylvester Stallone as Rambo single-handedly rescuing American prisoners of war” (Barrett
1996:129), SEAL Team Six epitomizes militarized masculinity. They bring to mind an image of
masculinity, perpetuated “throughout all communities in the Navy,” which “involves physical
toughness, the endurance of hardships, aggressiveness, a rugged heterosexuality, unemotional
logic, and a refusal to complain.” (Barrett 1996:132).

When Scahill (2013:52) asked General Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff under Clinton, to describe what differentiates SEAL Team Six from other military units, he
answered, “They are a surgical type of unit. They are not to be used to assault a fortress or
anything – that’s what the army and the Marine Corps does. But if you need someone that can
skydive from thirty miles away, and go down the chimney of the castle, and blow it up from the
inside – those are the guys you want to call on.” With a description like that from a high-ranking
official, it is no surprise that SEAL Team Six’s terrorist hunters have become the stuff of legend.

The Rise of Navy SEALs in American Popular Culture
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Right after President Obama announced that the United States had killed Osama bin Laden,
reporters and anchors assumed most of the details would remain a mystery. For example, Landler
wrote for the New York Times five days after the raid, “They are the shadowy warriors of the raid
that killed Osama bin Laden: two dozen members of the Navy Seals who stormed the fortified
compound in Pakistan where Bin Laden was hiding. Their identities will probably never be
known; their faces will most likely never appear in photographs at the White House, on
magazine covers or on television talk shows” (Landler, New York Times, May 7, 2011).

While there was some cultural fascination with the elite SEALs before 9/11 – the film Navy
SEALs starring Charlie Sheen was released in 1990 and Demi Moore’s GI Jane was released
1997 – it was primarily military members and aficionados who knew anything about the Navy
SEALs let alone SEAL Team Six. “SEAL Team 6” is now a brand. A 2015 New York Times
exposé, “SEAL Team 6: A Secret History of Quiet Killings and Blurred Lines,” coauthored by
five major investigative journalists with the support of six others, notes, “Team 6’s role in the
2011 Bin Laden raid spawned a cottage industry of books and documentaries” (Mazzetti et al.,
New York Times, June 7, 2015). In addition to the SEAL-authored tell-all books and a slew of
documentaries and news specials about the raid, there are many movies, television shows, and
books about SEAL culture and other missions, there are camps where one can re-enact the bin
Laden raid and train like a SEAL, drawing upon the referent image of the SEAL’s mental
prowess over months of nearly impossible physical training. Navy SEALs consult on video
games that depict their missions (e.g. most notably, Medal of Honor: Warfighter), appear on talk
shows, and have become increasingly involved in politics, including Missouri governor Eric
Greitens and former Congressperson and United States Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke. In
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a television remake of the film series Lethal Weapon, the protagonist Martin Riggs, who was a
Green Beret when played by Mel Gibson in the 1980s, is an ex-Navy SEAL in the reboot. The
Navy SEALs are the current stock, iconic military character, as the Green Berets were in the
post-Vietnam era. The Navy SEALs are a household name and they are everywhere.

Though surprising due to the highly classified nature of their missions and silence and
commitment to “quiet professionalism” before the bin Laden raid, it is predictable that the hunt is
told from the perspective of the hunter. As the Ewe-mina proverb says, “Until lions write their
own history, the tale of the hunt will always glorify the hunter.” Adagba explains, “Even though
people celebrate their stories, they are also aware that they will never know all that goes on in the
forest…” (Adagba 2006) The hunters’ speaking part in the narrative about the hunt can obfuscate
the truth since there are so many details available, but not from all sides. More, it interjects
hunters’ perceptions about their work and social roles into popular culture and thereby the sensemaking processes of individuals.

In the case of the Navy SEAL “hunters,” they literally narrate the story. Navy SEALs have
published memoirs about their personal stories and processes (i.e. Warrior Elite (2003) by Dick
Couch, Warrior Soul (2004) by Chuck Pfarrer, SEAL Team Six (2011) by Howard Wasdin and
Stephen Templin, American Sniper (2013) by Chris Kyle, The Red Circle (2014) by Brandon
Webb, and Damn Few (2014) by Rorke Denver), as well as accounts of particular battles, usually
honoring fallen brothers, such as Eric Blehm’s The Only Thing Worth Dying For (2011) and
Fearless (2012), Gary Williams’ SEAL of Honor/Heart of a Lion (2011), Marcus Luttrell’s Lone
Survivor (2013), and Rusty Bradley’s Lions of Kandahar (2014). In fact, an entire book and film
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genre, exemplified in Luttrell’s Lone Survivor, has emerged in which US special forces are
isolated in dangerous terrain, hunting down terrorists, resulting in a project that both humanizes
the hunters through flashbacks and emotional backstories, as well as to projects American
cultural values through the actions and choices of the heroes.

SEALs Chuck Pfarrer (SEAL Target Geronimo (2011)), Matt Bissonnette under the pseudonym
Mark Owen (No Easy Day (2012)), and Robert O’Neill (The Operator (2017)) all published
accounts of the bin Laden raid. Of this phenomenon O’Neill (2017:644) wrote, “The fascination
with who we were and what we’d just done exploded all around us.” In addition to these books
and the documentaries about the raid, since 2011, the profile of US Navy SEALs and their
perspectives have been elevated through the production of feature films about their missions.
Every year since the bin Laden raid there has been at least one Hollywood film about SEAL
missions. From dramatized accounts of the bin Laden hunt and raid (Zero Dark Thirty (2012)
and National Geographic Channel’s SEAL Team Six (2012)) to Act of Valor (2012), a Hollywood
blockbuster starring real Navy SEALs that began as a Navy recruitment film, Captain Phillips
(2013) about the American captain abducted by Somali pirates in 2009, the film versions of
Luttrell’s Lone Survivor (2013) starring Mark Wahlberg and Kyle’s American Sniper (2014)
starring Bradley Cooper, a new installment of the Behind Enemy Lines franchise, SEAL Team 8:
Behind Enemy Lines (2014), and 13 Hours (2016) about the 2012 violence in Benghazi, Libya,
the action film genre has also been heavily influenced by the special ops aesthetic.

Many new television programs follow the sordid personal lives of law enforcement and military
investigators and analysts who hunt down terrorists, including The History Channel’s jingoistic
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Six about SEAL Team 6 (January 2017). The Fall 2017 prime time American network television
lineup includes three new shows that center on SEAL teams: CBS’s SEAL Team, NBC’s The
Brave, and the CW’s Valor. These TV shows have come to replace the ubiquitous police
procedural of the 1990s and 2000s. NBC’s The Brave does not shy away from making this
cultural shift explicit. Its pilot begins, “The defense of the United States and its citizens relies
increasingly on two groups. The intelligence analysts in Washington, who uncover and interpret
threats. And the Special Forces operators tasked with eliminating them,” practically calling out
to be compared to the famous opening of Law & Order, “In the criminal justice system, the
people are represented by two separate yet equally important groups: The police, who investigate
crime, and the district attorneys, who prosecute the offenders. These are their stories.”

Appearances on television comedy talk shows help audiences feel like they are getting to know
the SEALs who are presenting an image that is not only more “heroic” than anyone viewers
likely know personally, but also quite likable to some, embodying a classic expression of “good
ol’ boy” white American masculinity. For example, Chris Kyle, famous for being the most lethal
sniper in American history who once made a shot from 2,100 yards, humbly referred to himself
as a “monkey with a gun” and let comedian Conan O’Brien heckle him about how he was
somehow less because he was “only” on SEAL Team 3 and never trained or tried out for SEAL
Team 6. On a more serious note, SEAL Marcus Luttrell was a public proponent of Rick Perry’s
presidential run and was later invited to speak at the 2016 Republican National Convention. He
leveraged his credibility to warn “the next generation,” among the 25.2 million viewers
(Huddleston, Fortune.com, July 29, 2016) that their “war is now.” He continued, “your people
are afraid…who among you will love something more than you love yourself?...The world
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outside of our borders is a dark place, a scary place. America is the light. And her people are the
goodness that grows from that” (CNN.com, July 18, 2016).

In addition to these media, SEALs also penetrate American popular culture with opportunities to
physically train, act, and be like SEALs. The New York Times reported on a role-playing range
where for $325 individuals could experience “two hours of Navy SEAL training and a chance to
re-enact the military raid on Bin Laden’s three-story compound” (Yaccino, New York Times,
September 15, 2012).
The night started with firearm instruction and a mock intelligence briefing – a
presentation of maps and 3-D models based on public information about the raid.
A yoga class was still meeting in another room nearby as the group practiced
rounding a corner and firing at cardboard pictures of Bin Laden in one of the
facility’s two shooting galleries. One by one, the participants later crept through a
dark alcove in the scenario room and toward the terrorist’s bedroom as a
soundtrack of gunfire and helicopters pounded through speakers. Some shot wide
and forgot what few commands they had just learned as a screaming Bin Laden
fired blanks at them from a modified Glock 17 handgun before he collapsed on
the ground (Yaccino, New York Times, September 15, 2012).
The owner, Mr. Yatch, justified the re-enactment on the basis of the universality of heroes and
villains. On one hand, “you can’t offend someone if you’re shooting the devil, Hitler or Bin
Laden” whereas if he “had invented a fictional ‘bad guy’ from the Middle East for the scenario it
could have been viewed as anti-Muslim.” On the other hand, “everyone is a superhero in their
mind. We watch the news and think we would have done X or we would have done Y. The
reality is you wouldn’t unless you were trained” (Yaccino, New York Times, September 15,
2012).

Former SEAL Mark Divine’s training camp and podcast advise:
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Being SEALFIT is more than just a sculpted physique; it is a way of life, state of
mind and a way of orienting oneself in the world. To be SEALFIT is to embody
the character traits of discipline, drive, determination, service, self-mastery,
honor, integrity, courage and authentic leadership. We develop warriors of all
walks of life in elite-level fitness, awareness, durability and longevity. We thrive
on cultivating the “Kokoro” (warrior) spirit in our clients, helping them be
unbeatable in life. We specialize in developing the whole person: elite
athleticism, durability and mental toughness, emotional control and sense
development and, perhaps most important, spiritual strength (Navyseals.com).63
As viewers of television or film or as participants in video games, re-enactments, and training
camps, everyday individuals have the opportunity to not only admire, but also live vicariously
through SEAL masculinity.

Participating in the authorized discourse as narrators is not universally glorified. In fact, for some
it has presented serious problems. Matt Bissonnette was the first team member present at the bin
Laden raid to write about it. His work as “Mark Owen” became an instant bestseller, popular
with a broad audience, but the Defense Department and the SEAL community condemned the
book. Although 60 Minutes reminded audiences “Owen told us, in his only interview, that No
Easy Day is not about him. He says it’s a tribute to the hundreds of Americans who gathered
intelligence, planned and trained in the 10-year pursuit of the world’s most wanted man. SEAL
Team Six, he told us, just took care of the last 40 minutes,” (CBS, 60 Minutes, September 11,
2012) it has largely been received within the SEAL community as unnecessary boasting that
undermines the ethos of “quiet professionalism.”

In a New York Times’ piece entitled, “Navy SEALs Trade Secrecy for Swagger,” Clines quotes a
letter to SEALs by Rear Admiral Brian Losey, the head of the Naval Warfare Special Command,
63

Kokoro, Japanese for heart, or more specifically a strong connection between mind, body, and spirit, and not
warrior, is a notable appropriation given the ways the Japanese were dehumanized as political and military
adversaries.
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stating, “we do not abide willful or selfish disregard for our core values in return for public
notoriety and financial gain…Hard work undertaken with little individual public credit is the
nature of a true SEAL” (Clines, New York Times, November 6, 2014). In Bissonnette’s case, his
unapproved manuscript was so beyond the scope of acceptability the Navy won a suit ordering
him to pay back $6.6 million in royalties (Baldor, USA Today, August 20, 2016). Robert O’Neill
cleared his manuscript and will not face the same penalty, but he spends quite a bit of time at the
end of the 2017 book complaining about the treatment he faced after people saw the 2014 Fox
News documentary about him and heard he was writing a book.

While there are many former and active duty SEALs who object to the disclosure of details about
SEAL training, missions, and experiences on the basis that the SEAL-related products in popular
culture do not portray SEALs accurately, the pervasiveness of the narrations produce a referent
image that has contributed to shaping the broader militarized aesthetic of American culture in the
2010s. These objections have two sides. On one hand, this anger from the SEAL community
maintains the SEAL brand – the vast majority still get credit for being quiet professionals – but
at the same time, the hegemony maintenance project benefits as the public devours SEAL
cultural products that glorify their missions and the broader military aesthetic they represent.

Special Ops Masculinity and Hunters as Agents of Hegemony
With such a prominent role in public discourse, SEALs are agents of cultural hegemony in three
distinct dimensions. First, SEALs, through their role as narrators, are “weavers of the fabric of
hegemony” (Gramsci 2010). Alongside other “organizing intellectuals,” from priests and
teachers to filmmakers and novelists, from famous athletes and small town coaches to advertisers
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and journalists, SEALs’ omnipresence in popular culture has the capacity to “regulate and
manage gender regimes” (Donaldson 1993:645). Popular cultural representations of SEAL Team
Six extend the embodiment of American “special ops” masculinity to civilians.

“Special Ops” masculinity is omnipresent in American culture in the 2010s. From television
shows and movies to video games and comic books, from extraordinarily detailed children’s
action figures to SEAL memoirs about their boyhoods, there is no doubt a unique aesthetic for a
newly popularized elite, militarized masculinity abounds.

Figure 9
Compare a 2018 action figure for the History Channel’s Navy SEAL series, Six, left, to NAVY SAILOR action
figure MILITARY ONE Vintage 1982 Porto Play, right
Source: ebay.com

A particular photo of an anonymous SEAL Team Six member in Iraq, Figure 10, was widely
circulated in media about the team, capturing the aesthetic.64 From the race and physique to the
tattoos and the gear, this photo captures the idealized masculinity of US Special Forces, most
commonly described as “swagger.”

64

A “tin eye reverse image search” turns up 129 unique hits of 27.1 billion images.
https://tineye.com/search/d9d4b471aab9eb46fe90b6977919f7e495955a0c/?page=1&sort=score&order=des
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Figure 10
Original New York Times caption: “A seal member preparing to capture top insurgents in 2007 near Fallujah, Iraq. Members of
Team 6 are the elite of the elite” (Bumiller, New York Times, May 5, 2011)

American culture is historically militaristic. Without exaggeration, there are only a few years in
its nearly 250-year history when the United States has not been at war, domestically or
internationally. 65 What is notable about American militarism comes from its emphasis on
individualism. During settler colonialism, “every settler was a solider” (Dunbar-Ortiz,
Intercepted, February 28, 2018); settlers, not the state military, organized themselves to take over
the whole continent and slave patrols were self-organized militias of white men who believed
they had individual obligations to keep watch for and turn in “renegades,” any black people they
came across who did not have permits to wander freely.

It is also essential to note the role of popular culture and civilian veneration of the SEALs in the
perpetuation of a distinctly militaristic American culture.66 US Naval College historian Aaron B.
O’Connell wrote in a New York Times editorial in 2012:

65

225 years of its 242 year history: https://www.globalresearch.ca/america-has-been-at-war-93-of-the-time-222-outof-239-years-since-1776/5565946
66
According to Marcus Schulzke (2018:5-6), “Militarism and militarization are distinct, though closely related,
concepts. I use the term militarism to refer to a belief system characterized by uncritical enthusiasm for the military,
which is linked to nationalism and a desire to use military force to secure foreign policy objectives. Militarization is
a process. It is characterized by the spread of military influence or values into domains that are thought to constitute
a separate civil sphere. Enloe says that ‘Militarization is a step-by-step process by which a person or a thing
gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well-being on militaristic ideas’” (Enloe
2000:3 qtd in Schulzke 2018:6).
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But Eisenhower’s least heeded warning — concerning the spiritual effects of
permanent preparations for war — is more important now than ever. Our culture
has militarized considerably since Eisenhower’s era, and civilians, not the armed
services, have been the principal cause. From lawmakers’ constant use of
“support our troops” to justify defense spending, to TV programs and video
games like “NCIS,” “Homeland” and “Call of Duty,” to NBC’s shameful and
unreal reality show “Stars Earn Stripes,” Americans are subjected to a daily diet
of stories that valorize the military while the storytellers pursue their own
opportunistic political and commercial agendas. Of course, veterans should be
thanked for serving their country, as should police officers, emergency workers
and teachers. But no institution — particularly one financed by the taxpayers —
should be immune from thoughtful criticism
(O’Connell, New York Times, November 4, 2012).
Further, as Martin and Steuter (2010:12) argue, “Militaristic culture and policy, once it gets on a
roll, can create an audience that wants more militaristic culture and policy.” “Militarization,”
adds Marcus Schulzke (2017:11), “may therefore be a self-perpetuating process that is difficult
to escape.”

“Special Ops” masculinity is so immune to thoughtful criticism, in part, because of the strength
of the historical legacy of American sheepdog masculinity, discussed in the next section. In brief,
like other constructions of masculine protectors, these “all-American” boys who were
transformed into warrior elite after their years of training, were activated in the name of suffering
victims to use legitimate violence as the agents of righteous retaliation. From “the AngloAmerican settlers’ violent break from Britain in the late eighteenth century,” (Dunbar-Ortiz
2018:41) to “their search-and-destroy annihilation of Delaware, Cherokee, Muskogee, Seneca,
Mohawk, Shawnee, and Miami during which they slaughtered families without distinction of age
or gender, and expanded the boundaries of the thirteen colonies into unceded Native territories,”
(Dunbar-Ortiz 2018:41), from the “black people escaping to freedom [who] were hunted down to
prevent labor loss to their white slavers,” (Dunbar-Ortiz 2018:83) to “the colonists’ savage
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violence across the continent that continued until the twentieth century, and the legacies of
African slavery through such practices as convict leasing, legal segregation, rampant institutional
racism, discrimination, police killings, mass surveillance, criminalization, and incarceration”
(Dunbar-Ortiz 2018:131-132), it has taken indefatigable cultural work to reconcile America’s
self-professed “democracy, equality, and equal rights” with this legacy of “genocide, settler
colonialism, slavery, and empire” (Dunbar-Ortiz 2018:133).

This cultural work relies on the resonance of a chivalrous masculine protector, guided by his
morals and his loyalty to his community against feral wolves, evil to their core, who, by contrast,
use violence maliciously against their own pack and the sheep alike. From those who ambushed
indigenous families in the name of protecting white people and property to those who mobbed
together to find black men to lynch in the name of protecting white women’s sexual purity, from
the brutality of targeted policing of communities of color to the Navy SEALs during the raid on
the bin Laden compound, in the name of American security in general and 9/11 families in
particular, the hunters are venerated as representatives of civilized, moral, surgical, defensive
violence in contrast to the primitive, immoral, offensive violence of the “wolves.” This allpervading narrative of “the good guy with a gun” quells cognitive dissonance over militarism to
combat violence.

However, it is also something new. After playing video games and watching television and
movies where SEALs hunt down terrorists, reading their memoirs about their upbringing,
training, and views on violence, and even engaging in live role play boys and young men have a
model of a super-human, super-violent, nearly invincible masculinity to live up to where the
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emphasis on righteous violence is overt and extreme. A real man can carry his body weight over
again in gear while holding his breath under water for 8 minutes before ultimately killing
multiple people with near-perfect efficiency and accuracy. I will discuss the implications of this
construction of masculinity in conjunction with the availability of increasingly deadly weapons
in the United States in the conclusion that follows. Importantly, “The public face of hegemonic
masculinity…is not necessarily even what powerful men are, but it is what sustains their power,
and it is what motivates large numbers of men to support it because it benefits them. What most
men support is not necessarily what they are” (Donaldson 1993:645).

Second, the SEALs represent the United States in its hegemonic force projection globally. Even
before the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush indicated his hopes to shift “U.S. force projection” to
elite units who must be “agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical
support” (Bush on the campaign trail in 1999, qtd Schahill 2013:9). Scahill (2013:9) asserts the
intention of the shift to small, elite team raids was to give “the executive branch of the U.S.
government unprecedented power to wage secret wars [and] conduct covert operations with no
oversight.” Shortly after 9/11, the Bush administration was able to begin the process to make this
intention a reality. Bergen (2012:151-152) writes,
In a sign of where [former Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld wanted to take the
military, in the summer of 2003 he took the unprecedented step of asking [Special
Operations boss] General Schoomaker to come out of retirement to become
chairman of the Joint Chiefs [“The collective body of the JCS is headed by the
Chairman, the principal military adviser to the President, Secretary of Defense,
and the National Security Council” (http://www.jcs.mil/About/)]. And on
September 6, 2003, Rumsfeld signed an eighty-page order that empowered JSOC
to hunt al Qaeda in as many as fifteen countries…In the decade after 9/11, JSOC
mushroomed from a force of eighteen hundred to four thousand, becoming a
small army within the military. It had its own drones, its own air force, and its
own intelligence operations.

255

According to USA Today, “Special operations forces, including SEALs and the Army's Green
Berets, are often the face of the American military in foreign hot spots where they rescue
hostages, raid terrorist camps and train local troops” (Vanden Brook, USA Today, August 6,
2015). In the case of the bin Laden raid, many state agents seemed to delight in the idea that this
image of American force projection was the last thing Osama bin Laden saw before he died.
Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) said jubilantly, “The last thing Osama bin Laden saw on
this earth was a small team of Americans who shot him” (qtd on NBC Nightly News, May 2,
2011) In a CNN special five years after the raid, Peter Bergen said to Admiral McRaven in an
interview, “as a SEAL yourself, you know, you must have satisfaction to know that the last thing
he saw on this earth was a SEAL.” McRaven responded, “Well, I'm sure he probably didn't know
it was a SEAL, which was fine by us. But I think probably more importantly is the last thing he
saw was an American. That's what's important” (CNN, We Got Him, May 1, 2016). To the same
comment from Bergen, Obama responded, “Hopefully, at that moment, he understood that the
American people hadn't forgotten the some 3,000 people who he had killed” (CNN, We Got Him,
May 1, 2016).

Finally, SEAL Team Six also arguably holds a hegemonic position within the military as
demonstrated by the lack of oversight and accountability as possible war crimes are brought to
light. In 2015 The New York Times released the first exposé, but it is The Intercept, a news outlet
that considers itself outside of authorized, mainstream political discourse, that offers the only indepth insight to date into the extent of the violence and impunity.
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Investigative journalist Matthew Cole (The Intercept, January 10, 2017), in his 80-page report
published in The Intercept in January 2017, describes Team Six’s “cascade of extraordinary
violence” attributing it to several causes. For one, he states, it is, in part, that
the unit’s elite stature has insulated its members from the scrutiny and military
justice that lesser units would have faced for the same actions…As the legend of
SEAL Team 6 grew, a rogue culture arose that operated outside of the Navy’s
established mechanisms for command and investigation. Parts of SEAL Team 6
began acting with an air of impunity that disturbed observers within the
command.
More specifically, he argues, “One result of the growth was that back in Virginia, the captain in
command of the entire 300-SEAL force had far less oversight over tactical battlefield decisions”
(Cole, The Intercept, January 10, 2017). In regards to a particularly violent incident, he added,
In what would become part of a pattern of secrecy and silence, the SEAL
operators dealt with the issue on their own and kept the incident from their chain
of command. “The SEALs believe that they can handle the discipline
themselves, that’s equal to or greater than what the criminal justice system
would give to the person,” said Susan Raser, a retired Naval Criminal
Investigative Service agent who led the agency’s criminal division but did not
investigate this mission. “They have an internal process that they think is
sufficient and they are not inclined to cooperate unless they absolutely have to.”
Raser, who conducted investigations into both regular SEAL units and SEAL
Team 6, said that in her experience, SEALs simply didn’t report wrongdoing by
their teammates...One clear sign that all was not right with the command was the
way sadism crept into the SEALs’ practices, with no apparent
consequences…Operators began taunting dying insurgents on videos [one SEAL]
shot as part of his post-operation responsibilities. These “bleed out” videos were
replayed on multiple occasions at Bagram Air Base. The operator who made
them, a former SEAL leader said, would gather other members of Red Squadron
to watch the last few seconds of an enemy fighter’s life. “It was war porn,” said
the former SEAL, who viewed one of the videos. “No one would do anything
about them.” The operator who made the bleed-out videos was forced out of
SEAL Team 6 the following year after a drunken episode at Bagram in which he
pistol-whipped another SEAL… Senior members of SEAL Team 6 felt the pattern
of brutality was not only illegal but rose to the level of war crimes (The Intercept,
January 10, 2017).
Somehow, the state and the public largely rationalize this extreme violence. In fact, “The Trump
administration is relying on Special Operations forces to intensify its promised fight against the
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Islamic State and other terrorist groups as senior officials embrace an Obama-era strategy to
minimize the American military’s footprint overseas” (Schmitt, New York Times, March 19,
2017). What is more, “In Africa, President Trump is expected to soon approve a Pentagon
proposal to remove constraints on Special Operations airstrikes and raids in parts of Somalia to
target suspected militants with the Shabab, an extremist group linked to Al Qaeda” (Schmitt,
New York Times, March 19, 2017). While SEALs perform hundreds of raids per month with
decreased oversight, they remain decidedly heroic in narrations about their overall actions across
the authorized discourse. To better understand the cultural work that maintains this image, their
actions and traits must be placed within the broader context of American culture in the 2010s.

The Heroic Side of the Binary: SEAL Team Six as Cultural Window
If as Cole (The Intercept, January 10, 2017) writes, “No single military unit has come to
represent American military success or heroism more than SEAL Team 6,” what specific
character traits, values, behaviors, and historical legacies construct this image? While the
authorized discourse structures attention toward the ways bin Laden is from another world – an
unimaginably rich Saudi Muslim who writes meandering Islamic poetry to express grievances –
SEALs are “all-American;” mostly self-professed gun-toting white, Christian, athletic, simple,
modest, direct and honest, hardworking family men who write in crisp declarative sentences.
Although their origin stories make them seem familiar, they are unquestionably elite. However,
while bin Laden’s privilege is unearned, the authorized discourse centers the dedication it takes
to accomplish becoming a SEAL in general, a member of Team 6 in particular.
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The authorized discourse focuses on the illegitimacy of bin Laden’s grievances and tactics, while
it circulates the SEAL ethos that draws upon American moral codes surrounding their humble,
anonymous defense. Even when admitting how routinely night raids include extreme violence
(e.g. Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015), the authorized discourse continuously
constructs SEAL violence as a last resort, absolutely necessary to protect the American way of
life. The SEALs are just fighting back, where bin Laden has limitless, active hostility toward
American values. While the effectiveness of bin Laden’s use of violence is evidence of his
barbarity, the efficiency with which SEAL Team Six uses violence is respectable.

The constructions of SEAL violence as righteous are part of the larger pattern of binary
descriptions developed throughout the dissertation: terrorists are retrogressive, wanting to return
to the seventh century, while Americans are innovative and progressive, especially the SEALs
whose central task is to develop warfare; terrorists have stark, rigid beliefs, while American
armed forces have nuanced discretion; terrorists have no rules of engagement, and American
armed forces have a chain of command that prioritizes minimization of civilian causalities;
SEALs are the hunters, and bin Laden is animal prey. Above all, SEAL use of force draws upon
the deeply entrenched American image of white men protecting their families, property, and way
of life from indigenous groups at the “frontier,” free and enslaved black people, immigrants and
external “threats,” and roaming criminals.

All-American Boys
Fictional and non-fiction accounts about SEALs present origin stories that highlight characters’
“all-American” roots. According to the Fox News documentary about Robert O’Neill produced
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shortly after he came forward as the “shooter” during the bin Laden raid, he had a “normal”
American childhood, growing up in Butte, Montana. The narrator states, “And soon the boy from
Butte, MT, who one year before had been delivering taco pizzas, was a Navy SEAL sniper” (Fox
News Documentaries, November 11, 2014). O’Neill (2017:642, emphasis in original), himself,
expresses his surprise that his small-town American roots had led to Abbottabad in his book,
stating, “As I heard [Obama] say Osama bin Laden, I turned my head from the TV and looked at
Osama bin Laden. I thought, How the fuck did I get here from Butte, Montana?”

When Durkheim (1915) wrote about the sacred and the profane in Elementary Forms of
Religious Life, he formulated the binary differently than contemporary cultural sociologists’
iteration, discussed in Chapter 1. The sacred represented any marked or special categories, good
or evil. The profane referred to the mundane, unmarked categories that go unnoticed. His interest
was in the rituals that separated the two. In this formulation, bin Laden is the sacred character,
marked as especially evil. The previous chapter details the many ways American society marked
his difference. The SEAL cultural products reinforce the ordinary American backgrounds of the
SEALs. O’Neill is the opposite of bin Laden, not because he is the perfect moral hero, but rather
a “regular white guy” from Anytown, USA. It could be you.

Chris Kyle (2013:14) begins his memoir American Sniper by sharing some of the north-central
Texan cultural values that he, as a SEAL, holds dear:
I grew up in small towns where I learned the importance of family and traditional
values, like patriotism, self-reliance, and watching out for your family and
neighbors. I’m proud to say that I still try to live my life according to those
values. I have a strong sense of justice. It’s pretty much black-and-white. I don’t
see too much gray. I think it’s important to protect others. I don’t mind hard
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work…I was raised with, and still believe in, the Christian faith. If I had to order
my priorities, they would be God, Country, Family…I’ve always loved guns,
always loved hunting, and in a way I guess you could say I’ve always been a
cowboy…
Matt Bissonnette had a “simple” childhood hunting with his father in Alaska. His emphasis is on
American gun culture. As “Owen” (2012:32) explains,
I’d pretty much grown up with a gun in my hand during my childhood in Alaska.
My parents never let me play with toy guns because by the time I finished with
elementary school I was carrying a .22 rifle. From an early age, I knew the
responsibility of handling a firearm. For our family, a gun was a tool. “You need
to respect the gun and respect what it can do,” my father told me. He taught me
how to shoot and be safe with my rifle.
Rorke Denver (2013) describes an idyllic childhood in Los Altos, CA, emphasizing focus,
discipline, and brotherhood, Howard Wasdin (2012) grew up in small town Screven, GA
(population 702), and Brandon Webb (2014:17) (begins his story with reverence for his
construction worker father who “on the job, taught himself everything there was to know.” In a
tribute to the late operator Adam Brown, Blehm (2012:34) paints a picture of a classic American
Christmas when describing Brown’s childhood, arguably making him and his experiences
familiar, thereby rendering his death more tragic: “One snowy Sunday morning in December, the
Browns trudged out into the woods and cut down a small evergreen for their living room. They
spent the day making ornaments and strings of popcorn, then decorated its boughs to the smell of
hot cider with cinnamon sticks simmering on the stove. ‘We had pretty much nothing but
homemade gifts that year, but it was so, so much fun…It was lovely. It was…Christmas.”

Act of Valor (2012), the Hollywood-Defense Department collaboration starring SEAL-author
Rorke Denver, is narrated through a letter from a fallen SEAL to his son. In it, he explains the
composition of the platoon as they all sit around a campfire with their families the night before a
major deployment:
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We had Weimy, our sniper, he grew up in the middle of the Mojave desert, most
excitement he had as a kid was bowling frozen turkeys down the aisle at the
grocery store. Ray, our comms guy, our radio man. He grew up in east LA
gangland. Sonny, he was made of granite, this guy didn’t even do push ups
because he was afraid his chest was gonna get too big. Ajay joined the teams late
in his 30’s. He had been a Muay Thai fighter all his life, before that he grew up
dirt poor in Trinidad. Mikey had 20 years in the teams, as humble as he was, you
never even knew it. He kept a picture of his wife in his helmet, and a lock of her
hair in his pocket, quiet as the breeze. And finally, senior chief Miller. Couldn’t
really tell you much about him other than I’d rather take a knife to a gun fight
than have to be interrogated by him.
The casts of CBS’s SEAL Team and NBC’s The Brave are similarly diverse. Given the racial
demographics of real SEAL teams, the racial diversity of the fictional all-American teams is
notable. This trend is a trope. As Nikhil Pal Singh, in conversation with Jeremy Scahill
(Intercepted, February 14, 2018), suggests, “diversification and inclusion is enlisted in the
project of empire.” He explains:
The project of empire clearly once had a very naked, racist face…it was about
white man’s burden, it was about benighted peoples, it was about the inferior
lesser breeds and so forth in the kind of language of, say, the British Empire, or
the American Empire before World War II. But after World War II, you really see
how this notion of a kind of racially inclusive or multicultural imperial machine
begins to develop.
He continued about Hollywood and the multicultural face of empire (Intercepted, February 14,
2018):
I’ll never forget this moment, early in the Iraq War, watching a Frontline episode.
It was almost like one of those episodes from an American war movie where you
see the kind of multicultural platoon out on patrol, it’s like a Latino guy, an
African-American guy, a white guy, and there are some Iraqis in handcuffs by the
side of the road. They had stolen some milk or something…And these three guys
were interrogating, and then, all of a sudden, they say, “Well, because you did
this, we’re going to have to exact a kind of punishment”…And it’s so clearly this
moment of horror for a viewer like me, where these guys are in their own country,
their country under occupation where they’re trying to eke out a living, and here
they are facing retribution from this military machine with a multicultural face.
And it’s become an alibi for the empire, which still operates in its other face with
the notion that it is policing and disciplining an inferior people. So even if the
multicultural and inclusive face has emerged as a form of justification or a

262

legitimation for the American military, there is still always this other side that
constructs the enemy as somehow benighted, inferior, congenitally sort of
constituted as a threatening population.
Each of these images – the small towns, the gun slinging cowboy aesthetic, the Christian values
and rituals, as well as the alibi of the multicultural face – provides an American everyman
binary opposition to the Orientalized, culturally unfamiliar descriptions of bin Laden’s
upbringing, ideology, and lifestyle.

BUD/S and Beyond
According to the official Naval Special Warfare website, “Before becoming Navy SEALs,
candidates are put through some of the most mentally challenging and physically demanding
training in the world. Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training, or BUD/S, is designed to
find and develop those of the strongest character who give everything they have to accomplish
their mission and support those on their team” (Sealswcc.com). Bergen (2012:158) explains:
It is notoriously difficult to become a SEAL. First you have to survive what is
generally regarded as the hardest training in the world. The climax of the brutal
selection process is the aptly named Hell Week, which involves more or less
continuous running, doing push-ups, moving massive logs in teams, swimming
considerable lengths in the cold ocean, and sleeping only a few hours over the
course of the entire week. Other tests include swimming underwater for fifty
yards with your hands tied behind your back and your feet tied together. The
dropout rate is 90 percent. Eric Greitens, a Rhodes scholar with a doctorate from
Oxford who went on to become a lieutenant commander in the SEALs, recalls of
his training, “We had some incredible people come in – high school track stars,
intercollegiate water polo players, international-quality swimmers. And a lot of
them ended up failing. At the same time, we had guys who had trouble on the
runs, guys who had trouble doing push-ups, guys whose teeth would start
chattering just looking at the cold ocean, and yet they made it. And one of the
reasons why they made it is they had this relentless perseverance.” After Hell
Week comes Pool Competency training, in which the SEAL hopefuls swim
underwater with scuba gear and are attacked by instructors who tear off their
mouthpieces and masks and flip off their oxygen tanks. During this test, those
who make the cut have to remain calm and figure out how to reestablish their
lines of the life-giving oxygen while their bodies are desperate for air. “The point
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of all that is you are going to push people as hard as you possibly can. You push
them to their mental, physical, and emotional limit so that when combat happens,
they are ready, says Greitens.
SEALs’ motivation to endure the training it takes to become a SEAL in general and a member of
Team Six in particular reflects American cultural values surrounding hard work and pushing
oneself beyond personal limits, also seen in the fascination with Olympic athletes. Most stories
involve a lifelong desire to reach the apex of physical and mental conditioning required to be a
SEAL. Matt Bissonnette, under pseudonym Mark Owen (2012:ix), explains,
When I was in junior high school in Alaska, we were assigned a book report. We
had to pick a book we liked. Moving down the row of books, I stumbled upon
Men in Green Faces by former SEAL Gene Wentz. The novel chronicled
missions in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. Full of ambushes and firefights, it centered
on the hunt for a rogue North Vietnamese colonel. From page one, I knew I
wanted to be a SEAL. The more I read, the more I wanted to see if I could
measure up. In the surf of the Pacific Ocean during training, I found other men
just like me: men who feared failure and were driven to be the best.
SEAL Brandon Webb (2014:16) treats his quest to become a SEAL like a spiritual rite of
passage:
Every culture has its rites of passage. Native American adolescents journeyed into
the wilderness for days on end in vision quests aimed at gaining life direction
from an animal spirit, or totem, through a fast-induced dream. For Australian
aborigines it was the walkabout, young males trekking the outback for as long as
six months to trace the ceremonial paths, or dreaming tracks, taken by their
ancestors. Mormon boys ages nineteen to twenty-five are sent around the world
for two years to do full-time mission work. For me, it was shorter and simpler.
My rite of passage came when I was thrown off a boat in the middle of the Pacific
Ocean by my dad, a few weeks past my sixteenth birthday. I had to find my own
path home from that oceanic wilderness, and it turned out to be a path that
ultimately led to the most elite sniper corps in the world.
Robert O’Neill told Fox News (Fox News Documentaries, November 11, 2014), “BUD/S puts
recruits through some of the most grueling physical punishment anyone can endure.” The New
York Times’ Bumiller describes Hell Week: “recruits get a total of four hours of sleep during five
and a half days of nonstop running, swimming in the cold surf and rolling in mud” and reports,
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“80 percent of the candidates do not make it; at least one has died” (Bumiller, New York Times,
May 5, 2011). In Dick Couch’s (2003:149) The Warrior Elite, a full-length monograph dedicated
to describing the full training process for one SEAL class, he describes the toll it takes on
recruits’ bodies, “After the first race, it’s obvious that two of the trainees are having difficulties.
One of them is having trouble breathing; the other is throwing up blood. The instructors
outwardly show no sympathy…” The O’Neill documentary’s narrator goes on to explain that
training and trying out for SEAL Team 6 is even more arduous: “They are the best of the best.
The proverbial tip of the spear. Becoming a member, however, is no easy feat,” which O’Neill
then clarifies, “50% of Navy SEALs who try out for SEAL Team Six don’t make it, and that’s
saying something because these are serious dudes” (Fox News Documentaries, November 11,
2014).

Barrett (1996:141) states of military life in general, “Every officer, at some point(s) in his career,
is likely to experience degradation and humiliation that often accompany continual surveillance,
testing, ranking, grueling life conditions, and the constant possibility of failure.” In particular, he
discusses the “culture that chronically creates trials that separate the ‘weak’ from the rest. From
the first day of training, the culture creates a testing ground that creates boundaries of inclusion
around those who exhibit strength, endurance and competence. Passing these early tests is a sign
that one is capable of perseverance and toughness” (Barrett 1996:132). This is particularly true
of SEAL training, where each week each SEAL must submit a list of the top five and bottom five
trainees in the cohort. The bottom five are made public and most often, someone gets cut like a
reality show. Others opt to go home, forced to ring a bell before they exit the training,
succumbing to near constant goading to ring it. Barrett’s (1996:141) “study suggests that their
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investment in masculine discourse is a strategy they employ to compensate for these negative
experiences: one way to overcome subjective grueling conditions and constant surveillance is
manly experiences (‘This is so awful and painful that most can’t tolerate it, but I’ve shown I can
take it.’)”

This “investment in masculine discourse” is not limited to male bodies. Demi Moore’s
transformation throughout the training in the film GI Jane, pictured in Figure 11, is iconic among
the descriptions of BUD/S in popular culture. The film grapples with gender discrimination in
the armed forces, even at the hands of other women, but ultimately through her physical capacity
and mental grit, Moore’s character gains access to hegemonic masculinity.

Figure 11
GI Jane (1997) produced by Largo Entertainment, Scott Free Productions, and Caravan Pictures,
distributed by Hollywood Pictures

Women are permitted to apply for SEAL training as of September 2016. The first woman began
training in August 2017 and subsequently dropped out. Media reporting about her decision,
quickly reminds readers that 50-75% of men drop out as well. Godfrey, Lillie, and Brewis
(2012:541) write about “the ‘disciplined body,’ the process through which the civilian body
becomes literally incorporated into the military through the practices of ‘basic training’…[and]
the ‘gendered body’ and how spectres of the feminine serve to strengthen the masculine
conception of the military body.” Many in the Navy construct “women as physically weak and
unable to do what men do” (Barrett 1996:133), but several outspoken SEALs claim if women
complete the training, they will be accepted; their bodies are disciplined and gendered as SEALs.
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Robert O’Neill, for example, said, “So, I like to say, lock and load, ladies…If they don’t lower
the standards and they pass them, I think they should get a shot” (Chasmar, Washington Times,
February 17, 2016).

Part of the training is to learn and become invested in team dynamics so each SEAL can instill
unwavering trust in each teammate. When 60 Minutes’ Scott Pelley asked Matt Bissonnette who
pulled the trigger when bin Laden was shot, he responded, “we all did” (CBS, 60 Minutes,
September 11, 2012). That is also what the SEALs told President Obama when he asked in Fort
Campbell, Kentucky when he met with the SEALs to thank them (Landler, New York Times,
May 7, 2011).

This team dynamic is essential to the depictions of SEALs in popular culture. The Navy SEAL
team is the modern equivalent of the Homeric team who hunted the destructive boar in Calydon;
each hunter formidable and heroic in his own right, but nearly superhuman as a team. In popular
cultural representations, these bonds of brotherhood supersede most other relationships and
priorities. For example, Chris Kyle (2013:302) wrote, “My guys were going back to war and I
was flying home. That sucked. I felt like I was letting them down, shirking my duty. It was a
conflict – family and country, family and brothers in arms – that I never really resolved.” The
narrative letter in Act of Valor (2012), explains, “There’s a brotherhood between us and we
depended on each other more than family. Tecumseh said although a single twig may break, a
bundle of twigs is strong,” 67 and it highlights the fine line between gallantry and submission,
“Show respect to all people and grovel to none.”

67

This reference to Tecumseh is not a one-off for the movie. It is part of the appropriative, disrespectful, and
inaccurate cooptation of Native American cultural icons by the US military. According to The Sextant, an official
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In dramatic television shows about Navy SEAL teams there are several recurring character types
that serve as a consistent formula for the team’s makeup. National Geographic’s SEAL Team Six,
a highly stylized “feature-length film [for television] inspired by [the] true events” of the bin
Laden raid, features “Cherry,” a Southerner with long dark hair and a beard, raised by a single
mom, who “keeps it simple,” has no wife, no kids – “you know, it’s my mom, my bike” – who
lives by the motto, “nothing is free, you have to earn it.” He is emblematic of the unencumbered
bad boy. “Cherry” is juxtaposed against “Stunner,” the rule-abiding, clean-cut team leader who
joined the SEALs for duty, seeing no other choice but to serve. He insists, “We’re trained to live
by the rules of engagement. Don’t cause reckless harm. Don’t use women, children or old people
for cover. And don’t strap 50 pounds of explosives to your chest. But I know as team leader if
we give up on the moral code that our country believes in then we’re no better than them.” These
two competing, leading characters are used on stage to battle out which of these types makes a
better SEAL, but in the end, they are a team and both personality types and approaches are part
of what makes the SEAL team model so effective. There are several other supporting SEAL
characters in the show, including one who fills the role of the family man missing his wife and

Navy heritage website, “Tecumseh was a Shawnee Indian chief who won renown as a brave and skillful warrior and
devoted his life to opposing the advance of white settlers. Attempting to organize a great Indian Confederacy to stem
the white tide, he was defeated in the battle of Tippecanoe. After Congress declared war on Great Britain the
following year, Tecumseh accepted a commission as a brigadier general in the British army. He cooperated with
British troops to win a number of victories in the Great Lakes region, including the capture of Detroit. Tecumseh
was eventually killed in the Battle of the Thames on 5 October 1813. So, why does USNA [United States Naval
Academy in Annapolis] have a statue for someone who fought for the British? The original wooden figure was
salvaged from the ship-of-the-line Delaware, which was sunk by Union forces in 1861 at the Norfolk Navy Yard to
prevent her falling into Confederate hands. Brought to the Naval Academy in 1866, the figurehead was intended to
portray Tamanend, the revered Delaware chief who welcomed William Penn to America when he arrived in
Delaware territory in 1682. Each year, Tecumseh is coated in elaborate “war paint” and decorated in the style of
various themes to celebrate several events throughout the year, greeting midshipmen, graduates and tourists alike
who visit the Yard for football games. Freshman at USNA, better known as “plebes,” paint the statue to bring the
school luck as Tecumseh protectively gazes at the seal and Bancroft Hall.” (emphasis in original,
http://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/2016/08/26/annapoliss-relics-of-luck/).
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children back home, one young SEAL to whom the rest feel like big brothers, and one who dies
at the outset and serves as motivation for the team to avenge his death.

The characters on CBS’s SEAL Team are strikingly similar. The show is described by the
network as follows: “Deployed on clandestine missions worldwide at a moment's notice, and
knowing the toll it takes on them and their families, this tight-knit SEAL team displays
unwavering patriotism and fearless dedication even in the face of overwhelming odds.”
(CBS.com). “Jason Hayes” is the “respected, intense leader of the Tier One team whose home
life has suffered as a result of his extensive warrior's existence.” One of his teammates, “Sonny
Quinn,” immediately brings “Cherry” to mind, billed as “an exceptional, loyal soldier with a
checkered past who still combats self-destructive tendencies.” “Clay Spenser” resembles the
youngest SEAL in SEAL Team Six and “Ray Perry” is the team leader’s right hand and a classic
family man with a new baby. When “Clay” joins the team and “Ray” has to skip a mission,
“Sonny” is put into a leadership position and asked to take on tasks he normally would not so
“Clay” has opportunities to watch and learn. At the end of the episode the team teases him that
he can go back to being a “knuckle-dragger” who engages in fire fights more than strategy (CBS,
SEAL Team, Season 1, Episode 11). Everyone has a role to play.

CBS’s SEAL Team’s show-runners offer the public some insight into the role of race in BUD/S
training process. The show’s protagonist “Jason Hayes,” who is white, butts heads with an
African American team leader, “Beau Fuller.” A supporting character of color explains the feud:
“They went through Green Team [training] together. And Jason made team leader first. Plus,
now, there's always, ‘How many black team leaders does it take to screw in a light bulb?’ ‘Both
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of them.’ I'm just saying, I'm sure it hasn't been easy for him. But that does not excuse the fact
that he is a little bit of a dick.” Later, Ray, who is black, explains the racial dynamics to Jason:
Ray: You know, when I was getting out of selection, Bravo Team was deciding which candidate
from my Green Team class they were gonna pick in the draft. You remember any of the
conversations they had before deciding it ought to be me?
Jason: I don't, okay? I was a 3IC back then.
Ray: Okay. All right, well, let me ask you something. You ever consider the color of my skin?
Jason: Come on. No, it's not about that. It is not about that, do you understand me? As far as I'm
concerned, jackasses come in one color.
Ray: Yeah, but this particular jackass is black.
Jason: Yeah? And, so?
Ray: Look, I get it, man. I never could stand Beau myself. All right? He's an arrogant, uptight
perfectionist with no sense of humor, and he won't think outside the box. I get it. He drives you
crazy.
Jason: Good. I'm glad that we see the same way.
Ray: Okay, well, how do you think he's seeing you?
Jason: Better question-- do I care?
Ray: He's seeing a white guy with slept-on hair, couple days' growth, and your shirt flapping
almost as much as your mouth.
Jason: Thanks for that, Ray. Really appreciate it.
Ray: Look, man, the point is, he's seeing a guy go through life the way he wishes he could.
Jason: Look, what do you even know about this guy?
Ray: I know enough! I know what it's like starting BUD/S - 150 guys, first day of Phase 1, I'm the
only black face. Nighttime surf torture, everyone laid out side-by-side on the beach, eyes stinging,
mouths tasting like puke, salt and sand. Every time a wave comes in, everybody's trying to cheat,
right? Keep their head up so the seawater doesn't go back in your nose. Instructors yelling at you
to get back down. The thing is, in the dark, Jace, it's hard to tell one white face from another. So
who do you think they call out by name? Huh? “Perry, you get your nappy head back down in that
sand!”
Jason: We chose you because you're a great operator.
Ray: No, you chose me because I was the best operator. It's what you're not understanding,
brother. For me, for Beau, being great's not good enough. You go outside the box, you're
innovative, a self-starter. If we do it, we can't follow the rules. I'm not saying that excuses the way
Beau is at all. I'm just saying it's something you ought to at least take into account. (CBS, SEAL
Team, Season 1, Episode 6).

Cultural fascination with the hard work SEALs put in to succeed is pitted against bin Laden in
two dimensions. First, it highlights uphill struggle and unwavering dedication, rather than
unearned, inherited privilege. On top of bin Laden’s family and upbringing, both SEAL accounts
of the intelligence brief before the raid emphasized evidence that the “Pacer” could be bin Laden
because he never helped as all other inhabitants worked in the compound’s gardens.
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Additionally, the mandate for constant innovation in warfare demands continuous training:
“Team 6’s bland cover name — the Naval Special Warfare Development Group — is a nod to its
official mission of developing new equipment and tactics for the broader SEAL organization,
which also includes nine unclassified teams” (Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015).
Even the official SEAL ethos, discussed further below, states, “We expect innovation. The lives
of my teammates and the success of our mission depend on me – my technical skill, tactical
proficiency, and attention to detail. My training is never complete. We train for war and fight to
win. I stand ready to bring the full spectrum of combat power to bear in order to achieve my
mission and the goals established by my country” (Navy.mil). This forward-looking attitude is
common in narratives of American entrepreneurial spirit and work ethic and pitted in opposition
to bin Laden’s retrogressive ideology that gives recruits one-off training to engage in
rudimentary violence that will bring the world back in time to the seventh century.

Righteous Professional Violence
SEALs live by an ethos publicly available on the official Navy website. It begins by identifying
the SEALs as the melodramatic heroes explicitly awaiting The Call to Adventure: “In times of
war or uncertainty there is a special breed of warrior ready to answer our Nation’s call”
(Navy.mil). The ethos explicates that SEALs are a reflection of core American cultural values:
each SEAL is the everyman whose grit, heritage, loyalty, humility, self-control, and selfless
protectionism have enabled him to hone his skills to serve his country. It states, in part:
A common man with an uncommon desire to succeed. Forged by adversity, he
stands alongside America’s finest special operations forces to serve his country,
the American people, and protect their way of life… My Trident is a symbol of
honor and heritage. Bestowed upon me by the heroes that have gone before, it
embodies the trust of those I have sworn to protect. By wearing the Trident I
accept the responsibility of my chosen profession and way of life. It is a privilege
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that I must earn every day. My loyalty to Country and Team is beyond reproach. I
humbly serve as a guardian to my fellow Americans always ready to defend those
who are unable to defend themselves. I do not advertise the nature of my work,
nor seek recognition for my actions. I voluntarily accept the inherent hazards of
my profession, placing the welfare and security of others before my own. I serve
with honor on and off the battlefield. The ability to control my emotions and my
actions, regardless of circumstance, sets me apart from other men.
Uncompromising integrity is my standard. My character and honor are steadfast.
My word is my bond… I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity. My
Nation expects me to be physically harder and mentally stronger than my
enemies. If knocked down, I will get back up, every time. I will draw on every
remaining ounce of strength to protect my teammates and to accomplish our
mission. I am never out of the fight.
While SEALs acknowledge that they are “special” and their desire to succeed is “uncommon,”
this status is acquired through dedication and hard work rather than innate ability or unearned
inheritance. The cause is noble – protecting Americans’ way of life when they “are unable to
defend themselves” – and must also be executed virtuously through constant demonstrations of
integrity, loyalty, honesty, and perseverance. The SEALs are beholden to a legacy – the symbol
of the trident and those who came before – and responsible for the fate of a people. The reward is
not recognition, but rather it is accomplishing the mission. As a loved one notes about Adam
Brown in Eric Blehm’s (2012:181) book about his life, “Adam was just Adam all over again –
but in a different uniform. He was my hero as this crazy football player who loved Lake
Hamilton High; now he was a SEAL, and his team was our entire country. But he wasn’t loud
about it, like he’d been before. He’d matured and was more quiet and humble, and that to me
made him more powerful.” These traits, revered throughout American cultural products, are in
direct juxtaposition to the characterization of Osama bin Laden, his unearned privilege, his
deceit, his taunting communications, and his cowardice in death.
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Further, the ethos states, “The execution of my duties will be swift and violent when required yet
guided by the very principles that I serve to defend. Brave men have fought and died building the
proud tradition and feared reputation that I am bound to uphold. In the worst of conditions, the
legacy of my teammates steadies my resolve and silently guides my every deed” (Navy.mil).
Throughout the authorized discourse, SEALs use violence defensively and as a last resort. In his
60 Minutes interview about the bin Laden raid, for example, Bissonnette insists, “This was
absolutely not a kill-only mission. It was made very clear to us throughout our training for this
that, ‘Hey, if given the opportunity, this is not an assassination. You will capture him alive, if
feasible.’ I mean, we’re not there to assassinate somebody. We weren’t sent in to murder him”
(CBS, 60 Minutes, September 11, 2012).

Fighting in the name of a fallen brother is a righteous justification for violence in SEAL culture.
The death of operator Neil C. Roberts “sent shudders through the tight-knit community”
(Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015). Roberts was killed in SEAL Team 6’s first
major battle in Afghanistan. “Beyond the dehumanizing manner in which the al Qaeda fighters
had treated his corpse,” writes Matthew Cole for The Intercept, “Roberts’s death pierced the
SEALs’ self-perception of invincibility…Roberts’s death, and the subsequent operations in
eastern Afghanistan during the winter 2002 deployment, left an indelible impression on SEAL
Team 6, especially on Red Team” (Cole, The Intercept, January 10, 2017).

The authorized discourse explains away these revenge projects, in part, as a predictable and
acceptable byproduct of so much reasonable, yet extreme, violence. The New York Times
reported in 2015, “between 2006 and 2008, Team 6 operators said, there were intense periods in
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which for weeks at a time their unit logged 10 to 15 kills on many nights, and sometimes up to
25. The accelerated pace caused ‘guys to become fierce,’ said a former Team 6 officer. ‘These
killing fests had become routine’” (Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015). In addition to
the quantity of violence, there was also a quality to the violence not traditionally reported within
the authorized discourse about American military activity. The Times exposé continues
Noting that they shoot to kill, a former noncommissioned officer added that the
operators fire “security rounds” into those who are down to ensure that they are
dead…In a 2011 mission on a hijacked yacht off the coast of Africa, one Team 6
member slashed a pirate with a knife and left 91 wounds, according to a medical
examiner, after the man and other attackers killed four American hostages.
Operators are trained “to slice and dice every major artery,” said one former
SEAL (Mazzetti et al., New York Times, June 7, 2015).
Critical reporting like Matthew Cole’s piece for The Intercept argues this is more than just due
diligence protocol and is actually a dark side of the revenge motives, including the death of
Roberts. He wrote,
According to multiple SEAL Team 6 sources, the events of [the day Roberts was
killed] set off a cascade of extraordinary violence…“It’s a schoolyard mentality.
You guys want to play with those rules? OK.” Although this former SEAL
acknowledged that war crimes are wrong, he understood how they happen. “You
ask me to go live with the pigs, but I can’t go live with pigs and then not get
dirty” (Cole, The Intercept, January 10, 2017).
This phenomenon is by no means unique to the SEALs. When a police officer is murdered, there
are many cases in which the perpetrator is pursued with more intensity and even physically
harmed or killed in custody. For example, in Rhode Island in 2005, Esteban Carpio killed a
police detective in a police station interrogation room while being questioned about another
homicide. He was catastrophically injured while in custody, sustaining injuries to his face so
severe he appeared in court the following day in a “protection mask” covering his entire face
except his extremely swollen eyes and forehead.(O’Neal Parker, Washington Post, April 23,
2005). Despite the transferability of this emotional response and its rationalizations across the
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American security sector in the authorized discourse, when Muslim civilians join “terrorist”
organizations and use violence to avenge loved ones killed by American violence it is called
“radicalization.” Within the authorized discourse, it is somehow cast as a completely different
phenomenon and that term does not seem to apply when SEALs or police engage in gratuitous
vengeance.

Books, television shows, and films offer counternarratives to these exposés that are arguably
more persuasive and certainly more pervasive. “Jason Hayes” the fictional team leader on CBS’s
SEAL Team breaks the rules, “acting with an air of impunity,” but in traditionally heroic ways. In
the series’ second episode, Hayes bonds with a small child among a group of Syrians
contaminated with a nerve agent trapped in a hospital, now being used to make chemical
weapons. Hayes marks himself as a “good guy” implicitly when he gives the child his dose of the
antidote to increase his chances of living through the night and explicitly when he tells a
teammate that the use of nerve agents is what differentiates them – the good guys – from those
who use “that deadly stuff.” There is some debate within the team about trying to get all of the
civilians out of the hospital. In the face of their Lt. Commander’s order to leave everyone and
everything behind, Hayes uses his SEAL ingenuity and realizes he can spin rescuing the
civilians; they are evidence of the presence of a nerve agent. Accounts of Operation Red Wings,
captured in the book and film versions of Lone Survivor, attribute the team’s blown cover and
ultimately the death of everyone on the team but Luttrell, the book’s author, to the team’s
humanitarian choice to release a small family of goat herders who stumbled upon the unit.
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While establishing the morality of the hunters in relation to the hunted applies in the hunting of
animals, as discussed in Chapter 1, the stakes are different when the hunted prey is a human.
Carrier groups who offer third party descriptions of hunters’ feats must strike a careful balance
between casting the hunted as a formidable threat, enough to bring honor to the hunter, but weak
enough to be overcome. For example, in SEAL Robert O’Neill’s (2017:633-634) memoir about
the bin Laden raid, he articulates this balance as he reflected on his thoughts as the helicopters
flew away from bin Laden’s home, toward the US military base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan:
When I think of it now, it reminds me of when the super-underdog USA hockey
team beat the Russians in 1980. In the old TV clips, you can see the tense crowd
counting down the last minute, afraid of the hope rising in their hearts, afraid they
want it too much and that their very desire will somehow guide a desperation slap
shot past their goalie into the back of the net, a last-second thunderbolt that will
kill their dream. But no Russian finds an opening. Ten seconds, and the USA fans
start counting down, almost timidly at first, but louder and louder until they're all
screaming. Three...two...You can see what they're thinking, which was pretty
much what we were thinking on that chopper: This could happen. We might live.
The valorization of SEALs in their memoirs and movies are the contemporary American
equivalent to the reliefs of kings hunting big game, such as lions, found throughout the ancient
world, from Mesopotamia to Macedonia. On one hand, similar to the prowess of hunting kings,
such as Alexander the Great, Team Six is famous for their elite status, their extensive training,
and their access to the full technological prowess of the United States military. From that
perspective, since this reflection comes after O’Neill, by his own admission, shot bin Laden
unarmed in his sleep clothes, it is hard to imagine O’Neill as the “super-underdog” with whom
he empathizes in this passage. On the other hand, the kings were only as admired for their kill as
the challenge their prey presented, therefore, as discussed in the previous chapters, the authorized
discourse focuses on bin Laden’s formidability – his elusiveness in the past, his propensity for
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lethal security systems, and the number of bodyguards the SEALs had to confront on their way
to bin Laden’s sleep quarters – to further bolster the reputation of his killers

American Sniper (2013, 2014) draws upon the metaphor of sheep, wolves, and sheepdogs to
legitimate SEAL violence, originally put forth by retired Lt. Colonel Dave Grossman. In the
movie, Chris Kyle’s father tells his sons, “There are three types of people in this world: sheep,
wolves, and sheepdogs. Some people prefer to believe that evil doesn’t exist in the world, and if
it ever darkened their doorstep, they wouldn’t know how to protect themselves. Those are the
sheep” (Warner Brothers 2014). The original Grossman (2008:181) text adds, “If you have no
capacity for violence then you are a healthy productive citizen, a sheep.” Kyle’s father continues,
“Then you’ve got predators who use violence to prey on the weak. They’re the wolves” (Warner
Brothers 2014). In Grossman’s (2008:181) conception, “There are evil men in this world and
they are capable of evil deeds. The moment you forget that or pretend it is not so, you become a
sheep. There is no safety in denial.” The film clearly indicates that “terrorists” are the “wolves”
that prey on innocent Americans. Finally, Wayne Kyle tells his sons, “And then there are those
blessed with the gift of aggression, an overpowering need to protect the flock. These men are the
rare breed who live to confront the wolf. They are the sheepdogs” (Warner Brothers 2014). Chris
Kyle understands himself and his fellow SEALs to be sheepdogs, those who “have a capacity for
violence, and a deep love for your fellow citizens…A sheepdog, a warrior, [is] someone who is
walking the hero's path. Someone who can walk into the heart of darkness, into the universal
human phobia, and walk out unscathed” (Grossman 2009:x).
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Grossman (2008:182) also reminds why the hegemony must constantly work to legitimate the
violence of the sheepdogs:
The sheep generally do not like the sheepdog. He looks a lot like the wolf. He has
fangs and the capacity for violence. The difference, though, is that the sheepdog
must not, cannot, and will not ever harm the sheep…Still, the sheepdog disturbs
the sheep. He is a constant reminder that there are wolves in the land…The sheep
would much rather have the sheepdog cash in his fangs, spray paint himself white,
and go ‘Baa.’ Until the wolf shows up. Then the entire flock tries desperately to
hide behind one lonely sheepdog.
In his writings, Grossman derides sheep directly for questioning the sheepdog. The use of the
metaphor in popular cultural products is perhaps more effective, as its messaging is subtler than
Grossman’s direct approach. In addition to its use as the key frame for righteous violence in
American Sniper, in the scenario with the chemical weapons in Syria on CBS’s SEAL Team
referenced above, Hayes persuasively declares that there “is not a whole lot of honor in being a
sheepdog, busy keeping his own flock safe and no vigilance in keeping anyone else safe” (CBS,
SEAL Team, Season 1, episode 2).

The “conscious, moral decision” (Grossman 2008:181) to become sheepdogs, is narrated as a
duty to the collective. SEALs describe their duty to their fellow Americans after the cultural
trauma of 9/11. Already enlisted, Robert O’Neill describes the attacks as, “a shot in the gut” and
says “it was surreal, it was painful, and it was infuriating to see the symbol of the greatest nation
gone. Then you have people dancing in the streets overseas, the footage of Osama bin Laden in a
cave laughing about it, just one of those, ‘ok, it’s on and we’re gonna get ya” (Fox News
Documentaries, November 11, 2014). When describing his fear that he may not make it back
from the bin Laden raid alive, O’Neill added, “It is time to do my job…we were the end, we
were the fists. We were the FDNY, we were the NYPD, we were the American people. And
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when President Bush said freedom will be defended, he meant it for everyone. We were
everyone” (Fox News Documentaries, November 11, 2014). Other SEALs echo this assertion
that violence is for the collective. In an interview with his brother’s biographer Eric Blehm
(2012:182), Shawn Brown says of his brother Adam, “After 9/11 it was a blur, but I remember
Adam saying that he was going to be fighting for us, for our way of life. Not ‘us’ as in our
family, but ‘us as in America.’” Don Mann, in Inside SEAL Team Six (2012:6), reiterates these
sentiments, “I’d been in a program to try to nail the bastard [bin Laden]. And I had never really
gotten over the horror and embarrassment of the attacks on 9/11.” While Chris Kyle was already
through SEAL training in 2001, the film version of American Sniper reconstructs the timeline to
establish 9/11 as Kyle’s motivation for joining the military to avenge the deaths of innocents.

The sheep-wolf-sheepdog framework in general, and the above statements about defending the
collective in particular, both of which aim to legitimate SEAL violence, are deeply gendered and
racialized. More or less explicit in Grossman and Kyle’s application in counterterrorism
contexts, sheep can be white or nonwhite – per the discussion about victimhood above, Afghans,
for example, can be victims (of wolves, not sheepdogs) – but the wolves are usually nonwhite
and sheepdogs are always white or agents of white hegemony maintenance.

Sheepdog’s inclination to protect is also distinctly masculine. Young (2003:4) explains,
The “good” man is one who keeps vigilant watch over the safety of his family and
readily risks himself in the face of threats from the outside in order to protect the
subordinate members of the household. The logic of masculinist protection, then,
includes the selfish aggressor who wishes to invade the lord’s property and
sexually conquer his women. These are the bad men. Good men can only appear
in their goodness if we assume that lurking outside the warm familial walls are
aggressors who wish to attack them. The dominative masculinity in this way
constitutes protective masculinity as its other.
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It is not much of a leap to make parallels between Young’s “selfish aggressor” and Grossman’s
wolf and the “good man” as a sheepdog. Young associates the sheepdog with the construction of
the “male head of household as protector of the family, and by extension, masculine leaders and
risk takers as protectors of the population” (Young 2003:3). Sheep, in her analysis, are
“paradigmatically women and children,” (Young 2003:2); men who are not sheepdogs are
feminized and subordinated in comparison to the aggressively protective, risk-taking sheepdogs.
Light (2017:13) adds, “the duty to retreat was incompatible with ideals of the ‘true man’ and the
‘American mind.’ Shifts in gender and race ideals increasingly framed white masculinity as
protective of feminized dependents and of property from encroachment by nonwhite,
criminalized strangers.”

Light (2017:12) traces white masculinity’s monopoly on the use of defensive, protective violence
to the “castle doctrine,”
established in England in the early 1600s. Popularizing the adage ‘A man’s house
is his castle,’ the doctrine allowed a man to meet force with force when his home
was invaded…Since it originated at a time when women and nonwhite people
were largely excluded from the rights, protections, and immunities of full
citizenship, the castle doctrine exempted white, property-owning men from the
prohibitions circumscribing the use of defensive violence…The castle doctrine
did not allow people who were themselves considered property – such as enslaved
Africans and African Americans – to defend themselves from white violence.
Native people likewise found no protection in the castle doctrine, for when settler
colonialism favored the right of white Europeans to invade a seize land already
populated by others…Settler colonialism, legalized slavery, and women’s
exclusion from most legal rights ensured that property and the power to protect it
would remain in white male hands…
Light’s “DIY security citizen,” the armed defender of his castle, the good (white) guy with a gun,
is a sheepdog. Under the logic of the castle doctrine “a man should not have to retreat from an
attacker within the space that is intended to be his haven from the dangers of the outside world”
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(Light 2017:12). Much like, “nonwhite people’s self-defensive actions against white attackers
were usually criminalized” (Light 2017:13) in the United States, the Ahmed brothers living in
the Abbottabad compound are “wolves” and therefore do not have the right to use force
legitimately to defend their home and family during a midnight home invasion. The accounts by
“Owen” (2012) and O’Neill (2017), as well as the news and expert accounts of the raid, clearly
and consistently refer to the fire from the Ahmed brothers as offensive, to which their rules of
engagement permitted a “defensive” response. Whether a racist, dehumanizing double standard
or an emasculating suspension of the frame, or both, these considerations explain why O’Neill
and Bissonnette interpreted the same action they would likely take if someone invaded their
homes as so reprehensible.

Again and again, the SEALs differentiate themselves from the bin Ladens and the Ahmeds and
legitimate their violence through an emphasis on performances of chivalrous masculinity. Young
(2003:4) explains, that “good” men according to contemporary American cultural scripts are not
“selfish, aggressive dominative [men],” but rather,
Real men are neither selfish nor do they seek to enslave or overpower others for
the sake of enhancing themselves. Instead the gallantly masculine man is loving
and self-sacrificing, especially in relation to women. He faces the world’s
difficulties and dangers in order to shield women from harm and allow them to
pursue elevating and decorative arts. The role of this courageous, responsible, and
virtuous man is that of a protector… (Young 2003:4).
While the authorized discourse, even after the White House retraction, continued to emphasize
bin Laden’s cowardice in using his wife as a human shield to avoid death, the SEALs narrate
their priority during the raid to avoid harming innocent women and children. O’Neill (Fox News
Documentaries, November 11, 2014) recounts,

281

…there’s a little girl [in bin Laden’s compound], crying, I was sort of holding
down, I had a guy take my spot, I went and grabbed her and walked her across the
hallway, to find a woman to give the girl to, because even in the heat of
something that important as that moment, we’re the good guys and we don’t want
her to be any more afraid than she needs to be because she has nothing to do with
this. So we’re going around making sure kids are huddled with parents.
CNN’s Chris Lawrence reported, “While all this was going on, one of the US helicopters had
trouble. The team made the call to destroy it there on the ground and hustled the women and
children out before detonating the aircraft” (CNN, The Situation Room, May 2, 2011). Hillary
Clinton also contributes to this legitimation of sheepdog violence through chivalrous
masculinity: “Something that doesn't get enough attention is, when they blew the helicopter, not
sure of what the consequences would be, the SEALs took the time to bring all the women and
children out of the compound behind a back wall, as far as from the helicopter being blown as
possible” (CNN, We Got Him, May 1, 2016).

The women were not all treated well; O’Neill and “Owen” both describe how bin Laden’s
daughters were tackled and his wife Amal was shot, how a fellow SEAL aggressively “shook”
bin Laden’s daughters to solicit a confirmation on his identity and O’Neill (2017:628) insisted
they “forget about these women and children” because they had to leave, but the authorized
discourse de-emphasizes or justifies these actions as defensive. Matt Bissonnette, for example,
told 60 Minutes’ Scott Pelley: “All the women on target were very hostile. Something very
different than what we see in Afghanistan or Iraq. You typically don’t see the women that are
this aggressive and hostile. Even though the females had come out of this building and talked to
us, they were still very combative and aggressive. And we saw that in the entire compound, even
up on the third floor” (CBS, 60 Minutes, September 11, 2012).
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Rationalizing violence as protective is a central tactic in hegemony maintenance because it puts
sheep “in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience. To the extent that citizens of a
democratic state allow their leaders to adopt a stance of protectors toward them, these citizens
come to occupy a subordinate status like that of women in the patriarchal household” (Young
2003:2). This can lead citizens to “accept a more authoritarian and paternalistic state power,
which gets its support partly from the unity a threat produces and our gratitude for protection. At
the same time that it legitimates authoritarian power over citizens internally, the logic of
masculinist protection justifies aggressive war outside” (Young 2003:2). For American
audiences turned off by this construction of white hegemonic masculinity, there is, however, an
alternative to ensure maintenance of the cultural hegemony in the face of this distaste.

The Sisterhood?: Alec Station, “Maya,” and the CIA
Navy SEALs may have killed Osama bin Laden, but women led them to their prey
-Robert Windrem, NBC.com, “Hunting Osama bin Laden was Women’s Work”
The various documentary films about the Abbottabad raid have the look, feel, and sounds of a
traditional American action movie trailer: heart-pounding music, hyperbolic narration in a
menacing male voice, computer-generated action scenes with explosions and the green glow of
night vision. HBO’s Manhunt (2013) based on Peter Bergen’s (2012) book is a quiet film. There
is no narrator, just subtle informative text on screen. Rather than electronic dance music, eerie
piano, violins, and cellos softly create dramatic tension and intrigue. After a clip of President
Obama’s first sentence when he announced bin Laden’s death, the film quickly pans to a blond
woman sitting down on a deck off a beautiful suburban home with a cup of coffee. As she takes a
contemplative sip, the text on screen reads: “The raid took 40 minutes. The CIA’s hunt for
Osama bin Laden took two decades.” We will soon learn that this woman is Nada Bakos, a CIA
analyst who worked in the Bin Laden Issue Station, known more popularly as Alec Station. Later
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she led the targeting team who eventually killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al Qaeda in
Iraq, the predecessor organization to ISIS. The credits transport the viewer into the intricate web
of clues known as a “link chart,” Figure 12, used to target al Qaeda leadership. These aesthetic
differences immediately set this film apart from its counterparts.

Figure 12
The link charts from the credits appear as watermarks between scene changes to remind viewers throughout the
documentary of the complexity of the hunt (Source: Manhunt, HBO 2013).

The first segment of the film is entitled “The Sisterhood” and in the very first spoken line of the
documentary Bakos states, “I think women make fantastic analysts. We have patience and
perseverance. And we’re not always looking for the sexy payoff immediately” (HBO 2013). In
the book, Bergen (2012:77-79) elaborates,
From the founding of the bin Laden unit in December 1995 – the first time that
the CIA had established a “station” targeting a specific individual – female
analysts such as Barbara Sude played a key role in the hunt for al Qaeda. The
founder of the unit Micahel Scheuer, explains, “They seem to have an exceptional
knack for detail, for seeing patterns and understanding relationships, and they
also, quite frankly, spend a great deal less time telling war stories, chatting, and
going outside for cigarettes than the boys. If I could have a sign up saying, ‘No
boys need apply,’ I would’ve done it”… The prominent role that women played in
the hunt for bin Laden was reflective of the largest cultural shift at the CIA in the
past two decades. Veteran CIA operative Glenn Carle recalls, “When I started,
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there were to my knowledge four senior operation officers who were females, and
they had to be the toughest SOBs in the universe to survive. And the rest of the
women were treated as sexual toys.” When Scheuer set up the bin Laden unit,
Carle remembers the reaction among his fellow operations officers: “What’s his
staff? It’s all female. It was just widely discussed at the time that it’s a bunch of
chicks. So, the perspective was frankly condescending and dismissive. And
Scheuer [and his staff] essentially were saying, ‘You guys need to listen to us’
this is really serious. This is a big deal, and people are going to die.’ And of
course they were right.’”
However, no one listened to the analysts at Alec Station, even those in other agencies who had
firsthand knowledge that bin Laden was a threat. “From the start, key FBI officials resisted the
idea of cooperating with Alec Station,” wrote Zeman, Wise, Rose and Burrough (2004) for a 44page article for Vanity Fair based on the 9/11 Commission Report. “Chief among them,” they
continued, “was the FBI’s top counterterrorism guy, a swaggering, old-school G-man named
John O’Neill…Very early on O’Neill refused to hand over to the CIA a notebook taken from an
al-Qaeda operative captured by the FBI. According to [former top CIA official for clandestine
operations and senior adviser to the FBI John] MacGaffin, O’Neill said, ‘Fuck you. I’ve got it.
I’m keeping it. It’s mine. This is the FBI’s’” (Zeman et al., Vanity Fair, November 2004).
Likewise, Clinton-era counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, who was an early, outspoken
advocate for “eliminating” bin Laden, said of Alec Station, “Fine that you came to the same
conclusion that we all came to, fine that you’re all worked up about it, and you’re having
difficulty getting your agency, the rest of your agency, to fall in line, but not fine that you’re so
dysfunctional within your agency that you’re making it harder to get something done” (Zeman et
al., Vanity Fair, November 2004). Further, according to the Vanity Fair article,
By 1998, Scheuer and his staff had become so passionate about going after bin
Laden that he felt his superiors weren’t getting it. Scheuer later informed
Congress that when Alec Station had obtained detailed intelligence in 1996 about
attempts by bin Laden to acquire nuclear weapons, the higher-ups decided to
suppress the information…A bunker mentality set in at Alec Station. Them
against us. Up on Langley’s seventh floor, in the executive suites, the top brass
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started to view Scheuer as a hysteric, spinning doomsday scenarios, a sort of
Kurtz-like figure. “The Manson family,” some started calling him and his staff.
“The overwhelming majority of officers who worked for me were women,”
Scheuer recalls. “And they don’t care for that. They don’t care for women, period,
but they especially don’t care for successful women” (Zeman et al., Vanity Fair,
November 2004).
As viewers of the Manhunt documentary are introduced to Susan Hasler, who edited the CIA’s
daily report to the president, and Cindy Storer, who began tracking bin Laden for the CIA in
1995, there are scenes of suburban cul-de-sacs and the women driving. It gives the impression
that CIA analysts live among us, in this case in suburban Virginia, bringing to mind the
stereotype of a “soccer mom,” more than an action hero. Hasler explains that in the 1990s, “the
people who had really deep expertise in al Qaeda, they were women. And they did a job that did
not make them very popular with their managers” (HBO 2013)

Storer adds,
I was counseled once in a performance review that I was spending too much time
working on bin Laden. They said we were obsessed crusaders, overly emotional,
using all of those women’s stereotypes. Men throw chairs, women cry. I ask you
which one is better. Yes, we were borderline obsessed, but I thought it was for a
good reason. And were we crusading? I wouldn’t call it a crusade. Were we
passionate about what we were doing? Absolutely. And that was another
bureaucratic norm of the time. You weren’t supposed to be passionate about
anything. Which I think is ridiculous. How can you do something like this without
passion? You can’t (HBO 2013).
Senior al Qaeda analyst Barbara Sude says to the filmmakers, “we were trying to protect the
United States, it’s a big burden…the rest of the organization didn’t necessarily think very much
of terrorism analysts. They said the terrorism people are just tracking things. That’s not real, real
analysis, that’s just tracking things. So we poor lowly terrorism analysts, we were tracking
things” (HBO 2013). The Bin Laden Issue Station blended analysts and operatives and included
both CIA and FBI so there was direct contact and conflict between the two cultures within the
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intelligence and law enforcement communities. In the film, this disparaging attitude toward
female analysts is contrasted with the rugged masculinity of the field operations side. Storer
explains, “on the operations side, this is where all the spies work. Which are the ones you always
see in the movies running around recruiting assets or playing James Bond or whatever” (HBO
2013). Senior operative Marty Martin, insists operations work “is dangerous, dangerous…we are
case officers, alright? We’re the jet fighters. We’re the gangsters. We’re the doers. Analysts,
come on man!” (HBO 2013).

The gender discrimination is strong even in Bergen’s retelling of the story. In the book, he lauds
another analyst from the founding team at Alec Station, Gina Bennett, for her foresight, “in
August 1993…[she] authored a paper that was the first strategic warning about a man named
‘Usama bin Laden’” but feels the need to qualify that “in the years since the attacks on New
York and Washington, Bennett helped draft the key National Intelligence Estimates of the state
of al Qaeda while at the same time balancing the demands of her five children” (2012:78).68
Likewise, his account of yet another top female analyst, Jennifer Matthews, not only relays to
readers that she “knew her Islamic history cold and how al Qaeda believed it fit into that history,
which made her a formidable interrogator of al Qaeda detainees, some of whom found the fact
that she was a well-informed female particularly disconcerting” he also talks about her balancing
“her busy job at the CIA,” with “raising three young children” (2012:77).

Former CIA Director John O. Brennan, said “In addition to the innate intelligence and capability
and creativity that women bring to the workforce, I think they have the opportunity to see the

68

Usama bin Laden is an alternative Arabic transliteration. While the news media consistently uses Osama, the
government spells his name Usama and refers to him by the initials UBL.
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world through – and I think this is very important – the eyes of a woman” (Windrem, NBC.com,
November 14, 2013). Of the Alec Station analysts interviewed for the documentary, Bakos, in
particular, seems to adopt this essentialist notion that men are better suited to some things, while
women are better suited for others, and embraced the feminine qualities she brought to her work.
She told NBC, “We're aggressive in the protection of our children…We see risks differently,
longer term.” (Windrem, NBC.com, November 14, 2013) Of the field operatives she said, “these
guys need confidence to pull that off. There is a fair amount of bravado. I think it’s a component
of the personality in some cases for the job.” She emphasizes women’s inclination for thinking in
terms of relationships, for example,
You have to intimately know the target you’re going after. How that person is
going to act, react, what they’re going to do that day, what their strategy is, who
they’re going to talk to, what are their priorities in life, is it Wife #1? Is it wife
#2? It seems so strange that I never met Zarqawi. My former colleagues in the
Jordanian intelligence service used to call him my boyfriend. I feel like I knew
Zarqawi too well. He was a quiet guy in a pathological sort of way. He was a
monster. I was thinking about him 24/7 (HBO 2013).
A fictional female CIA analyst in National Geographic’s SEAL Team Six, echoes this, telling the
camera for this documentary-style feature film, “being obsessed with a target is like having a one
way affair. It’s a secret and you can’t stop thinking about him but you’re always alone. The only
question is how will it end?” (National Geographic 2012).

The marginalization that so many attribute to the gender composition of the unit, continued right
up until the 9/11 attacks. However, despite of the near-total dismissal of an August 6, 2001 CIA
Presidential Daily Brief, entitled, “Bin Laden Determined to Strike US,” that read, “Clandestine,
foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin (sice) since 1997 has wanted to
conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin (sic) implied in US television interviews in 1997
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and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi
Yousef and ‘bring the fighting to America’” (CIA PDB August 6, 2001), after 9/11, a CIA
internal investigation cast blame on some of the original members of Alec Station for the attacks.
Cindy Storer recounts her experience:
Cry at home, come to work, be professional, do your job, cry at home, come to
work, be professional, do your job. And people were very focused running around
getting the job done. In about November, things start to slow down a little bit and
the guilt sets in. And that is just the worst. Sorry I’m going to cry now…people in
Congress would say things like “you were negligent.” I was like, “what did you
know about bin Laden before 2001? Nothing. You didn’t help us at all. And now
you’re blaming us for having tried” (HBO 2013).
In a distinctly mocking tone, case officer Marty Martin states, “They failed to connect the dots”
(HBO 2013). The long-term contributions of these women were also largely eclipsed after bin
Laden was killed, most of the success being attributed to a single analyst. The authorized
discourse has many names for her: she is “Maya” in Zero Dark Thirty, “Jen” in Mark Owen’s No
Easy Day, “the woman CIA analyst,” in Robert O’Neill’s The Operator, and “Frederica” in
Bergen’s Manhunt, in addition to the many secondary speculations about her character where she
remains unnamed. In 2014 after a new CIA report on torture, she was dubbed “the unidentified
queen of torture,” by NBC and The New Yorker. Some argue the fictional character is a
conglomerate of many of the women described so far, but others have deduced that she is senior
CIA analyst Alfreda Frances Bikowsky.69

In each of her fictional representations, the analyst’s unwavering confidence and stubbornness,
abrasive and demanding behavior, and toughness and tenacity grant her access to white
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Scott-Clark and Levy (2017), in their book Exile, identify “Maya” as Gina Bennett, the first analyst to warn the
White House about bin Laden in 1993, and not her colleague Bikowsky. In several blogs after the release of HBO’s
Manhunt where viewers learned about the female analysts of Alec Station, people mused that Maya is more likely
based on Nada Bakos.
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hegemonic masculinity and its monopoly over legitimate violence and protection. Unlike her
female colleagues who were ignored and blamed, Zero Dark Thirty, and to a lesser degree her
role in other accounts, mythologizes her as terrorist hunter. In the film, Maya first hears the name
Abu Ahmed, immediately deduces that he could be the key to unlocking bin Laden’s
whereabouts, and relentlessly follows up on the lead until she identifies him. In the face of
marginalization and accusations of obsession, she demands the resources she needs to target him,
coordinates the agents who find and surveil the compound in Abbottabad, presents the lead to the
director of the CIA, keeps everyone’s feet to the fire until the president came to the decision to
use a SEAL night raid, goes to Afghanistan with SEAL Team 6, and identifies bin Laden’s
corpse when the SEALs return from Pakistan. She hunted bin Laden, the SEALs merely
followed her instructions: “you’re going to kill him for me” (Columbia Pictures 2012).

Gender and heroism is complex terrain. As Charles-Antoine Courcoux (2014:225) argues,
“heroism has historically played an important part in the shaping of culturally prevailing gender
norms. And yet, because it traditionally articulates itself around a set of stereotypical masculine
practices, traits, and attributes, the status of ‘hero’ tends to be problematic when applied to
women.” Importantly, my argument is that fictional representations of one female CIA analyst
construct her character in ways that, despite her embodiment, grant her access to white
hegemonic masculinity, and in turn celebration as a heroic hunter, in ways her other female
colleagues with more traditional gender expressions were not socially rewarded. As Roger
Cohen put it in The New York Times, “Maya is based on a real-life agent. But she is clearly a
fictionalized creation who serves an essential narrative purpose – the conflation in one attractive,
patriotic woman of all the practical, police-work determination to find bin Laden from which her
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country, the United States, had found myriad distractions at the mall” (Cohen, New York Times,
February 11, 2013).

In reality, Bikowsky has still faced the double standards typical of gender discrimination in the
work place. A former CIA associate told the Washington Post’s Greg Miller, “the attention from
filmmakers sent waves of envy through the agency’s ranks” (Miller, Washington Post, December
10, 2012). In fact, after the successful raid “she was denied a promotion and a $16,000 pay raise
– perhaps, suggested one former CIA official, because she doesn't ‘play well with others. She has
very sharp elbows’” (Windrem, NBC.com, November 14, 2013). For example, Miller reports,
“she was among a handful of employees given the agency’s Distinguished Intelligence Medal, its
highest honor except for those recognizing people who have come under direct fire. But when
dozens of others were given lesser awards, the female officer lashed out. ‘She hit ‘reply all’ to an
email announcement of the awards,’ a second former CIA official said. The thrust of her
message was ‘You guys tried to obstruct me. You fought me. Only I deserve the award’” (Miller,
Washington Post, December 10, 2012). The denial of the promotion “stunned the woman’s
former associates, despite her reputation for clashing with colleagues. ‘Do you know how many
CIA officers are jerks?’ the former official said. ‘If that was a disqualifier, the whole National
Clandestine Service would be gone’” (Miller, Washington Post, December 10, 2012).

While SEAL films like American Sniper exemplify “Classic Americana” with its “accentuated
robust stereotypes of the heroic and the virtuous, where principled, if sometimes maverick,
characters struggle against the odds in battles of obvious moral polarity, allowing ‘good’ to
eventually prevail over evil” (Jones and Smith 2015:3), Zero Dark Thirty grapples with
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a world of moral ambiguity and emotional complexity…Characters, often flawed,
are trapped in social systems, hierarchies, or incompetent bureaucracies where
doing the right thing is neither easy nor obvious. Dramatic tension comes not with
high tempo action sequences resulting in the traditional, predictable, denouement
– the triumph of the good guys – but from character development…and the
struggles that characters have with the dilemmas imposed by their social
imprisonment (Jones and Smith 2015:3).
Kyle’s mission is clear: “defend the US homeland and the suburban Texan homestead,” (Jones
and Smith 2015:11). Jones and Smith suggest that because
Clint Eastwood conceived the film as a testament to the heroism of the American
soldier and his commitment to his comrades…there is no examination of the
war’s motives and Kyle has little doubt about the integrity of his role in the killing
machine…The Eastwood film, somewhat predictably, follows the blueprint of the
Sergio Leone ‘Spaghetti Western’ where the enigmatic lone gunman takes out the
bad guys against a lawless desert backdrop…Reducing Iraq to Hollywood
stereotypes leads not only to a caricature of the war but also of the protagonists
(Jones and Smith 2015:11).
By contrast, Zero Dark Thirty, “takes a far more ambivalent attitude” (Jones and Smith 2015:13)
in its exploration of “the problem of intelligence, intelligence failure, and the consequent
political and security challenges arising from a war that, according to CIA official, Buzzy
Krongard, would be fought ‘in large measure by forces you do not know about, in actions you
will not see and in ways you may not want to know about’” (Jones and Smith 2015:2). Richard
Combs of Film Comment Magazine, published by the Film Society at Lincoln Center, pinpoints
the heart of this genre. At the very end of Zero Dark Thirty, “After identifying bin Laden’s
corpse, she is airlifted out, alone, in a giant cargo plane, and the pilot asks: ‘Where do you want
to go?’ The hero of any Western would have no trouble answering ‘Home.’ But the end of
Maya’s story is silence” (Combs, Film Comment, April 22, 2013).
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The substantive action of the film begins with a torture scene, emblematic of the “war on terror”
genre, but unlike earlier representations of torture on screen, like Jack Bauer’s noble, urgent
violence in the jingoistic television series 24, there is a visceral discomfort with what the CIA
has become since 9/11. The film was highly criticized for giving the impression that torture is
effective and led to the intelligence on the couriers that ultimately led to Abbottabad. Roger
Cohen suggests it is important for American and global audiences to sit in the gray:
the heated debate around it is misplaced…Watching torture – the CIA should
abandon its ghastly euphemism [of enhanced interrogation] – is profoundly
unsettling. But [Zero Dark Thirty director and screen writer] Bigelow and Boal
have done an important service in setting before a wide US and global audience
images of a traumatized America’s dark side. This happened: the waterboarding,
the sleep deprivation, the sexual humiliation, the cruelty. Not exactly as depicted,
but yes, it did, in places that, as if in a totalitarian world, existed on no map. And I
think the movie’s portrayal of torture is truthful: It helped at times but at others
did not (Cohen, New York Times, February 11, 2013).
From a characterization standpoint, Jones and Smith (2015:13) argue that “the lone female
operative bucking the bureaucratic, male-dominated, intelligence system” has become a common
theme in the Dark Americana genre. In fact, “Bigelow, the driven director who tells the story of
the driven operative, says she felt as if she’d been dealt ‘a royal flush’ when they discovered a
young woman at the center of the Osama hunt” (Dowd, New York Times, December 11, 2012).
Bigelow explicated, “I think very simply put when you take a portrait of a terrorist hunter, you
don’t necessarily think of you. You don’t think of women being at the center of that kind of hunt,
for the world’s most dangerous man so I think that was kind of a surprise and a great one at that”
(Rothman, Time Magazine, December 14, 2012). In other words, much like contemporary
audiences seem to tire of the morally polarized heroes and villains of classic Americana and seek
a more realistic window into the ambiguity of fighting terrorism in films of the dark Americana
genre, they also tire of the traditional white male hero and demand a broader array of
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representations of heroes, including those who best their opponents on an intellectual level,
rather than with guns blazing.

Zero Dark Thirty is the only full-length account of the raid consumed by many Americans.
Maya’s character is a prime candidate for the new American terrorist hunter in ways that satisfy
American audiences who ignored the SEAL-related media. On one hand, Maya is a “prototype of
Western femininity…young, white, intelligent, attractive, a priori heterosexual, thin,
economically independent, and professionally devoted,” (Courcoux 2014:227), so her heroism is
unexpected at first. Courcoux (2014:231) refers to “the incongruity of Maya’s presence as a
female agent within the all-male environment of a prison camp” in the torture chamber of a
Black Site. As Richard Combs of the Film Society of Lincoln Center put it, it might seem
refreshing and different
that a young and delicate-looking woman with flowing red hair should have the
steel and determination to pursue the hunt for Osama bin Laden more ruthlessly
than her male colleagues…But Maya isn’t just the protagonist of a ‘deadlier than
the male’ political thriller. Or to put it another way, although the point seems to
be that she’s a woman who can act like a man, and become a killer, her role
throughout is screened through ‘the female.’ She exists in a female context, which
the film treats as part of this war (if that’s what the ‘war on terror’ is), and which
reveals what the meaning of Zero Dark Thirty might be if it’s not just a gung-ho
celebration of military adventure (Combs, Film Comment, April 22, 2013).
On the other hand, since she is a white heterosexual, cis-woman with traditional gender
expressions, she only has one identity category to transgress in order to gain access to white
hegemonic masculinity. She readily counters “marks of sexism” (Courcoux 2014:231), by “being
at ease,” “taking initiative,” treating men “from the beginning as equal” (Courcoux 2014:231).
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Maya is quiet at first. Corliss writes for Time Magazine, “Surrounded by tattooed enforcers like
Dan and upper-management toughies like George, Maya at first seems as pale and petite as a
naked mole rate…Chastain takes a while to grow into Maya’s skin, but her tentativeness in the
early scenes may be an accurate depiction of a young woman just out of college, enduring the
growing pains of a difficult matriculation in a killer job.” (Corliss, Time Magazine, November
25, 2012). New, but eager and observant, the audience gets the sense that there is nothing that
divides her attention from her work. No love interest, no family, no friends. Corliss writes,
“What are Maya’s political beliefs? Who are her family and friends back home? Does she have a
sex life? Doesn’t matter: she is her job. In a way, Maya is the CIA equivalent of [Zero Dark
Thirty director Kathryn] Bigelow, a strong woman who has mastered a man’s game.” (Corliss,
Time Magazine, November 25, 2012). Maya first roars into hegemonically masculine spaces a
few years into working in Pakistan when she tells off her boss, Islamabad station chief “Joseph
Bradley,” who suggests she is too obsessed with bin Laden:
Bin Laden is the one that keeps telling them to attack the homeland. If it wasn’t
for him, al Qaeda would still be focused on overseas targets. If you really want to
protect the homeland you need to get bin Laden…You just want me to nail some
low level Mullah-crack-a-dulla so you can check that box on your resume that
says while you were in Pakistan you got a real terrorist. But the truth is, you don’t
understand Pakistan. And you don’t know al Qaeda. Either give me the team I
need to follow this lead or the other thing you’re going to have on your resume is
being the first station chief called before a congressional committee for subverting
the efforts to capture or kill bin Laden. I need four techs and a safe house in
Rawalpindi and four techs and a safe house in Peshawar. Do it or send me back to
DC and explain to the Director why you did it (Columbia Pictures 2012).
Later, after her lead on the courier begins to pan out, a meeting of senior CIA officials is called.
Maya is asked to sit along the back wall instead of at the table with a scale model of Osama bin
Laden’s Abbottabad compound. A senior official asks the roomful of men, “Who’s she?” The
men stare at Maya, who stands up and says flatly, “I’m the motherfucker that found this place”
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(Columbia Pictures 2012). After the meeting, over a hundred days go by without a decision, and
she furiously writes and erases the days on her boss’s office window, creating the illusion that
Maya and only Maya is the sole driving force behind the eventual action in Abbottabad.

Towards the end of the movie when she is in Jalalabad, Afghanistan with the SEALs, waiting the
go ahead for them to board the helicopters to Abbottabad, she bluntly deviates from the norm of
revering them. She turns to one SEAL who is quizzing her about the intelligence, and says,
Quite frankly I didn’t even want to use you guys. With your dip [chewing
tobacco] and your Velcro and all your gear. I wanted to drop a bomb. But people
didn’t believe in this lead enough to drop a bomb. So they’re using you guys as
canaries in the theory that if bin Laden isn’t there, you can sneak away and no one
will be the wiser. But bin Laden is there. And you’re going to kill him for me
(Columbia Pictures 2012).
The title for the section of the movie that focuses on the raid is “The Canaries,” a distinctly
emasculating name for a moment socially marked as hypermasculine, evidencing Bigelow’s
intention of centering Maya as the terrorist hunter of the film. To further this frame, Boal writes
the scene so the SEAL seems impressed, rather than upset by the comment. He later says to
another SEAL, “her confidence is the one thing keeping me from getting raped in a Pakistani
prison” (Columbia Pictures 2012).

None of this is to say that Maya’s utterances are masculine or that Maya is in some way
repressing a feminine gender identity. Women can, of course, be assertive and demanding and
demeaning, without actively rejecting femininity. Rather, my argument is that her behavior
matches the gender norms for hegemonically masculine spaces and she can therefore more easily
gain access and accolade. As Courcoux (2014:232-234) puts it,
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her agency is not based on traits identified as typically feminine, but rather on her
ability to perform confidence, control, and authority without rejecting some of the
more ‘ordinary’ corporeal features of femininity...Maya’s ability to move on a
large spectrum, to endure, and her predilection for technologies that enable her to
subordinate the soldiers who go “kill bin Laden for [her]” and not fall into the
typical trap of the phase of being engulfed proper into the heroic journey. The
emphasis put on these aspects suggests that the character’s accession to hegemony
ultimately derives from a double feat: she succeeds, by interposed representative,
in making the president of the United States (a.k.a. “the most powerful man in the
world”) adopt her point of view; while she manages to eliminate, by interposed
military, the world’s most wanted terrorist. Her power therefore stems just as
much from her indifference to sociocultural gender prerogatives as from her
aptitude to assume the masculine point of view of her superior or her enemy. She
understands that the foundation of masculine ascendancy lies…in culture, in a
reticular conception of power, the monopolistic use of technology, and a
decidedly urban anchoring.
More specifically, her range of displayed emotions, her confidence, and her toughness not only
secured her a place in the historical legacy of the hunt, but also allow her moments of weakness
that her female colleagues were highly criticized for.

Maya is engaging in the emotional logics of righteous retaliation, drawing strength for the hunt
from one of the only acceptable emotions under hegemonic masculinity: vengeful anger.
Halfway through the movie, Maya finally warms to fellow analyst “Jessica,” the fictionalized
version of Jennifer Matthews. The two become close and survive the bombing of the Islamabad
Marriott together. Jessica dies a few months later when a Jordanian al Qaeda mole the CIA
believed they were developing as an asset detonated a truck bomb at Camp Chapman, an
American military base in Khost, Afghanistan killing 8 other Americans and the bomber. Combs
(Film Comment, April 22, 2013) argues,
Maya is inevitably a somewhat remote, even abstract figure. But about halfway
through the film, that is all about to change – with a dramatic wrench, in fact – as
Maya’s dedication to finding Osama bin Laden takes on another quality: the
charge of personal revenge, and even of religious crusade…[After Khost,] Maya’s
response is her first declaration of a personal intent behind her dedicated detective
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work: “I’m going to smoke everybody involved in this op, and then I’m going to
kill bin Laden.” Later when she is told there are no resources for tracking the
courier, Abu Ahmed, who she believes will lead them to bin Laden, she declares:
“A lot of my friends have died trying to do this. I believe I was spared so I could
finish the job.” When the detective work becomes a quest for revenge and revenge
becomes a sanctified mission, then it also becomes a quest for recuperation – an
attempt to replace what was lost, a loss which has left behind a void and made of
the revenger something of an empty, voided soul. Here Zero Dark Thirty could be
compared to revenge Westerns, specifically those where the hero has lost a wife
or family. But for Maya, who at the end seems more emptied than fulfilled by her
quest, what is gained in revenging friends we’ve been told she didn’t have?
In addition to her enactment of righteous, vengeful anger, descriptions of Bikowsky emphasize
her unwavering confidence. In Zero Dark Thirty, when Maya is asked to weigh in on the
likelihood that it is indeed bin Laden in the Abbottabad compound, in response to the men who
have indicated a maximum of a 60% chance, she glibly states, “100% he’s there. Ok, 95%
because certainty freaks you guys out, but it’s a hundred” (Columbia Pictures 2012). Later, as
mentioned above, when the SEALs are waiting the go-order and discuss whether they are
nervous, one SEAL says he’s not due solely to Maya’s confidence. Likewise, of the conversation
SEAL Matt Bissonnette had with the female analyst he calls “Jen” when he sat next to her on the
way to Afghanistan, he writes,
“Honestly,” I asked Jen. “What are the odds it’s him?” “One hundred percent,”
she shot back, almost defiant…We’d heard the “one hundred percent” call in the
past, and each time it made my stomach hurt. “Be careful with that shit,” I said.
“When our intel folks say it is one hundred percent, it is more like ten. When they
say ten percent, it is more like one hundred.” She smiled, undeterred. “No, no,”
Jen said. “One hundred percent.” “One hundred percent like in 2007?” I said. Like
me, she remembered 2007, when we’d been spun up to chase the guy in white
flowing robes. Jen rolled her eyes and frowned (Owen 2012:182-183).
Bissonnette refers back to Jen’s confidence throughout his account of the raid. First, once inside
the compound he noted, “Jen and her analysts were right so far. They suspected that the house
was split into a duplex. The bin Laden family lived on the second and third floors with their own
private entrance” (Owen 2012:225). After bin Laden was shot, he reflected, “Jen had pronounced
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one hundred percent, I should have believed her” (Owen 2012:247). Finally, when the SEALs
got back to the Afghanistan base where she was waiting during the raid, he recalls he “tapped her
on the shoulder. ‘Hey, it was one hundred percent!’ I said, leaning close so she could hear over
the roar of the engines. She looked at me in a daze. ‘Seriously, no shit,’ I said. ‘It was one
hundred percent’” (Owen 2012:269). He told 60 Minutes after the book came out, “I can’t give
her enough credit. I mean, she, in my opinion, she kind of teed up this whole thing. And is just,
you know, wicked smart, kind of feisty” (CBS, 60 Minutes, September 11, 2012). Likewise,
SEAL Robert O’Neill (2017:597-599) wrote, “Admiral McRaven, the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) chief, would later say that the intelligence that bin Laden was in the
compound was presented to him as ‘at best fifty-fifty.’ But as I prepared to board the helicopter
that would take me there, I had no doubt about who I’d find once we made our way in. And I
owed that certainty to having gotten to know this intel analyst. I was 100 percent convinced bin
Laden was there because she was.”

Zero Dark Thirty and other accounts emphasize not only her confidence but also a determined
toughness, always willing to speak truth to power and fight for what she believes. Bergen
(2012:77-78) writes, “Frederica (a pseudonym) was another smart, tough CIA officer who was
indefatigable in chasing after al Qaeda. Scheuer says of her, ‘If she bites your ankle, if she gets
her teeth in your foot, you’re done like dinner. You may as well give up. It may take two years,
but she’s going to get you.’”70 The New Yorker’s Jane Mayer, in The Dark Side, describes her as,
“a tall, pale-skinned, spiky-haired redhead who wore bright red lipstick and was particularly
controversial among many of her male colleagues for her ferociousness. In a predominantly male
culture where macho derring-do was cherished at least in theory…[she and others were]
70

Scheuer married Alfreda Frances Bikowsky in 2014.
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discounted by many male peers who sniped at them as man-hating fanatics” (2008:35). The
Washington Post’s Greg Miller says she has a “combative temperament” (Miller, Washington
Post, December 10, 2012), The New York Times’ Maureen Dowd said she is “smart,” “prickly,”
“compulsive,” and “worked in Islamabad with the monomaniacal zeal of Captain
Ahab…messianically hunting down Osama bin Laden” (Dowd, New York Times, December 11,
2012). As mentioned above, Maya literally screams at and threatens her station chief, and in No
Easy Day, Jen jabs at Bissonnette when he tells her that they are “all in this together,” retorting
“‘You mean the boys’ club,’ Jen said. ‘You guys are showing up for the big game’” (Owen
2012:184).

The assertion that her confidence, toughness, and emotional motivations grant her access to
hegemonic masculinity and veneration as a terrorist hunter does not mean she is not permitted to
show emotion or indecision. Actually, the fact that she can do so and remain a fierce hunter is
evidence that she is not marginalized for expressions of emphasized femininity (Connell 1987).

As mentioned above, Zero Dark Thirty ends with Maya crying in the cargo plane unsure where
to go next. Combs (Film Comment, April 22, 2013) explains the vulnerable moment as a result of
situational context and the dark Americana genre, rather than personal character traits:
One complicating – and abstracting – aspect of Maya’s quest for revenge is that
it’s not just personal. She is also acting out of national need. This pre-Raphaelite
avenging angel is born out of the darkness of those desperate voices on 9/11.
Therefore she may never have any home beyond the cavernous belly of the C-17
cargo plane – the belly of the war itself. Is this because war is endless, or because
war maintained as a cycle of revenge is both endless and – as revenge Westerns
tell us- fruitless?
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In No Easy Day, “Owen,” describes the moments when the SEALs first got back to the military
base in Afghanistan with bin Laden’s body:
… she started crying. A couple of the SEALs put their arms around her and
walked her over to the edge of the group to look at the body, which surprised me.
A few days before in the chow hall, Jen had told me she didn’t want to see Bin
Laden’s body. “I have no interest in seeing it,” she told me. “My job description
doesn’t include having to look at a dead body.” I was sure this was some sort of
bravado. She didn’t have to get dirty in her line of work. She wore expensive high
heels and she didn’t worry about carrying dead weight to a helicopter. She’d
beaten bin Laden on an intellectual level. “If we pull this off,” I had told her from
across the table, “you’ve got to see the body.” Back in the hangar, Jen stayed on
the perimeter of the crowd. She didn’t say anything, but I knew from her reaction
she could see bin Laden’s body on the floor. With tears rolling down her cheeks, I
could tell it was taking a while for Jen to process. She’d spent half a decade
tracking this man. And now there he was at her feet. It was easier for us (Owen
2012:267).
Bissonnette acknowledges the value of her intellectual defeat of the hunting prey, empathizes
with the gravity of the moment for her as a relentless hunter, and understands her reaction hunter
to hunter, instead of disparaging her emotionality as a contradiction to her tough exterior to that
point.

O’Neill provides a different account of the moments after the “CIA woman” saw bin Laden’s
corpse, one that upholds her steely demeanor and status as a seasoned hunter. Reminiscent of the
Calydonian boar’s hunt, where after Meleager kills the boar he gives huntress Atalanta the boar’s
hide for drawing first blood, O’Neill (2017:635-637) describes the moment he gave the analyst a
trophy for her participation in the hunt:
“Hey, there she is.” He was pointing at the CIA woman. “You got to give her
something, man. You killed bin Laden.” We walked over to her, and I pulled the
magazine out of my gun and held it out to her. “Hey, do you have room for this?”
There’d been thirty bullets in that magazine when I’d left Afghanistan that night.
Now there were twenty-seven. She looked at me, and I could see it sink in. “I
think I can find a space in my backpack,” she said, taking it from me. In the
movie Zero Dark Thirty, a SEAL walks her character over to the body. She sees it
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for the first time, then walks away. She waits until she boards the C-130 to tear
up. That’s not her at all. What really happened: The point man and I walked her
over to the body bag, which had been opened again, revealing that familiar but
now ruined face. Below the neck didn’t look too pretty, either. As I watched her
look him over, I was thinking, This is historic. Here’s her life’s work; she just
found the most wanted man in history, there he is, it’s all her doing. What’s she
going to say? Stone-cold, stone-faced, she said, “Uh, I guess I’m out of a fucking
job.” And then she walked away. I admired her brass, but for my part I was
starting to feel the euphoria. I was alive, and I’d done this thing that seemed part
dream, part Hollywood movie.
The authorized discourse intertwines gender discourses and security discourses to garner support
for war. The fictional portrayals of Alfreda Frances Bikowsky are but one example in a larger
trend where a broader cross section of individuals of different genders, sexualities, races,
religions, and nationalities fight the masculinist, white supremacist war on terrorism. Most
notably, Showtime’s Homeland stars Claire Danes as CIA agent, Carrie Mathison, but there are
many other ensemble-cast shows that star women and people of color, adding gender diversity to
the multicultural face of American imperialism. Some argue the path toward gender equality
includes more women with access to male power (e.g. Sunderland 2004; Rosin 2013; Sandberg
2013). Within that frame, roles and programs like these have the capacity to serve as forward
strides for women through the politics of representation. However, I argue that given the
cooptation of a broader array of actors into the hegemonic coalition, while individuals who reject
masculinist protection and bravado remain sidelined like the female analysts of Alec Station, any
progress toward gender and racial justice on this front is illusory.

As Al-Sulthany (2012) writes in the context of the representation of Arabs and Muslims in
entertainment media, the fictional representations of more diverse characters seem like examples
of “positive” images that come with perceived equality. However, these actors still conform to
the logics of righteous retaliation, most often as agents of the state. This may quell dissent
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against the white masculine monopoly on legitimate violence, as it appears more people can
wield it, but the logics of the violence remain imperial, statist, racist, and gendered. Zero Dark
Thirty and other SEAL- and CIA-focused dramas are classic hegemonic war propaganda
regardless of the identities of the protagonists. These stories and images still help audiences to
believe in the mission of the war and to bolster morale and confidence in victory – and thereby
create a sense of confidence in the population, restoring the anxious hegemon to its more
confident grip on power.

Dominant Decoding of Innocent Victims and Justice-seeking Sheepdogs

With nearly monolithic constructions throughout the authorized discourse of America’s
exceptional innocence and duty as “liberator,” how do the interviewees and focus group
participants process American identity and self-concept, victimhood, and heroism? What is their
exposure to the Navy SEALs and what opinions do they hold about them? What did they think of
Zero Dark Thirty in general and Maya in particular? Was the hegemonic project successful in
producing psychological identification with and empathy for American victims and heroes?

American Self-Concept
Overall, while several of the interviewees and focus group participants had extremely critical
views on the United States and American culture – especially Na’ama, who flatly stated America
is “violent, Christian, statist, obsessed with law and order, rationality, and reason,” and Samia,
who focused on the legacies of colonialism, racism, and Islamophobia common to France,
Canada, and the United States in her experiences – most felt that despite its flaws, on the whole,
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Americans are “good” and America is “better than alternatives.” Some of the others who
expressed critical views about the United States said they felt embarrassed or fearful of the
Trump administration, but were clear that they did not feel that way while Obama was president.
Yet others who were critical of some US policies related to counterterrorism, especially the Iraq
war and when drone strikes kill civilians, understood the killing of bin Laden to be “a moral
response to the deadliest attacks in US history,” emphasizing how many civilians died. When I
brought up deadlier massacres of indigenous people, several participants reminded me that
“people from many countries and races died on 9/11.” Gino, in particular, said “civilians are
civilians, this, for once, is not about white innocence.”

While most rejected “militarism” and “violence” on moral grounds, many rationalized American
military operations as “unavoidable.” Some participants expressed concern about American
power in the world and the importance of wielding it benevolently, while others perceive the
United States to be vulnerable to Islamist terrorism, an underdog in the fight. For example, in the
focus group of recent college graduates and graduate students, I told participants they could feel
free to play video clips to express a point they wanted to make for the group. In response to
Ben’s insistence that American use of force is proportionate and defensive, Adele played a clip
of former clandestine services officer Amaryllis Fox. In it, she says
An al Qaeda fighter made a point once during a debriefing. All these movies
America makes like Independence Day, Hunger Games, and Star Wars. They’re
all about a small, scrappy band of rebels who will do anything in their power with
the limited resources available to them to expel an outside, technologically
advanced invader. And what you don’t realize, he said, is that to us, to the rest of
the world, you are the evil empire and we are Luke and Han, you are the aliens
and we are Will Smith (AJ+ 2016).
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Adele said, “this is totally it. It’s just like in [the Broadway musical by Lin Manuel-Miranda]
Hamilton when he says, ‘I’m just like my country, young, scrappy, and hungry, and I’m not
throwing away my shot.’ How can we possibly think we’re scrappy? Maybe then, yeah, but we
so still think that now, and how can we? We’re the biggest military on earth!” Ben responded,
“Right, but I still think since the United States has sort of been the rock that has underpinned the
entire international order in the past 70 years, the image of strength has been both one of
projection, but also of necessity. Because we were sort of the leader amongst the Western
Alliance, and that as a position of leadership, you need to project this kind of strength to align if
federal people won’t recognize your position.”

Mike, the New York State political operative, was among the most patriotic participants. When I
asked him his perspective on core American values, he answered:
I think that the United States stands for pluralism, democracy, tolerance, liberty,
economic freedom, cultural freedom, the ability to have free speech, to say what
you want, to practice the religion that you believe openly, without fear of any
retribution, and to essentially – you respect those values in other cultures as well.
And to me, that’s what America would be known for across the globe.
Conversely, during a discussion of American violence in Afghanistan, he added:
…if you look at the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, women weren’t allowed to go
to school, people were enslaved if they were Christians and if they weren’t willing
to convert. People were put to the sword for not wanting to convert. You had the
imposition of radical Islamist philosophy – the government philosophy. Meaning
that anybody who didn’t want to accept that was either imprisoned, killed or
chased off or enslaved…So all those issues with me, and I could come up with
probably hundred additional ones, but those, for me, concretely demonstrate that
this is not just a religious difference, this is an aggressive evil philosophy that you
see to impose its view on everybody else or else.
More commonly, participants were aware of how the mythology of American culture played out
in the authorized discourse about 9/11 (that participants like Mike seem to have internalized), but
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distanced themselves personally from the view. The ironworkers, for example, were emphatic
about splitting themselves from those they termed “Middle Americans.” There was consensus in
that focus group that Middle Americans have an unrealistic image of American victimhood.
Recently-retired Bill, in his 70s explained,
Out near Pittsburgh in the bushes, all of them, all of them: my brothers and sisters,
my wife’s brothers, cousins, Aunt Sarah. They’re all crazy. They are bible
thumping, gun nuts anyway that think America’s the greatest since sliced bread,
flags just everywhere. They think that ISIS is coming there, the poor idiots. A
terrorist attack is not coming to Middle America – the terrorists are coming to
New York. I lost five friends in 9/11. They’re coming here. They’re not coming to
– they’re not going to Oklahoma. Well, the local nuts might go to Oklahoma, but
they’re not going to be in the Midwest except for maybe somewhere like Chicago
or…They’re going to strike targets where a lot of people are. I mean, out there,
there’s nowhere for them to attack, so what is with the guns? So what am I gonna
do, sit behind a machine gun and wait?
Justin explained further, “But about the [television] shows, they’re directed towards Middle
America, we as New Yorkers have personal connections that make us have a different kind of
view of terrorism. Because we lived it. We don’t need shows to show us American good guys
and towel-head bad guys. We know it.”

Joe, the middle school social studies teacher, explained that the 9/11 attacks
…sort of hit the sweet spot of patriotism and sort of American exceptionalism and
the belief that we’re a shining beacon of freedom. But the people that were doing
this to us, in our conception, didn’t have a reason so it was like we were the
victims of the attack by people who did, sort of. I just remember Bush saying,
“They hate us for our freedom” and I feel like that was something that many
people still think somehow.
Not Joe, but “many people.” Likewise, while most participants used “we” and “us” to describe
American actions, several used “they” and “them,” indicating a personal distance from the myth.
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Despite countless civilian deaths due to American military operations abroad since 2001, many
participants spoke proudly about the armed forces in terms of the rules of engagement, chain of
command, and efforts to minimize civilian casualties. For example, Daniel, a 52-year old white
“international democracy consultant” who told me his experiences in Somalia gave him “a very
different view about terrorism than most Americans,” explained:
…violence by a state gets viewed differently than violence by non-state actors. So
we were told we are a nation of morals. So the fact that our military is committing
violence it must be okay, right? Whereas non-state actors committing violence is
terrorism. So that’s the distinction. The violence committed by state actors is
conducting wars. Violence by non-state actors is terrorism…we have protocols in
place to prevent deaths against civilians. Al Qaeda, do they have protocols in
place to prevent deaths against civilians? It seems not. It seems like they target
civilians. So our claim is always well, we never intentionally target civilians.
Sometimes we kill them and that’s called collateral damage.
There is some difference there between saying I am going to go and round up
University College students and shoot them in the head versus okay, we believe
that this is a guy that we’re fighting is hanging out at this Madrasa and we are
targeting him, but our goal is not to kill everyone in the Madrasa. We don’t go to
the Madrasa and kill everyone there. And there is some difference there. It begs
the question of whether our whole mission makes any sense. But there is some
difference, in my view…So Navy SEALs commit some acts of violence where
people also say mistakes happen. Just the way you see domestically. The police
are in a tricky situation. Mistakes happen. So it’s kind of in that role. It’s like
that’s not the policy. The policy isn’t for Navy SEALs to go around killing
civilians. That was a mistake. That was whatever you want to call it.
This explanation reveals not oppositional decoding, but deep internalization of hegemonic
culture. The first reason Daniel and others gave for the moral superiority of American violence
compared to Islamist violence is that in the international system of states: state military action is
more acceptable than nonstate violence. The global hegemonic order that has reigned since the
1644 treaty of Westphalia that made nation-states the unit of analysis in global politics is not
given. The state in general and nation-states in particular are deeply problematic social
constructions that are not universal, eternal, or natural. More, they assume that nonstate violence
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is inherently illegitimate because it is not sanctioned under international law and thus occurs with
impunity, without considering the racist, statist, imperial roots of international law that leave
many nonstate groups without any legitimate pathways to self-determination.

This leads to the second common justification for the morality of American violence: the rules of
engagement. Many interviewees prioritized existence and not implementation of the rules. In
other words, the American military operates within legal architectures that forbid the targeting of
civilians and use the term collateral damage to refer to accidental civilian deaths. Over half of
my participants, not only Daniel, believe the existence of these rules, and the absence of such
norms in Islamist violence due to the direct targeting of civilians, overrides the actual number of
civilians killed by American military and paramilitary violence. This reasoning is similar when it
comes to domestic law enforcement. Police have rules and when the rules are broken it is a
mistake that can be justified as “a bad apple within a good institution” or a “necessary evil” due
to the illegitimate violence of criminals. However, when these rules are broken with impunity,
does their existence negate the immorality of the violence?

Finally, while participants spoke at length about the generosity of Americans, the importance of
community, and especially the national unity immediately following both the 9/11 attacks and
bin Laden’s death, there was a contradictory emphasis on individualism. Ben, 25, explained:
The first thing that comes to mind [when you ask about American values] is
individualism. Above all else, I feel like that’s a very strongly American thing, the
image of the cowboy, so to speak. I don’t necessarily mean like Western; we just
tend to applaud people that stand out for doing something, someone who follows
their own path and personal principles and uses that as a guiding ideology as
opposed to following the crowd or whatever.
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As mentioned above, this emphasis on individualism is essential in understanding how
militarism in general and militarized masculinities in particular shape American civilian culture.

Impressions of the Navy SEALs and Zero Dark Thirty
While every participant was marginally aware that the Navy SEALs in general or SEAL Team
Six in particular had conducted the bin Laden raid and are increasingly present in American
popular culture in the years since, there were only a few who actively and voraciously consumed
SEAL-related media.

Warren, a white 49-year-old investor who completed two of the SEAL training programs for
civilians and met Matt Bissonnette at a reading in a private home with only twenty guests when
he was touring with No Easy Day, referred to himself as “a SEAL junkie.” With an exhilarated
tone, he described the role of the Navy SEALs in US counterterrorism operations:
These guys, from what I understand and what I have read and all, they find out
who the bad guy is, they track him until they get some actionable intelligence,
come in the middle of the night while the guy is sleeping in his home with his
wife and children, and they come in and they snatch him. And the wife and
children wake up the next morning, they never knew anyone was there and the
bad guy is gone, their father or husband. That strikes a level of fear into our
enemies that 10,000 ground troops – where their position is known, it’s debated in
Congress, and it take 6 months for them to deploy – don’t; it’s a whole different
level of warfare and where the US public is increasingly intolerant, I think, of
ground wars. Also, we have seen that drone strikes accidentally hit weddings,
being able to send in Special Forces like this is an incredibly powerful weapon.
He also described his civilian impressions of the training:
One of my trainers said you just don’t want to be “The Guy.” “The Guy” is
someone who, in the BUD/S class, let’s say you are down to your last 50 or 100
people or something, and for whatever reason you draw the negative attention of
the instructors, they single you out for extra torture, they don’t like you, they
think you have a bad attitude, they think you are not trustworthy, they think you
are not pulling your weight in the boat, like you’re paddling but not pulling it at
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all, and so you’re letting your teammates carry you, and there is nothing more
destructive, they hate that more than anything. For whatever reason, this one guy
became “The Guy” and they singled him out, and they would pull him aside and
make him do 100 pushups and sit-ups and just torture him. This drill sergeant was
screaming at him to ring the bell and quit or whatever and he finally yelled back,
“with all due respect, fuck you, I’m not quitting, you can take me out of here in a
body bag, that’s the only way I’m going out here.” And, you know what, from
that point forward, he wasn’t “The Guy” anymore and the instructors were like,
ok, I respect that…
While insubordination and disrespect in other segments of the armed services would be grounds
for discipline, punishment, or dismissal, the SEALs, in Warren’s view, are taught their
“irreverent, cowboy attitudes in training because that confidence will save their lives out there.”
Na’ama, the self-professed radical feminist with anarchist tendencies from the focus group of
recent college graduates, was less impressed with the SEALs, but had similar assumptions about
their conduct and demeanor:
…the entire process of carrying out orders without being able to challenge, being
able to criticize orders, I think, does something to your perception. But with these
guys, anyone who, I think, goes into Special Forces is particularly authoritative. I
think it requires a different kind of disregard for civil liberties, for certain rights.
You just walk, barge in, you just kind of do it. It’s probably very invigorating for
this type of guy; it seems like they are having a ton of fun. So people who do it, at
the end, it kind of is a lost hope in that realm. It’s a problem that doesn’t end with
their “service.” Can you imagine those angry white guys coming home to menial
jobs after 15 years of kicking down doors and killing people? Now that’s scary.
The focus group of media professionals of color said that they thought of SEALs as being very
“bro-y,” but not necessarily “dumb jocks.” Eddie, 30, who is black, was a scholar-athlete in high
school, and was approached by a SEAL recruiter, said he was not interested in joining because
“unlike other units that are mostly poor, Southern patriots with no options, which includes a lot
of black folks…the SEALs are elite because of the pipeline from Annapolis [Naval Academy.]
That makes them hyper-intelligent. But also racist.”
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Warren, who I interviewed one-on-one after Joan, a participant in this focus group referred me,
confirmed this. He said, “10-20 years ago the SEALs were not the hot brand they are now. It
used to be no one had ever heard of them and you sort of have to know somebody and they had
to personally refer you. And it was like almost father down to son, you’ll get a lot of father-son
combos or brothers in the SEALs and it was a very exclusive little white cloud right there with
zero diversity, there is still almost none. That’s why I’m happy that the SEALs are a hot
commodity now and more people know about them. It means more people might aspire to it.”

Jake, a black retail worker in his 50s, also offered his analyses about the lack of racial diversity
in the SEALs:
Strong, proud black men do not like white men yelling at them and treating them
like scum, saying you are a piece of shit, you are a coward, you should quit, you
are never going to pass this. I’ve heard those drill sergeants impose themselves
physically, even torture you, basically, that’s hard enough for any human being,
but when it is a white guy, doing it to a strong proud black guy, like any black guy
doing this kind of thing, finds it mentally unacceptable to be in those racial
dynamics. And so I bet any black guys are like fuck, I’m not going to put up with
this. I’m not going to have these punk ass drill sergeants screaming at me like
some sort of slave or something and they are like fuck you and just ring the bell
[the signal that a trainee is exiting the program.] I can’t imagine women being
treated like that either, most women have too much sense to accept that.
Evelyn, a black media professional in her 30s, added to the discussion on what it means to be
“bro-y,”
Yeah, they are white frat brother types. I definitely picture a combo of chivalrous
protection to the point of condescension and womanizing, depending. And
brotherhood is the biggest part of being bro-y; sometimes, ok, usually, that means
bros before hos too, so being bro-y is not usually good for girls.
Rama, a Bangladeshi-American in her 30s, in our one-on-one interview, agreed,
it is all about entitlement. Being the biggest and the baddest, they think that also
means they should protect girls, can have whatever girls they want. I don’t
imagine there’s an epidemic of sexual assault like in parts of the military where
there are more women, but it’s still a rape culture. Because you know, they are
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hot, so girls think they want them, but I bet they treat them like shit, I’ve heard
from family in Pakistan who have seen them, they’re awful.
While he did not talk about sexual violence, Warren did describe the gendered hazing that goes
on in BUD/S:
Outside of training there is a whole element of hazing that’s also a part of the
culture that’s maybe a little frat house-ish, right, but it is also, I think, part of the
bonding where you’re the new person and then they put duct tape on your chest
and rip your chest hair off and do incredibly painful things and whatever, but
there is also an element of bonding that happens as a result of this. And no, you
couldn’t do that for women or with women there, and maybe some of that’s good,
but you have to wonder about the cultural element where you’re trusting your life
and willing to give your life for your guys in your squad, or your team. That’s true
anywhere in the military, but like it is two or three times a day when you’re a
Navy SEAL.
Similarly, while he did not connect the trauma experienced during training to extreme violence
in combat, Warren relayed his SEAL friends’ trepidation about allowing their own sons to follow
in their footsteps:
One of my buddies who was a former SEAL and is now a SEAL instructor has a
12-year-old who goes for runs on the SEAL obstacle course with him and I asked
him if he wanted his son to become a SEAL like him. Because he would be old
enough in just 6 years, you can sign up at 18. And he said, “I’m really torn
because of the brutality, the suffering, I don’t know if I want my kid to go through
that, and like what father wants their kid to suffer like I suffered?”
Many with firsthand knowledge or deep exposure to SEAL-authored memoirs feel that way,
Warren claims, which speaks to the importance of recruitment via SEAL-related media, given
the increasingly high demand for covert operators. After watching a 6-minute featurette on the
making of Act of Valor – the 2012 Hollywood blockbuster that began as an in-house Navy
recruitment film and later evolved into a piece of “militainment” where active duty SEALs
played leading roles using real military equipment and live ammunition for action sequences
filmed on US military bases – Eddie was literally gripping his chest. He brought up how he had
been approached by recruiters again and said this movie was “dangerous” as a recruitment film.
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“Not so much because Hollywood and the Pentagon should collaborating,” but because of “its
similarity to” and “escalation of” military video games and sports analogies: “Hey, males, you
like football and video games, try this!” He added, without loosening his grip on his chest, “I can
literally feel the testosterone and adrenaline pumping through me watching the clip.”

After viewing “American Sniper” Chris Kyle’s appearance on Conan O’Brien’s talk show, Eddie
offered that he thought it made total sense for Chris Kyle to be the face of the SEALs:
He’s a good ol’ boy from Texas, modest, likable, a perfectly packaged commodity
to celebrate war and killing – like [the videogame] Call of Duty does – it gets
people who have no interest in politics or serious news to get this on their radar.
He helps us love our war heroes. I mean, I would want to run next to him in Call
of Duty because he has a 99 shot [has a near perfect shooting record.]
After a few others weighed in, Eddie added, “You know though, I think he’s more important as a
spokesperson than we ever needed for war. Obama can’t be super pro-war without getting
pegged the angry black man, so the good ol’ boys have Chris Kyle to listen to instead.” Victor
added that “Obama wanted to reshape global views on the US and its military after the Bush
years” and he was able to do so while the SEALs played a very different role than tough General
MacArthur played in contrast to President Truman: “these are not strategists, but operators,
glorifying the day to day violence, it is a different animal.”

Reem, the 41-year old Jordanian Christian who is a SEAL and war on terror video game
aficionado, looked like she might burst when I screened the segment “The Sisterhood” from the
documentary Manhunt where the female CIA analysts describe their experiences of
marginalization and blame. “Maya seems all badass, especially when she said ‘I’m the
motherfucker who found this place’ and in the other scene where a younger analyst tells Maya
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how much she admires and looks up to her,” she told the group, “but why’d she forget her girls?”
Of the same clip, Eddie, told his focus group, “I feel duped! I thought the targeters got more
attention because I only saw Zero Dark Thirty so it’s all about Maya. But they didn’t get credit?
And it wasn’t because they were intelligence workers, but because they were women? Nah, nah,
I feel duped!” This evolved into a discussion about what other aspects of the narrative our
attention is structured away from. Participants were especially concerned about where the
surviving wives and children had ended up and how they had experienced the raid, which they
had never considered.

While interviewees and to a greater extent, focus group participants, discussed the gendered and
racialized dynamics of the subject matter and showed some negotiated and oppositional decoding
of American identity myths, by and large, they supported or celebrated the death of bin Laden
and felt empathy and psychological connection with the American victims of the attacks. From
these conversations over the last two years, it seems the most effective discursive maneuver
within the authorized discourse was the careful balance and constant juxtaposition of victimhood
and heroism. As they reflect back, the presentation of a strong, capable hegemon did help many
participants to make sense of the attacks and the American response. As Obama put it, bin
Laden’s death “once again reminded [us] that America can do whatever we set our mind to. That
is the story of our history, whether it’s the pursuit of prosperity for our people, or the struggle for
equality for all our citizens; our commitment to stand up for our values abroad, and our sacrifices
to make the world a safer place” (Obama 2011).
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However, at the same time, the hegemon successfully revealed its anxiety; they also felt bin
Laden deserved to die, not only as punishment for 9/11, but also to prevent against future harm.
Anker (2005:26) explains, melodrama “sanctions state power by presenting its deployment as a
necessary as well as righteous measure toward fighting evil. American action against its villain is
justified through the moral imperative to attack evil.” In other words, when victims and heroes
are connected as Americans, innocence and extreme retaliatory violence are less contradictory
and dissonant for audiences.

The same goes for the symbolism of bin Laden’s death: the hegemon takes credit for a decisive
victory, while making sure Americans do not think the threat has been extinguished entirely.
Obama, in his remarks on bin Laden’s death, clearly reminds Americans, “his death does not
mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks
against us. We must – and we will – remain vigilant at home and abroad…The cause of securing
our country is not complete” (Obama 2011). Hegemonic carrier groups make sure to keep the
wound open and the fear fresh so the cycle of hegemony maintenance can continue.
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CONCLUSION
THE ROOTS AND BRANCHES OF RIGHTEOUS RETALIATION
The great through lines of American history run from the slave plantation to the ghetto, and the
frontier to the Pentagon.
-Jack O’Dell, quoted in Singh (2017), Race and America’s Long War
In this dissertation, I studied the presentation of the hunt for and killing of Osama bin Laden in
order to understand the roots and branches of righteous retaliation as a sociological construct.
Broadly, righteous retaliation, in the eyes of its agents and benefactors, is just and moral; its
reactive violence is protective, preemptive, and defensive, and therefore, legitimate. Righteous
retaliation is melodramatic; it relies upon victims’ and heroes’ performances of sacred cultural
values that constitute reaffirmations of national myth and collective self-concept, while villains
and minions represent an evil binary opposition that is beyond the scope of rational grievance.
Narratives that are familiar to audiences in terms of genre, plot structure, and especially
characterization, construct the moral basis and contextually specific contours of righteous
retaliation. Examining this single case as a culturally and historically contingent manifestation of
violence legitimation gives insight into the roots – looking backward to its foundations, its
historical legacies, its continuities, its familiarity and resonance – as well as the branches –
looking forward to what the bin Laden raid spawned, furthered, changed, and exacerbated.

Most generally, this dissertation illustrates the power of narrative in ideological (re)production,
as well as the merits of structural hermeneutic analysis. Structural analysis of plot, genre, and
character, when historicized within the cultural moment and paired with tools from critical race
and gender studies, can illuminate the inner workings of the symbolic mechanics of authorized
discourse, which in turn, unmasks the broader project of cultural hegemony maintenance. While
I argue the 9/11 attacks were not entirely unprecedented (as so often portrayed in the authorized
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discourse), if one considers massacres of civilians of color throughout the history of the United
States and around the world, the 9/11 attacks were murderous on a mass scale and the ideas and
resources that brought the plan to fruition were in no small part facilitated by Osama bin Laden.
Casting bin Laden as the archetypal super-villain in this story is not a stretch. Regardless of the
ways he was vilified, one action defined his character; no amount of textured biography or
empathetic position on his political grievances would have made a difference for most people,
given the hegemonic system of meanings about America’s role in the world and its right to
invulnerable sovereignty. An extreme case – where the event, the victims’ suffering, the enmity
of the villain, and the stature of the heroes were all cast as unprecedented – can provide a
roadmap to study subtler cases and manifestations of similar phenomenon.

Inspired by critical race theorists’ emphasis on revisionist history, I sought to look back to the
gendered and racialized roots of righteous retaliation in this case, which I argue are
simultaneously fundamental to the historical development of the United States and entirely
contradictory to American national myth and collective self-concept. American righteous
retaliation is built on white supremacy: white people and property deserve protection, violence
against criminalized nonwhite others is legitimated as purely defensive, and as agential
protagonists, agents of white violence have the nuanced discretion to choose when and how to
use violence, while there is never a rational, moral, or defensive basis for the use of violence by
nonwhite people, unless they are acting on behalf of the hegemon.

This manifests globally as American exceptionalism and domestically as the differential
valuation of lives and livelihoods among people living within US borders. White supremacist
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violence often wears the mask of sheepdog protectionism. On a global scale, Americans and
civilians within its allies in Western Europe, Israel, and Oceania, are sheep, while any armed
struggle for self-determination is comprised of wolves whose violence is always already
malicious and unprompted. Domestically, whiteness defines who deserves protection from the
violence of nonwhite criminalized wolves.

These racist logics of protectionism are not gender neutral; righteous retaliation manifests as a
white masculinist monopoly over the right to use and label violence as protective and defensive.
The confluence of American exceptionalism, white supremacy, and hegemonic masculinity is
evident in early settler colonial contact with indigenous peoples, in slave patrols, in lynch mobs,
in Jim Crow apartheid, in police violence against black, brown, and indigenous people, in mass
incarceration, in Islamophobic policies, and in the myriad forms of structural violence that
maintain a staggering gap between men and women and white and nonwhite communities.

Attention to these roots and their uses in the authorized discourse about “post-9/11 terrorism” are
particularly important, given that at the time of writing, overt racism, orientalism, xenophobia,
and performances of hypermasculine reassertions of supremacy are modeled regularly and
openly by US President Donald Trump. Future research should explore the role of anxious white
hegemonic masculinity in the pursuit of reclaiming the right to a monopoly over defensive
violence in support for Trump and his policies. It is particularly important to focus on this recent
history, as the explicitness of the move to the right, the transparency of racism, and the level of
discourse have set the bar so low that George W. Bush and his administration’s legacies run the
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risk of being sanitized instead of remembered as complicit in the production of a vengeful,
fearful, violent zeitgeist.

Looking forward, there are several areas for future research to which the theorization of
righteous retaliation and its cultural construction can contribute: 1) the implications for the role
of special operations in perpetual war, 2) what the logics of righteous retaliation, historically
entrenched “sheepdog” masculinity, and the popularity of “special ops” masculinity bring to bare
on gun fundamentalism and mass shootings, and 3) the ways these logics perpetuate and expand
direct and structural violence against Muslims, Arabs, and other communities of color today.

The increasing use and social valorization of small Special Forces teams have significant
implications for warfare. Schmilde (The New Yorker, August 8, 2011) reported that the years
leading up to the bin Laden raid saw nearly two thousand similar actions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, including 12 others the very same night, capturing or killing 15 to 20 targets. He quotes
a military official who said these raids have become like “mowing the lawn.” The use of Special
Forces has only increased since the bin Laden raid. The first year of Donald Trump’s presidency
set a record; Special Operations forces were deployed to 149 countries (Turse, The Nation,
December 14, 2017). Turse writes, “the Trump administration has embraced their [special
forces] use in the style of the former president, while upping the ante even further. President
Trump has also provided military commanders greater authority to launch attacks in quasi-war
zones like Yemen and Somalia.” Zenko (Foreign Policy, August 1, 2017) reports that Trump
authorized five times as many lethal counterterrorism missions in non-battlefield countries in his
first six months as in Obama’s final six months.
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These particular operations and the broader shifts in military architecture that enable them
largely go unnoticed by the public. Niva (2013:198) suggests,
Public criticism has largely focused on concerns about unlawful drone strikes,
civilian casualties, and the unchecked automation of warfare through these new
technologies…Drones, however, are a synecdoche for a bigger issue: the
expanding system of a high-tempo regime of targeted strikes, special operations
forces raids, and detention practices that are largely unaccountable to the public
and draped in secrecy rules.
Hardt and Negri (2004:12) explain that this “shadowy warfare” extends into the “social fabric of
life becoming a permanent social relation.” They argue,
If a war is no longer an exceptional condition but the normal state of affairs, if,
that is, we have now entered a perpetual state of war, then it becomes necessary
that war not be a threat to the existing structure of power, not a destabilizing
force, but rather, on the contrary, an active mechanism that constantly creates and
reinforces the present global order (Hardt and Negri 2004:13).
Niva (2013:199, emphasis added) adds,
What we are now seeing, however, is the development of a form of warfare that
more closely resembles a global and possibly permanent policing operation that is
focused on managing risks and preempting potential challenges through
continuous surveillance and strike operations…the prosecution of this new form
of warfare may thus become a normal and ongoing function of state governance –
like collecting taxes, enacting laws, or even “mowing the lawn” – that is sold to
the public as ways of providing security.
This dissertation, as an in-depth investigation of the symbolic mechanics of the legitimation
work for the raid that brought these Special Forces strikes into the public eye, contributes to a
crucial field of future research, should this trend continue, as these scholars and national security
experts suggest.

Outside of the context of the armed services, this study also brings to light tools to study
individual gun fundamentalism and mass shootings. American gun culture – another
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manifestation of righteous retaliation when used for lethal self-defense, to arm militias, or for
mass violence – stems from the same roots in settler colonialism. Throughout westward
expansion, there was a mandate for every individual household to own a gun and ammunition to
defend against indigenous people, whose violence was consistently cast as bloodthirsty and
random, not an effort to protect and defend their stolen land (Dunbar-Ortiz, Intercepted,
February 28, 2018). Additionally, the logics of righteous retaliation are evident in slave patrols
and lynch mobs – also self-organized – where individual white men internalized a social
obligation to use lethal self-defense to shore up the security of white people and property. As
Dunbar-Ortiz (2018:42) puts it, “The militias referred to in the Second Amendment were
intended as a means for white people to eliminate Indigenous communities in order to take their
land, and for slave patrols to control black people.”

Light (2017:2) argues, in the context of Stand Your Ground laws that permit the use of lethal
self-defense, “Our popular narratives of heroism disparage the state’s incapacity to protect
citizens from a growing list of urgent threats. Foremost among them is terrorism in the wake of
September 11, 2001, attacks which shook the nation’s collective sense of security…the only
thing protecting unarmed, peace-loving ‘sheep’ from criminal ‘wolves’ are the heroic
‘sheepdogs’ who selflessly stand at the ready to defend themselves and others.” Light is not
referring to the military fighting terrorism in the global theater. White and white-passing men,
most famously Trayvon Martin’s killer, George Zimmerman, have consistently been acquitted of
murder charges by pleading self-defense against a so-called “wolf,” while, for example, a black
woman named Marissa Alexander’s invocation of the same defense in the same state as
Zimmerman was rejected. Recognizing this history and studying gun fundamentalism for its
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racialized justifications is essential to better understanding whiteness as a sociocultural
explanation for this form of gun violence.

Mass shootings perpetuated by white men in the United States have been a popular subject of
public inquiry in the 2010s. Despite the observation in liberal news coverage and opinion media
that far more “innocent Americans” die at the hands of these white men than in terrorist attacks
underpinned by Islamist political philosophy, the cultural hegemony still has difficulty grappling
with the shooters’ whiteness, attributing the violence to mental health issues and the availability
of guns, rather than sociocultural explanations about white anxiety and historical predilections
for direct, structural, and cultural violence (Galtung 1990). Rather, public discourse has recently
turned to the role of “toxic masculinity” – cultural norms that equate masculinity with control,
aggression, and violence and that label emotions, compassion, and empathy “unmanly” – to
explain gun fundamentalism and mass shootings. This dissertation’s theorization of anxious
white hegemonic masculinity, sheepdog masculinity, and special ops masculinity can shed
further light on the gendered nature of these phenomena.

Contemporary social acceptance of sheepdog masculinity goes beyond its uses in SEAL
literature as outlined in Chapter 5. It is also suggested as a healthy and desirable alternative to
“toxic masculinity.” In a blog for Psychology Today, for example, anthropologist Samuel
Veissière (2018) argues
As a father, I expect my sons to be sheepdogs. In my household, of which I
assume the head-role as a single father, masculinity is at once a source of pride
and identity and a goal to aspire to. As a man, I am not always good at routines
and schedules, at matching socks or mending clothes when they are old and
ripped. The following maxim, however, is non-negotiable… Be strong and
caring; protect the weak...The sheepdog story is a good one. It is also found in all
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cultures. As a father and a man, it is my role to pass it on to the youth (Psychology
Today, February 16, 2018).
.
While the cultural norms of toxic masculinity, especially when they manifest as anxious white
hegemonic masculinity, discussed further below, are deeply problematic and do contribute to
violent expressions of masculinity, I argue that sheepdog masculinity’s chivalrous, defensive
norms, black and white notions of justice and innocence, strength and weakness, good and evil,
and its moral superiority constitute a dangerous and powerful construction for legitimating
violence. Protection of the weak from whom? Who are the weak? Both of these categories are
socially constructed, neither are race- or gender-neutral.

Adjacently, the rising popularity of the aesthetic of “special ops” masculinity in particular has
the capacity to contribute to explanations of mass shootings, as well. Military.com, a 10 millionmember online military and veteran membership organization, produced a video in 2010 for its
“Shock & Awe” channel called “Hunting Down Terrorists,” captioned, “Army & Marines doing
their job to make America safer” (Military.com). Images of military personnel in combat zones
are set to rock band Linkin Park’s song “Faint.” Its chorus, tense and full of rage, wails, “I can’t
feel the way I did before/Don’t turn your back on me/I won’t be ignored/Time won’t heal this
damage anymore/Don’t turn your back on me I won’t be ignored.” The lyrics and the quality of
the vocals alike present an angst-filled, frustrated masculinity, reminiscent not only of the
anxious masculinity of the United States immediately following 9/11, but also that of the “trench
coat mafia” of the 1990s or the “beta males” of the 2010s who vent their disillusion and
resentment in American mass shootings.
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The militarization of American culture after nearly 20 years of continuous, publicly
acknowledged war in general and the reverence of the SEAL aesthetic in particular are directly
connected to the popularity of the AR-15, the most commonly used weapon in American mass
shootings. According to Watkins, Ismay, and Gibbons-Neff (New York Times, March 3, 2018),
The AR-15 has been a recurring character in some of America’s most infamous
violent crimes. Adam Lanza used his to kill 20 children and six educators at
Sandy Hook. Stephen Paddock used an enhanced AR-style gun to kill 58
concertgoers and wound hundreds on the Las Vegas Strip in October [2017]. A
month later, Devin Kelley murdered 26 congregants with a Ruger AR-15 variant
at a church in Sutherland Springs, Tex. And the rampage last month at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Fla., renewed calls for assault-style
rifles to be banned – a common refrain after mass shootings…When the AR-15
reappeared in gun stores that fall [after the Clinton-era assault weapons ban
expired], American culture had changed. Now, this civilian-model military rifle
was being sold amid not only a swell of anticipation but also post-9/11 patriotism
and at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Special Operations forces were being mythologized in news segments, shown
carrying their rifles through the desert in imposing tactical gear. Children were
shooting the AR-15’s military equivalent in wartime video games. Manufacturers
designed rival versions, creating a competitive market that made the AR-15 more
affordable…“So you want to buy a rifle like our troops are using in Iraq?”
National Public Radio asked in November 2004. “Well, step up to the counter and
tell the man what you want.” Gun storeowners scrambled to meet demand,
contemporaneous news accounts show. Shops that historically sold traditional
bolt-action guns and older firearms started stocking AR-15s.
With the militarization of society, the prevalence of the “special ops” aesthetic, and the
availability of the deadly AR-15 and other similar weapons in mind, anxious white hegemonic
masculinity is a helpful frame to understand these manifestations of violence from two angles.
On one hand, agents who have long been associated with and had access to white hegemonic
masculinity fear a changing world (Kimmel 2013). Many feel they are losing a grip on the
monopoly over political power, material resources, and the right to use defensive violence, or
otherwise feel insecure, and lash out to reassert supremacy over subordinated others. Political
essayist and cultural critic Chauncey DeVega wrote for Salon.com in 2015,
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Toxic white masculinity is a fear of the world changing to the disadvantage of
white men, and where what too many white men take as natural rights are actually
going to be exposed as unfair advantages, advantages which were gifted by a
lottery of genetics and fortune of birth, as opposed to earned merit. Toxic white
masculinity defaults to violence as a means of maintaining social and political
control. It clings to guns as a symbol of “real” male identity. It fears women as
equals; it lashes out at non-whites who are somehow “stealing” white men’s jobs
and power. Toxic white masculinity sees “liberals,” “progressives,” “social
justice,” and “feminism” as enemies – out of a fear that “white masculinity” will
somehow be made obsolete or extinct. The dream worlds and paranoid fantasies
of angry white men are distractions that look to some type of Other as the
preeminent threat to America’s safety and security.
On the other hand, the stakes of hegemonic masculinity are getting higher and harder to meet. As
“special ops” masculinity certainly exemplifies, the ideal expressions of hegemonic masculinity
are becoming increasingly physical and violent, reaching near superhuman standards. More and
more people are failing to meet its pressures, and those who feel subordinated and unable to
access hegemonic masculinity also lash out.

A “beta” on reddit explained, “Since sexual

freedom is rising and women today can choose with whom they want to have sex, a small
minority of ‘alpha males’ get all girls while most betas are left in the dust. See this picture. After
the betas have realized this, they’ll rise up and stop the feminist insanity that left them without
pussy.” Now add semi-automatic weapons. Disgruntled white men, anxious over feeling
subordinated in comparison to other manifestations of masculinity and inundated with imagery
of Navy SEALs and other elite militarized masculinities, are taking up arms. Sociologists
Michael Kimmel and Cliff Leek (Huffington Post, February 22, 2013) explain, “White
men...have a somewhat more grandiose purpose: they want to destroy the entire world in some
cataclysmic, video-game, and action movie-inspired apocalypse. If I’m going to die, then so is
everybody else, they seem to say. Yes, of course, this is mental illness speaking: but it is mental
illness speaking with a voice that has a race and a gender.”
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Finally, just as violence against indigenous, black, and other nonwhite people, such as the
Japanese, throughout US history informs this case, the state, news media, and entertainment
industries’ narration of 9/11 as an American cultural trauma and the killing of Osama bin Laden
as righteous retaliation informs the treatment of Arabs and Muslims as well as other communities
of color today.

Nikhil Pal Singh explains the historical roots of the simultaneous internality and externality of
American state violence against communities of color: “Both of those projects [“frontier warmaking” and “an anti-insurrectionary project aimed at slave revolts”] are fundamentally about
alien populations: one, on the border, one in the interior” (Intercepted, February 14, 2018). Since
September 11, 2001, Arabs and Muslims have been constructed, explicitly and implicitly, as an
internal and external security threat to justify racist and xenophobic policies. Globally, the
United States has engaged in devastating declared wars and highly lethal undeclared wars waged
through Special Forces activity and drone attacks. The United States also has an enhanced
military presence in the form of military bases and training programs in many Muslim-majority
countries, changed many of its policies on detention, interrogation, and prosecution for citizens
and non-citizens, especially Muslims accused of or indicted for terrorism, and culturally,
politically, and militarily shifted attention toward the Middle East as the main source of global
insecurity. Domestically, federal, state, and local governments have enacted many reforms to law
enforcement procedures and technologies. Military-intelligence-local law enforcement
collaborations often escalate aggressively when targeting Arabs and Muslims. These
communities are further targeted through data mining and surveillance, profiling in preparedness
for major public events, and building and transportation access. Most recently, the Trump
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administration has attempted to limit travel and immigration to the United States from several
Muslim-majority countries.

The devaluation of Arab and Muslim lives is also evident in the significant increase in
Islamophobic violence, vandalism, exclusion, and humiliation following the 9/11 attacks and
again after the election of Donald Trump as US president. This is reinforced on social media in
the proliferation of “check-ins,” “#weare…” and “temporary profile pictures” to stand in
solidarity with Western victims of Islamist terrorism, especially France and Belgium, with no
corollary for loss of life in Iraq and Afghanistan, let alone in Gaza, Turkey, Lebanon, and
Pakistan. Othering of Arabs and Muslims did not begin with 9/11, but Islamophobia no doubt
intensified. I suggest that government and media narrations about the hunt for bin Laden
constitute the clearest expressions of violent reprisal as justice and therefore offer a window into
the broader cultural environment where Islamophobic violence and exclusion are constructed as
legitimate and justifiable redress for terrorist attacks.

The violence and discrimination against Arabs and Muslims in the post-9/11 era has set a
dangerous precedent for the treatment of other communities of color. It cannot be overstated that
Black and indigenous communities continue to bear the brunt of state violence, discriminatory
policies, structural violence, and slow death (Berlant 2007) that began with the historical roots I
continually refer back to. The authorized discourse, in my reading, reanimated and reinforced
legacies that have been at play throughout American history and constitute the foundations for
righteous retaliatory violence, and in that sense have exacerbated violence against these
communities in some cases. Here, I suggest that future research should examine how the deeply
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gendered and racialized cultural logics drawn upon by hegemonic agents in the case of Osama
bin Laden are deployed to justify a detainment and deportation regime, in general, taking the
targeting of Latinx communities under the Trump administration under the guise of MS-13 gang
affiliations as one example.

Romero and Zarrugh (2017:2) argue:
The issues of immigration and terrorism are not a natural fit in various ways,
particularly in relation to Latinos/as. Latinos/as are often racialized as “illegal
aliens”, but this racialization is not classically associated with terrorism. While
the “illegality” surrounding Latinos/as has implications of criminality, this
racialization is associated with economic and cultural xenophobia. However,
Islamophobia has traditionally associated Muslims with notions of “terrorism.”
While the majority of Muslims are not terrorists nor do they become terrorists,
Islamophobia renders Muslims and even non-Muslim groups that are racialized as
Muslim (e.g. Sikhs) as potential threats to national security. Yet, the dissonance
between Latino/a “illegality” and Islamophobic notions of terrorism is not very
different. Both Latinos/as and Muslims share a perceived “foreignness” to the US.
Samuel Huntington best exemplifies this perception when he stated that
Latinos/as (2004) and Muslims (1996) are detrimental and incompatible to US
ways of life and will lead to a “clash of civilizations”. This sentiment forms the
basis for the extension of Islamophobia that has been crucial for extending
deportation coverage – it allows for policies and institutional foci that are
normally reserved for anti-terrorism to be implemented in antiimmigrant efforts,
most of which affect Latino/a immigrants.
MS-13 is a gang comprised mostly of Salvadorans and Hondurans living in the United States,
founded in Los Angeles in the 1980s. In recent years, they have had an increased presence in
Long Island, New York. When MS-13 members allegedly murdered two light-skinned teenage
girls from the Latinx community, the group gained national attention that sparked state action.
“Operation Matador” is a US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) program that targets
and deports people allegedly associated with the gang and seeks to “target and deport gang
members regardless of their criminal history” (Sperri, The Intercept, February, 11, 2018).
According to an interview on radio station WNYC with special agent in charge of ICE’s
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Homeland Security Investigations in New York Angel Melendez, the operation was named for
the final stages of a bullfight “when ‘el Matador’ comes to finish…And that’s our commitment,
to finish.”

Walter Barrientos, Long Island coordinator for Make the Road New York, a group that works
closely with “families caught between the dual fears of gangs and ICE,” in an interview with The
Intercept’s Alice Sperri, said, “Their purpose is, get as many young people deported, regardless
of whether any of these gang connections are true or not, whether they are criminal or not…In
essence, what they’re doing is what they did post-9/11 with Muslim men…We just don’t have a
Guantanamo; what we have is all these immigration detention centers they’re sending young
people to.” Much like Bush-era arguments for preemptive violence, an ICE official in New York
told Sperri, Operation Matador is simply a “more proactive approach.” Sperri (The Intercept,
February 14, 2018) explains,
…officers can execute administrative arrests, based on alleged gang members’
immigration status, rather than “sit back and wait” for them to commit crimes. So
far, Operation Matador has led to more than 400 arrests of what ICE calls
“transnational gang members” on Long Island. Of those, 228 were alleged MS-13
members, about half of whom were taken into custody via administrative arrests,
according to the agency… ICE can also access gang databases compiled by local
law enforcement agencies – usually with little accuracy and even less
transparency. The use of these databases has intensified in recent years, as have
reports of the many errors they contain. CalGang – a database widely used in
California – listed 42 babies under the age of 1 as active gang members. The
Chicago Police Department’s gang database contains an astonishing 130,000
names. Individuals listed in these databases aren’t notified when their name is
added — and if gang designations are difficult to fight in criminal court, with
court-appointed attorneys, they are even harder to contest in deportation
proceedings, in which there are no public defenders and those who can’t afford a
private attorney end up alone before a judge.
These databases are reminiscent of the FBI Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO)
monitoring of civil rights activists, the recent creation of a “Black Identity Extremists” list and
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the Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation of anti-Dakota Access Pipeline activists, and, of
course, the No-Fly List dominated by Arab and Muslim men. Post-9/11 surveillance of Arabs
and Muslims provided the national security establishment with many new tools to track
“terrorists;” however, there is no equivalent systematic tracking of white nationalist terrorism to
date. Meanwhile, affected Long Island residents pled for funding and programs to keep youth off
the streets, not preemptive deportation of any young male accused of associations with the gang
(Robbins, New York Times, July 27, 2017).

Finally, Sperri comments on “the level of discourse” that justifies this preemptive, often
erroneous violence against the Latinx community of Long Island. She quotes President Trump as
calling people allegedly associated with MS-13 “animals,” ICE Acting Director Thomas Homan
as boasting, “My gang is bigger than theirs,” and Attorney General Jeff Session (emphasis
added) as stating, “Since our founding, the independently elected sheriff has been the people’s
protector, who keeps law enforcement close to and accountable to people through the elective
process…The office of the sheriff is a crucial part of the Anglo-American heritage of law
enforcement. We must never erode this historic office” (The Intercept, February 14, 2018).

Further, on May 16, 2018, Donald Trump stated, “We have people coming into the country, or
trying to come in — and we’re stopping a lot of them — but we’re taking people out of the
country. You wouldn’t believe how bad these people are. These aren’t people. These are
animals” (Bump, Washington Post, May 17, 2018). In the backlash to these comments in the
days that followed, Trump defended his statement, adding, “We have laws that are laughed at on
immigration. So when the MS-13 comes in, when the other gang members come into our
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country, I refer to them as animals. And guess what – I always will” (Hirschfeld Davis and
Chokshi, New York Times, May 17, 2018). The criminalization of all immigrants of color draws
on the primacy of the protection of deserving sheep from malevolent wolves. This is evident in
the specific Long Island case where the villainy of MS-13 was bolstered and solidified through
the invocation of the murdered girls as true victims (Cole 2007). “Unlike most other victims,”
Sperri clarifies, “the girls were U.S. citizens and the daughters of U.S. citizens, and some on
Long Island say it is no coincidence that their murders were the ones that finally prompted
authorities to intervene.”

Criminalization through the stark logics of us and them has gone beyond any one program to root
out those with connections to MS-13. Throughout 2018 the scale of the detention and deportation
regime has increased substantially. Hegemonic agents use dehumanizing and criminalizing
discourse in effort to legitimate family separation upon arrival and of immigrant families of
mixed status, the discharging of immigrants in the armed services who were promised
citizenship, and a task force to de-naturalize permanent, naturalized citizens, drawing upon the
gendered and racialized cultural logics at work in this case study
***
Activism and scholarship need not be mutually exclusive. As Canadian anti-racist feminist
Sunera Thobani explained after receiving intense criticism for “a passionate and detailed analysis
of US foreign interventions over the past half century, arguing the ‘horrific violence’ and mass
death caused by US foreign policy were at the root of the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon” (Sudbury and Okazawa-Rey 2009:2),
I place my work within the tradition of radical, politically engaged scholarship. I
have always rejected the politics of academic elitism, which insist that academics
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should remain above the fray of political activism and use only disembodied,
objectified language and a ‘properly’ dispassionate professorial demeanor to
establish our intellectual credentials. My work is grounded in the politics,
practices and languages of the various communities I come from, and the social
justice movements to which I am committed (qtd in Sudbury and Okazawa-Rey
2009:2).
In this tradition, this dissertation demands action. The fabric of hegemony is tightly woven, but it
must be acknowledged and disentangled. There are endless angles from which scholar-activists
can approach this work. My research demonstrates how elucidating and questioning dichotomous
cultural representations can be a method of resistance and change. In other words, my research
offers a replicable theoretical and methodological framework to bring to light the dichotomous
character schemes, apocalyptic story architectures, and extant cultural logics that may also be at
play in other conflicts. This study encourages us to imagine alternatives to the polarized,
discriminatory environment in which we live that currently elude us.

Joy and Robbins (2011:1) argue, “belief systems operate like a violent fog – the system needs
built-in defense mechanisms so rational and humane people participate in irrational and
inhumane practices,” namely, denial, normalization, and cognitive distortions. Denial of the
system and its victims helps to convince audiences that there is a humane way of perpetuating
the oppressive system. Terrorism is named, but the maze of responses that all serve to oppress
and maintain supremacy of some at the expense of the rest remains unnamed. Victims of
American violence are kept out of sight and thereby out of many audience members’ conscious
awareness, abstracting the loss of life. The cultural framework that justifies and glorifies war, as
well as a clear mythology about traits and behaviors of heroes and villains, allow Americans to
know about key events within the narrative without seeing them as problematic.
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Myths about oppressive belief systems justify their continuation. Myths become normalized
when they become institutionalized. Hegemony promotes key ideas of the belief system across
all major social institutions from history textbooks to news coverage to Hollywood movies. The
premises of the myths are embedded in the fabric of society. Cultural environments where
racism, xenophobia, and terrorism fears pervade formal and informal ideology promote cognitive
distortions where hegemonic agents encourage audiences to place individuals in rigid categories
to make complexity more easily digestible and to limit the disorienting effects of cognitive
dissonance when logical inconsistencies and contradictions become apparent.

Deciphering the defense mechanisms highlight the weak points in the system. The “myths
American lives by” (Hughes 2003) include a reverence for justice, a quest for truth, and an
underlying compassion for fellow beings. Any interpretative work that brings to light the ways
the justifications of extreme violence rely on myths and do not actually bring justice to victims
can change how justice is pursued and defined. Killing bin Laden does not align with a generous,
moral, empathetic American self-concept and illuminating this and the dark truths that underpin
the dominant interpretation of events has the capacity to reveal cracks in the stability of
hegemonic ideology.

Attention to the roots and braches of this act of righteous retaliation reveal that the narrative arc
did not begin with 9/11 nor end with bin Laden’s death. It might seem the hegemonic
construction of the threat of terrorism and the system of justifiable direct and structural violence
to address it is too mighty for individual actions to temper, but just as with other oppressive
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belief systems and their defense mechanisms, awareness of continuities and implications is a first
step. In 2005, Richard Jackson (2005:153-154) wrote,
…“the war on terrorism” now stands as the dominant foreign policy approach in
American politics…the power of the discourse is due to its internal construction:
it is a coherent, appealing and reassuring narrative for Americans which restores
the confidence and sense of purpose which was so severely undermined by the
terrorist attacks…Political discourses only rise to prominence in this way when
other social actors – the media, in particular, but also institutions like universities,
churches and foundations – reproduce and amplify the language across the wider
society. This is exactly what happened in the years following September 11, 2001:
the media, together with other important actors, reproduced the official discourse
in a relatively unmediated fashion, while at the same time silencing and
marginalizing alternative narratives. Without such faithful reproduction, it seems
likely that the “war on terrorism” would have remained a marginal foreign policy
discourse largely ignored by the wider public…
I argue this remains true today. Whether Obama renamed his counterterrorism policy
“countering violent extremism” or refused to use the phrase “radical Islamic terrorism,” and
whether the media pays more attention to other stories since the election of Donald Trump as
president of the United States, targeted killings with little regard for civilians or property
continue as the centerpiece of American military operations around the world. White American
hegemonic masculinity’s monopoly over legitimate violence is woven into the fabric of
American hegemony. Its moral superiority is so fundamental to America’s origin stories and the
way Americans understand the global role of the United States, it appears given, natural, and
eternal; often approached uncritically or with the resignation that its entrenchment is too much to
ever be subverted. This dissertation and its focus on Osama bin Laden is a contribution to
literature on how the meanings of the 9/11 attacks were made and how the “war on terror” and its
component parts fit into the longer story of US history. Cultural hegemony is successful when
the world actually appears to be as simple as it is in the dualistic morality of the 9/11
melodrama, not simplified by human hands.
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
Presidential Speeches
• All George W. Bush Speeches:
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_
Bush.pdf
• All Barack Obama Speeches listed individually in reference list
Government Documents
• 9/11 Commission Report, 2004
• Central Intelligence Agency, The President’s Daily Brief, Aug 6, 2001
• National Security Strategy, 2002
• National Security Strategy, 2006
• National Security Strategy, 2010
• National Counterterrorism Strategy, 2011
Newspaper Headlines, May 2, 2011
• Boston Globe: Bin Laden Dead
• Chicago Sun-Times: DEAD (in block letters over his photo)
• Chicago Tribune: US Kills bin Laden
• LA Times: US Kills Bin Laden
• New York Daily News: Rot in Hell!
• New York Post: Got Him! Vengeance at Last – US Nails the Bastard
• New York Times: Bin Laden Killed by US Forces in Pakistan, Obama says, Declaring
Justice Has Been Done
• Newsweek: Mission Accomplished: but are we any safer? (all red illustration of bin
Laden’s face and beard, white turban, white blind fold)
• Philadelphia Daily News: We Got the Bastard!
• San Francisco Examiner: The butcher of 9/11 is dead
• The Economist: Now, kill his dream
• The New Yorker: (a half erased pencil drawing of bin Laden with a flak jacket over his
traditional attire, no title)
• Time Magazine: (A photo of bin Laden with a red x across his face, no title)
• Wall Street Journal: US Forces Kill Bin Laden (subhead: Obama says Sept 11 attacks
avenged in commando assault on Pakistani compound; body of terror mastermind
captured)
• Washington Post: Justice has been done: US forces kill Osama bin Laden
• USA Today: Osama bin Laden is dead, Obama says
• Compendium of smaller newspaper magazine covers and newspapers:
http://www.spd.org/2011/05/dead-osama-bin-laden-magazine.php
Authorized Discourse on the Hunt (Books)
• Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad by Peter Bergen
(2012) – all page numbers are ebook locations in iBooks
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•
•
•
•

•
•

The Finish: The Killing of Osama bin Laden by Mark Bowden (2012) – all page numbers
are ebook locations in iBooks
No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account of the Mission that Killed Osama bin Laden by
“Mark Owen” with Kevin Maurer (2012)
SEAL Target Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden by
Chuck Pfarrer (2011) – all page numbers are ebook locations in iBooks
The Operator: Firing the Shots that Killed Osama bin Laden and My Years as a SEAL
Team Warrior by Robert O’Neill (2017) – all page numbers are ebook locations in
iBooks
The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight by
Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy (2017)
Killing Geronimo: The Hunt for Osama bin Laden by Darren G. Davis & Jerome Maida,
illustrated by Stefano Cardoselli (2012)

Specialized Biographies on bin Laden for Comparison
• Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of a Terrorist by Adam Robinson (2001)
• Osama: The Making of a Terrorist by Jonathan Randal (2005)
• Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America by Yossef Bodansky (1999)
• Bin Laden: A Psychological and Political Profile by Anthony J. Dennis (2002)
• The Osama bin Laden I know by Peter Bergen (2006)
Authorized Discourse on the Hunt (films)
• CIA Confidential: Hunt for bin Laden/Operation Jawbreaker, Dreamaker Productions,
National Geographic Channel, Partisan Pictures (2009)
• Killing Bin Laden, Discovery Channel, Peacock Productions (2011)
• Last Days of Osama bin Laden (aka Finding bin Laden), Storyhouse Productions,
National Geographic Video (2011)
• Manhunt: The Inside Story of the Hunt for Bin Laden, HBO Documentary Films, Motto
Pictures, Passion Pictures, produced in association with Prettybird (2013)
• Osama bin Laden: A Decade to Justice, Worldwide Entertainment, Film Ideas, Inc.
(2011)
• SEAL Team Six: The Raid on Osama bin Laden (aka Code Name Geronimo),
StudioCanal, Voltage Pictures, National Geographic Channel (2012)
• Targeted: Osama bin Laden (Reign of Terror Series), History Channel, Wildeyes
Productions (2004)
• Targeting bin Laden, Nutopia (2011)
• The Hunt for Bin Laden, Smithsonian Channel, Brook Lapping Productions, in
association with ZDF/Arte and NHK (2012)
• Zero Dark Thirty (aka Kill bin Laden), Columbia Pictures (presents), Annapurna
Pictures, First Light Production (2012)
Navy SEAL Films
• 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi (2016)
• Act of Valor (2012)
• American Sniper (2014)
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Captain Phillips (2013)
G.I. Jane (1997)
Lone Survivor (2013)
Navy SEALs (1990)
Renegades (2017)
SEAL Team 8: Behind Enemy Lines (2014)
Seal Team Six: The Raid on Osama Bin Laden (2012)
Zero Dark Thirty (2012)

Navy SEAL Books
• American Sniper (2013) by Chris Kyle – all page numbers are ebook locations in iBooks
• Damn Few (2014) by Rorke Denver
• Extreme Ownership (2015) by Jocko Willink and Leif Babin
• Fearless (2012) by Eric Blehm – all page numbers are ebook locations in iBooks
• The Finishing School: Earning the Navy SEAL Trident (2004) by Dick Couch
• Lions of Kandahar (2014) by Rusty Bradley
• Lone Survivor (2013) by Marcus Luttrell
• Navy SEALs: Their Untold Story (2015) by Dick Couch and William Doyle
• No Hero: The Evolution of a Navy SEAL (2014) by “Mark Owen” and Kevin Maurer
• SEAL of Honor/Heart of a Lion (2011) by Gary Williams
• SEAL Team Six (2011) by Howard Wasdin and Stephen Templin
• The Heart and the Fist: The Education of a Humanitarian, the Making of a Navy SEAL
(2011) by Eric Greitens
• The Only Thing Worth Dying For by Eric Blehm (2011)
• The Red Circle (2014) by Brandon Webb – all page numbers are ebook locations in
iBooks
• Warrior Elite (2003) by Dick Couch – all page numbers are ebook locations in iBooks
• Warrior Soul (2004) by Chuck Pfarrer
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Human Subjects
Pseudonym (if quoted)/Participant Number
Bob
Justin
Bill
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 1
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 2
Evelyn
Joan
Victor
Sarita
Eddie
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 3
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 4
Na’ama
Ben
Adele
Ari
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 5
Samia
Reem
Fatima
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 6
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 7
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 8
Javier
Greg
Retired Captain
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 9
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 10
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 11
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 12
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 13
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 14
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 15
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 16
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 17
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 18
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 19
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 20
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 21
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 22
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 23
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 24
Unquoted Focus Group Participant 25
Adam
Joe
Gino
Mike
Patritzia
Scott
Josephina
Daniel
Jake
Warren
Rama
Unquoted Interview 1
Unquoted Interview 2
Unquoted Interview 5
Unquoted Interview 5
Unquoted Interview 6

71

Age
50s
30s
70s
40s
30s
20s
60s
20s
20s
30s
20s
20s
20s
20s
20s
20s
20s
30s
40s
50s
20s
30s
30s
20s
40s
70s
20s
20s
20s
20s
20s
30s
30s
40s
40s
40s
50s
60s
60s
50s
30s
70s
70s
30s
30s
40s
40s
20s
30s
40s
50s
50s
40s
30s
30s
30s
20s
30s
30s

Race/Ethnicity71

Gender
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Nonbinary

Male
Female

White/Irish-American
White/American
White/Irish-American
White/American
White/American
Black/American
Black/American
Black/Nigerian
Indian-American
Black/Liberian
Lebanese-American
Chinese-American
White/American ex-Hasidic Jew
White/American
White/Irish-American
White/Israeli-American
White/Russian
Moroccan-French
Jordanian-American
Yemeni
Yemeni-American
Palestinian-American
Sudani-American
Puerto Rican
Black/American
White/Irish-American
Dominican-American
Chinese-American
Chinese/Filipino-American
Thai-American
White/Irish-American
White/Irish-American
White/American
White/American
Romanian
Afro-Latino
White/American
White/American
White/Jewish American
White/Jewish-American
White/Jewish-American
White/Italian-American
Mexican-American
White/Italian-Irish American
White/Italian-Irish American
White/Russian-American
White/Irish-American
Latinx/Mexican-American
White/American
White/Italian-American
White/American
Black/American
White/American
Bangladeshi-American
Persian-Canadian
Puerto Rican
White/American
White/Jewish American
White/Irish-American

As participants self-identify.
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Interview or
Focus Group
FG1
FG1
FG1
FGI
FGI
FG2
FG2
FG2
FG2
FG2
FG2
FG2
FG3
FG3
FG3
FG3
FG3
FG4
FG4
FG4
FG4
FG4
FG4
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG5
FG6
FG6
FG6
FG6
FG6
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Unquoted Interview 7

30s

Male

Unquoted Interview 8
Unquoted Interview 9
Total Participants = 62

30s
60s

Male
Male
M = 37
(59%)

20s
19
(30%)
30s
19
(30%)
40s
10
(16%)
50s
6
(9%)

F = 24
(41%)
NB = 1
(1%)

White/German-Christian/Jewish
American
White/Israeli-American
Arab-American
White = 36
(58%)
PoC = 26
(42%)
• Black = 6 (10%)
• Latinx = 7 (11%)
• Arab/Middle
Eastern/South Asian =
10 (16%)
• East Asian = 4 (6%)
•
•
•

•
•
•

60s
4
(6%)
70s
4
(6%)

I
I
I
Total FG Participants
= 43
FG1=5 “ironworkers”
FG2 = 7
“media professionals
of color”
FG3 = 5
“recent college
graduates/graduate
students”
FG4 = 6
“volunteers for ArabAmerican direct
services organization”
FG 5 = 15
“police officers”
FG 6 =
“misc ages/races”
Interviews = 19
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